Juan Mendoza-Collazos, Lund University / Universidad Nacional de Colombia
The study of the relationship between material culture and language has a long tradition, from the studies of cultural evolution to the findings of the cognitive sciences. The recent conclusions of these studies in relation to the universals of language tend towards linguistic diversity and evolutionary linguistics, neglecting the role of universals. This article explores the role of artifacts in the constitution of universal patterns, proposing that within the evident cultural diversity –and language diversity–, it is still valid to consider universals without contradicting the new paradigms of cognitive semiotics. This idea is supported by the thesis of a relational ontology between artifacts and language.
In the field of research on human communication systems, Coseriu (1977) proposes the distinction between universals of language and universals of linguistics. The latter refer to linguistic theory: a body of systematized knowledge useful for studying the diversity of language from the perspective of methodologies and principles. It is the level of linguistics as a science (Coseriu 1977:328) and of linguistic epistemology, establishing general notions and methods of universal application. Instead, language universals refer to “properties of language itself” (ibid.:328). The analogies and structural similarities in phonemes, grammatical categories or types of sentences between different languages are good examples of this. On the other hand, for Evans and Levinson (2009), the universals of language are nothing more than a myth. These authors, with a cognitive approach, question the existence of generally accepted universals such as phrases, lexical categories, structure rules or verbal affixes. To do this, they expose multiple examples of languages showing cases in which said universals are not fulfilled. His alternative proposes the diversity of language as the norm, being the only crucial factor for understanding the nature of language and its role in human cognition (Evans and Levinson 2009:431). Comparing Evans and Levinson’s approach with Coseriu’s proposal, the former omit the distinction between linguistic universals and language universals. It is not clear if it is a deliberate omission or simple ignorance of the Romanian’s work. Instead, it should be noted that universals understood as scientific methodologies, in principle, would not be affected by the criticisms of Evans and Levinson. As Robert Freidin states, ‘It is not possible to disprove the hypotheses of universals only from specific examples’ (Freidin 2009:454). In the following lines I propose a balance between these two approaches, through the proposal of a relational ontology between artifacts and language that, from cognitive semiotics, insists on the possibility of universals both in the artificial world and in the world of ideas.
References
Coseriu, E. (1977) “Linguistic (and other) Universals” in Linguistics at the Crossroads, A. Makkai (ed.), 317-346. Padua: Liviana & Jupiter Press.
Evans, N. y Levinson, S. (2009) “The Myth of Language Universals: Language Diversity and its Importance for Cognitive Science”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (5): 429-448.
Freidin, R. (2009) “A note on methodology in linguistics”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (5): 454-455.