Deep Locational Criticism:

Imaginative Place in Literary Research and Teaching

Jason Finch

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Entries: anti-modern, archaeology, archipelago, architecture, art, atmosphere, background, barrier, biography, border, boundary, bridge, cartography, centre, chora, chronotope, city, cityscape, clearing, colony, compass points, concrete, container, context, cosmopolitanism, country, critical, deixis, depth, displacement, distant reading, district, door, dwelling, earth, ecology, engagement, environment, equiprimordiality, everyday life, experience, extension, flâneur, forest, fourfold, frame of reference, gender, geocriticism, geographical information systems [GIS], geography, globalization, ground, heterotopia, history, home, horizon, house, humanistic, imaginative place, individual, interaction and interdependence, intratexual arrangements, iridescence, junction, land, landscape, limit, (literary) criticism, literary studies, literature, lived body, loc-, local,
locale, location, loco-reference, manywheres, map, metropolis, mimesis, mobility, modernity, motion, mountains, multiple unity, nation, neighbourhood, non-place, non-representational theory, nostalgia, original, particularity, path, periphery, photography, physical experience, place, place and space, placelessness, plain, plane, point, polycentricism, porosity, position, possible worlds, power, practical concept, pre-understanding, problem of place, psychogeography, questionability, realism, reference, region, repeated returns, representation, river, road, room, rootedness, route, ruin, rural, scale, scene, sea, sense, setting, shore, site, sociology, space, spatialism, spirit, stasis, street, suburb, surroundings, synoptic, technology, thing, topo-, topography, topology, toponym, topos, triad, universe, urban, verisimilitude, visual image, wilderness, world, zooming.

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Jason Finch, Hammarbacka/Vasaramäki, Turku/Åbo, August 2015
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Chapter 1. Introduction

A Distinctive Activity

This is not a book about “Theory” let alone a theoretical text. Instead, it introduces a practice and an activity: Deep Locational Criticism. In Deep Locational Criticism, literature and place are approached in a distinctive way, applied in this book to a diverse range of concrete examples. The approach concentrates on the fact that all literary texts are geographically located. The book is aimed at literary scholars and workers in allied fields (e.g. cultural studies, visual studies, social and cultural history, human geography, philosophy of place) all over the world. In the first chapter, the approach is compared to and distinguished from various alternative ways of understanding literary geography.

In Anglophone literary research, an interest in spatiality is not entirely new. The American deconstructionist critic J. Hillis Miller (1995) began in the 1970s to sketch out a complete topographic approach to reading. But more influential on literary researchers in recent years have been accounts of the conceptualization of modern urban space by, for example, Raymond Williams (1989) and David Harvey (2003), the latter influenced by Henri
Lefebvre ([1968]; [1974]). Certain insights from postcolonial studies (Bhabha 1990; Jameson [1990]; Said 1978; Said 1993) have also been widely applied. Franco Moretti ([1997]; 2006; 2013), with his ventures into mapping and his concept of distant reading, has attracted interest but also scepticism. More recently, a whole discipline of literary geography has developed. Here, the work of Marc Brosseau (2008; 2009) and Sheila Hones (2010; 2011) points the way towards a newly sophisticated account of the relationship between narrative and space as seen from the point of view of human geographers. And this is not to mention the numerous earlier accounts of places as settings for literary works, or backgrounds to them.

The fullest guide to previous work on the subject in this book is to be found in its “A-Z Glossary” (below, pp. 456-532). The glossary also contains in individual entries a summary of the terminological discussions which take place in the book’s first two chapters and which are then put into action in case studies in Chapters 3 to 8. In addition to this, the glossary contains reflection on what specific imaginative place conceptions, such as forest, sea and mountain, might be understood to mean within broadly western and more specifically Anglophone contexts. Like everything else in the book, the glossary is to be understood as a step towards future work in Deep Locational Criticism, rather than anything which claims to be complete and final.

Deep Locational Criticism draws on multiple empirical disciplines, thus
placing literature in the world experienced by located human beings. Any researcher has his or her own position, and reference to the researcher’s personal experience is not to be excluded here. Indeed, Deep Locational Criticism sometimes includes accounts of visits to places, self-constructed maps, and discussions of visual images. As will be fully explained in this introduction, the approach defines place very broadly as the totality of human experiences of spatiality. It takes account of both the text-internal and the referential dimensions of place (or, to put the same thing another way, the imaginary and real). And an effort is made to avoid prioritizing some human experiences over others. The largest cities or countries and the most famous writers are not more important than seemingly less major ones. In this respect the impulse is typological: the aim is to map the multiplicity of human place experience using large quantities of literary data. In dealing with this, Deep Locational Criticism is concerned with the human-geographical concept of scale (Smith 2000). It proceeds by zooming in and out, considering multiple means of viewing the human understanding or experience of a particular place or category of place as it changes in time.

As well as being an accessible introductory text, this book aims to do several things that are new. For one thing, it proposes a new way of evaluating literary texts. Novels like George Gissing’s *Workers in the Dawn* ([1880]) and William Plomer’s *The Case Is Altered* (1932; see Finch 2012a, 167-173) may seem second-rate or imperfect in terms of plotting,
characterization and style compared to say Conrad’s *The Secret Agent* ([1907]) and they have certainly received far less critical attention. But they are actually more revealing of the complexity of what is defined here as *imaginative place*—roughly, a place that could be visited as it is conceived of in people’s heads—than are London novels such as Conrad’s undisputed masterpiece.

The imaginative places of all three of these novels are specific zones of London at specific moments in time. Conrad reduces the detail of London into his aesthetic scheme, so that it is pared back to a few sites: a street in Islington where children kick balls; an embassy in Belgravia; a nameless alleyway; and the shabby Soho street where Mr Verloc, the agent of the title, lives behind his shady shop. These sites are important in a reading of the novel because they confer an atmosphere, and also for their part in Conrad’s establishment of a symbolic pattern. For most readers, however, their relationship to the actual city of the 1880s and 1890s seems less important. Reading *The Secret Agent* in an alternative way, however, as a novel of a particular place at a particular time, repositions it as a portrait of the vast, squalid and mysterious city which Conrad encountered twenty years before writing it, upon arriving in London. Foreign visitors to London in the nineteenth century very frequently found its size and physical darkness (smokiness, fogginess, dirt) baffling, and the very visible poverty and prostitution horrifying (e.g. Dostoevsky [1863]). But in the two novels
by Gissing and Plomer, London outdoes, it goes beyond, the power of their authors to manage it. The novels therefore become, largely unwittingly, rich bodies of evidence about the extra-textual place.

This book not only questions accepted criteria of judgment in the evaluation of literary works. It also forms part of a broader scholarly effort to connect literary studies with other disciplines, particularly those which, like literary studies, investigate relations between human beings and their temporal and spatial surroundings. It will help literary scholars to discuss changing understandings of particular places with workers in historical, geographical and archaeological studies. At present, literary scholarship, and in particular that concerned with the writing of the past two centuries, is still not sufficiently engaged in dialogue with these disciplines. If the imaginative dimension in the formation of places is emphasized, places themselves, through analysis, could change.

Deep Locational Criticism could also have impacts on university pedagogy and grassroots cultures of place. Cooper and Gregory (2011, 105) write of their project for a “literary GIS” (geographical information system) that it could provide “an accessible space in which students can further their conceptual and critical understanding”. The approach turns to and integrates many different empirical sources and methodologies in its repeated returns to particular sites. Collaborative programmes studying particular places could be established by communities of people associated with those places,
or by teachers and students working together. The study of imaginative place requires collaborative work of a level not previously envisaged in academic literary studies. As opposed to being handed down from above, academic writing could potentially be created by a community and still be academic. Not just academics and students but also associations that aim to protect and nurture particular places could benefit from Deep Locational techniques.

The approach developed here is inspired by several forerunners other than the voices—Miller, Lefebvre, Said—mentioned at the beginning of this section. One is Walter Benjamin with his *Arcades Project* ([1982]), plotted out and begun in the 1930s but never completed. The 1071 pages divided into 36 chapters or “convolutes” which survive of this enormous unfinished work cover a series of themes grouped around the arcades that were built between Parisian boulevards from the beginning of the nineteenth century onwards, sites that became central to both a life of strolling and the observation of fashion and commerce, and to the image of Paris worldwide as the capital of clothing and sexual liaisons. Each “convolute” has a heading. These can seem straightforwardly descriptive (e.g. “Fashion”) but can also indicate imaginative worlds rather than streets that can be physically walked along. One section has the title “Dream City and Dream House, Dreams of the Future, Anthropological Nihilism, Jung” (Benjamin [1982], 29).
Since its appearance in full, first in German as part of Benjamin’s complete works (1982), then in English (1999), The Arcades Project has in equal measure inspired and baffled readers. In the words of Benjamin’s editor Rolf Tiedemann, the statements made by Benjamin in the book are “neither complete nor coherent” (Tiedemann [1982], 930). The Arcades Project more often attracts homage than engagement. It is a work very close to the messiness of reality which gets repeatedly mistaken for a work of “Theory” in an Anglophone literary studies environment still recovering from the shocks of poststructuralism. Understood as a piece of locational criticism, one of the deepest so far produced, Benjamin’s great collage of quotes and observations could seem, not – to quote Tiedemann again – a frustratingly unfinished “materialist philosophy of the history of the nineteenth century”, but something that is itself city-like in its invitations to wander through and dip in, a thing that is necessarily incomplete, an example of city living as a set of repeated returns, encounters, observations that can never fully encompass or chart what is being experienced. Read this way, The Arcades Project becomes replete, sufficient in itself, and parallels could emerge between it and other sorts of book—a city’s street atlas, the never-ending topographic Survey of London series.

The approach proposed here has other forerunners. For example there is the 1960s and 1970s work on the US inner city carried out by the linguist William Labov (1966; cf. Finch 2011, 38), the geographer David Ley
(1974) and the sociologist Gerald D. Suttles (1968). All three emerge from or at least were influenced by the Chicago School in sociology. Their work, and indeed much of the work produced in sociolinguistics since its inception under Labov (e.g. Becker 2009), keeps close to the textures of topographies as experienced, and the messiness of lived experience emerges here, in a way rarely found in literary research concerned with similar sites. Benjamin, Labov, Suttles and Ley all concern themselves with the modern or postmodern metropolis, but equally useful in this sort of scholarship are examples of architectural, urban and local history produced in twentieth-century Britain (see Finch 2011, 188-89). These involve precisely the sort of single focus on a locality and returns to it from different directions which is proposed here. One of the differences is that such approaches suffer from concealment of the writer or researcher’s position in relation to the site being described. Shirley Corke (1993), for instance, writes an admirable history of Abinger Hammer in Surrey, but thanks to her married surname can keep hidden the fact that she is in fact the local landowner.

Neither Benjamin nor Chicago-School sociology represents the main theoretical underpinning of this book, however. Instead, this is to be found in the topological mode of thinking and living developed from the later writings of Martin Heidegger by Jeff Malpas, which will be described in due course.

Methodologically, Deep Locational critics use techniques originating in
several academic disciplines which share a grounding in empirical study: architectural history and the study of the built environment; local history; cultural geography; industrial-age archaeology. Also a key source is work on different visual cultures, such as documentary photography. A literary text (even Kafka’s *The Trial* or Beckett’s *Endgame*) cannot help referring to actual realities of place, *but also* participates in the construction of imaginative places. Well-known examples of imaginative place abound, for instance, in conceptions of the USA: the Wild West, Hollywood, the Old West, the Deep South, the Ghetto, Wall Street, the Suburbs, for instance. These imaginative place labels come from a project on the post-World-War-Two literature and society of the USA which I undertook with first-year undergraduates in Finland in 2012. Part of my motivation was that, whereas human geographers (e.g. Kneale 2003) have worked to grasp how their traditionally empirical and even positivist discipline can take account of textual constructions of location, literary scholars have so far had less success doing the same in reverse.

In addition to taking account of *both* the pairing of spatial landscapes internal to texts and reference to the non-textual world, the Deep Locational critic has a third methodological habit or practice. This is that of visiting the places people have written about and attempting, as far as time allows, to get a sense of the richness of impressions available, and of the way they have been constructed and discussed. Such personal locational encounters
are available to those who, for example, walk down a particular street on a particular day, or who examine the archaeological record of what was found under that street, or sort different photographic images of that street, texts which have it merely as a setting, or which construct notions of its broader environment.

In Deep Locational Criticism, maps and visual images, including filmic ones, are used to assemble a picture of an imaginative place zone during a particular temporal phase. Literary texts will often be at the centre of the picture, but non-fictional accounts of various sorts, or creative work in other media, could also be there. The aim is always to put an imaginative place at the centre, and then to ask which materials need to be read or examined in order to understand that place. As such, the approach moves beyond the tradition, long established in literary studies, of discussing (for instance) how London is represented in eighteenth century literature, or what version of London is given by Dickens (Ackroyd 1987).

Anyone, potentially, could be a Deep Locational critic. The practice should not be limited to people who are unusually obsessed with mapping, geography or place names. Nor is it – even if men are in folk culture sometimes thought better at directions than women – a masculine rather than a feminine activity. And it is not the same thing as the writerly rambles and reflections of Peter Ackroyd (2000), Iain Sinclair (1997; 2002) or Nick Papadimitriou (2012; 2013). These three writers of postmodern histories and
creative non-fiction have been assigned a label derived from French situationist efforts to defamiliarize everyday life, “psychogeographers” (Coverley 2006; Sheringham 2006), while Papadimitriou calls what he does “deep topography”. Psychogeography provides Deep Locational insights, but a clearer theoretical foundation here is a specifically gender-conscious rethinking of the term place as mobile and ever-shifting by the human geographer Doreen Massey (1994). Everyone on earth locates themselves at every moment of their life, and this self-location can be either self-conscious or completely automated. A Deep Locational critic reads books in an academic setting in a way that, thinking of Heideggerian philosophy, draws together the materials which are ready “to hand” (see Taylor [1993], 326-7), in order to understand our being in the world and navigate our way through it.

**Organization of the Work**

This introductory chapter raises some controversial preliminaries, and then sketches the key principles of Deep Locational Criticism. First, two seemingly opposed accounts of the topic of human locatedness are reviewed. These, proposed by Edward Casey and Michel de Certeau, turn out to share a dichotomized view of space and place which is also the view
found in geographical dictionaries (e.g. Gregory 2000; Castree 2003). Another way of understanding location is that of Heidegger ([1950]; cf. Pöggeler [1963]; Pöggeler [1992]), for whom thinking is an act of questing, of following a path. This perception underlies Jeff Malpas’s philosophy of place, which is based in large part on a reading of the later Heidegger and a reorientation of Heidegger’s thought as a whole around the notion, not of time, but of place, or Greek *topos* (sometimes juxtaposed with *chora*, or space understood as mere extension). The use of this kind of Heideggerian thinking about spatiality as mediated by Malpas makes it necessary for this introductory chapter to address the so-called “problem of place”, in which place is associated with immobility and a view of the world as somewhere that ought to be unchanging. Related to this, and politically problematic, is the Heideggerian view that things have their proper home (*Heimat*), which has been associated with Nazism because of the potential it has to be used in arguments associating blood and soil.

The working principles of Deep Locational Criticism are as follows:

- first, that of moving between the inside and the outside of literary texts, or between their narrative world and their position in an extra-textual setting of human interaction;
- second, that of alertness to the interdependence of human beings as structured by relations between lived human bodies;
- third, that of scale, or zooming between different levels of
magnitude;

- fourth, that of asserting, for heuristic purposes, location itself over other foci for literary study including context, history, politics, gender and narrative;

- fifth, that of opening up binaries into triads.

Of these principles, the first three are the most important. All are practically and straightforwardly applicable in literary and geographical research and teaching.

The vexed question of the distinction between the terms *space* and *place* is largely avoided in the present work. Instead, following a discussion of the concept of *landscape* as one possible alternative, I settle for an all-encompassing, non-evaluative term for the semantic content of all three (*space*, *place* and *landscape*): *location*. Some key terms are also discussed in the section on terminology: *imaginative place* and *experience*.

The principles are translated into a set of methodologies:

- first, there is the application to individual literary works of a *triadic* locational approach, in which *intra-textual arrangements* and *loco-reference* are placed alongside whatever *physical experience* a researcher can gain of somewhere recorded, imagined or reworked in a piece of writing;

- second, there is the act of *zooming* in and out, of altering *scale*, as part of research practice;
- third, there is the inclusion among place experiences of what can be gleaned from study of the best *archaeological, socio-historical and geographical research*;

- fourth, the use of available *technologies* such as online mapping applications, both as an analogy for a process of zooming in and out which links very small to very large human conceptualizations of location, and in the production of Deep Locational studies.

Once this introductory opening chapter has discussed these matters of principle, terminology and methodology, Chapter 2 introduces a few types of case study a Deep Locational critic might undertake, concluding with some thoughts about the classroom usefulness of this approach. Deep Locational readings of individual authors are entirely possible. Chapter 2 considers the examples of two female poets with strong but differing urban associations: Gwendolyn Brooks and Christina Rossetti. Alternatively, the focus can be on a particular imaginative place or on the intra-textual landscape of a single literary work. These two possibilities are illustrated by Chapter 2’s extended discussion of an earlier effort, by J. Hillis Miller, to formulate a topographic criticism, and the same chapter’s account of Dickens’s *Bleak House* ([1853]) as a novel mapped in the head whilst reading. The chapter then moves on to some reflections on the frontier between academic literary studies and creative writing as disciplines, and on how in future this might be somewhat redrawn, and concludes with a
discussion of two possible pedagogic applications.

The book’s subsequent chapters are all in-depth case studies in Deep Locational Criticism. Chapters 3 and 4 both look at the drama of Early Modern England, but from quite different perspectives. Chapter 3 examines the conceptualization of human locatedness in a single, canonized play read as a text (Shakespeare’s *Henry IV, Part Two*), using the model developed by Malpas from Heidegger. Chapter 4 examines a single spot on the surface of the earth as its resonances can be felt across the centuries and in what we can reconstruct of the early audience there of a single play (the Fortune playhouse in London, in which was staged *The Roaring Girl* by Thomas Middleton and Thomas Dekker).

Chapters 5 to 7 are related to each other as a series of experiments in the use of Deep Locational techniques: the notion of deixis taken from linguistic pragmatics (here used to read a single short story, Bernard Malamud’s “The Letter”); the new technologies known as Geographical Information Systems (GIS) (applied to the view of England contained in a single chapter from E.M. Forster’s *Howards End*); the sort of close-up empirical work practiced by urban historians and historical geographers (used to create a new narrative of the imaginative history of London’s East End). Chapter 8, finally, explores the possibilities for a new literary geography which emerge through a Deep Locational analysis of Samuel Beckett’s works. This concerns itself above all with the relationship between seemingly anti-place
and multiply located aspects of Beckett’s writing, and also touches on the relationship between textual and biographical modes of literary research.

Preliminaries

Place versus Space? Casey and Certeau

The philosopher Edward Casey accuses philosophy of neglecting the concept of place and instead focusing on space. Casey’s claim is that philosophers have found the human and experiential dimensions of our located existence too obvious or banal to merit consideration. He writes as follows on the distinction between space and place:

I maintain that “space” is the name for the most encompassing reality that allows for things to be located within it; and it serves in this locatory capacity whether it is conceived as absolute or relative in its own nature. “Place”, on the other hand, is the immediate ambience of my lived body and its history, including the whole sedimented history of cultural and social influences and personal interests that compose my life history. (Casey 2001, 404)

A contrary and influential viewpoint is presented by Michel de Certeau ([1980], 117). Certeau claims that place “excludes the possibility of two things being in the same location”. One person cannot sit in another’s place
at dinner for instance, without substituting for that person, replacing them, that is to say. While place, for Certeau, is “ruled” by what he calls “[t]he law of the ‘proper’” (the place at dinner properly belongs to someone in particular), space is much more mobile:

A space exists when one takes into consideration vectors of direction, velocities, and time variables. Thus space is composed of intersections of mobile elements. It is in a sense actuated by the ensemble of movements deployed within it. Space occurs as the effect produced by the operations that orient it, situate it, temporalize it, and make it function in a polyvalent unity of conflictual programs or contractual proximities. On this view, in relation to place, space is like the word when it is spoken, that is, when it is caught in the ambiguity of an actualization, transformed into a term dependent on many different conventions, situated as the act of a present (or of a time), and modified by the transformations caused by successive contexts. In contradistinction to the place, it has thus none of the univocity or stability of a “proper”. (Certeau [1980], 117)

Certeau’s definition makes space seem more active and more capable of taking account of ambiguities and double meanings than place, which on this view is implicitly conservative, slow-moving and out-of-date. Writers who have a similar viewpoint, including Henri Lefebvre ([1974]) and Raymond Williams (1973), tend to associate place with the rural and the
past, space with the urban modern and postmodern.

Both Casey and Certeau engage in a sort of advocacy, one of place, the other of space. Although they do not mention one another, their arguments seem diametrically opposed, not only in that one prefers one term and the other the other, but in that each takes his preferred term to be equal to the concrete and the lived in opposition to some sense of abstract system. For Casey, thinking back to Aristotle, space (*chora*) is a mere container; for Certeau, recalling Pierre Bourdieu’s notion ([1983]) of *field* (*champ*), space (*espace*) is the site of a dynamic clash between forces on the move. Despite the different positions they adopt on the pairing, Casey and Certeau’s advocacy is likely to lead literary geographers working with either of them to distinguish place writing from space writing. It is likely that such a distinction would associate intimate, deeply individualised writing describing rural experience with place—the poetry of Wordsworth, perhaps—and the dislocated, mobile worlds of twentieth-century modernist and postmodernist fiction with space.

But instead of taking sides in a battle between two theoretical concepts, space and place, a reconciliation could be sought. The objective could be action rather than debate. In part, this is precisely Casey’s goal. He claims that place has been detached from space and cast out. But he also views space and place as “two different orders of reality between which no simple or direct comparisons are possible”. In effect, Casey acts as an advocate for
the concept of place whilst other thinkers, for instance the Marxist geographers David Harvey and Edward W. Soja, are arguing for space. Casey is enlisted in a recent collection to defend Kant’s geography against the attacks of Harvey, for instance (see Elden 2011, 10).

When Casey (1997, 243-84), in Chapter 11 of *The Fate of Place*, extracts space and place from Heidegger, he isolates the two components and thus creates an abstraction. Casey uses Heidegger, Edmund Husserl and other writers from the twentieth century as weapons in his battle on behalf of place and against space. Advocating the concrete over the abstract is worthwhile but not without risks. As with advocating “materiality”, the “everyday” or “the body”, the danger is that a researcher doing this merely creates a new abstracted and preferred term, a mere concept, when what was intended was to talk about the actual messiness of life. This is what Benjamin recognized in planning his *Arcades Project* as an exposition of “extreme concreteness” (Tiedemann [1982], 932).

The “lived body” introduced to this discussion by Casey (2001, 404) has experiences of place but is also always somewhere in the encompassing reality of space with its Cartesian coordinates. Reading novels and poems or watching plays and films can conceal this, because literary and cinematic art so often concentrates on phenomenological experience and not a global or cartographic view of human positionality. At the same time, it is possible for us to conceive of some outer space where no human has ever been, or
some absolute non-place far more radical than the motorways and airport lounges labelled by the French anthropologist Marc Augé ([1992]) as *non-place*. Such possibilities will be discussed in Chapter 8 here, in relation to the radically de-placed worlds of Samuel Beckett’s writing.

Discussing the distinction between the concepts of space (German *Raum*) and place (*Ort*) to be found in Heidegger’s thought, Malpas (2006, 251) argues “that although place and space are distinct, they also have to be seen as standing in a close relation to each other”. Malpas holds, within a general claim that place has not been understood in its full richness and complexity, that place “opens out ‘into’ space” (Malpas 1999, 19-31). Unlike Casey, with his advocacy of place over space, this condensed account of how place and space have been related to one another in Western thought refuses partisanship.

*Contextualism and Meta-Contextualism*

Since the 1990s, Malpas has articulated an entire philosophy of place based on a reading of Heidegger. He writes (2006, 305) that “what seems to remain consistent throughout” Heidegger’s career is the attempt to articulate what might be thought of as ... the “situated”, or better the “placed”, character of being, and of our own being, so much so that we may describe the thinking that is associated with the name “Heidegger” as a thinking that does indeed consist, as
he himself claimed, in an attempt to “say” the place of being as a topology of being.

Topology is here to be understood not in its mathematical sense but as an investigation of place, a study or science of place. The most straightforward way of applying these thoughts to literary study would be to pay attention, as systematically as possible, to the quality of being geographically located somewhere, a quality which all literary texts share.

Malpas, in Heideggerian fashion, follows his own path through Heidegger. As Malpas himself (2006, 305) admits, “the idea of topology as such appears only quite late and rarely in Heidegger’s thinking”, but, he argues, “a topological approach can be seen to underlie much of Heidegger’s work both early and late”. Moreover, a literary topology inspired by Malpas has, while avoiding the rigid binaries of structuralism and some of its offshoots, fuller sense of the overall, of the whole, than much of the context-based scholarship which dominated literary studies between the 1990s and the 2010s.

This kind of work, which could be labelled contextualism, involves founding the meaning of literary texts on varied sorts of surroundings among which they were produced and initially received. This context is most often made up of written texts and other sorts of cultural activity produced in approximately the same time and place as the literary text in question. Within such work, as John Kerrigan (2008, 2) points out in his
important (and thoroughly locational) study of Archipelagic English (cf. Prescott 2009; Brannigan 2014), the “sphere of analysis traditionally reserved for literary artefacts” has widened to include a broad “range of materials from medical treatises to heraldic devices” leaving “all early modern writing open to scrutiny”. Indeed, the early-twenty-first century contextualism in literary studies began with American new historicism (e.g. Greenblatt 1985; Michaels 1987) and the UK’s closely related cultural materialism (e.g. Dollimore and Sinfield 1985; Williams 1989), the objectives of the latter even more explicitly left-political than the former. While in Kerrigan’s work a nuanced politics can still be detected, in the hands of many scholars since the early 2000s contextualism has, less polemically, involved embedding literary texts in the debates of the precise moment in which they were produced, as when George Yeats (2011) uses journalistic discussions of “dirty air” in the 1850s and 1860s to read Dickens’s *Little Dorrit*.

Timothy Clark (2011, 4), writing on literature and the environment, distinguishes the contextual approach, which describes the (pre)conceptions of a certain cultural environment, from *meta-contextual* work. Clark identifies his own somewhat Heideggerian eco-criticism as meta-contextual in that it “may involve perspectives or questions for which given cultural conceptions seem limited”. The present book, in turn, shuttles between the contextual and Clark’s meta-contextual. Such shuttling can be observed in a
literary study which relates particular writings to an imaginative place setting whose construction and modification those writings both describe and participate in. Chapter 7 below, concerned with the idea and the reality of the East End of London, is a case in point. Clark’s Heideggerian criticism aims to reach beyond local contexts. The aim is both to read the depths of specific localities and to unveil connections between them and elsewhere. Contextualism implies that people and phenomena are built up from, emerge from, their surroundings. Contrary to the emphasis in new historicism on contests and acts of resistance, this is in fact not far from the notion that things have their proper place or their natural home.

Fascism and the Problem of Place

A chapter in Malpas’s Heidegger and the Thinking of Place (2012, 137-57) entitled “Geography, Biology, and Politics” concerns what I earlier called the problem of place. Here, Malpas’s conceptual advocacy of place rather than space seems allied with a preference for tradition and stasis over change and mobility, and for the rural over the urban. His ecological or holistic views of place, according to which the reuniting of humans with their environment is an ethical good, seems aligned with conservative and even far-right politics. Clark (2011, 59) recognises that Heidegger’s “rejection of enlightenment ideals of universal rationality in favour of ... a close, would-be ‘authentic’ relationship to one’s local place, traditions and
dialect” can lead to “atavism” and even racism. Clark, however, would not cast out the concept of place, whereas others, including Bruce Robbins (1998), regard place with more scepticism, usually from a standpoint that identifies itself with political radicalism.

Conversely, when place is defended, the results can seem overly nostalgic. As an advocate of place Casey (2001, 406-9) bemoans a world in which place is, as he puts it, “thinned-out” in contrast with former times: become more shallow, our encounters with different sites being more fleeting and transient. Thomas Brockelman (2003, 36), assessing Casey, concludes that in our times to identify yourself as a place person is to raise a standard: “Under the banner of topos, a battle is fought, a battle against the levelling and universalizing tendencies of modern life”. In this view, place is sensuous and concrete. It is aligned with content, the body and the id rather than with form, the mind or soul and the super-ego.

Like Robbins, poststructuralist literary thinkers of the later twentieth century often found the concept of place problematic. J. Hillis Miller’s discussion (1995, 216-54) of Heidegger in Chapter 9 of his Topographies is an important case in point. Miller uses an autobiographical mode, describing how his book came about gradually over several decades rather than being created all at once, and recounting in the process his changing relationship with Heidegger. Over time, Miller came to regard Heidegger as “problematic” to the extent of being “dangerous ground”, a writer who
should be read rather than forgotten, but read “with extreme care and wariness”. The autobiographical mode enters when Miller says that like many American intellectuals of his generation (he was born in 1928) he first read Heidegger in the 1950s under the banner of existentialism “without much regard for the differing political commitments” of “existentialist” philosophers.

An early chapter in Miller’s book, developed from a paper read in the 1970s (Miller 1995, 9-56), lays out a Heideggerian, place-led approach based on notions of rootedness which Miller at first seems to have envisaged as applicable throughout his own work. Miller’s initial advocacy of Heidegger is based on a belief that Heidegger “established what looks like the firmest conceptual foundation for a notion that novels ground themselves on the landscape” (Miller 1995, 10). In a reading of Thomas Hardy’s *The Return of the Native* which follows, Miller takes Heidegger to have advocated a static and traditional-rural notion of *dwelling* in opposition to the ceaseless shifts of the modern, technological world. And it is true that one side of Heidegger is opposed to the tyranny of technology so that it is indeed possible to understand him as anti-modern.

But Miller analyses Heidegger’s texts as though they were “literary artefacts” in the pre-contextualist New Critical sense of those: discrete, walled, complete within themselves (cf. Kerrigan 2008, 3). Miller’s chapter on Heidegger and Hardy actually juxtaposes the German philosopher and
the English novelist: it is not a Heideggerian reading of Hardy of the sort attempted here of Shakespeare’s *Henry IV, Part Two* (below, Chapter 3). Miller then uses Hardy to develop the argument that Heidegger is naively pro-rural, “beguiled by the dream of a harmonious and unified culture, a culture rooted in one particular place” (Miller 1995, 55). The “problem of place” is in essence a belief that employing place as a central concept necessarily involves an idealistic and nostalgic illusion, the sort of trap Miller here declares himself to have avoided. The problem Miller has with Heidegger is how to incorporate biographical knowledge into such an approach, particularly an awareness of Heidegger’s 1930s Nazi activities (which became widely discussed only in the 1970s: see Thomson 2005; Wolin 1993a). Behind the view which emerges in Chapter 9 of *Topographies* that Heidegger is not merely nostalgic but dangerous, then, stands the knowledge that Heidegger is problematic because of his biography. He personally did bad things, the charge is, and this must affect our view of his work.

Yet in his critique of Heidegger, Miller cannot face up to the biographical: he cannot accept that the problem is to do with biography, with the knowable life of an individual. Instead, his doctrine of reading forces Miller, like a New Critical close-reader, to identify crucial points in the text of Heidegger’s “Building Dwelling Thinking” (Heidegger 1971, 145-61)—the most celebrated essay of the later Heidegger among 1970s
cultural geographers, and postmodern architectural theorists—which to him contains evidence of a “slippage”: of something creeping in that should not, he thinks, be allowed to creep in (Miller 1995, 55). In particular, Miller objects to the entry of divinities into the “simple oneness of the four”—or fourfold—given in “Building Dwelling Thinking” (Heidegger 1971, 150; Young 2006) as a model of the existence of mortal human beings. Human existence is said to be on earth, with the sky above mortals, who are also in the presence of “the beckoning messengers of the godhead”. But Miller makes no attempt to meet Heidegger on Heidegger’s ground, to reach out to him, to see what, conditionally or modally, he himself might get from Heidegger, were he to try thinking in a Heideggerian way. He is not prepared to make the effort or, perhaps, it does not occur to him to do so.

From the foregoing it should be clear that the interest of Heidegger for a topographically oriented literary critic has been far from exhausted by Miller. In fact, Miller helped bring literary critical discussion of Heidegger by topographically or locationally oriented critics to a premature end. The pieces could now be picked up. For Heidegger, the act of gathering the multiplicity of items within some site into a meaning or whole has priority over a Cartesian notion of space as mere extension, as something measurable but meaningless. “Building Dwelling Thinking” famously describes how a bridge gathers the two sides of a river into a unity. The Heideggerian locational approach could usefully supplement the view of
space derived from French social thought, in which it is a politically-contested field of “intersections” (Certeau [1980], 117), something produced or constructed by dominant ideologies and involving the violent suppression of others.

Since the later twentieth century, allegiance to place has also been associated with ethnic or soil-based forms of nationalism, of the sort which first emerged in many parts of Europe during the nineteenth century. While the Marxists Benedict Anderson (1983) and Eric Hobsbawm (1990) presented nations as manufactured by elites, and therefore as exemplifying produced space, as seen by Lefebvre (1974), the culturally conservative view of Anthony D. Smith (1987) presented them as really existing, because rooted in people’s long-established attachments to particular territories, languages and customs. Since the 1990s, academics positioned on the political left, particularly those based in geography departments (e.g. Massey 1994; Cresswell 2006) but also social historians such as Raphael Samuel (1994) and contributors to the History Workshop Journal he helped establish, have since the 1990s worked to reclaim place as a grassroots alternative to top-down, elite-driven social change.

Deep Locational Criticism, aligned as it is with these geographers and historians, examines place both above and, more often, below the level of the nation as ideology or imagined community. This contrasts with some of the work in postcolonial studies produced in the wake of Homi Bhabha
(1990), in which an “ill-defined” nation is seen as the only coherent geopolitical actor (Kerrigan 2008, 3). The nation is merely one imaginative place among others, with everything from a street corner to the universe qualifying as an imaginative place (Perec [1974]). In this respect my own earlier work on sub-national place in E.M. Forster (Finch 2011) fits squarely into the project of this present book. In criticism written during the 1980s and 1990s, Forster’s relationship to place was most often linked to grander spatial abstractions at the level of the nation and above, such as East versus West, or to a binary view of English social class. This concealed one of the most distinctive things about Forster: his fairly extreme localism, or affection for, in his own words, “Particular scenes” (quoted in Finch 2011, 2). It also concealed the fact that, as with the novels mentioned earlier by Conrad, Gissing and Plomer, any work of fiction can be read geographically, from the bottom up, as an account of human place experience.

Malpas (2012, 140-41) defends Heidegger and “place-oriented thinking” against Georgio Agamben’s claim that any “holistic or ecological conception” of place has right-wing or racist undertones. Such a claim tends to link Heidegger to the notion of Lebensraum, in which a particular people, understood as related by blood and cultural history, are said to have a historically established right to a particular territory as a place perhaps mystically, inherently and naturally their own. As part of his defence of
Heidegger, Malpas distinguishes his view of place from the fundamentally biological, racially based one held by Jacob von Uexküll (1864-1944), the founder of biosemiotics. For Uexküll, according to Malpas, different races have different (local) worlds; they form the world in different ways. Instead of aligning Heideggerian place thinking with Uexküll, Malpas places it together with the work of the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel and his French counterpart Paul Vidal de la Blache, claiming that in all three the relationship between human culture and environment is seen as one of interdependence and interaction.

Interdependence matters. As Malpas (2012, 149) puts it, in Vidal, “[t]he physical environment is seen as opening a range of possibilities for human interaction rather than determining that interaction”. Heidegger’s place-based or geographical approach, resembling Vidal and also the non-deterministic Ratzel but not the biologicist Uexkull, Malpas argues, is thus inherently anti-Nazi because of its emphasis on local variation as a human universal, an orientation that is markedly tolerant of difference. Nazism may have used local and regional belonging as a key rhetorical tool, but its real engine was central control. It turns out to be a Heidegger problem rather than a place problem: it resides, as the residually New Critical Miller could not apprehend, in the philosopher’s biography.

Place thinking, on Malpas’s argument, serves to heterogenize rather than homogenize our view of human existence: it makes mixing, blending,
variety, oddities and combinations central and ordinary, rather than undesirable and aberrent. Heidegger’s topological thinking thus contains within itself a quality of uncanniness and variousness. What we call a city is also a group of settlements and a gathering of individuals who are both together and at the same time utterly separate from each other. The notion is not identical to that of Anderson’s (1983) imagined community, since it arises more from lived experience than from an analysis of rhetorical constructs. The settlements within a city can be geographical: city districts or the “urban villages” said to characterise a giant city such as London. They can also be communities of different ethnic or linguistic groups, often referred to as minorities, such that the Swedish-speakers of Turku (in Swedish Åbo) in Finland. A whole city is a single imaginative place; it is commonly grasped by both inhabitants and outsiders as one thing. But simultaneously there is a sense in which Åbo and Turku are two different imaginative places, although they centre on the same co-ordinates on the earth’s surface.

Useful at this point is the notion of equiprimordiality (Malpas 2006, 306). Equiprimordiality means that each of the parts of a whole, and the unity they make up, must be given an equally primary importance. In literary terms, such thoughts enable us to grasp the way that texts produced in, and containing reference to, a particular setting both establish their own worlds by using that location as a launch-pad, and also form part of the patchwork
of evidence enabling that site to be understood in depth. The interaction between creation and representation in the treatment of London and neighbourhoods on its fringes to be found in Shakespeare’s *Henry IV, Part Two* and Middleton and Dekker’s *The Roaring Girl* is described in detail below (in Chapters 3 and 4), putting the notion of equiprimordiality into action.

Before moving on from Malpas’s reading of Heidegger, it is worth stressing that this is only one possible approach to Heidegger. To argue that Malpas is right about Heidegger would be to miss the point. My position here draws on Heidegger scholarship. In the words of Charles B. Guignon (2006, 2-3):

Heidegger explicitly rejected epigonism and pedantic scholarship, calling on thinkers to *travel along the paths he traversed instead of pondering his words*. As a result, the finest scholarly work done on his writings tends to reflect widely divergent readings of what he has to offer. (my emphasis)

Additionally, Guignon writes, Heidegger’s “claim that what is most important in any thinker is what remains ‘unsaid’, together with the belief that authentic interpretation always requires doing ‘violence’ to the texts” encourages this “conflict of interpretations” around Heidegger’s own writings. Deep Locational Criticism, this is to say, should be understood as an act—or in fact a potentially limitless series of acts—of travel along a
path indicated by Heidegger and Malpas (among others), rather than an application to literary studies of a Heideggerian approach. As such, the present book can be understood as a rejection of the “schools of literary theory” approach to interpretation which dominated university-level education in departments of English literature between the 1960s and the 2000s.

To recap, Heidegger’s account of spatiality contains a powerful critique of technological modernity. This was attractive to scholars—notably cultural geographers and architectural theorists—who were attempting to recover notions of community and belonging in the aftermath of the World Wars of the twentieth century. But it has also been aligned with the controversy over Heidegger the man and his Nazism. Malpas brings to the table an emphasis on what could be understood as the detotalizing techniques available via Heideggerian thinking, among which I have specially noted the concepts of interdependence, equiprimordiality, and the path. These, as part of an anti-systematic approach to human locatedness, underpin Deep Locational Criticism.

**Working Principles**

*Inside and Outside Texts*
Deep Locational Criticism proceeds via an oscillation between readings (inside texts) and assessments of places (outside texts). In this it differs from most existing efforts to take account of place(s) in literary studies, which continue to be primarily concerned with the explication of canonical texts: which stay, in other words, largely inside a world of texts. The existence of one single canon may be less widely credited than in the 1950s, but canons of different genres, of popular fiction, or of writing by particular minority or ethnic groups, or from just one period, keep emerging and keep driving text-led readings. In his book *Topographies*, Miller (1995) prophetically announced a topographic criticism, but did not produce the finished article, since he stayed almost wholly within canonized texts. The present work’s methodological practice of moving between internal and external views of texts will be further outlined below.

*Interactivity, Interdependence and the Lived Body*

As already indicated, the theoretical basis of this book is the Heideggerian understanding of human existence as founded in interactive and interdependent relations between the individual mortal human being and the environment in which this being exists. Heidegger, unlike a writer such as Lefebvre, who also helps us grasp the dynamic relations between humans and their surroundings, takes a view that is not fundamentally historicist, except in so far as it is founded in a critique of the history of western
philosophy. At the centre of all Lefebvre’s writing, by contrast, is an account of human existence as always inside a certain historical stage, a primordiality of historical positioning Lefebvre takes from Hegel and Marx. Heidegger is closely associated with a particular region of Germany. But his own writings on place seem in fact seem to make less of a demand than Lefebvre’s that a user of them be positioned similarly to their author. In Lefebvre, human history can seem identical to French history.

Malpas and other contemporary Heideggerians such as Julian Young (2002) explore the Heidegger of the late 1930s and afterwards. Casey (2001: 406-7), however, uses *Being and Time* (1927) as his sole source for Heidegger’s view of place. This leads him to represent Heidegger as a forerunner of his own view that our experience of the world is shallower—in his terms, “thinned out”—in today’s phase of globalization exemplified by technology, which appears to reduce the distances between people to nothing. Yet for Malpas *Being and Time* remains fundamentally time-bound. And it is only in Heidegger’s later works, beginning with “The Origin of the Work of Art” and *Contributions to Philosophy* (see Malpas 2006, 213-25), that the core place-based nature of human existence emerges with full force. To be, this is to say, is to be somewhere.

Malpas (e.g. 2006, 305-15) uses the topological, everyday-life and experience-oriented side of Heidegger’s later writings to argue against the view of him as an especially mystical or conservative thinker. The oracular
or literary quality of the later Heidegger, sometimes dismissed or critiqued, is something Malpas defends:

[T]he “poetic” character of Heidegger’s later thinking ... refers us to the way in which Heidegger aims at a certain attentiveness to “surface”, [and] allows us to glimpse another way in which Heidegger’s approach is properly characterized as topological, since “surface” is one sense that might be attached to the notion of topos.

(Malpas 2012, 38)

Malpas pays attention to the shifting colours and varied topography of reality’s surface, rather than to the supposedly deeper truths or underlying binary structures that literary critics and philosophers alike may have been trained to seek. Mapping details could really matter.

Malpas says that place has an inherent character of “questionability” which resides in “the essential iridescence—the indeterminacy and multiplicity—that attaches to” it (Malpas 2012, 17). The term which matters here is multiple unity. To visit a new place, for example a city or country never before travelled to, is to have the experience of perceiving a single place. Seen in one way, this is mere inexperience or shallowness. But seen in another, it is inevitable and universal. We go to Portugal or London or Montpellier, or somewhere much smaller, and cannot possibly see all the buildings and all the streets or all the landscapes or all the plants. Even in a tiny village we do not enter every room in every house. Indeed, we do not
attempt to see everything, but only enough to get a feel for the place, which could then deepen and become more complex if we were to stay there for longer. In Deep Locational terms, the same holds true when discussing a series of writings describing, or set in, one particular city or region or country.

In Malpas’s theory can be detected a sensitivity to the iridescent surface, in which the shifting colours of life itself matter. This represents a true advance beyond earlier philosophical treatments of spatiality and directs the Deep Locational critic towards a reading of texts that is sensitive to similar colours and shifts within what might traditionally have been thought extraneous elements: within the surface detail rather than in the underlying structure preferred by narratologists. Malpas extends the notion of *multiple unity*, or *equiprimordiality*, to the interpretation of Heidegger’s entire career:

The place at issue … which appears in various guises as the “Da” of Dasein, as the clearing, *die Lichtung*, that is the happening of the truth of being, as the gathering of the fourfold … is itself constituted only through the interrelations between the originary and mutually dependent (“equiprimordial”) elements that themselves appear within it. (Malpas 2006, 306)

Malpas is at this point referring to the fact that, throughout Heidegger’s thinking, theoretical wholes exist only through certain combinations of
components.

But this passage could be read equally well in what could be called a more worldly way. That would mean returning to the “problem of place” which at least in Heidegger’s case has been argued here to be a problem of biography. An idea of place is consequent solely upon the sensually rich and emotionally complex realities which are individual place experiences. Heidegger could not have written of places other than those he knew, Malpas concludes, without violating a key point in his thinking: “place only appears, and can only be spoken, in and through specific places” (Malpas 2006, 314, my emphasis). A concept of “place” emerges thanks only to our existence in particular, unique and personally experienced locations. While the sites found in fiction can be considered, in the words of the geographer James Kneale (2003), as “secondary worlds”, we can only comprehend fictional worlds or travellers’ tales through our understanding of what it is to be somewhere. In this sense, whatever appears in a literary text is very much part of our own primary world.

The notion of a place as a multiple unity stands in stark contrast with, for instance, Certeau’s claim that place equals stability because place means every individual thing occupying its “proper” position and not sharing that position with any other thing (Certeau [1980], 117). Malpas’s account of the Heideggerian multiple unity of place recalls the struggle in 1970s human geography – which sometimes named Heidegger as an inspirational figure –
against the view taken on the spatial science wing of geography that, in David Ley’s words, “space is meaningless. The environment has no variety, no richness” (Ley 1974, 10). The aim in Deep Locational Criticism is, as in Ley and like Malpas, to take account of what Ley (1974, 9) calls the “complexity” of environment. Like Walter Benjamin in his *Arcades Project*, but unlike the “resolutely abstract” Heidegger of *Being and Time* (Schatzki 2007, 13), both Ley and the later Heidegger offer a highly concrete, non-abstract view of the universe and of the place of people in it.

One of Malpas’s key points (2006, 310) is that Heidegger is not, as has sometimes been thought, an “essentially ‘backward-looking’” philosopher of non-travelling, rootedly rural life. Heidegger advocates a “homecoming”, Malpas writes, but this is not a journey to any place in particular. It is no more a journey to the countryside, the place of ancestors, than to “the contemporary urban life of cities such as New York, Beijing or Sydney”. Instead,

The “homecoming” of which Heidegger speaks is a return to the nearness of being. That nearness is not a matter of coming into the vicinity of some single, unique place, but rather of coming to recognize the placed character of being as such. *Such a recognition is always articulated in and through the particular places in which we already find ourselves, and no one such place can have any priority here*. Moreover, in this return to place, we are also returned to the
essential questionability of being. Returning to place is a returning to nearness of things, but such returning is a matter of *allowing things to be what they are, in their closeness as well as their distance, in their unity and differentiation*. Returning to place is thus not a returning to a stable and fixed spot on earth, but rather *a freeing up of the essential questionability of beings and being, of thing and place, of self and other*—this is a reason why returning to place, as Hölderlin makes clear, stands in an essential relation to “journeying.” Only insofar as we journey—and such journeying need not always be the journeying of physical distancing—do we come into nearness of the place in which we already are and which we never properly leave. Returning to place is thus not a returning to any one place, but a *returning to the openness and indeterminacy of the world*—a returning, also, to the experience of wonder. (Malpas 2006, 309-10; emphases mine).

Malpas here ascribes to Heidegger a sensitivity to the familiarity yet strangeness, and above all the placed-ness somewhere, of human life. And this sensitivity is what distinguishes Malpas’s reading of Heidegger from other, more systematic philosophical systems. It is precisely an awareness of the difference within places, people and things, precisely what Derrida found so rewarding in Heidegger (Spinosa 2005). We must let things and people be, however different—which in scale terms is to say far from us—they are (or seem), quite regardless of whether or not they are aligned with
our own norms or beliefs. And by doing this, we will come to know them, as far as we ever can. The consequence for literary study, as I have argued in relation to E.M. Forster’s writing of Surrey in southern England (Finch 2011, 193-203), is that we need a radically increased sensitivity to the nuances of local place, and indeed to location at all levels of magnitude.

In a 1968 seminar, Heidegger distinguished the body from the lived body. The limit of the body itself is the skin. The limit of the lived body is the point at which what can be perceived or immediately experienced by the body beyond its own limits—what the eyes can see, what the ears can hear—gives way to what cannot, to the rest of the world (see Malpas 2012, 116). Related insights can be detected in recent research aiming to connect geographic information systems (GIS) with literary study. David Cooper and Ian N. Gregory have plotted the heights of different peaks in the English Lake District against the toponyms mentioned in writings on the area in succeeding generations by Thomas Gray (1716-71) and Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834). They point out that while Gray “sometimes looks up at the high fells”, he usually ignores intermediate summits, unlike Coleridge whose “embodied experiences included those at more than 800 metres”, enabling him to, in his own words, “look down into the wild savage, savage Head of Eskdale” (Cooper and Gregory 2011, 97-8; Coleridge [1802], 26, italics in the original). Thinkers in the social or human sciences such as Nigel Thrift and Donna Haraway have suggested the body as a foundation
for all study, in the manner that “society” once was. But the body can surely be no simple foundation, since it is part of something else, of being-in-the-world, and the latter is primary in terms of all humans’ lifelong experience. Instead, it is precisely the distinction between body and lived body, including the formation of norms and values in the experience of the latter, which is foundational for locational criticism.

Scale, Limits, Technologies

Deep Locational Criticism operates by zooming in and out in the manner of a piece of online mapping software such as Google Maps or a traveller arriving somewhere and leaving: via a scaled viewpoint. The geographer Neil Smith (2000, 724) understands scale as “one or more levels of representation, experience and organization of geographical events and processes”, with its primary or cardinal definition for him seeming to be the cartographic, “the level of abstraction at which a map is constructed”. Scaling can mean the application of limits that are almost arbitrary (cf. Malpas 2012, 73-95), such as what occurs when the decision is made to confine a study, spatially, to a single city, or of a tiny neighbourhood within it, or conversely to look at a continent from afar. It is also possible to examine movements between these levels. How does a given writer look when viewed as a resident of a given city neighbourhood, as opposed to when read in a way that concentrates on his or her gender, “race” or
nationality?

New technologies can explain how acts of scaling or zooming conceive or envisage the world. For instance, a map created by Dustin Cable (2013) and available online shows “one dot per person for the entire United States”, and the dots can be racially colour-coded or not, as the user chooses. The dots stay the same size as the user zooms in and out, meaning that at the largest scale the whole eastern half of the US looks densely populated, unlike the west. At maximum magnification, an American city chosen without knowing which it is (Cable’s map contains no names) looks like an abstract pointillist painting. But checking the colour coding reveals that a purple region near a city centre is made up of a mixed white and Asian population around a large university, whereas the city beyond contains a large segment in one area shading from a more solid to a more lacy pale green. This segment turns out to be a district of the inner-city with a predominantly African American population, and the suburbs beyond it into which some middle-class blacks move when they are sufficiently prosperous, while they are also remaining in the same quadrant of the city. Relating Cable’s map to a map in a conventional atlas reveals that this city is in fact Waco, Texas, in turn revealing other ways of reading it.

A consciousness of scale in literary study enables us to grasp position embedded inside a locality of, say, Gwendolyn Brooks’s writings of black Chicago or Bernard Malamud’s of Jewish New York. Simultaneously,
streets and individual buildings can be understood in the much larger perspectives represented by the whole cities of which these writers’ texts contain fragments, and the broader perspective still of notions like modernity and urbanization in the twentieth-century industrial world. Scaling enables writers positioned far in space and genre from Brooks and Malamud—let us say Borges in Buenos Aires or Bulgakov in Moscow—to be understood in relation to them and one another.

*Topographic not Synoptic*

Synoptic views group places as large-scale wholes. They often concentrate on central visible symbols of a given country or city, as these are used in forming an idea of that place which distinguishes it from others. When we associate Paris with the Eiffel Tower or New York with the Statue of Liberty we are dealing with a synoptic view. Synoptic views are by no means all touristic or marketing-driven. Among them are critiques of ideologically constructed wholes such as Edward Said’s conception ([1978]) of orientalism (the European construction of “The East”) or David Harvey’s account (2003) of the idea of Paris to be gleaned from a reading of Balzac, both of which concentrate on the way that an idea of the city as one thing in particular is manufactured by members of different social groups with specific ends in view. In Deep Locational Criticism, however, the objective is not a synoptic view, whether of a city or of any other site, but a dissecting
survey.

Cultural theories of place could benefit from a grasp of the distinction between topographic and synoptic locational conceptions. Andreas Huyssen draws on the “social imaginary” proposed by Charles Taylor (2004), in order to arrive at an account of the “urban imaginary”, as “the cognitive and somatic image which we carry within us of the places where we live, work, and play” an idea which somewhat resembles the notion of imaginative place offered here (Huyssen 2008, 3). But Huyssen’s “urban imaginary” is hampered by taking a synoptic, rather than topographic view of human place conceptions. On Huyssen’s account, to talk of an urban imaginary is to talk of how “city dwellers imagine their own city” in various ways, quotidian, or involving certain histories, traditions and communities. But imaginative place conceptions are ever-overlapping and individual, and therefore have no “urban” (or “modern”) quality isolated from the human locational experiences that are not urban (or modern). Neither can the urban experiences of an individual be isolated from other, non-urban experiences which that same individual has. Nor does Huyssen talk about how individuals conceive one district or sector of a city in relation to other cities, or to ideas of that city as a whole, notions engaged with for example in discussions of London’s East End. What is missing from Huyssen’s urban imaginary is the truth of geographical variation.

Certeau (1984, 91-2), by contrast, is critical of synoptic views of places,
and of cities in particular. It has long been a desire of human beings to see from above in order, Certeau writes, to reduce the complexity of actual living in among one another. To see somewhere from above is to see it in a way that is comprehensible and allows—or seems to allow—it to be apprehended as a whole, as a single thing. Certeau connects such perspectives from on high with positions of power, and his work is used as a foundation for the notion of visualization proposed by Nicholas Mirzoeff (1999). Mirzoeff envisions a whole new discipline of visual culture coming into being as a critique of practices of visualization such as the battlefield view taken by generals, practices which survey somewhere in order to reduce it to a controlled status and do violence towards it. Recent work by Stuart Elden (2013) on the notion of territory should be mentioned in this context. The topographic view of place taken in Deep Locational Criticism is a view from ground level, a view which does not seek to escape or surmount, but to live within the complexities and micro-distinctions of locations as they are experienced in non-reflective human life.

*Place First*

Miller (1995, 5) writes that the “approach” taken in his book *Topographies*, is made throughout by way of the reading of examples. In each reading I have allowed the text to dictate the paths to be followed in raising or answering one or another set of my topographical questions.
This means that each chapter provides a particular perspective on the presupposed conceptual landscape, a perspective allowed by that text alone.

Miller puts text first. In Deep Locational Criticism, on the other hand, place comes first, ahead of individual writers or texts, as a locus for interpretation. Researchers need to seek many views of the same place, and be suspicious of the privileging of one or another individual view.

In this regard the approach is aligned with the “distant reading” proposed by Moretti (2013), and is a radical departure from traditional literary-critical methods, which almost invariably put individual authors and/or texts at the centre, as is the case with the topographic criticism heralded but not actually practised by Miller. In putting place first, the present book has more in common with work by geographers, sociolinguists, archaeologists and local historians than with existing literary studies, which continue to be founded on the figure of the canonical author, even in interesting materializing and spatializing developments like the “Thing Theory” practised by Bill Brown (2001; 2003) on US naturalism and by Elaine Freedgood (2006) on Dickens and Charlotte Brontë, or in the literary GIS of Cooper and Gregory (2011) on Gray and Coleridge.

Not Two but Three

In a 1980 essay, “Triads and Dyads”, Lefebvre (2003, 50-56) states his
determination to get beyond binary oppositional pairs like subject and object or presence and absence. Such binaries, he says, have dominated western thought since the ancient Greeks. Instead, following Hegel, he favours a “triadic structure”. Lefebvre proposes that triads are “inexhaustible”, whereas dyads tend to degenerate into a “rivalry that is derisory to ... either” side. Here we might think of fascists and anti-fascists, or Islamic radicals and Islamophobes. Any pairing can be opened up by the introduction of a third term. “There is always the Other”, as Lefebvre puts it. Or, to put this another way, if I oppose myself to you, there is always also something that is neither me nor you. It is hard to see much universality or even necessity in the actual triads which Lefebvre then lists, but perhaps this is the whole point. Triads pretend less often to absolute completion than do binaries such as male/female, east/west, good/evil, speech/writing. Some of the triads Lefebvre presents, for example “Centrality Periphery Mediation”, are quite brilliantly insightful for spatial study.

Lefebvre’s most famous triad is the one offered in The Production of Space ([1974], 38-9), involving space as perceived, conceived and lived. But Lefebvre deploys triads throughout his work. For instance he uses a triadic base for his “Rural Sociology”: village community, slave (serf) labour, and capitalism (Lefebvre 2003, 117-18). The triadic aspect of Lefebvre’s thought radically opens up possibilities, rather than closing them down into relations of right and wrong. Despite, or perhaps because of some
of his more revolutionary statements, particularly those produced in the context of 1968 (e.g. Lefebvre [1968], 150), Lefebvre’s triads point more towards pragmatism and flexibility than towards some belief in monumental or enduring ideologies.

**Terminology**

Evaluative definitions of space and place as terms, then, are of limited usefulness, even though locational thinking must start from some reflection on the subcategories of human spatial experience within which, in the western tradition at least, the concepts of space and place have been foundational. One way to move beyond the space/place paradigm would be to adopt an alternative label.

**The Landscape Alternative**

For instance, a group of linguists, psychologists and geographers practise what they call ethno-physiography (Mark *et al.* 2011) have selected *landscape* as the label for what they are studying. The human geographer Denis Cosgrove, meanwhile, defines landscape, not as a scene before the eyes or a stretch of actual land, but as a way of seeing (Cosgrove 1984; Daniels and Cosgrove 1988). While arguing for landscape as “the principal object of geographical science”, Cosgrove (2008, 1) admits that it is a “strongly pictorial” term, raising questions about its applicability to texts.
Interdisciplinary studies of landscape such as that of Stephen Daniels (1993), which draws both on cultural geography and on fields such as literary studies and the history of art, indicate that the term tends to be used for what Lefebvre ([1974], 38-39) would call conceived space (*espace conçu*): plans, overarching visual surveys, all-encompassing views, often commissioned by rulers or owners of one sort or another.

As outlined by Casey (2001, 416), key figures in landscape studies include not only Cosgrove but several others: Relph, who shares with Cosgrove an interest in the anti-modern theorizations of landscape of Ruskin (see Relph 1981; Cosgrove 2008, 121-51); the American anti-modernist theorist of the built environment J.B. Jackson, founder of the journal *Landscape*; the founding father of humanistic geography Yi-Fu Tuan, famed above all for his assertion (1977) that place is space humanized; and the great English local historian W.G. Hoskins. Hoskins wrote a topographical sort of history (Hoskins [1959]; see Finch 2011, 60; Johnson 2007). He believed that actual personal knowledge of place, aided by the investigation of material culture, mattered more than the documentary records left by people in power traditionally favoured as by historians as sources.

But like all those on Casey’s list, Hoskins also seems nostalgic. Faced with a frightening present, he harks back to a supposedly more honest, reliable and fulfilling past. Landscape, more than place, is conceptually
aligned with a certain timidity. At best, it is evaluative in the manner suggested by Jackson’s statement that landscapes should be assessed “not merely” in terms of “how they look, how they conform to an aesthetic ideal”, but also of “how they satisfy elementary needs”. Jackson’s example is that of US soldiers redefining, making use of, industrial towns in Belgium and the Netherlands during Operation Market Garden near the end of World War Two (Jackson 1980, 16). And what stands behind Cosgrove’s view of landscape as a way of seeing is The Country and the City, Raymond Williams’s classic, politically engaged account (1973) of urban and rural space as having socially constructed meaning. Sometimes landscape is given a counterpart, cityscape, by scholars who apply to urban areas a primarily visual concept developed to describe and portray the rural. On the whole, the urban-focused work of Benjamin, Labov and Suttles, so abundantly full of human life, provides more of a model for Deep Locational Criticism than the pessimistic, Ruskinian and openly evaluative work of Relph and Jackson, with their frequent rejection of change as a too destructive process.

True, some fascinating work has been produced under the heading “landscape”, not least within the discipline of landscape archaeology (Johnson 2007). Marc Antrop (2013) valuable sketches the sheer diversity of work produced under the heading ‘landscape’, from applied to theoretical and from political to environmental in orientation, although the main lines
indicated in this section can be detected in his account too. Much potential, also, is contained within the notion of cityscape. For one thing, it could lead to an analysis of the ways of seeing within urbanity which could be profoundly multiple in a way less likely within rural settings (Relph 1976). But in relation to the space versus place problem, landscape is not simply adequate as a replacement or synthesis term.

Two difficulties with landscape as a term stand out. For a start, the notion of landscape cannot help privileging the visual among the bodily senses. An online image search for “cityscape” yields pictures of urban skylines made up of tall modern blocks, an image of the city that is not only markedly visual but also seen from outside the city (recalling countless film and TV images of American cities, for instance the title sequence of Dallas and run-of-the-mill shots of Midtown Manhattan). Cultural studies workers (Bull and Back 2003) have pointed out that a sense of place, of being somewhere in particular rather than anywhere else, includes the other senses, notably that of smell. This is especially the case for memories of places once known in the past. Also, landscapes are looked at, whether in an art gallery or from the back of a rich man’s house, and this indicates a second difficulty with landscape as an overarching conceptual label: it is specifically linked to a particular moment in Western cultural history, on the frontier between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, when rich people began hanging landscape paintings on their walls and flooding villages so as to establish a
prospect from their upper lawns and terraces resembling that of paintings: in a pure sense, picturesque (OED s.v. landscape; Clark [1949]; Johnson 2007, 2-4).

The Case for Location

Instead of in landscape, I believe that the solution to these terminological problems lies in the second, broader definition of place already mentioned, if this were adopted and rechristened. The reason for renaming it is so as to avoid subsuming space under place or, with Thrift (1993, 102-4) – who talks about “Place Space” as one type of space – thus subsuming place under space. All of us are in places and no-one doubts that, in our lived experience at least, they exist. We have already heard Malpas (1999, 2) use location as a neutral term encompassing both place and space. So in the present study, the word location is preferred for this broad understanding of place, or of space as constructed and experienced (thinking of Lefebvre), so as to avoid confusion with the definition of place in which it is intrinsically connected to belonging, tradition, and deep engagement with one special somewhere. It will be remembered that, for some (e.g. Tuan 1977), experiential understandings of space are labelled places, whereas for others (produced) space has precisely the same meaning as ideological or, in my terms, imaginative place (Lefebvre [1974]). It is therefore desirable to avoid both space and place as overarching terms. Location is not, in the present
book, used in the sense it is has for humanistic geographers such as John Agnew (1987), for whom it is measurable, quantifiable space as opposed to imagined and experienced place. Instead, here, it combines the two. But as for Agnew, the kind of location discussed in the following chapters is understood as the answer to the question *where?* with the caveat that the answer to that question can be framed in terms of personal experience and memory, and even of invention, just as much as in terms of coordinates.

One’s engagement with a location can be from afar, as when one leafs through an atlas, or can occur in close-up, as when one visits somewhere previously only known at second hand. It can be deep and long-standing, as when one lives in a single mountain hut for decades, but also shallow or near-instantaneous, as when one takes a weekend break in an unfamiliar city. We are all of us located at every moment of our lives. The present book’s governing metaphor of scale and zooming in and out could be understood through the magnifying glass, through the use of online mapping software, and through the human experience of arriving in a city by plane on a clear day, descending in the plane, passing through arrivals, and then entering that city.

Let us now survey some of the foundations of a locational criticism. This is an approach which oscillates between the place criticism exemplified by, say, Malpas’s earlier work (1999), focused on the uniqueness of individual experience, and the so-to-say spatialism of Moretti and others, which points
towards a large-scale mapping and plotting of many texts in the effort to grasp the complexities of human locational experience. Malpas (2012, 225-235, here 231) argues that while Heidegger and Benjamin (1999) have been dichotomized as rural-nostalgic-fixed-solitary Heidegger versus urban-modernist-moving-sociable Benjamin, the locational positions taken by both these thinkers actually demonstrate “the embeddedness of the thing in the world”.

As philosophers have come to appreciate place, human geographers and other social sciences workers have begun to apprehend the importance of the experiential and individual in people’s embodied relations to their surroundings. Thrift (1999; 2008; see also Cosgrove 2008, 4-5) calls this a turn to “non-representational theory”. Here, as with an “affective turn” taken by gender studies and other fields, people are seen as existing only in relation to the environments they inhabit, but as also able to change these environments. Their lives are inescapably entangled with those of others, but not simplistically determined by surroundings (Anderson and Harrison 2010, 7-9). The job of social research is on this view not to represent deep-lying structures that have been observed through acts of witnessing, but to be sensitive to surface moves of performance and practice, including the multiplicity of the everyday. One example is Ben Anderson’s work (2014) on “affective life”, or the importance of mood and feeling in placed human existence. And the relational emphasis of non-representational theory hints
at affinities with other branches of thought as well: C.G. Jung’s notion ([1928], 188-211) of anima and animus, the idea that gender roles are not opposed but contained in one another; or Roger D. Sell’s account (e.g. 2000; 2011) of literature as an act of interactive, dialogic communication between real individuals.

Particularly in the age of “Theory”, literary scholarship has often found place a category even less appealing than that of character. And there are in fact points of comparison between the two. As Alex Woloch (2006, 297) remarks, the “transformation of the literary character into an implied person outside the ... narrative text” proved deeply troubling for twentieth-century literary theorists. Yet, while it seems a straightforward first-year error to think that a literary character such as Elizabeth Bennet ever had an existence outside the text of Pride and Prejudice except in the head of Jane Austen, the same cannot be said about the Bath described in Northanger Abbey and Persuasion. The city of Bath has an undeniably real and non-literary existence in time and space, yet one is not single: in it, layers of successive pasts are built up, overlaying one another (Lefebvre [1974], 403). Bath in Austen exists in dialogue with the Bath that could be visited in her lifetime and the related but non-identical Bath that exists in the twenty-first century with Austen as part of its identity (cf. Finch 2009).

The link between literary places and real places may be undeniable, but it is nevertheless routinely ignored. The exceptions – works aimed at the non-
academic general reader (Bradbury 1996; Ousby 1990) and works examining literary tourism as a cultural phenomenon (Watson 2006) – prove the same point: for literary scholars, reading the places described in books as in any way the same ones in which the same scholars work or go on holiday seems to be regarded as a crude error. Deep Locational Criticism sets out to challenge this assumption.

*Imaginative Place*

In doing so, its key tool is the notion of *imaginative place*. An imaginative place is a conceptualization of place which combines the actual (what in fact is experienced in some way, whether physical, textual or somehow virtual) and the imagined, the deduced, the posited: what is garnered from tales and assumptions. The imagined must in some way also be experienced: what can you imagine without evidence? Of course, if you have never been to Paris, you can still imagine it thanks to others’ reports, photographs seen online, films, novels and so on. But your encounters with these pieces of evidence are themselves experiences. Moreover, you can make mental leaps from the places you have actually experienced to ones that you have not.

An imaginative place, then, is a combination of the actual or empirically describable and the fictive or fictitious. Imaginative place is the locational idea which is in play when we think of ideas of portions of Britain or the US in the past two centuries: “Hollywood”, “the slums”, “Nob Hill”, “the East
End”, “the Wild West” and so on. All of these are places that both do and do not exist. For one thing, the word “Hollywood” denotes a district of the City of Los Angeles that can be identified on a map and distinguished from areas such as West Hollywood and Beverly Hills, which in administrative terms are both cities in Los Angeles County that are not part of the City of Los Angeles (although Beverly Hills is completely surrounded by the City of Los Angeles). But beyond this geographical exactness, “Hollywood” is also a metonym for the American film industry and its products, and also contains ideas of the lives of stars and those who aspire to become stars, palm trees, and—perhaps more than anything else—those huge letters written on the hills. The imaginative place conception “Hollywood” is supposed to encode glamour, as when it appears in the names of night clubs: Club Hollywood in Tallinn, Estonia; Hollywood’s in Romford, UK. Such perceptions are in no way universal. While very famous, Hollywood will probably have no meaning for billions of people in the world, who will still necessarily carry around other imaginative place landmarks in their heads.

An imaginative place can be a room (varying ideas of the bedroom, the drawing room or the kitchen go here), a neighbourhood (like the Lower East Side of New York City, or NW11 in London) or a whole continent (it includes ideas of Africa or Asia or Europe or subdivisions of these which associate them with stereotyped images of one sort or another—again, partly truthful and partly not. Our knowledge of imaginative place is by its nature
sometimes shallow and includes preliminary guesses. There is no need to follow Relph and Casey and dismiss such experiences or viewpoints as “thin” or insufficiently deep sensings of place. Tourism is worth defending. J.B. Jackson (1980) presents the honest effort to know more which he sees in the Baedeker-equipped cultural tourist of pre-Second World War Europe as a positive model for the researcher into places. Stereotyping, like tourism, has a bad name, but we all of us make partly-informed guesses and then, we would hope, better ones, as gradually we get to know somewhere or some nationality or other group of people. Most of us are also sometimes tourists.

The concept of imaginative place ranges the early or rougher guesses alongside the deeper and subtler forms of knowledge about somewhere which emerge with the progressively more profound engagement achieved through repeated returns to it. The key model or metaphor applied in Deep Locational Criticism is that of scale. Scale includes both zooming in and zooming out, both intimate experiences of location lasting decades or even generations, and hastily-grabbed impressions, without prioritizing the former. Finally, some pieces of writing have an indexical relation to actual places that is much clearer and more single than in others. There is a contrast between so-called realist texts and another sort of text described as modernist or postmodernist or, in another way of describing them, between strongly metonymic and strongly metaphorical texts. A key task of this book is to problematize the dichotomy between these two types of writing, since
they share a content that can be understood as imaginative place.

**Experience**

Malpas claims (1999, 31) that the study of experience, defined by him as “the human response to environment”, demonstrates the need for a philosophy of place. He goes on to argue that place cannot be understood within the pairing subjective-objective but “is integral to the very structure and possibility of experience” (Malpas 1999, 32, discussing Entrikin 1991). The concern he expresses here is not, like that of most geographers interested in “place”, with the subjectivity of place as opposed to the objectivity of space, but rather with “the way in which place can be viewed as a structure within which experience (and action, thought and judgement) is possible”. In the more explicitly Heideggerian terms of Malpas’s more recent work (2012), place grounds experience.

A Deep Locational critic repeatedly returns to the primordial nature of place indicated here as the surroundings of human experience, the site in which humans necessarily experience their being. As Malpas increasingly recognizes in his later work (2006; 2012), the notion of place comes only from the experience of specific actual places. Place and experience are interdependent, and the geographers, whose expertise is the places themselves rather than place (or location) as a category, are thus indispensable. In Deep Locational Criticism philosophers of place and
human geographers alike can find precise analysis of the located experiences recorded in literary texts.

Methodology

A Triad

One of Deep Locational Criticism’s techniques is to bring text-internal readings and attention to extra-textual reference together with a third term (cf. Finch 2011, 64-9). This involves:

1. spatial *arrangements found within texts*, arrangements of a sort which can be *mapped* graphically by sociologists, literary scholars and geographers (Bourdieu [1992], 40-43; Moretti ([1997], 11-140; Dennis 2008, 107, 219);

2. texts’ *reference to the outside world*, described by workers on deixis (e.g. Levinson 2004) as *indexicality*; seen by some students of literary realism (e.g. Lodge 1979; Freedgood 2006) as *metonymic* rather than *metaphoric*;

3. a situated researcher’s *personal experiences of place* (Finch 2011), comparable with *creative non-fiction* including reflections on *biography* and particular places (Holmes [1975]; Perec [1974]; Sinclair [1997]; Papadimitriou 2012; Saunders 2010).
Deep Locational critics will typically bring each of these three factors to bear on a given text, group of texts, or imaginative place.

With honourable exceptions such as the earlier work on Dickens by J. Hillis Miller (1958; 1971), twentieth-century literary criticism viewed localities as irrelevant background details, and even Miller, as already noted, fought shy of a fully topographic approach. But what has hitherto been understood as inert background, or as secondary, extraneous detail, is in fact at the absolute heart of what the literary work is. So-called background needs to be moved into the foreground, as when Charles Taylor ([1993], 325) offers a philosophical discussion of background or context. This he defines as the non-explicit horizon within which – or to vary the image, as the vantage point from out of which – this experience can be understood. To use Michael Polanyi’s language, it is subsidiary to the focal object of awareness; it is what we are “attending from” as we attend to the experience.

We experience through, by means of, something that we are not aware of while experiencing, and this is our lived body, our location, with its ever-shifting horizons.

A statement by Miller (1995, 10) well illustrates the first term in the triad, the locational patterns found within texts.

Every narrative, without exception, even the most apparently abstract and inward, traces out in its course an arrangement of places,
dwellings, and rooms joined by paths and roads. These arrangements could be mapped. They tend in fact to be mapped, at least implicitly, in the mind of the reader as he or she reads the novel.

This is superficially similar but not identical to Moretti’s claim ([1997], 70) that a particular literary space, for example “the Highlands” or “the Home Counties”, “determines, or at least encourages” the content of the literary material that has its setting there. Not identical, because Moretti seems to give the geographical region more agency or more of a protagonist role than Miller does, and seems more concerned with readers’ experience of novels’ story worlds.

Within texts, in fact, places are organised in relation to others in particular ways, unique even within one book by one author as opposed to another work by the same author. Work like Peter Ackroyd’s (e.g. 1987) on London as real place in relation to literature describes Dickens’s London as a single, complete entity: threatening, Gothic, and defined by its disease-ridden slums. But every Dickens novel has a unique internal landscape, and each is a complex intermingling of real-world reference with pure imagination and with narrative requirements (see Westphal [2007]). *Bleak House* ([1853]), for instance, contains several interrelated central districts which could be found on a historical map in Holborn and Westminster, yet no zones on the urban periphery. As will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 2, in the internal spatial landscape of *Bleak House* a line is drawn
that connects London to other parts of England. These, in the novel, which in this respect schematizes real life, are strung out along a road running north of London, a road that is, in part, the historical Great North Road (see Finch 2011, 31).

This particular *intra-textual* arrangement contrasts with that found in Dickens’s *Dombey and Son* ([1848]). There, in key with Moretti’s account of the agency of regions, numerous settings on the periphery of London work to thematize the spread of the city and the suburbanization of formerly rural areas around it. *Barnaby Rudge* ([1841]), meanwhile, introduces further complexities, looking back sixty years into the past, more than thirty years before its author’s birth, and imagining how things were prior to the gigantic housing boom at the end of the Napoleonic Wars covered the fields north of the earlier edge of London with houses, a time when London was still “belted round by fields, green lanes, waste grounds, and lonely roads, dividing it at that time from the suburbs that have joined it since” (Dickens [1841], 16.177). Here, Dickens concentrates on the paths between the city and the not-city, on the connections between the urban and the rural, a locational concentration which has largely been ignored in readings of the novel focusing on its vivid description of the Gordon Riots.

Secondly, Deep Locational Criticism’s methodological triad includes extra-textual reference. *Barnaby Rudge* indicates that intra-textual arrangements – the routes crossing the limits of the city – exist in dialogue
with historical changes such as railway booms and the growth of suburbs. And just as novels by necessity have major and minor characters (Wolloch 2006), so literary texts of all sorts cannot help making reference to the extra-textual world in a way which literary criticism since the dawn of the New Criticism has rarely proved able to appreciate but may now at last be beginning to, in the “geocriticism” proposed by Westphal ([2007], 75-110), who devotes a chapter to precisely this topic.

For understanding literary loco-reference help is provided by the notion of spatial deixis as developed by Stephen C. Levinson (1983; 2004) and discussed from the perspective of literary studies by Roger D. Sell (1998). Frames of spatial reference vary between language cultures (Dokic and Pacherie 2006). In Indo-European languages location is most typically encoded in an egocentric way, with speakers orienting listeners in relation to themselves and an object being indicated. But in certain other natural languages—for example native Australian languages—it is more usual to use a key site in the known world as a centre of orientation (called origo in the terminology). Deixis means linguistic and allied modes of reference outside an utterance, and if a work of literature is accepted as being, among other things, a linguistic utterance, it would seem foolish to ignore its ability to refer (and not only construct). More will be said about Levinson’s investigations into human spatial reference in language and how they could be applied to work on literature later in this book. Chapter 7 is concerned
with Bernard Malamud’s story “The Letter”, set in a mental hospital on Long Island in New York, and discusses the frames of spatial reference to be found there.

As well as via the linguistic-pragmatic concept of deixis, literature’s real-world spatial reference can be understood via the conceptual distinction between metaphor and metonymy. Roman Jakobson’s original formulation of these two as not just rhetorical figures but poles of being ([1956]) was developed by David Lodge (1979) for literary study. Lodge distinguishes the “metaphoric” of the lyric poem from the “metonymic” of the realist novel, establishing them as two contrary poles of literature with various grades of more or less metonymic and metaphoric literature in between. Since the publication of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s *Metaphors We Live By* in 1980, a whole discipline of metaphor studies has grown up (see Steen 2010). As for metonymy, after decades of neglect and even hostility towards the metonymic among literary critics, who variously saw it as naive, impossible and politically suspect (see Belsey 1980), Elaine Freedgood’s “strong metonymic readings” (2006) of Victorian fiction work to reclaim metonymy, and can be aligned with other work (e.g. Beaumont 2007; Jameson 2013) now again taking seriously literature’s capacity to say things about the extra-textual world.

While never straightforwardly mirroring the outside world, literature can, in the old formulation of Auerbach ([1946]), make reference to reality. The
point to remember is that no one individual’s experience of the outside world can ever be complete or final but is always partial and shifting. Here Heidegger’s pupil Hans-Georg Gadamer ([1960]; 1994), with his notion of horizons that exist in relation to individual viewpoints, is a vital reference point, and literature can mediate and inform people about the world with which historians and human geographers concern themselves. Examples of this concern with extra-textual reference are present in every chapter of this book.

Along with intra-textual arrangements and loco-reference, reflection on researchers’ physical experience of the places being examined is part of the Deep Locational approach. Including in written-up research the way that somewhere makes an investigator feel could seem like a locational version of the affective fallacy identified in the mid-twentieth century by the US New Critics W.K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley. They defined the affective fallacy as “a confusion between the poem and its results: (what it is and what it does)”, the understanding being that literary critics exist to interpret the former term in each of these pairings: the poem itself, not “what it does” (Wimsatt 1954, 21). It could seem in a parallel way that what somewhere does to you is to be distinguished from what that location is.

But, to take an example, if any understanding is sought of E.M. Forster’s fictional house Howards End as a place, it matters to the investigation that Rooksnest House in Hertfordshire, where Forster lived as a child, still exists
and can be visited (see Finch 2011, 349-361). Moreover, the fact that one particular researcher into Forster’s work happens to be male and to have been born in the year Forster died, and was then raised in southern England, contributes to that researcher’s perspective on Forster’s writing, as the Gadamerian notion of horizon can remind us. This is not to claim that such an individual would have more to say about Forster than someone female born, say, twenty years later in Arizona. Such a person would in fact bring insights, a position, that the Englishman born in 1970 would not. But any researcher’s position whatever in relation to Forster and the sites of his writing are part of the picture and should not be denied. Researchers sometimes almost pretend to live disembodied lives, but they do not. The inclusion of personal place experiences in a Deep Locational study is a reminder of the provisional and relational nature of human life, as well as being a fertile source of new impressions. Contrasting with the typical position taken by literary scholars, the historical geographer Richard Dennis (2008, xiv) sees accounts of such visits in a scholarly text as relatively unproblematic: for him they are “the geographer’s traditional activity of fieldwork”. Place encounters can be enriched, moreover, not only by personal visits, but also through attention to scholarship and technologies of place.

Among historical and geographical researchers, those for whom landscape is an important term are perhaps most likely to have incorporated
their personal experience. Examples include J.B. Jackson’s accounts (1980) of his peripatetic travels through the US lecturing on the cultural landscape, of his pre-war European cathedral tours, and of the way the US Army redefined the meanings of places in southern Belgium and Holland during the Second World War. Another example is the British historian of localities W.G. Hoskins ([1959]), who views rural England through the eyes of a Devonian—Hoskins himself—descended from a line of Exeter bakers bearing the same first name. This suggests a value in the notion of landscape that was perhaps not apparent in my earlier terminological discussion here.

Deep Locational Criticism’s approach to literary place is tripartite, then, then: intra-textual landscapes, loco-reference and physical experiences all form part of the picture. The places found in works of literature are not entirely imaginary, but neither are they straightforward representations of reality. To some extent they result from the debates, the ideological clashes, of the time in which they were produced, but this too is only part of the mosaic. As I have written elsewhere, “[r]eality transcribed in some way, artistically heightened reality and unreality are all ever-present in literary formulations of place” (Finch 2011, 62; see also Westphal [2007], 90-91, 99-101). But For “place”, now read location.

**Zooming**

Zooming in and out is another characteristic methodological move in Deep
Locational Criticism, the counterpart of which among the principles of the approach is that of *scale*. A discussion of zooming could refer to the “humanistic” geographer Yi-Fu Tuan’s distinction (2001) between hearth and cosmos. Tuan describes this pairing as a shift from micro to macro, and demands that the one be seen in dialogue with the other. In Tuan’s hands this becomes an oscillation between two poles rather than a smoothly steady movement in and out in the manner of—say—a physical entry to, or exit from, somewhere by car or plane, or the movement one experiences when using an online mapping application. Tuan writes:

During Christmas Eve, an American family gathers around the decorated fireplace; a more cozy and satisfying world is hard to imagine. Yet its perfection depends on elements from the cosmos – the ice of the North Pole, a figure of universal goodwill riding out of the firmament on a reindeer sledge, the bizarre entry down the chimney rather than through the door. (Tuan 2001, 322)

For Tuan the two spatial extremes, hearth and cosmos, need one another, but they do not blend into each other. There is no relationship of scale between them. Indeed, Tuan claims that each of the two is “as necessary as body and mind” (321). This is dualism. It contrasts with the shifts into multiplicity made by Heidegger, Lefebvre and other thinkers in the Continental philosophical tradition – Hegel, Husserl and Derrida.

Instead of Tuan’s dualism, an alternative way of understanding the
present book’s process of zooming in and out can be found in the French writer Georges Perec’s *Species of Spaces*. This is a piece of writing which is neither fiction nor academic theory. In the course of eighty pages, Perec moves through sections or chapters whose titles include progressively larger units of imaginative place, from “The Page” to “The Bed” and “The Bedroom”, then, in sequence, to “The Apartment”, “The Apartment Building”, “The Street”, “The Neighbourhood”, “The Town”, “The Countryside”, “The Country”, “Europe”, “The World”, “Space”. The nation is not—as it is whether explicitly or implicitly in much spatialist work—at the centre of the picture, but just one element among many. So “My Country” appears within the section “The Country” (Perec [1974], 74-75).

With its scraps of autobiography and philosophical reflection, *Species of Spaces* resembles a writer’s notebook. It is relaxed in its engagement with different genres of place writing. The setting is palpably somewhere in particular, namely urban France, with life lived in a flat in a block.

The section “The Apartment Building” contains a subsection, “Project for a novel”, which works by removing the façade from a Paris block and then describing the rooms thus unveiled and the activities unfolding in them according to seemingly arbitrary formal patterns such as “a polygraph of the moves made by a chess knight” (adapted, moreover, to a board of ten squares by ten). “Project for a novel” announces and sketches out Perec’s novel *Life: A User’s Manual*, yet the other sub-section of the chapter “The
Apartment Building”, entitled “Things we ought to do systematically from time to time”, consists of practical advice for flat-dwellers about how they might get to know their neighbours and begin to sense more deeply the life in their block: “notice how unfamiliar things may come to seem as a result of taking staircase B instead of staircase A, or of going up to the fifth floor when you live on the second” (Perec [1974], 40, 44). This sub-section is a project for living in place, as opposed to writing about it.

Species of Spaces as a whole, this creative hodge-podge with its index, its poems, lists, schedules, its “other banalities” (Perec [1974], 19), and within it the chapter on “The Apartment Building” as just one example, provides a template that strongly contrasts with Tuan’s binary modelling of local and global. Perec sweeps smoothly through different levels of size in an effort to grasp the totality—which is also multiplicity—of the human experience of place.

Scholarly, Creative and Cartographic Resources

While Malpas’s philosophy of place is a theoretical underpinning, the main methodological inspiration for Deep Locational Criticism comes from work in human geography, archaeology and branches of history: architectural, local, and urban history, together with the allied field of historical geography. This can be illustrated with a few examples relating to the poorest districts of London.
Archaeological research based on excavations carried out in 2002-2003 during the construction of the High Speed Rail link at St Pancras, today on the northern edge of central London, graphically reveals the build-up in bodies at the burying ground of St Pancras Old Church after the 1820s (Emery and Wooldridge 2011). Bio-archaeological analysis of the same site provides a picture of the life expectancy and average height of the people interred there between 1793 and 1854, as well as the condition of their teeth and even the incidence of syphilis among these parishioners of St Pancras (Langthorne et al. 2011). What this reveals is that different points of the past, transient but enduring, are piled up underneath and indeed in the present (the coffins were still there, in heaps). This recalls Lefebvre’s description ([1974], 403) of the spatial networks we occupy as “stratified and tangled”, such that different temporal moments are more intertwined than separable. In the present book, the most in-depth exploration of such layering and stratification is Chapter 4. There, a single point on the surface of the earth (51° 31’ 22” N, 0° 5’ 38” W, in the terms of the World Geodetic System) is examined by using the build-up of textual debris that can be located there.

Work in the empirical scholarly fields mentioned above indicates how a Deep Locational critic might operate in practice. The historical geographer Dennis (2008b; cf. Dennis 2008a on George Gissing, a direct application of geography to literature), for instance, has written about the realities of the
ownership of Spitalfields common lodging-houses, and of the life lived in them, during the era when the “Jack the Ripper” murders mythologized the East End of London for outsiders as a modern urban hell. Alongside Dennis’s sort of work should be mentioned the massive, ongoing project of the Survey of London and the topographic account it takes of an area within a city such as Clerkenwell (Temple 2008a; Temple 2008b) should be mentioned. Deep Locational Criticism originates in literary studies and is always likely to emphasise individual dimensions: circles of people; and artistic and technical decisions about how pieces of writing are shaped in relation to other pieces of writing. But the potential exists for works of literature to be set in place as profoundly as the Whitechapel murders are placed by Dennis.

Nigel Thrift’s non-representational theory, based on the concept of the body, is avowedly “anti-biographical and pre-individual” (Thrift 2008, 7). But our only access to the world is through our individuality, in everyday life all of us work on the assumption that others are creatures somewhat like ourselves. At the same time, the report on the excavations at St Pancras, the view of Clerkenwell made available by the Survey of London volumes, and Dennis’s account of London’s lowest lodging houses in 1888, suggest mental and visual frameworks. Between neighbourhoods as they exist in time, there are boundaries that are both imaginary and real between neighbourhoods as they exist in time, which are created by, and which
construct, the individuals who move through them and inhabit them. This point is apprehended equally well in the disparate approaches of Malpas and Thrift.

In the discipline of geography, the authority and reliability of human consciousness was for long taken for granted, and non-representational theory, seen in that context, is justified in problematizing the individual (see Anderson and Harrison 2010). But since the 1960s literary studies, which has always been filled with dreams, hallucinations and unreliable narrators, has been dominated by the idea that literary meanings are beyond the control of those who put words onto paper. In the present book, the task is rather different. Deep Locational Criticism is founded on a belief that literary studies must rediscover, not move beyond, the actual, the concrete, the empirically observable. In non-representational theory it is not conceived space, or what people think they are doing, that is of interest, but what they actually are doing, and the understanding is that people are all the time embodying “dispositions and habits” without being either the slaves of ideology, or fully aware of the actions, the rituals and patterns, they are enacting. “Put simply”, say Ben Anderson and Paul Harrison (2010b, 7), “all action is interaction”.

The present book, similarly, proposes an interactional model for the human relationship with locational surroundings. This recognizes the status of a writer as a human individual meriting respect (see Sell 2001). But no
writer has total control over the placed existence and unique character of his or her writing. Instead, what needs to be stressed is the interdependence between the person and placed situation, both always in temporal change.

Alongside these scholarly and theoretical resources, and the physical experiences to be had by walking, writing down observations and taking photographs, the practice of Deep Locational Criticism also uses the vast multiplicity of visual images available in books and online (for depictions of London, for instance, see Davies 2009 and Baker 2007-2012). The images found in sources are themselves texts: they are sources in themselves and call for some competence in visual studies. The methodology involves putting images alongside verbal texts and topographic accounts of the sites in question. Technological assistance is provided by the open source mapping application ShareMap, deployed below in Chapters 6 and 7 on the idea of London’s East End and on Forster’s conceptualization of England in one chapter of Howards End. The way one uses an online mapping application such as Google Maps or OpenStreetMap provides an analogy for the cartographic practice of Deep Locational Criticism, which repeatedly zooms between close-ups on minute areas and much larger imaginative places: “east London”, “the East End”, “Docklands”, “London”, “Europe”, “the British Empire”.

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Summing Up

This introductory chapter began by advocating a new locational criticism that would be radically interdisciplinary and concretely located in the world. Even in those early pages, several of the principles, terminological arguments and methodological aspects of the approach introduced here as Deep Locational Criticism were, in part, already anticipated. To recap, the principles of the approach are an oscillation between the narrative insides and the located outsides of literary texts, a focus on interdependence and interactivity, the attempt to establish a poetics of scale, and an approach to literary and non-literary places that is topographic or local rather than synoptic, symbolic or top-down. This involves, a heuristic assertion of locatedness over a text’s other qualities – a place-first approach – and an effort to open up binary oppositions into triads and other structures.

It was then argued that “location” is a term which helpfully covers the broad and complex understanding of place outlined by Malpas in his 1999 book *Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography*. “Location” works well as the central term in this book because it combines the site or position as something identifiable by spatial coordinates with the highly varied nature of human experiences of surroundings. Locational study traces multiple individual *experiences of imaginative place*—the conception that appears in people’s heads when they think of a particular somewhere,
whether they know that place well or not. These experiences are mapped and compared using multiple academic techniques which allow the same location to be viewed at different levels of *scale*: from close-up; from far away. Deep Locational Criticism could thus be labelled a poetics of scale. It operates in ways consciously modelled on research in cultural and historical geography and post-medieval archaeology, and views the human being as interdependently both a thinking agent and a component in a larger system whose extent is usually inaccessible to the individual in the moment of action.
This chapter begins with two experiments which show how Deep Locational Criticism can be practically used in literary research into particular authors, texts and represented places. More exactly, it begins the book’s demonstration of how repeated returns to particular writers and places function within the approach. The first experiment tests how two poets, Gwendolyn Brooks and Christina Rossetti, might change if read, not in terms of gender or “racial” identity, but according to the city locations of their lives and poems in Chicago and London. The second experiment focuses on a single novel, Charles Dickens’s *Bleak House* ([1853]), and a reading of it which develops from J. Hillis Miller’s efforts to map phenomenological literary topographies.

The chapter’s third and final section examines how two specific imaginative places, both decayed districts of an Anglophone inner city in the later twentieth century, could be used in Deep Locational classroom practice. Beginning researchers – or students in the classroom – are sometimes at a considerable distance, whether temporal, spatial or cultural, from the imaginative places they are to investigate. The difficulty in studying a cultural item seems greater and greater the further away that item
is positioned temporally and spatially from a student, a phenomenon investigated by workers in intercultural communication (Finch and Nynäsvi 2011). One of the main principles of this book is interactivity, and Deep Locational critics must try to understand the components from which particular interactive moves are made. This in turn involves an assessment of relative difference, of how far one thing is from another, or the extent of their overlap. An orthodox answer to the problem of relative cultural distance (by which I mean magnitude of apartness rather than otherness in the sense of unknowability) would be to say that students need more historical context of the sort provided by scholarly editions of, and companions to, the works of longer-dead or farther-away writers. But in what follows here, a much more practical, project-based approach is adopted, in pursuit of learner autonomy.

Locating Two Poets

_Gwendolyn Brooks in “Bronzeville” and Chicago_

How should we locate Gwendolyn Brooks, the (African-)American poet (1917-2000)? In Chicago? In the Mid-West? In the part of the US that during the Jim Crow era was unsegregated? In the USA? As a woman? As black? As African-American? As an African-American woman? As, in the
words of a 1962 assessment written by a (white, male) university professor, not “compared to other Negro poets or other women poets, but to the best of modern poets” (Webster [1962])? Perhaps she can be located using the sweep between these and other levels suggested by Perec’s “Species of Spaces”. Discussing Brooks as a single author, a human being, within the framework provided in Deep Locational Criticism means talking in the terms of Heidegger, Thrift and Malpas about interaction and interdependence.

In urban Chicago, Brooks had a better education than most African-Americans of earlier generations were able to get, graduating from Englewood High where white and black students studied side by side, and where she received positive encouragement from teachers (Kent 1990, 25). More importantly, she taught herself to be a poet in a supportive home environment. Her writing, however, presents a dichotomy. On one side is the demure, conservatively-dressed figure of the female librarian or schoolteacher, the respectable educated black or African American—coloured or Negro, in the terms of that era—woman of the 1940s. On the other is the idea of the bad girl, the woman of the streets. The dichotomy is clearly expressed in her poem “a song in the front yard”.

I’ve stayed in the front yard all my life.

I want a peek at the back.

Where it’s rough and untended and hungry weed grows.
A girl gets sick of a rose.

... 

My mother sneers, but I say it’s fine
How they don’t have to go in at quarter to nine.

...

But I say it’s fine. Honest, I do. And I’d like to be a bad woman too,
And wear the brave stockings of night-black lace
And strut down the streets with paint on my face.

(Brooks 1963, 6)

The poem appeared in Brooks’s first and best-known collection, published in 1945. The title of this volume was explicitly place-referential: *A Street in Bronzeville*. In the 1940s, “Bronzeville” was often said to be the area of Chicago equivalent to Harlem in New York: the city’s centre of African-American culture (Manning 2005). The South Side of Chicago today remains, alongside Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant in New York City, one of the capitals of black culture in the whole US. Skin-colour identifiers, or levels of blackness, are frequently alluded to in Brooks’s poems, as in phrases like “chocolate Mabbie” and “this old yellow pair”, the “bean eaters”, an impoverished couple who would be labelled black by whites but among blacks seem light-skinned (Brooks 1963, 7, 72; on the labelling see e.g. Michaels 2006).

The name “Bronzeville” was adopted by the media in the 1930s as a
positive alternative to the terms used up until then in white-owned newspapers for the part of Chicago’s South Side where the black population was concentrated, the ghetto in other words: “the Black Belt” or even “Darkie Town” (Travis 2005). As a toponym, Bronzeville seems to have originated as an act of polite renaming driven by notions of positivity, a more complimentary, elegant or elevated way of saying “Darkie Town” while retaining the colour epithet. It has points in common with the use of “coloured” in the same period for the people nowadays labelled African Americans. In the twenty-first century “Bronzeville” still seems to denote a definable geographical portion of the official community area of Douglas, on the South Side. But the custom of naming a “Mayor of Bronzeville”, beginning in the 1930s, indicates the extent to which it was a label attached in a more general way to the huge area of the South Side which then had a majority African American population (and which, in the 2010s, still does). Seen thus, “Bronzeville” is not a place but a way of identifying a group of people. When young, Brooks herself, meanwhile, suffered “intraracial color prejudice” at the hands of other blacks, her school-mates for instance, being relatively dark-skinned (Kent 1990, 6, 20).

Brooks’s spatio-temporal situation when a young adult matters. It was that of a black woman in supposedly unsegregated Chicago in the era straight after the Great Depression. For grasping this imaginative location, context is supplied by Saul Bellow’s story “Looking for Mr Green”. This
story, clearly written from the point of view of a white male, presumably a second-generation immigrant with a Jewish background, is profoundly evocative of Depression-era inner-city Chicago:

Grebe took in the building in the wind and gloom of the late November day—trampled, frost-hardened lots on one side; on the other, an automobile junk yard and then the infinite work of Elevated frames, weak-looking, gaping with rubbish fires; two sets of leaning brick porches three stories high and a flight of cement stairs to the cellar. (Bellow [1951], 176)

Grebe, a young, college-educated white man who has taken the job of delivering welfare cheques because he was himself unemployed, patrols the black ghetto, viewing it with the eyes of an outsider, through which the narrative is focalized. He calls the area “the Negro district” (Bellow [1951], 174), a more polite locator than “Darkie Town”, but not an act of rechristening like “Bronzeville”. Grebe looks through collapsing houses for the elusive charity recipient of the story’s title, his surname a colour word (“Green”), who is undoubtedly—although this is never actually stated—black. The story is a meditation on the nature of human identity within and beyond a world that is hierarchically stratified by notions of colour: Grebe never actually finds Mr Green.

In the post-war decades, Brooks’s spatio-temporal positioning and self-presentation altered. Following A Street in Bronzeville in time, the impact of
the Civil Rights Movement, Black Power, integrated education, white flight, and the crisis of the black inner city can all be read in her later poems. How might it be possible to talk about Brooks in a way that is locational and not identity-based? Walter Benn Michaels, himself based in Chicago, points the way here. Race is a fiction but also a fact, he writes (Michaels 2006). So is it possible or desirable to detach place from race and gender? If Brooks talks about a “Bronzeville Woman in a Red Hat” (Brooks 1963, 103-6), after all, she is denoting, not connoting, a black woman, and partly by means of the locational marker.

But Brooks was also capable of writing a poem like “A Man of the Middle Class” (Brooks 1963, 96-8). This poem presents the interiority of someone who, not locationally, but in terms of US identity, is Brooks’s opposite: a white male. This man follows orders and makes money yet is himself beaten down (“I am bedraggled, with sundry dusts to be shed”, “my grudge-/Choked industry or usual alcohol”. In his suburban house are “Rugs. Ivories. / Bronzes”, “Blackamoors”: imported or antique-shop trophies. But the implicitly white corporate male does not make the link between these items and the black people who in cities like Chicago labour in positions inferior to his (the city whose suburbs he lives in is not named). Brooks presents the man in a way that is not directly critical. The man is not made to say anything directly about black people, and among women mentions only his wife, who is said to “Give teas for poets, wear odiferous
furs”. There are no toponyms in “A Man of the Middle Class” and nothing to prove that we are not in the outer and more spacious suburbs or dormitory towns of New York, New Orleans, St Louis, Los Angeles or any other US city. But thanks to Brooks’s established locational (not racial or gendered) identity as a Chicagoan, we feel that we are probably in her territory, west of Lake Michigan.

Writers like Brooks and her near contemporary the novelist and essayist James Baldwin were praised by Harvey Curtis Webster of the University of Louisville—he of the blurb comment about “the best of modern poets” in the Nation—for their “ability to see through the temporal”. Yet viewed from the following century, they can seem very much of a particular time. One way of seeing writers like Brooks and Baldwin, indeed, would be to think that the positions they took on identity in the 1940s and 1950s were superseded by the outcome of the Civil Rights movement. By the late 1960s, much more militant black voices were coming to the fore. The accent in black culture now fell, not on the imitation of a white culture in which poets and novelists you could ask to tea were the attraction, but on the development of separatist notions of culture in which phenomena like popular music and different sorts of performance and rhetoric came to the fore. Brooks’s own career reflects this, with later works such as Riot (1970) examining the urban unrest of the 1960s in a way that a critic such as Harold Bloom (2000, vii; cf. Hansell [1974]) finds hard to process. Locational
criticism can, among other things, be seen as a branch of the “mediating criticism” proposed by Roger D. Sell (2001). In the case of US urban culture since the Great Depression, it could mediate between today’s world, post-Civil Rights and perhaps, if Michaels is to be believed, on the way to being post-race, and the era of Brooks and Baldwin.

The main works published on Brooks (e.g. Kent 1990; Melhem 1987; Mootry and Smith 1987) are decades old by now. Yet her poetic power to, in the words of Langston Hughes, deliver “the sparsest expression of the deepest meaning” (cited by Bloom 2000, vii) is one reason why her writing works very well in pedagogic contexts far removed from that of twentieth-century race (and indeed gender) relations in the US. A fuller reassessment—non-historical and non-engaged: locational, I would argue—is called for. It would focus on Chicago and the invention of “Bronzeville”.

**Christina Rossetti in London**

Much of the Victorian lyric poetry of Christina Rossetti has an internal and mythic focus and as such could be contrasted not only with the work of novelists such as Charles Dickens and George Eliot, continually describing external details and abounding in toponyms, but also other female poets from both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who seem locational and oriented towards the outside world. Elizabeth Barrett Browning (1806-61) and Elizabeth Bishop (1911-79) would seem to fit into the latter category,
and so would a poet positioned as clearly in a particular nationality, gender and ethnic group such as Brooks. Rossetti and Levertov could be classed alongside Kafka and Beckett as seemingly placeless or anti-place writers, in contrast with Dickens, Hardy, Wordsworth and Brooks. Other writers, for instance Rossetti’s brother Dante Gabriel, seem to work with a notion of place that is deliberately fantastic or displaced from the places that we know and identify by certain names in our everyday lives. Thus a typology of writers can be developed according to their relations with place or location. Such a classification could also question accepted boundaries of periodization, which remain central to both spatialist and contextualist approaches.

An earlier trend in readings of Christina Rossetti, indeed, was to see her as unworldly, as the isolated, spiritual woman poet living in retreat, in opposition to male and obviously worldly prose-writing contemporaries: Dickens, Mayhew. In later years, a biographer writes, she was “a gloomy, bigoted religionist and recluse” (Marsh 1994, 500). But things are more complicated, as indicated by deeper biographical investigation. Under the heading “LIFE” in the index to Jan Marsh’s Christina Rossetti: A Literary Biography (1994, 624-25) are to be found, alongside more personal or internal subheadings such as “illness”, “nervous breakdown” and “religious belief of” others which make her seem more outwardly focused: “anti-vivisection activity”, “as campaigner against child prostitution” and
“voluntary work at Highgate Penitentiary”. Contrasting with Marsh’s description, these contribute to a picture of a more engaged, outgoing Rossetti. The fact is that Rossetti spent almost all of her life in central London. Yet her writing has—until recent cultural-studies research (Norcia 2012)—not usually been read as part of the city.

In the twentieth century the chief means of putting Rossetti into the world was that of feminism. Virginia Woolf ([1932], 239) suggested that by adulthood “something dark and hard, like a kernel” had “formed in the centre of Christina Rossetti’s being”. She was trapped, Woolf implied; there was something wrong with her that had to do with her being an unliberated, religious, Victorian woman. In Woolf herself, an anti-Victorian stance coexisted with a fascinated interest in the era of her own father, the great Victorian freethinker and biographer Sir Leslie Stephen. And her negative remarks about Rossetti sit alongside the eulogizing address to the poet with which she ends the essay, titled “‘I am Christina Rossetti’”: “O Christina Rossetti ... yours was a complex song ... your eye, indeed, observed with a sensual pre-Raphaelite intensity that must have surprised Christina the Anglo-Catholic .... You pulled legs, you tweaked noses”, she writes there. This is an act of personal address which after the frown at the “dark and hard … kernel”, perhaps to be associated with religion, aligns Rossetti with Woolf herself as a woman and an artist.

Woolf claims that “[o]ur remote posterity will be singing” two poems by
Rossetti when the Victorian age is forgotten, when “the Albert Memorial is dust and tinsel”. The two poems are lyrics from the 1862 collection *Goblin Market and Other Poems*. Woolf ([1932], 244) identifies them by their memorable first lines, “When I am dead, my dearest” and “My heart is like a singing bird”. Of these the latter, called properly “A Birthday” (Rossetti 2001, 30-31), is filled with nature and art in a way that has a distinctly medievalist air:

> Raise me a dais of silk and down;  
> Hang it with vair and purple dyes;  
> Carve it in doves and pomegranates,  
> And peacocks with a hundred eyes;  
> Work it in gold and silver grapes,  
> In leaves and silver fleurs-de-lys.

The “singing bird”, “watered shoot”, “apple tree”, “thickset fruit”, “rainbow shell” and “halcyon sea” could be in all, or none, of several places and non-places: England, present and past; a storybook world; an Italy remembered by elders and read about; an imagined Holy Land as depicted by painters. There is no obvious or simple placing of them.

Woolf’s reading is feminist in that she aligns herself with Rossetti on account of their shared gender and practice of literary art. Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar (1979, 564-75), making more explicitly feminist readings intended to guide students through the writing produced by women in the
nineteenth century, shift the focus away from the short lyrics to “Goblin Market”. They read this strange 550-line ballad-like narrative poem in terms of its “multiple heroines”, “representing”, they claim, “alternative possibilities of selfhood for women” (Gilbert and Gubar 2000, 564).

But to read Rossetti as either a religious believer positioned in a one-to-one relationship with God or as primarily defined by her gender, in the influential manner of Gilbert and Gubar, who partly follow Woolf, is to miss another side of her which also emerges from a reading of her biography. Apart from a few brief holidays, she spent her entire life in London and is said by the diarist William Sharp to have called herself “as confirmed a Londoner as was Charles Lamb”. Speaking against another middle-class lady who had spoken feelingly for taking London slum children into the countryside, she said “I really doubt if it would be good for me ... to sojourn long or often in the country, and you must remember there are more Lambs than Wordsworths among us townfolk, and that as we are bred so we live” (in Marsh 1994, 499; cf. Marsh 1999, 143; emphasis mine).

In an earlier generation of criticism, that of the New Critical focus on the text in itself, this information would probably have been dismissed as mere gossip. Even today, with contextualism more welcome, Sharp’s account remains a dubious basis for the actual textual interpretation of Rossetti’s poems. Yet the Deep Locational critic is able to say that London, and a life embedded totally within it, spatially bounded there, stands behind, or in
Heidegger’s terms as he is read by Malpas (e.g. 2012, 74-79; cf. Miller 1995, 10; Taylor [1993], 325) grounds Rossetti’s writing. This—not Italy, but the position of the second-generation immigrant in London—is where her writing starts from, and this is the home it comes back to. Asked at the same tea-party described by Sharp whether she was inspired by nature, Rossetti replied that her knowledge of the natural world was like that “of a town sparrow or, at most that of a pigeon which makes an excursion occasionally from its home in Regents Park or Kensington Gardens” (Marsh 1994, 500). Rossetti perceived the world of nature not only as a cultured Londoner with Pre-Raphaelite connections, but more specifically saw it through eyes which had been trained in London galleries and museums. In view of this, the analogy she draws between herself and a “town-sparrow” or “pigeon” is curious: Rossetti’s engagement with nature was far more self-conscious than that of any bird, whether of town or country, and she knew it. Nor, within London, was she the slum child, the impoverished cockney Londoner popularly associated with the city’s sparrows, even though she often came into contact with such people. But still she firmly aligned herself with her city environment.

To return to “Goblin Market”, the place setting there (Rossetti 2001, 5-20) is what today we would call a fantasy world. This is somewhere that makes us feel we are not in an Anglo-Catholic environment but in the “sensuous pre-Raphaelite” world in which Woolf situates Rossetti. The
world of Rossetti’s brother Dante Gabriel’s painting and poetry is not very far—but still some way—off. But we can do much better than getting stuck on the body-soul dualism indicated by Woolf. After all, the dangerous fruit of “Goblin Market” channel, filtered through Milton and through Rossetti’s Anglicanism, the tradition of imaginative place associated with the Biblical Garden of Eden (Brandt 2006).

What about the more isolated and reclusive-seeming among what Rossetti calls her songs? A recluse, needless to say, is positioned somewhere, and so is a mental patient or bedridden invalid. Reading works by Beckett (Endgame and Murphy: see Chapter 8 below) and Perec (“Species of Spaces”) confirms this. The other song of Rossetti’s highly praised by Woolf begins “When I am dead, my dearest”. Woolf commended Rossetti for her rigorous artistic sensibility: “you were drastic, sure of your gift, convinced of your wisdom. A firm hand pruned your lines; a sharp ear tested their music. Nothing soft, otiose, irrelevant cumbered your pages” (Woolf [1932]). In this poem, like Beckett in his post-war writing, Rossetti seems to have excised, edited out, what she was happy to name in the conversation reported by Sharp, the local London toponyms: “Regents Park”, “Kensington Gardens”, “Bloomsbury”, “Whitechapel” (Marsh 1994: 500). What is left is not a (“pre-Raphaelite”) fantasy world or a symbolic-religious (“Anglo-Catholic”) one, but something sparer, made more to aspire towards universality: the “roses”, “steady cypress tree” and “green
grass” of a graveyard; the rain and the song of a nightingale which come and go hither and thither as time passes and the speaker speaks from beyond the grave.

The aspiration to universality remains an aspiration and not an achievement, and for at least two reasons. One, the place-world of Rossetti’s poems is identifiably derived from a particular tradition within human culture, Christian and western European. Two, the English language was the tool used by this child of an immigrant. According to Sharp, she spoke it in an unusually precise and distinct manner. This is not to suggest that she writes a non-standard English. Far from it; but her immigrant identity and physical placement in London stands somewhere hidden behind her writing.

Particularity rather than universality is needed in a study of Rossetti for both textual and biographical reasons, this is to say. If Rossetti is to be understood as a Londoner, but also as a second-generation immigrant, insights from postcolonial studies become relevant to readings of her texts. Fredric Jameson ([1990]) argues that the hidden periphery defines the supposed imperial centre. Until now, in other words, it has been hard to detect traces of Rossetti’s located existence in her writing, because her writing is so full of the western tradition and delocated European landscapes. Biographically, as the conversation recorded by Sharp allows us to see, Rossetti spoke from—she occupied—London. She spent the last decades of her life living reclusively inside 30 Torrington Square. And she
was place-grounded by London, the kind of grounding that Malpas (2012, 73-95) shows to be typically human. Assuming Sharp was not grossly mistaken, his memory of her indicates that Rossetti felt with Londoners, and as a Londoner. She saw no need to free slum-dwelling London children from London itself. It was only from localized woes such as child-prostitution that they needed to be saved. “Rossetti the Londoner”, therefore, deserves working a fuller Deep Locational study, a rereading of her whole career.

In Deep Locational Criticism a single author such as Gwendolyn Brooks, quite clearly associated with a single place (Chicago) and identity (female, African American) can be fruitfully put alongside a writer from another era such as Christina Rossetti, whose locational identity as a Londoner and second-generation immigrant was concealed by her writing and has hence tended to be ignored in the writing of others about her. The two both appear in a way that is more nuanced than when their identity as women is given an exaggerated importance. The placed existence of both calls for more attention.

The Intratextual Landscape of a Single Work of Literature: *Bleak House*
J. Hillis Miller starts a chapter of his book *Topographies* called “Sam Weller’s Valentine”, with an assertion that is keen-eyed but inaccurate:

On the thirteenth of February 1831, the day before the great trial of Bardell v. Pickwick, Sam Weller strolls through “a variety of bye streets and courts” … in East London. He makes his leisurely way from the George and Vulture Hotel, George Yard, Lombard Street, towards the Blue Boar in Leadenhall Market to meet his father. (Miller 1995, 105)

Miller highlights what Dickens expected from his (initial) readers: that they will share something that Miller and his students and colleagues in US academia will tend not to have. They will have “detailed foreknowledge not only of London’s streets and buildings but also of southern England’s roads, towns and cities”. Readers, Miller points out, are supposed to know “what sort of place the Blue Boar in Leadenhall Market is, and how it is different from the George and Vulture in Lombard Street”, and if they do not, “an important dimension of sociological and personal meaning in this chapter will be lost” on them (Miller 1995, 105). So far, so good.

But in the chapter “Sam Weller’s Valentine” as a whole, Miller then swerves away from such matters. For his statement about the importance of topographic knowledge makes no attempt to explain why *Pickwick Papers*, like so much of Dickens’s writing, has been enjoyed by readers in spatio-
temporal contexts very different from that of 1830s London and its surrounding counties.

From the very start, one might say, Dickens wrote—yes—for London experts, presenting himself as the great authority on the city. But he also, using that accreditation, addressed a much broader audience who could be in Bath or Manchester or Boston or Dublin. Such readers might have been to London or might not. The popularity of *Pickwick* surely resulted in part from the taste of London living—including the toponyms—which it gave its early readers. They would essentially take Dickens’s word that things in London are the way he says they are, would happily enter his textual spatial world for the duration of their reading experience (regardless of whether or not they would consider using *Pickwick* as guidebook were they to go to London). And this is only to consider the initial readership of the 1830s, not the subsequent reception history.

Miller makes a crucial topographic error in the first sentence of his chapter, one which is repeated in association with the word “real” at the end of the chapter. In relation to London, the phrase used by Miller, “East London”, implies “the East End”. But the streets mentioned in the opening sentences of “Sam Weller’s Valentine” are not in the East End, the zone thought by late nineteenth-century writers such as Walter Besant to stretch eastwards from Aldgate Pump on the easternmost edge of the old, walled City of London (see the extended discussion of the East End’s shifting
borders in Chapter 7, below). The City of London (or just “the City”), in turn, was in earlier centuries viewed as equal to London itself, in contradistinction to the suburbs, as well as to the more fashionable district referred to as “the town”, which grew up west of the City of London and north of the home of Parliament at Westminster from the early seventeenth century onwards. The East End was the zone known to many outsiders at the end of the nineteenth century through novels like Besant’s All Sorts and Conditions of Men. In the East End, Besant claims, “the streets are all mean”, with “the people living the same mean and monotonous lives, all after the same model” (Besant 1883, 47; 29). The streets Sam Weller walks in the passage discussed by Miller, by contrast, lie just east of the centre of the City of London. They in fact belong to the oldest, most central London district of all. Going back to Roman times, Hugh Clout (1991, 28) writes that “early Londinium mainly occupied the area around modern Lombard Street and Gracechurch Street” (Clout 1991, 28).

When Miller says “East London” he seems to be introducing topographically vague, generalized conceptions of lowlife in London associated with its eastern side. It is true that the area of Leadenhall Market was some way east of the fashionable “town” portion of London, and in some sense the smoky commercial zone of the City was for wealthy Victorians aligned with the east. “Nobody goes east” quips Besant, though in the same breath indicating indicating that two million people live in
London east of the City (Besant 1883, 14). In fact, the East End lies east of where Sam Weller is, immediately beyond the old walls of the City of London. He is in the old centre: this is where the coaching inns were, due north of London Bridge, in an area that in Tudor times had been in the heart of the city (see e.g. Clout 1991, 58-9, a graphic reconstruction of London in about 1570). The statement at the end of Miller’s chapter, that “the imaginary Sam Weller is” in the passage under discussion “shown walking through real East London streets” (Miller 1995, 132) is thus both undermined and highlighted by the fact that the streets concerned are not really accurately described when Miller says they are in East London, even if this attempt to juxtapose fictional characters and actual streets, capable of being walked, was in itself an important literary critical development.

Miller’s accounts of place give no indication that he has himself walked the streets of London in pursuit of them. Instead of from physical experience, the chapter of Topographies concerned with the London of Pickwick seems to arise from Miller’s engagements between the 1950s and the 1980s with successive emerging schools of literary theory. Looked at in the mid-2010s, “Sam Weller’s Valentine” seems like a historical document originating in the era of “high” theory. Miller examines the passage from Pickwick Papers in which “Sam Weller’s eyes” become “fixed” on a valentine, a sort of elaborate greetings card, in “a small stationer’s and print-seller’s window” near the sign of the Blue Boar in Leadenhall Market.
Doing so, Miller (1995, 132) finds himself faced with a “swarm of … questions”. These are not about the location of the scene, however, but all concern how the passage should be related to twentieth-century literary and linguistic theory.

Miller’s approach to Dickens is strikingly different from an earlier sort of topographic criticism. This was well represented by the book The Inns and Taverns of “Pickwick” by Bertram W. Matz [1921]. Matz states that “topographers have never discovered a ‘Blue Boar’, or learned that one ever bore the sign” (Matz 1921, 157-60). This raises the question of whether Miller’s demand for the specifics of topography is undermined if, whatever rambling old London inns existed in that neighbourhood during the 1820s and 1830s, none of them was called the Blue Boar. Miller says that readers are supposed to know “what sort of place the Blue Boar in Leadenhall Market” is, but he does not address the question of whether, while in the text of Pickwick the Blue Boar may seem specifically located, it may also be no place: it may never have existed.

Deep Locational critics should be ready to use as a resource the kind of literary scholarship that pays attention to small-scale topographical and biographical details. This includes articles of the sort that have for long been published in a periodical like The Dickensian, and continued to be published there with titles like “Did Charles Dickens’s Uncle William Really Run a Coffee House?” (Long 2013). Matz exemplifies a pre-academic era of
Dickens criticism which could seriously argue about the relationship between a non-fictional inn and one depicted in Dickens’s fiction. As Matz puts it:

The only case in which Dickens deliberately used the name of one inn for another was that of the “Maypole” and “King’s Head” at Chigwell in *Barnaby Rudge*. But in this instance he admitted that he had done so, although it was scarcely necessary, for the inns were very dissimilar and the novelist’s description of the latter could not be taken for the former. (Matz [1921], Chapter 18)

A narratologist might consider Matz’s act of associating the inn of Dickens’s text with the inn of real-life Chigwell to be irrelevant in understanding the spatial arrangements of *Barnaby Rudge* (cf. Ryan 2014). But to see things like this would be to remain at a text-internal level. It may be that the only connection between them is an act of labelling designed by Dickens to confer verisimilitude on his text: the Maypole is not in Chigwell, Essex, but in the literary site labelled “Chigwell” in *Barnaby Rudge*.

Despite his presentation of his work as a topographic criticism, Miller is far less concerned than Matz with the places which stand outside texts and which can—or at least could once—be visited. He is more interested in what sort of speech act a valentine is, even though, along the way, he makes some of the most insightful remarks about the content of a topographic criticism that exist. To anyone trained since about the Second World in academic
literary studies, to take the use of toponyms in fiction as seriously as Matz did in 1921 might seem almost insanely naïve. But perhaps there is something in it. Matz seems like a keen local historian, not a professional. But the fact remains: Chigwell exists, but the Maypole pub never existed there. The study of imaginative place therefore relates to one another places that have been and places that have not to one another rather than, like *both* Miller and Matz in different ways, seeking to divide and distinguish them.

Miller’s sorts of effort to relate topography to a governing theoretical approach, or to use it to adjudicate between more than one such approach, have been replaced in literary studies since the 1990s by the less explicitly ideological and linguistic effort to place literary texts into their surroundings which I have labelled contextualism. To take one example, “Thomas Middleton’s London” by Paul S. Seaver (2007) is an illuminating essay appearing in a work of officially validated scholarship (not presented as criticism). Miller’s chapter “Sam Weller’s Valentine” could also be juxtaposed with this, a work on an earlier period of the same evolving imaginative geography, that of the City of London’s centre and eastern flank. Seaver provides a map of London circa 1600. On it, Lombard Street is to be seen towards the right hand (eastern) side, but in the heart of the City. Work such as Seaver’s stays close to specific parts of London as it was and was perceived in different stages of the past. And in Tiffany Stern’s writings (2009a; 2009b) on Shakespeare and early modern theatrical
practice, or in the work of Diana Maltz (2011) on Arthur Morrison, we find further examples of recent scholarship imbued with great topographical subtlety.

But despite a certain shakiness on the meanings of particular portions of London at particular times, Miller should not be condemned for getting the distinction between the City and East London slightly wrong. After all, he is a non-Londoner trying to make sense of London from afar. Too often the discussion of literary sites can become limited to those who know the sites in question really intimately. This actually falsifies the human relationship to place, since most people know most places very little, yet still form ideas of them. Experts on London—or anywhere else in particular—can become bogged down in minutiae and lose sight of how their place looks to those who know it less well (a category that includes most of its inhabitants). One of the strengths of Miller’s work is that he is making an effort to relate different types of literary topography – canonically Anglo-American as they may be – to a general conversation.

A potential problem with the more recent contextualist work that I have exemplified with Seaver, Stern and Maltz is not at all the fault of the individual scholars. The work of all three is excellent, but they are part of an overall tendency towards micro-specialism, in which the only conversations to be had are between fellow specialists (in post-romantic British writing; in Stuart drama). The truth is that for investigators to make an effort to get to
grips with places that they do not come from or identify with or specialize in is an admirable part of literary topographic or locational study.

The approaches to places being exemplified in this chapter are examples of the topological thinking proposed by Malpas, in that they involve movement along a path towards fuller understanding which will never become complete understanding (cf. Heidegger [1950]; Guignon 2006, 2-3). Deep Locational Criticism will take steps beyond both spatialist and contextualist criticism by zooming in and out of localities and by providing a framework for the comparison of different moments in time. The discussion of Dickens’s *Bleak House* ([1853]) which now follows will centre on another sort of path: this novel’s text-internal spatial organization around a line projected northwards from London which is derived from, but not identical with, the route of the former Great North Road, itself the ancestor of today’s UK A1 road.

*Mapping Novels in the Head*

In this subsection, the spatial arrangement under consideration is that which is perceived when reading. As Malpas and Heidegger would say, this is what is experienced. In a moment I will outline the intratextual landscape of this single work of literature, one quite frequently discussed in critical approaches that could be labelled topographical. First, however, I would like to identify a couple of false trails.
One of these is the risk inherent to topographic criticism that the result is excessively chatty or shallow, or makes broad, unjustified assumptions. It can be easy to assume that a location detectable in a text is the same as what is plainly obvious in front of our eyes during everyday life. The risk is evident in Matz’s discussion of the inn signs of Dickens. Yet it is also present in more recent pieces of topographical criticism, such as Moretti’s *Atlas of the European Novel 1800-1900* ([1997]). Although Moretti provides rough indications of ways forward for topographic criticism, his title is a deliberate exaggeration. His book is in fact not an atlas of the nineteenth-century European novel with any aspiration to exhaustiveness. It is, rather, a set of sketches.

On the other hand, there is the danger of attempting to be absolutely scientific and so failing to convince. Some of the approaches to literary writing that fall into this trap could broadly be classed as linguistic or narratological (e.g. Werth 1999). But then again, work by linguists on the expression in language of human perceptions of position in space is part of the very foundation of Deep Locational Criticism. Especially important here are two subfields: work on deixis originating in linguistic pragmatics, deixis being the means by which speakers and auditors relate themselves and one another to their mutual bearings and surroundings; and the relations between language and human world-construction revealed in sociolinguistics (Hickmann and Robert 2006; Levinson 1983; Levinson 2004; Labov 1966;
Reading *Bleak House*, a Deep Locational Critic will ask which sites are seen in detail at a great level of magnification, which from a distance or glancingly, and which not at all. A great help in understanding where such emphases are laid is provided when this particular novel is laid alongside others from the broadly realist nineteenth-century English tradition, without the assumption that their shared membership of such a tradition makes them all alike. The authors of these other nineteenth-century novels need not have been writing before Dickens for the comparison to be instructive. Take, for instance, three novels written in the decades following the publication of *Bleak House*: George Meredith’s *The Ordeal of Richard Feverel* (1859), Samuel Butler’s *The Way of All Flesh* (not actually published until 1903 but a Victorian novel in that it was written during the 1870s) and Thomas Hardy’s *The Return of the Native* (1878). The movement of *Bleak House* can be traced and compared with that found in these three other novels.

How should one go about this? As a preliminary, to orient our thinking, let us recall the geographer Tim Cresswell’s account of place (2004, 1) as something known in a non-intellectual way because we encounter it every day, and let us recall, too, Lefebvre’s notion ([1974], 26-28) of social space. Then, to proceed, one technique is to map a novel in the head. This means thinking of what remains some time after you have journeyed through that novel, and attempting to recall the experience. Precedents for this mode of
thinking exist in imaginative writers such as Wordsworth and Proust, and people do something similar with the places they visit in real life. Photographs taken on a trip somewhere could tend to stereotype the traveller’s impression of it, to freeze it in certain ways. But at the same time, they afterwards serve as a reference point useful in the clarification of thoughts. Here we can refer to the point made by Malpas (2012, 16): that the salient and the withdrawn must coexist in (our experience of) a place.

Some months after reading Meredith’s debut novel *The Ordeal of Richard Feverel* ([1859]), I recorded my experiences of its internal spatial world as follows:

[T]here is the old house of the family; London; the Isle of Wight; the wild (foreign, in fact German) forest at the end of the book. Represented graphically, the world of the house would be large and to the left of the diagram, surrounded by other things in the country orbit (farms, other gentry houses). To the right of the house a rather small London consisting of the fashionable world and a few of its satellites would appear. From it to the south would be seen the Isle of Wight. London, the country house in the Thames Valley and the south coast would all, before our eyes, become connected by railway lines in the course of the book. Finally and separated by water, located on the Continent of Europe, would be the world of the wild and the primitive. (Finch 2006, 48)
I did the same with Butler’s *The Way of All Flesh*, recalling the following as salient points:

Family origins in a village somewhere, the family history and the publishing business, the curate outside Cambridge, the rectory where Theobald and Christina raise young Ernest Pontifex, the visits of the unmarried aunt, Ernest’s life in Cambridge (within which the account of the relationships of space within the college with the low-church, déclassé “Sims” hidden at the back is powerfully done); Ernest in London (the space of the boarding house where he lives, imagined as a series of boxes, filled with people all doing their thing in their different boxes, the atheist tailor and the prostitute, the man who beats his wife); meeting the man he admires from Cambridge; then the unconvincing marriage beneath him and the shop in South London; finally the Temple as a bachelor refuge. The internal-spatial aspect of *The Way of all Flesh* seems uncertain to me because the novel is so loosely constructed: a mixture of family history, spiritual (auto)biography and an intellectual history of the nineteenth century. Likewise the internal spatial arrangement seems a series of relatively unconnected flashes. (Finch 2006, 58)

And, for another, the following on *The Return of the Native*, which, about three months after I read it (I wrote the following on 13 March 2006, to be precise) left a clear outline in my mind:
The hill and the wildness of the heath at the beginning, the people like ants on the hill at night; the glances early on into the church of another parish where they were to be married; the rustics arriving at the inn “The Quiet Woman” to sing to the couple who did not marry; glances further afield to the resort of Budmouth and beyond it Paris. It is from Paris that “of all contrasting places in the world” Clym Yeobright returns to his childhood home on Egdon Heath. Clym is the native of the novel’s title. A native is a person of or belonging to a certain place; the title therefore emphasizes the ties binding people to place; Eustacia [Vye] is by comparison a native of Budmouth whose tragedy is to be at Egdon; Hardy in these things turns the minute into the gigantic, for can there really have been so much difference between Weymouth on the one hand and the hills between Dorchester and Bournemouth on the other? Overall, the novel’s heath seems a blanket laid over rolling turf, people criss-crossing it. The sense of it as a piece of cloth laid upon the land is something given by Hardy himself in describing the “white palings, which marked the verge of the heath in this latitude” and which surround the Yeobright house and claiming that they “showed upon the dusky scene that they bordered as distinctly as white lace on velvet” (Finch 2006, 66-67)

All of the novels just summarized I read in 2005 to 2006, and I have not since reread any of them. To say this is to break one of the literary critical
rules of etiquette, which is always to act as though every book ever read is fully present to one at the moment one speaks of it. In assembling locational readings, however, an interval of time left after reading allows the places of a particular book to emerge in relief.

The memories of place in these three novels that I have had while working on this chapter between 2012 and 2015 are more scattered, barer, perhaps more essential, perhaps more stereotyped. The novels set off new resonances when I compare them with others that I have since read or reread. The wild continental ending of The Ordeal of Richard Feverel finds echoes in Wells’s Ann Veronica and Lawrence’s Women in Love. This starts me thinking about whether there is a tradition of continental endings or escapes in the English novel of the Victorian and post-Victorian period (escapes that often end in death rather than marriage: for Ann Veronica substitute Dombey and Son). People do not remember things in precisely the same way as one another. But in my memories of these books there is a similarity between the loss of detail and connectivity (while flashes or overall resemblances remain) and the fading yet retention of certain images, which characterizes our non-reading experience of actual places visited once and then thought about years later. Our memory of novels and our memory of places seem to be alike.

One problem with mapping a novel in the head is the extreme subjectivity of it. Two people might not, perhaps would never, reconstruct the place
layout of one of these novels in a similar way. Some responses, of course, might seem obvious mistakes. This is an issue that teachers will encounter in the classroom when they are teaching in a Deep Locational way. When should a participant’s assertion about a place or a book be corrected or written off as arising from an insufficient knowledge of the world of the novel and its context or of the place in which the novel is set? Most often, perhaps, what a teacher hears about somewhere from a student should be accepted as one point of view among others, a peer of the teacher’s own viewpoint. Yet the notion of a path should encourage students to move towards enriched, nuanced views of places and their appearance in literature.

As Malpas indicates, we need to keep in mind a sense of “the essential iridescence—the indeterminacy and multiplicity—that attaches to place” (Malpas 2012, 17). Iridescence, the limitless shifting of colours on what can nevertheless be perceived as an identifiable surface, is a sort of multiple unity, something that Malpas, following late essays by Heidegger such as “Building Dwelling Thinking”, claims is at the very heart of the meaning of place. A place is one thing, not more than one. But no-one will ever experience that place in exactly the same way as any other individual. So the mental maps of novels produced by a Deep Locational critic are given in the manner of a journalist reporting from somewhere, addressing an audience largely based somewhere else.
In Chapter 12 of *Bleak House* (Dickens [1853]), readers briefly see Sir Leicester and Lady Dedlock leaving the Hotel Bristol in the Place Vendôme, Paris, then beginning to make their way back to their home country. This fraction of a scene is the only point in the text of the novel at which the action is set outside England. But *Bleak House* contains several other gestures towards the wider world, the world beyond England and beyond Europe. To begin with the British Isles, Scotland appears in a couple of brief asides in Chapter 27 (the old soldier Matthew Bagnet’s mother lives there); Ireland is mentioned only once, in Chapter 29, when Richard Carstone is despatched there with his regiment in his last attempt at a career before his obsession with the case in Chancery of Jarndyce and Jarndyce finally engulfs him. Wales receives a number of glances in connection with the heroine Esther Summerson’s eventual mother-in-law, who is Welsh. Something archipelagic lurks in this seemingly London-centric novel, then (Kerrigan 2008).

Twenty-first century criticism, including the “strong metonymic” reading proposed by Elaine Freedgood (2006), has paid some attention to spatial reference outside the actual settings of nineteenth-century British fiction. Such reference has been seen by Said (1993) and Jameson ([1990]) as part of a relationship between the colonial metropolis with its colonies
understood as hidden peripheries actually powering the centre, which in turn seems the only real or normal world. There is certainly a breath of this in *Bleak House*. Yet there was little mention of the outside-England portion of Dickensian spatiality in the 1940s-1970s criticism written by Humphry House, Lionel Trilling, Kathleen Tillotson, J. Hillis Miller and Philip Collins. There, within a notion of the Victorian, the focus moved between London and the industrial North of England, as for example in *Hard Times*.

The references outside the British Isles of *Bleak House* are, apart from the brief moment when the Dedlocks “rattle out of the yard of the Hotel Bristol” in their carriage, tales and allusions rather than actual portions of the action with a concretely realized non-English setting. As such, *Bleak House* contrasts with Thackeray’s *Vanity Fair*, in which a major portion of the action takes place in the Netherlands and Germany and Rawdon Crawley is banished to be Governor of an off-stage tropical island. There is also something of a contrast with Dickens’s *Dombey and Son*, a novel which has as a climax the frantic departure to Dijon of Carker and Edith Dombey, and also contains an extensive mystery revolving around the fate of Walter Gay’s ship to the Caribbean.

Among the fleeting allusions to places outside England in *Bleak House* there is Mrs Jellyby, with her eyes looking “a long way off” from London at “Borrioboola-Gha, on the left bank of the Niger” (Chapter 4). And there are others: Mrs Badger, with the international connections of her two dead
husbands, one a seafarer, the other “Professor Dingo … of European reputation” (Chapter 13); the Bagnets, who have tramped from one British military outpost to another, naming their son Woolwich and their daughters Malta and Quebec in tribute to the garrison posts (Chapter 27); the overseas heroics of Allan Woodcourt (Chapters 35 and 45).

All these refer to the England-in-the-world of missionary, military, commercial, exploratory, scientific and other such ventures. This could be understood on the analogy of the Heideggerian distinction between the body and the lived body (Casey 2001, 404; Malpas 2012, 16) as lived England, the world England experiences, rather than England itself within its borders. The non-English places of Bleak House do not include anywhere on the surface of the earth that is profoundly foreign to Dickens or his audience. In the 1850s, England’s power was at, or close to its peak. Continental Europe emerges for a moment in the “European reputation” of Professor Dingo, as well as in the Dedlocks’ holiday, and the murderous French maid Hortense.

The references outside England are worth tracing simply because academic critics of Bleak House in the twentieth century and since have tended to overlook them. But the locational centre of the novel is a spatial arrangement laid out, not within London, as Dickens’s popular image might suggest, but north-south down England like a spine. As far as I am aware, this has never been noticed. London itself in this novel has often been discussed in relation to the national allegory, with Sir Leicester Dedlock
standing for the landowning and governing classes and Jo the crossing
sweeper for the poor (Miller 1971). The London of *Bleak House*
dichotomises high and low: Sir Leicester’s town house and the horrifying
rookery of Tom-all-alone’s. In it are to be found many points and lines, all
central, all somehow crooked and overlapping, focused on the Law Courts,
Holborn and Temple area, but also including what is now called the West
End (the Dedlocks’ house, Newman Street, Leicester Square) and a brief
scene set south of the river (at the home of the Bagnets). But *Bleak House*
contains very little of London’s periphery. This contrasts with two earlier
Dickens novels, *Barnaby Rudge* ([1841]) and *Dombey and Son* ([1848]). In
the former, a constant shuttling between the centre of London and various
city peripheries is at the very heart of the novel’s meaning. In the latter, key
events happen on the borders of London, on the northern and southern
extremities of which the very different houses of the two Carker brothers are
situated.

At the centre of the London of *Bleak House* is not the West End, and
there is no mention of what would later become famous as the East End.
Instead, it is the zone around Chancery Lane dominated by lawyers. More
specifically still, it is the zone occupied by Lincoln’s Inn and the Inns of
Chancery at the western end of the Strand and to the north of there. The
Lincoln’s Inn area of *Bleak House* contains members of the legal profession
such as the Machiavellian family solicitor Mr Tulkinghorn and the smoothly
prosperous “Conversation” Kenge, but also their hangers-on, from the law stationer Snagsby down to “Nemo”, up all night copying documents.

Investigating the location of one key site in the novel, the slum Tom-all-alone’s, casts light on Dickens’s locational practice. Andrew Sanders (2010, 132) calls Tom-all-alone’s “unlocated” and it is indeed not explicitly connected by Dickens to the named London sites from which contemporaries such as Henry Mayhew reported. But “Tom’s” must be within a radius of not more than a mile or two from Lincoln’s Inn Fields. Tulkinghorn, in his rooms there, remarks in Chapter 22: “If Mr Snagsby don’t object to go down with me to Tom-all-alone’s and point him out, we can have him [Jo] here in less than a couple of hours’ time” (Dickens [1852-53], 328). Half an hour’s walk from Tulkinghorn’s rooms, including enough time to locate Jo and escort him back, sounds right. Tulkinghorn is a cautious man, not given to hyperbole. This would give “Tom’s” a number of possible originals in St Giles, Holborn, Westminster or even across the river in Lambeth. The church illustrated by “Phiz” as looming over the collapsing pre-Fire buildings of Tom-all-alone’s somewhat resembles St Andrew, Holborn. This would place “Tom’s” in the Saffron Hill and Field Lane zone also used by Dickens as the site of Fagin’s den in Oliver Twist, that of Holborn’s “Northern Tributaries” (Thornbury [1878]). Of course Phiz’s illustration is not a statement in Dickens’s text of the location of “Tom’s”. “Tom’s” is not to be found on any map, and in another sense it has no
identifiable location. Yet it is a slum connected with the legal profession, lying neglected because it is in Chancery, and thereby umbilically linked to the Chancery Lane area.

Beyond these London speculations, *Bleak House*, spatially speaking, is organized around a line extending northward from London. This connects London with the North of England by road, closely shadowing the actual Great North Road, the ancient route from London to Edinburgh via Hertfordshire, western Lincolnshire and Yorkshire. This line has a meaning related to the temporal positioning of *Bleak House* in that, by the time *Bleak House* was published, the Great North Road was sinking into what appeared to be torpid irrelevance. In “Tom Tiddler’s Ground”. Dickens’s sketch of Stevenage in Hertfordshire, this town flanking the old north-south route, by then made obsolete by the railway, stands sleepily filled with unneeded coaching inns (Dickens 1862; cf. Finch 2011, 356). In *Dombey and Son*, published before *Bleak House* but, it would seem, set later, the railway is a leveller and an avenger, the force of a future which changes the way the country is to be perceived. The line through England of *Bleak House* could perhaps, slightly more contentiously, be continued to Paris via Dover, the stagecoach route to the continent.

The line could be explicated with several parallel movements. To start late in the book there is Esther, with Inspector Bucket, looking for Esther’s mother Lady Dedlock (Chapter 57). And there is, at the very end, the new
Bleak House in Yorkshire, where the book concludes (Chapter 64). Crucially there is the encounter between Rouncewell the ironmaster and Sir Leicester Dedlock at the Dedlock country house in Lincolnshire where the upwardly-mobile Rouncewell’s mother is a faithful retainer (Chapter 28).

There are other things to add: Esther and Jarndyce go to Lincolnshire, and there Esther has her crucial encounter with Lady Dedlock, who throws herself upon her announcing herself to be Esther’s “wicked and unhappy mother” (Chapter 36). Moves on this line are at the centre of the book’s elaborate, careful plotting. Jo walks from London to Hertfordshire (Chapter 31). Jenny and Liz the brickmakers’ wives walk the same walk in reverse (Chapter 22), then go back again along what Esther calls “the familiar way to Saint Albans” (Chapter 57). For Sir Leicester and his ilk the line links town (or Parliament, the great world, the world of fashion) with country (the land owned, the stasis, the root of the power).

On the northward line there are four points. London is at one end, the Yorkshire of the ironmaster and the new Bleak House at the other. Industrial Yorkshire stands for a new England seen positively by Dickens. London, among other things, is the centre of an unreformed old English elite represented by Sir Leicester, surrounded by his retainers and London workers like Snagsby and Nemo. The same is true of Kenge, as of the unpleasant Vholes and the treacherous Tulkinghorn: the whole legal complex works to support unreformed England. And between London and
Yorkshire are two counties in a schematised England, Hertfordshire and Lincolnshire, standing synecdochically for England’s other counties.

But the relationship between the four places is one in which each is multiple. This is where Heidegger’s topological notion of multiple unity as explicated by Malpas comes in, foreshadowing the fuller account of Shakespeare’s *Henry IV, Part Two*, given in Chapter 3 below. The multiplicity can be seen in the way the places seem to reflect or mirror one another. Tom-all-alone’s within London mirrors the brickfields within Hertfordshire: each is a place of industrial or urban gothic horror; flames and night; spectacular squalor. Tom-all-alone’s and the brickfields, as the London and country lodgings respectively of Jo the crossing sweeper and the brickmakers’ wives, Jenny and Liz, mirror other pairings of a town lodging and a country one: John Jarndyce’s home at Bleak House in Hertfordshire, and the “cheerful lodging near Oxford Street over an upholsterer’s shop” which he takes in London (Chapter 13). And the Dedlock “place in Lincolnshire” and “house in town” (Chapter 16) are obviously partners, two sides of the same unreformed landowning life.

These relationships of mirroring in *Bleak House* find an echo in Heidegger’s *fourfold*, a relationship between elements (mortals, immortals, earth and sky) which comes to life, becoming a thing and a world in an action such as the pouring out of a drink from a jug as a gesture of welcome to a guest. Julian Young (2006, 373) sees the fourfold, not as a mystical
construction, but as “an essentially spatial notion” emerging from everyday life: the German word *geviert*, which “fourfold” translates, is “an obscure word for a ‘square’ or ‘courtyard’ – the courtyard of, for example, a farm surrounded on all four sides by farm buildings”. The fourfold is explained by Heidegger as an “appropriative mirror-game” in which each of the components presupposes each of the others (Heidegger [1949], 265; cf. Figal [2007], 28). This might seem more systematic than it really is. Malpas (2006, 211-303, especially 267-77) describes the shifts that took place as Heidegger developed the notion of the fourfold and the notion of multiple unity or equiprimordiality which underlies it. In fact, the fourfold never appeared twice in his writing in exactly the same form, in fact, and in his later writings its mobile and playful aspect is emphasized (Figal [2007], 31).

It could be said that Lincolnshire, Hertfordshire and Yorkshire each have two components in *Bleak House* (while London has many). The Lincolnshire of *Bleak House* is made up of two gentry houses, the Dedlock and Boythorne houses, and the connections between them are gentry accoutrements: a church, a park. Hertfordshire contains only a country house and a site of poverty, Yorkshire only an ironworks and a new house built with new money. Looking across the gentry-stifled zone that is Lincolnshire, the old Bleak House in Hertfordshire mirrors the new Bleak House in Yorkshire. The reformed (because enabling a new meritocracy to take power) industry of iron-working in Yorkshire mirrors the unreformed
(because serving the exploitative town activities of Dedlocks and speculative builders) industry of brick-making in Hertfordshire.

The line could, as I say, be extended beyond London to the south and east, and even to the continent. In this direction lies Deal, the Cinque Port where Richard Carstone is found at one stage of his decline (Chapter 45). The London-Paris-London aristocratic leisure route is travelled by the Dedlocks (Chapters 2, 7, 12).

Overall, the whole route (which is itself multiple in the sense that London is internally multiple and London-to-Paris and London-to-Yorkshire are two halves of the route which mirror one another) could be envisaged as a route from North of England to Continent which represents a symbolic move from work to leisure, and from day to night. All of the places on the route are complex within themselves. The vast size of London means that its position in Bleak House could be imaged as that of a giant ball with the two arms extending out like the hands of a clock at five o’clock.

**Conclusion: Better Mental Mapping**

Miller’s work on literary topographies indicates how much remains to be done. One way of moving ahead would be, I have been suggesting, to assemble mental maps of novels and compare the maps which different readers produce independently.

Deep Locational work which begins from a single novel such as Bleak
House faces some particular challenges. In constructing mental maps of works of fiction there is the question of how much overlap exists between one person’s experience and another’s of a literary work and the arrangements of sites within it. There is also the matter of how precisely accurate about the facts of place it is necessary to be. Locational precision is important, but it is also important that researches into historical and geographical minutiae – into where something was exactly positioned some exact one moment – do not act as a distraction from the real and broader cultural and philosophical work of placing writing. The purpose of placing writing will always be to know more about human society and individual experience, and to remove the barriers which alienate groups from one another.

Two Pedagogic Forays into the Decayed Inner City

A Fulham Novel: Photographs and Cultural Difference

Academic literary-critical works and works aimed at students sometimes contain maps. Examples include the works of Thomas Hardy, who approved and helped create the maps that became integral parts of the “Wessex Edition” of his novels from the mid-1890s onwards. Less commonly, works of scholarship include photographic images representing settings. Wilfred

Such works provide one indication of how a Deep Locational approach to literary teaching could work. Another is provided in a 1976 edition, long out of print, of Lynne Reid Banks’s 1960 novel of life in a scruffy London tenement house, *The L-Shaped Room*. This edition, by Chris Buckton, contains a set of photographs of Fulham, the area of London in which *The L-Shaped Room* is set, and follows this with “A Note to Teachers” (Banks 1976; Image 1; Image 2). Buckton writes:

> Although the photographs are not meant to illustrate particular moments in the novel, it is hoped that the many readers not familiar with the areas of inner-city bedsitter land will be helped. The pictures can also be used for discussion and for creative writing. (Banks 1976, 308)

The use of photographs in reading the text is not unproblematic. Arguably, it might steer students who are themselves situated beyond a certain distance from the place and time in which the book is set and those of its first readers, towards reading the book in an exoticizing way, as depicting an odd and picturesque world which they themselves do not live in, a problem
which also besets the teaching of, say, literature set in the poorer areas of Victorian London (cf. Ackroyd 1987; Sanders 2010). In Buckton’s words, the photographer Lance Browne’s “photo-essay ... shows the houses and streets some years after the book was written”, but in the mid-1970s “the feel of the area is very much the same”. This could not be said in the 2010s. Since the 1970s, Fulham has undergone forty years of gentrification. In the 2010s it could be called a yuppie ghetto. In other words, even students living in London today – let alone those elsewhere – are situated considerably further from the place content of Banks’s book than those of the 1970s would have been.

_The L-Shaped Room_ today features on few if any student reading lists. It has lost its contemporaneity and not been revived or accorded cult status, or canonized in literary histories of the 1960s, and it also contains material that from a twenty-first century British point of view is likely to seem crass, if not actually racist. It contains a very precise portrait of a certain quadrant of London in an era when widespread prosperity and near-zero unemployment were combined with a very visible survival of post-Victorian physical squalor. And it also has a quality of intensely felt life that today verges on the embarrassing. It is wholly convincing as a representation of the interiority of the novel’s narrator, a middle-class 27-year-old who is both unmarried and pregnant.

It matters that the district chosen by the narrator in which to slum it
happens to be Fulham. Heading south-west from central London, this area, a Metropolitan Borough between 1900 and 1965, lies immediately beyond Chelsea. By 1960 Chelsea had already moved through the stages of being first colonized by artists and then thoroughly gentrified, as was marked by the formation of the conservationist Chelsea Society in 1927 (Croot 2004, 79-90). The precision comes, for example, in the handling of money. We learn that a doctor with a prestigious private clinic in the West End of London charges a hundred guineas to arrange an abortion, but that he will reduce the price to sixty if the patient cannot afford that (Banks 1976: 26-27). A room in a smart Kensington flatshare costs “£3 10s.”, whilst the garret in Fulham is “thirty bob” (Banks 1976, 52, 66), both per week; the narrator is later offered a larger, first-floor room for “three-ten” or her own room upped to “two-ten” by her rapacious landlady (Banks 1976, 252). After decimalization, even the money needs explaining. In today’s terms this is £3.50 versus £1.50, or more than twice as much to live in Kensington as in neighbouring Fulham, the one seen as smart, the other as slummy.

But if money is precisely accounted for, there is comparatively little detail about the area surrounding the house. The layout of the inside of the house is carefully indicated, and in particular which character lives in which room. In this respect The L-Shaped Room is part of a tradition of novels set in and built around the communality and privacy relationship to be found in London houses informally divided into flats or let out in rooms, a tradition
also including novels by William Plomer, Norman Collins and Alexander Baron published between 1930 and 1965. But early on in Banks’s novel, the zone around the house is at least sketched.

The neighbourhood was completely strange to me. If I’d been in any mood to make judgements I’d have judged it to be pretty grim. The shabby houses fronted almost right onto the pavement, though some of them had front yards stuck with a few sooty bushes. Most of the windows lacked curtains and that gave the houses a blind look, or rather a dead look, like open-eyed corpses. They were decaying like corpses, too. Some of the front yards had dustbins instead of bushes, which would have smelt if it hadn’t been drizzling. But the drizzle didn’t do anything to reduce the dog-smell, which was foul. You had to watch where you walked. It hadn’t been raining long and the pavement had that sweaty look. (Banks 1976, 2)

Other features made to characterize the district include down-at-heel cafes and a newsagent-tobacconist’s shop run by a cynic whose cracked shop window contains yellowing handwritten advertisements: “second-hand prams, as new, and French girl gives lessons, phone after 6 p.m.”. The description is matter-of-fact, the viewpoint the eye on Fulham of a woman in her twenties—the protagonist and narrator, Jane—who has up until now lived with a father in prosperous suburbs, where she was still regarded as just a girl.
After this, there is not much detail on the street-scene in the neighbourhood. Jane rents “one room in the worst part of Fulham”, in “the backstreets”, but we do not learn, for example, whether this is closer to Putney Bridge or Wandsworth Bridge, or to the north nearer Hammersmith or the eastern border with Chelsea (Banks 1976, 3, 33). Once the plot has got underway readers are reminded that “The district was sinister enough at any time”, even without the dense smog that still swept winter London in the late 1950s (Banks 1976, 149).

Considering this lack of detail about the area, Browne’s photographs in Buckton’s 1976 edition might be thought to fill in a gap for student readers living outside inner London, probably at home with parents. But the danger, I argue, would be that of exoticizing and aestheticizing inner-city dirt and poverty. With the bedsitland London of the 1960s not being normality for either the respectable 1970s British student or for Londoners and others in subsequent decades, Browne’s photographs could easily be read in the terms of the sort of Rachman-era picturesque enhanced in the 1980s by British films such as *Absolute Beginners* (based on the novels from the time by Colin MacInnes) and *Scandal*. Here I have in mind the view of inner west London which developed in the 1950s, as noted by Frank Mort (2010): a place as excitingly and dangerously transgressive, a site of different border-crossings, of class, “race” and sexuality.

Black-and-white photographic images by Roger Mayne (2013) have
come to encapsulate this pre-gentrification English inner city of the post-war decades, a city of near-carless side-streets peopled by lean inhabitants at once shabby and sharp in appearance. Mayne’s most famous images include one of a group of West Indian men wearing fedora hats passing by seated and standing white residents of Southam Street in North Kensington, and several other images of the groups of long-haired, suit-wearing youth known as “teddy-boys” who occasioned moral panic in the 1950s British press. Compared to Mayne’s, Browne’s images focus in close-up on the decay of bricks and mortar in a manner that recalls the comparison between houses and “corpses” offered by Banks (see Image 1; Image 2). In Mayne’s images the Victorian houses of North Kensington and Paddington may be scabrous, but their function is as scenery, a backdrop for the attitudes struck by his people on their stage, the street, who come to seem like glamorous members of a fashionable subculture, as in the film director Ken Russell’s 1950s still photographs of “teddy-girls”.

Browne took none of the photographs illustrating the 1976 edition of Banks’s novel in SW6, the Fulham postcode. The majority were taken in Lots Road, near Fulham but in the SW10 postcode, a street some of whose shabby houses in multiple occupation have since been bulldozed, replaced by sharp grey blocks of flats and property renovation businesses, and some of which have been painted in pastel shades and renovated from top to bottom. At least one of the photographs was taken across the river in
Kennington (Image 3 [typesetter: this image to be placed near here, please]; Browne 2013). It is worth assessing such matters of scale and distance, assessing where London bedsitland stops and starts. But this is not to say that Browne—or Banks—misrepresents or mythicizes the bedsitland of the book, or that the place resonances of The L-Shaped Room are not worth investigating. Using Browne’s photographs and visits to this area and others that are its equivalents today, in London and elsewhere, students could enter the book’s place-world, and explore its links to and differences from the culture that produced it.

Used in university teaching, Deep Locational Criticism could help bring young people armed with curiosity, energy and reading skills but little worldly experience into contact with relationality: the varying distances between them and human others. To see Banks and Banks’s London as both other and the same. This is not to teach Banks as a timeless genius. Characters in the book express outdated attitudes, and these illuminate the time and place in which the book was produced and first consumed. But nor is the book a mere curio, illustrative of a moment in British history. The Deep Locational reading goes beyond what is possible in historicist and contextualist approaches to literary studies in the classroom.

It is possible to imagine whole Deep Locational doctoral theses coming from glances into past efforts to teach, and using examples such as this edition of The L-Shaped Room. The span bridging 1960 and 1976 is tight.
Ideas of post-war and pre-Thatcher Britain could be reassessed using the textual content of *The L-Shaped Room*, plus the apparatus provided by Buckton, Browne and Banks herself (who contributed a newly-written introduction to the 1976 edition). This could be put alongside allied materials such as other photographs, other recollections of Fulham between the Second World War and the 1980s, as available for example via archival research in London’s many local studies centres. Parallels and distinctions will emerge when Fulham is put alongside other London zones as covered by the other London writers of the bedsit house: Plomer’s Bayswater; Collins’s Kennington; Baron’s Hackney. The result could resemble the cultural imagology with roots in semiotics practiced by Anthony W. Johnson (2005). The difference would be that the image-world would gain a crucially geographic edge. This would also be an edge of what could be called reality, actuality, worldliness or phenomenologically-understood experience. Such an edge could be developed through visits to Fulham involving not just research in local archives and walks through the streets but also interviews with Fulhamites and sometime bedsit dwellers while these people are still alive.

39.289372°N, 76.646848°W: The Imaginative Place Project

In the spring of 2012, I taught (in English) a course to first-year students majoring in English Language and Literature at Åbo Akademi University, a
Swedish-language university in Finland. The course was a brief introduction to the modern and contemporary literature, culture, history and geography of the United States. It lasted seven weeks, and once a week I would give a lecture to the whole group (45 minutes long) and then meet the students in three smaller groups, also for 45 minutes at a time.

The group became guinea pigs for what I called the Imaginative Place Project. Their predecessors a year earlier had been asked to take part in what I called the US Cities Project. These students had selected a city from a list of twenty or so and prepared a presentation on it. The presentation was supposed to focus on what could be broadly understood as the city’s cultural aspects, rather than for instance on a narrative history of it, or on its relationship with the human and physical geography of a region. Some participants had simply turned to the Internet, and on the whole they had found too many easy answers there. Some of them had showed promotional films in which—say—Houston or Memphis was presented in an entirely favourable light, the way that the city’s mayor and tourist office would like outsiders to see it. Others had dug up from YouTube supposed guides to the local speech in the area, designed to emphasize the comic aspects of that speech. Some students had spoken enthusiastically of a certain cultural figure, for instance a novelist or singer, associated with the city they had drawn.

That was in 2011. A year later I was puzzling over how to develop the
students’ engagement with the mysteriously complex, constructed and imagined yet also utterly concrete nature of imaginative place. I hit on the idea of introducing them to the very concept of imaginative place, the concept which stands behind the present book, something that a year earlier had seemed too abstract for first-year students. In 2012, then, the students did not choose from a list made up of Los Angeles, Detroit, Miami, Boston, Philadelphia and the other largest and most famous US cities. That list had not been a failure. It had taken us far beyond the clichéd and supposedly national images of America which many Europeans carry around with them unawares, of the Manhattan skyline, cowboys, the White House and Hollywood palms, of McDonalds and the US flag. But the 2012 students chose from a list containing terms like “the Suburbs”, “the Ghetto”, “the Old West”, “the Deep South”, and “the Mexican Border”.

Presented with imaginative places, the students working on the Imaginative Place Project were required to think. Unlike in a presentation of an individual writer or a city there is no encyclopaedia article under any of these imaginative place headings. Any investigation of imaginative places brings investigators—however inexperienced—face to face with the shifting, constructed, provisional, temporally specific nature of such place concepts. It forces them to make decisions about what matters most.

Of course, dangers were encountered. In carrying out a project on the suburbs you almost inevitably essentialize “the suburbs” as a concept. You
merge the varieties of suburb to be found in different parts of the country, in architecture of different styles, of different ages and at different distances from the centres of very different cities (streetcar suburbs and suburbs built around the automobile; New England suburbs, Chicagoland suburbs and Southern Californian suburbs), turning them into something single, even idealized. You take one of these as the classic suburb. Yet even in so doing, a researcher interested in imaginative place meets the criss-crossing of local, regional, national and trans-national patterns.

A good example of the sort of cultural production that could be used in a student imaginative place project is *The Corner*, a television series made in the US by HBO (2000). *The Corner* is set in the early 1990s, in a drug-infested inner-city district of Baltimore whose residents live in badly-maintained nineteenth-century row houses. The characters of this series are closely based on real-life individuals, even to the extent of keeping the names of their originals. The creator of *The Corner*, former Baltimore crime-beat journalist David Simon, suggests (2012) that there is a “corner”, or in other words an open-air drug market, in every US city. In one episode, a character from the show states that he left Baltimore hoping to beat his addiction only to find himself involved in exactly the same cycle somewhere else, in New Orleans or North Carolina.

*The Corner* depicts and explores the world as seen from the point of view of a single corner in Baltimore, the junction of North Monroe Street and
West Fayette Street (39.289372°N 76.646848°W). This spot is less filled with human life on Google StreetView as of March 2014 (the images there date from August 2011) than it appears to be in the television series, where it is always criss-crossed by movements: police cars, drug customers, the regular sellers and residents who sit on their stoops, children breaking glass. In *The Corner* this is a site to which “D.C. niggers” and “New York niggers” come from the outside world (which also includes the ghettos of other cities seen by characters in the cinema or heard about on rap records).

The police officer whose beat is in the neighbourhood has patrolled it for seventeen years, and is known to residents by first name and surname as “Bob Brown” (Dutton 2000, 55,22). He speaks of it, with pointed emphasis, as “my corner”. This is a world for which going to the cinema or the tourist sights of the harbour in downtown Baltimore is a voyage to a different world.

But through this single spot mappable via the coordinates of the earth’s surface, *The Corner* depicts one major aspect of post-1960s US life, the urban narcotics epidemic. The series is less sensationalizing than many other screen depictions of inner-city black life in the US do. It is unsentimental and squarely in the literary tradition of realism and naturalism. There is little violence. When drug-dealing youngsters use guns, things are clumsy and confused. Shots ring out but no one knows where they have come from. And shooting only happens once in the whole series,
which covers several years in the characters’ lives. Most episodes cover the
day-to-day struggle to live as one individual or another in the
neighbourhood: an addict, a low-level street dealer, an adolescent
attempting to stay in school in that environment, or a former drug-user
trying to reform. There are no diamonds and piles of cash for the small-scale
drug-dealers presented: some are themselves actually ageing, dying drug-
users, others young men who are destroying their future prospects for the
sake of some new trainers, and whose attempts to pose as the “gangstas” of
rap records and videos are pitiable but very human.

A viewer must nevertheless ask how this piece of high-realist art relates
to other experiences of that life. What is that life? It could be defined as
Baltimore life or urban life or life in places like Monroe and Fayette (places
which could gentrify or find themselves peopled by Brazilians or
Vietnamese, to be demolished, or simply stagnate). Other corners should be
thought of, and so should the place of “the corner” in the life-history
experienced and conceived by individuals. A Deep Locational project
investigating “the ghetto”, or Baltimore, or “the corner” could do all of this,
integrating a reading of *The Corner* with readings of other Baltimore
fictions, with musical and documentary representations of the site, with
researches into urban history and human geography as regards landholding,
arquitecture, or road-building.
Conclusion

Several routes which can be pursued under the heading Deep Locational Criticism have now been showcased. This chapter has been a preview of some of the types of analysis contained in the more in-depth case studies which follow in Chapters 3 to 8 below.

To recapitulate in reverse order, pedagogic examples such as those of Fulham and Baltimore in *The L-Shaped Room* and *The Corner*, examined together with visual and filmic materials, indicate how deeper locational understandings can be developed through the practice of repeated returns, which is examined at greater length in sections of Chapter 4, on the Fortune Playhouse, and in Chapter 7, on the broader idea of the East End of London. The student encounters with imaginative place sites in decayed but differing Anglophone inner cities, would be at an early stage of locational depth, but this is an opportunity rather than a problem. Conversely, discussion of a single novel, and of passages or moments within it, indicate what can be brought to reading by an extreme close-up on particular sites at particular moments, as showcased here in thought about the location or lack of location of Dickens’s Tom-all-alone’s. Finally, discussion of Gwendolyn Brooks and Christina Rossetti in relation to the cities they wrote in can act as a kind of Deep Locational defamiliarization.
Chapter 3. The Heideggerian Fourfold and a Shakespeare Play

This chapter begins by re-examining the intellectual foundations of a locational poetics of scale. This involves some consideration of objections real and potential both to Heidegger and to some of the tenets of Deep Locational Criticism. The first three subsections investigate the theory standing behind the approach, with particular foci on the political meaning of Heidegger’s thinking, on his understanding of art, and on the possibility or otherwise of an interactional approach to literature which would seek to overcome certain problems encountered by the discipline of literary studies since the mid-twentieth century.

The final part of the chapter is a reading of a single work of literature by the most canonized of all literary authors, Shakespeare. In it, the focus is on the text of Henry IV, Part Two, and not on its real or potential actualization as drama in a particular place. The locational criticism practised here draws directly on Heidegger’s later accounts of human being-in-place rather than, as in much this book, drawing eclectically on different empirical disciplines of study as means of repeatedly returning to certain imaginative places from different directions.
Reclaiming Heidegger for Literary Studies

*Mysticism, Fascism and Deconstruction*

Deep Locational Criticism has been announced as a poetics of scale based on the topological thinking of Heidegger as expounded by Malpas. It is worth considering at this point some objections which have been advanced to Heideggerian thinking. To some in Anglo-American academe between the 1970s and the 2000s, Heidegger seemed peculiarly objectionable. Today, there are Heideggerians, and there are others who leave Heidegger alone, and there is not much conversation between them. This present section works as the prelude to a chapter which is the most sustained application in the book so far of Heideggerian topological thinking to a literary text.

Among literary academics who have tried to work with Heidegger but found him problematic, J. Hillis Miller has already been mentioned. Miller (1995, 216-54) came to the conclusion that Heidegger is a peculiarly dangerous figure for the topographic critic. Heidegger may have formulated a view of being as fundamentally placed, but he is tainted by his involvement with Nazism. Indeed, his thought can be seen as inherently Nazi in the sense of being opposed to urban modernity and in descent from the nineteenth-century cultural nationalism founded on what the Third Reich would call “blood and soil” (see Thomson 2005; Wolin 1993).
Heideggerians defend him against the charges. Julian Young writes as follows (2000, 72):

Hölderlin, I want to argue, educated Heidegger, educated him about the nature of poetry and about ... other things too. Heidegger’s deepening understanding of the poet led him out of several disastrous intellectual – and political – positions of the mid-1930s and into the serenity (the “Gelassenheit”) of his later thought. One mark of this tremendous debt to Hölderlin is the fact that the distinctive, and highly poetic, language in which that later thought is couched, the language of the fourfold, of “earth” (in a different meaning to that which it had in “The Origin [of the Work of Art]”, “sky”, “gods” and mortals, is, as Heidegger acknowledges ... taken directly from Hölderlin.

The Heideggerian fourfold mentioned here by Young will be applied in reading a literary text in the present chapter (cf. Young 2002, 92-121; Young 2006). As already stated, Miller (1995, 55) puts the fourfold at the centre of his literary-critical examination of Heidegger, and critiques it, being particularly unhappy with the presence there of gods or “divinities”. Like Miller, the editors of the *Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism* single out as a possible weak point in Heidegger’s thinking the philosopher’s “mysticism and ... quietism, both of which suggest he never abandoned his youthful religious sensibilities” (Leitch 2001, 1120).

But Young reinterprets Heidegger’s “divinities”. Heidegger himself
(1971, 150) describes them as “the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the holy sway of the godhead, the god appears in his presence or withdraws into his concealment”. Young (2000, 129 f.n. 5) glosses this as a reference to what is experienced when “this four-part structure lights up poetically, when, that is, the fundamental values of our culture light up as divinities”. Understood this way, Heidegger’s gods or divinities could work equally well for people who do and for people who do not have religious beliefs. Heidegger rejected any totally material explanation of the universe, associating it with the technocratic homelessness or destitution he saw as characterizing modernity. But it would still be possible to be concerned about “a culture”, defined as a single thing with an essence of “fundamental values”.

Other objections to Heidegger have been expressed apart from those related to religion and politics. Anglophone readers have sometimes found Heidegger’s mode of expression too poetic, too literary, too incantatory, “repetitive and obscure”: he has even been considered “charlatan” rather than philosopher, by a philosopher from the analytic tradition (Leitch 2001, 1120; Inwood [1997], 1). But his way of expressing himself is inseparable from his contention, from Being and Time onwards, that the discussion of what it means for people to exist cannot be distinguished from the actual fact of existence as doing and involvement, continually experienced by everyone. Moreover, some literary critics and human geographers may feel
that Heideggerian place thinking was already fully justified in the 1970s when it was used to assert the value of subjective place experience, in a discipline of geography hitherto dominated by calculating notions of spatial science, and when advocates of slow and considered living in touch with one’s surroundings were drawing on essays such as “Building Dwelling Thinking” for support (see Cresswell 2004, 1-14).

But the truth is still more complex. Thinkers such as Hannah Arendt and Jacques Derrida went further than to forgive Heidegger for his 1930s Nazism. In the post-war decades, they turned to him for a new way of thinking (see Wolin 1993a, 283-90). Not just Derrida’s notion of the philosophical career as pursuit of a winding path, but also the anti-totalizing drive of his deconstructive practice developed from his reading of Heidegger and Husserl. This is particularly apparent in Derrida’s work to undo and open up binary oppositions which, following Heidegger, he viewed as sterile metaphysical constructs (see Spinosa 2005). Completely contrary to the view of Heidegger as a fascistic thinker, fascism could be altogether more single-minded and totalizing.

And yet problems remain. Heidegger asserted, in Malpas’s paraphrase, that “to determine that to which a thing properly belongs is also to determine its proper place or topos” (Malpas 2006, 267). This claim is important to Deep Locational Criticism because it asserts the unique importance to human existence of location. It could, it is true, be understood
in a way completely without political content. But it could equally well be understood as a form of justification for territorial expansion into the natural *lebensraum* pertaining to a certain group of people, or for ethnic cleansing of a sort that reaches its absolute extreme in the extermination camp.

**Literature, Art and Interaction**

The parts of the Heideggerian fourfold have no existence independent of one another. Instead, they exist *interdependently*: “By a *primal* oneness the four – earth and sky, divinities and mortals – belong together in one” (Heidegger 1971a, 149). The concepts of interaction and interdependence could potentially transform understandings not only of the relationship between literature and place, but also, more broadly, of those between agency and determinism, and between genius-based and contextualizing views of literature. In essays such as “The Origin of the Work of Art” (written 1935-37), “Being Dwelling Thinking” (1951) and “The Thing” (1950), Heidegger uses several metaphors for the placed interdependence of being. These include the temple, the bridge, and the act of pouring wine for a guest.

In the present book, Heidegger’s locational thinking is reached with the help of Malpas (esp. 2006; 2012). Alongside Malpas, other recent readers of Heidegger indicate the applicability outside academic philosophy of a broadly Heideggerian mode of thinking. These include Julian Young (2000)
on art, Theodore Schatzki (2007) on an architectural mode of spatial thought, and Stuart Elden (2001) on a political one. Among the most important concepts involved in this philosophy is that of *multiple unity*, in which a place consists of its elements as different things (a river, a country on either side of it, a certain sky), but which also forms a unity in a way that can be gathered together by, for instance, a bridge. And an art work has a particularly controversial and shifting status in Heidegger’s thought. On the reading proposed by Young it involves a clash and a transition between two different approaches to art. In one of these, art is a communal act resembling public worship. In the other, the most confrontational and hard-to-assimilate aspects of modern art are seen as the vital existential helpers in a technocratic world.

For Malpas (2012, 201-2), by reading Heidegger we come to understand any individual thing by walking around it and so seeing its details at the same time as we get a feel for it as a whole. Clearly, although Heidegger is typically associated with long-established and even motionless place relations, this is what we do when we experience somewhere new and try to get a sense of it quickly, be that somewhere an actual town or, say, the world of a writer we are new to. We get a sense of the place which can change us, but we also construct the place in a certain way and transmit it as that to others. In so doing, we actually bring about change within the thing we first gathered data about. And that thing could be literally a place, but it
could also be something else capable of being interpreted in a parallel way, such as a book or an author. Such an approach is based on the interrelation of the elements in a multiple unity.

As a person relates to a place, so a human settlement relates to the physical landscape in which it is situated: each affects the other. In talking about interaction of this sort, Malpas (2012, 149) refers to the French geographer Paul Vidal de la Blanche, who was concerned with how culture and the physical environment interact. This can be distinguished from the claim that within the pairing of human society and natural environment the one constructs the other. Exemplifying this second view in the late nineteenth century, the German proponent of “anthropogeography” Friedrich Ratzel claimed that culture was formed by the physical environment (see Hunter 1983), whereas Lefebvre would later argue, conversely, that seemingly natural formations like landscapes or organically arising human arrangements of space are actually produced by capital, or by culture in the sense of human activity. For both Ratzel and Lefebvre, one term in a binary opposition was to be understood as motivating and dominant, the other as acted upon and moulded by the former.

It would be a mistake to read Lefebvre as entirely monolithic and deterministic, even if he was undeniably far more interested in human power relations as a driver of spatial arrangements than in biological universals or very slowly changing features of physical geography. Consider
the alternative way of viewing things as phrased by Malpas:

The elements within the landscape provide the focus through which the unity of the landscape is grasped, the capacity to grasp the landscape depends on being able to mark out a particular region within which one works, and the unity of the landscape is also grasped through one’s interaction with that landscape even though it is not just a product of such interaction. (Malpas 2012, 203)

Here, in considering an individual’s interaction with a landscape, no element subsumes any other. Someone can only grasp a given landscape as somewhere in particular by cutting it off from everywhere else, an act of cutting that can only happen because that person is involved with where he or she is.

As a foretaste of the literary use of this, substitute text in the previous sentence for landscape. This would mean that in reading a book, we are in a sense part of it, but are in another sense necessarily cutting it off from everything else so as, quite reasonably, to see it as one thing. Work in bibliography and textual criticism has increasingly come to see texts—such as Shakespeare plays, including Hamlet and King Lear—once understood as satisfactory only if seen as a unity, as multiple The point in saying that a literary text is not only one but also multiple is to say that the parts—say an individual character or setting within a story—matter as much as the sense of the whole, and that every reader must also read with a shifting sense in
mind of the whole that is being experienced in a given book, poem, story or play. A reference point here is Chapter 7 of Malpas’s *Place and Experience* (1999, 157-74, esp. 157, 158), entitled “The Unity and Complexity of Place”. In this essay, the argument advanced is that a “richer concept of place” than the one so-far used by philosophers “will look to the appearance of place in contexts outside of philosophy, especially literature”.

Heidegger’s view of art demands further consideration. Instead of as a clash between opposing elements, it can be seen as a fusion or resolution. In “The Origin of the Work of Art” ([1935-36]), as paraphrased by Dreyfus and Wrathall (2005, 12; cf. Dreyfus 2005), a work of art is seen as an act of gathering, through which a group of people can come to “relate to one another in the shared light of the work” and in the process come to see the whole world differently. It will be observed that Dreyfus and Wrathall’s account places less emphasis on splits or divisions within Heidegger’s view of art than does Young’s, with its focus on a disjunction of tradition and avant-garde modernity. Young (2001), meanwhile, does not read “The Origin of the Work of Art” as the definitive expression of Heideggerian (anti-aesthetic) aesthetics, but rather as representing a “Greek” or Hegelian phase in Heidegger’s view of art, within which the job of modernity was to get back into touch with whatever enabled the ancient Greeks to create truly great art. The other phase, Young argues, is one in which Heidegger after the Second World War increasingly appreciated modern art, from the
Romanticism of Hölderlin onwards, as something different a Greek temple or Gothic cathedral, but as not necessarily a failure in its apparently non-communal nature.

Within Deep Locational Criticism, a work of literature should be understood as among other things a work of art in the Heideggerian sense (Dreyfus and Wrathall 2005), an act of gathering together into one which can also bring about change. Seen thus, Heidegger’s view of art surmounts two apparently opposed positions. These are, first, one in which art is produced as an expression of a tradition, the spirit brought about in a people by their sharing a group of texts which contain a way of viewing the world. In Anglophone literary culture Matthew Arnold’s *Culture and Anarchy* expresses this in the notion of Hebraism and Hellenism as warring principles within a single culture. Second, for Heidegger art has a critical and challenging function, not in expressing a connection with the past but in bringing about a radical break with the past (the view embodied in modernism). All in all, Heidegger’s view of art explains cruces in modernist studies which might otherwise prove puzzling, for example the relationship between T.S. Eliot’s “Tradition and the Individual Talent” and *The Waste Land*. In this relationship, as in Heidegger’s different stances on the history of western culture, an argument for the ongoing and necessary centrality of a main tradition stands alongside an obsession with that tradition’s collapse.

Heidegger’s enduring image of the art work, let us remember, is that of a
Greek temple as something whose true beauty consists in being fashioned to purpose. The temple, he says, was useful to a community in the same way that a pair of shoes or a working tool is useful to an individual. In effect, this is to treat the temple as a piece of equipment. The temple’s use is that it both conceals and “encloses” a god and “allows [the god] … to stand forth through the columned hall within the holy precinct” (Heidegger [1935-36], 20). Heidegger goes on:

It is the temple work that first structures and simultaneously gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire for the human being the shape of its destiny. (Heidegger [1935-36], 20-21)

To paraphrase, people’s experience of life is necessarily highly multiple—it consists of unique combinations of thousands of strands—yet life is experienced by individuals as having meaning. Literary works may not be as central to anyone’s lives as temples perhaps were to members of the societies that built them, but they can confer meaning and/or value on the interaction individuals have with the worlds created by human groupings interdependently with an earth that stands beyond all humans.

For another thing, the temple itself could conversely be read in Lefebvre’s terms ([1974], 236) as an example of absolute space (situated in relation to heaven and hell, rather than in space of a sort that can be
measured mathematically) as ruled by “priestly castes” and therefore far from being at one with the existence of people who are not members of such elites. Deep Locational Criticism will keep working to make Heidegger and Lefebvre comment on one another.

Let us consider locational interactions. For one thing, people interact with and alter locations when they simply move into or out of somewhere. In so doing, they make a house and a neighbourhood more or less densely populated. In Alexander Baron’s *The Lowlife* ([1963]), an old white woman starves to death in a London lodging-house and a family of Trinidadian immigrants move in. In Charles Dickens’s *Nicholas Nickleby*, Nicholas and Smike move into the garret room of Newman Noggs. At this level the smallness of the individual becomes apparent. Yet we all make such impacts. The totality of them makes the social world, and taken together they are not small. The view of literature and place taken in Deep Locational Criticism, based on interaction and interdependence, helps establish a balance between a critical, politically radical approach and a seemingly conservative roots-based or tradition-based one. Parallels will be noted with Young’s account of Heidegger on art and Malpas’s reading of Heideggerian topology. The same view based on interaction and interdependence also leads to work with the concept of scale. We—individually, as differing sizes of human grouping—are small in some comparisons, large in others.
One important side of literature is the richness and complexity of the record that it leaves of human interactions with place. Literature is on the one hand whatever we—society, an individual, a group setting itself up in judgement—consider to be literature. It is also any writing that requires us to reflect on what, following Heidegger, can be called our being-in-place. Reading literature and place as crucially interdependent will make certain texts and certain writers more important and more interesting than they may seem in the two means of academic literary canonization most often used at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. These are the defence of the liberal-humanist canon mounted by Harold Bloom ([1994]; [1998]), and the postmodernist and identity politics critiques against which Bloom sought to defend the humanities against. Shakespeare’s *Henry IV, Part Two*, meanwhile, tends to be understood not as an artwork in itself but as part of a series of plays. Looked at locationally, this could change.

To recap, the foundations of Deep Locational Criticism lie in Malpas’s claim (1999, 157), emerging from his reading of Heidegger, that to exist, to think and be conscious, and so to read or write literature is dependent on being a creature that has a grasp of both the subjective space correlated with its own capacities, as well as with the features in its immediate environment, and the objective space which the creature, and its environmental surroundings, are located.

The construction of literary geographies, including the practice of Deep
Locational Criticism, directs attention to that interplay between subjective and objective aspects of placed human existence of which Malpas here speaks.

**The Fourfold of Henry IV, Part Two**

SHALLOW ... I’ll drink to Master Bardolph, and to all the cavalieros about London.

*He drinks*

DAVY I hope to see London once ere I die.

—Shakespeare, *Henry IV, Part Two* (5.3.57-59)

Shakespeare’s *Henry IV, Part Two* is a play that can easily be understood, in the words of René Weis (1997, 1), as “transitional”. This is to say that it can be read as a comparatively minor stage on the road to the heroic monarchy of Prince Hal, afterwards Henry V. In it, the comedy surrounding Sir John Falstaff could seem a somewhat melancholic continuation of the comedy in the play to which this is a sequel, *Henry IV Part One*.

The main plot of *Henry IV, Part Two*, about the prince and his dying father, whom Hal succeeds at the conclusion, and its sub-plot, involving the drunken Falstaff’s increasingly desperate plotting, could seem inadequately
woven together. As James C. Bulman (2002, 166) points out, especially if
*Henry IV, Part Two* is viewed as a continuation of *Part One* rather than as a
text in its own right, it is likely to be seen as “a disappointment ... a pale
imitation of its greater first half”. Reading it this way would mean focusing
on high politics and particularly the story of Prince Hal’s progress towards
rule as Henry V. But as Bulman (2002, 167) then suggests, the play could
instead be read in quite a different way:

> It is as much the obverse of *Part 1* as its sequel. Its originality resides
in the casual, digressive, almost ramshackle way in which it casts a
wide net over England, gathering in social groups whose unwritten
histories rival in importance, even supersede, the official history
which concludes with Hal’s accession.

Deep Locational Criticism could bring something new to the analysis of this
casting of the net, specifically by rereading *Henry IV, Part Two* as not a
history play but a geography play.

In *Henry IV, Part Two*, there are four key imaginative places. As a
reminder, an imaginative place is a place as experienced or imagined: what
comes to mind when someone thinks of somewhere. Evidence of
imaginative place is to be found in literary, visual and other representations,
and such a place is formed through a combination of stereotyping,
 invention, and actual sensory experience. Imaginative place in literature is
not identical to *setting*. The four imaginative places of *Henry IV, Part Two*
to be detailed are not the play’s only settings, for it opens at Warkworth Castle in Northumberland (not on the list). An imaginative place is both what is represented when a work of literature is presented as set somewhere, and what happens through the writing and reception of that work of literature.

Shakespeare’s *Merchant of Venice*, for instance, began by representing Venice to audiences in 1590s London, holding up to them an image of Venice. Shakespeare’s success over the centuries meant that the image of Venice generated here became a thing in itself which ultimately actually affected, even altered Venice. The representation on stage of the city in *The Merchant of Venice* became one contribution to the transformation of Venice into the key European cultural tourist site, the city-as-museum, that it has become since 1600. That Shakespeare has had an impact on and arguably altered Venice is also demonstrated via more precise and localised effects such as the early-twentieth-century staging of it by Max Reinhardt, who used the buildings and streets of the actual Venice as a stage (see Fischer-Lichte 1999).

Returning to *Henry IV, Part Two*, its four key imaginative places are as follows:

i. **Gloucestershire**. This county in the west of England, perhaps contrary to expectations, does not straightforwardly stand for rural England, communion, placed and rooted belonging, festive
comedy and conviviality, although it does have at least some connection with that complex of meaning. Three scenes are set there (3.2, 5.1, 5.3), and tell how Falstaff goes there on a recruiting mission handed him by central, royal government and re-encounters an old companion, Justice Shallow. Reviewing the critical heritage for *Henry IV, Part Two*, Jonathan Crewe (2003, 444-45) states that writers on the play have struggled to include its Gloucestershire scenes in an overall picture of it, tending to treat them as a “backwater”. Indeed, these scenes include little overt description of Gloucestershire itself: no local toponyms, for example. These three scenes seem, indeed, to have been relocated to Gloucestershire from an earlier positioning in Lincolnshire. The whole of 3.2 passes without the county being identified and so the reader could well wonder what if anything is specific to Gloucestershire in these scenes as opposed to other counties (Weis 1997, 12).

ii. **London.** In the play the capital of England can be associated with a complex of related notions: black comedy, with lowlife, with commercialized sex and alcohol consumption, with scrabbling for position in the entourages of powerful people. And London in *Henry IV, Part Two* has a particular association with mortality. The bulk of the first two acts of the play happen there, as do the
last two scenes (1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 5.4, 5.5). Moreover the scenes set in Gloucestershire also contain some of the play’s main discussions of London. In Gloucestershire, Shallow reminisces about his youth in London as an Inns of Court gallant (a law student, in other words), perhaps, in retrospect, glamorizing that phase of his life (3.2.11-32, 5.3.57-59).

iii. The battlefield is somewhere away from the other places, a non-place, even. Yet it affects them, because the outcome of events on the battlefield can yield a new king, and monarchy in the play is quasi-divine. The play opens with rumours about a battlefield that is offstage and prior to the action, that at Shrewsbury where Hotspur’s rebellion is defeated at the climax of Henry IV, Part One. Lord Bardolph says that he “spoke with one … that came from thence” (1.1.25) and as a result brings the false tidings that the Earl of Northumberland’s son has triumphed. After the early allusions to the previous battle (1.1.24, 1.3.26), Lady Percy, Hotspur’s widow, begs that her father-in-law Northumberland “go not to these wars” (2.3.9). After that there are two scenes involving the rebels and royal forces about to meet in battle (4.1, 4.2). In Henry IV, Part Two, rebellion is unsuccessful, but elsewhere in Shakespeare, notably in Richard II, it is not. The battlefield shapes destiny.
iv. **The royal court**, where the king resides, is alluded to by the mere appearance of Prince Henry with a laddish but gentlemanly companion, Ned Poins (2.2). Courtly pleasures are also alluded to when this pair observe Doll Tearsheet kissing Falstaff, the two of them looking on and getting a voyeuristic thrill (2.4.268-62). Focused on London lowlife and high political plotting earlier on, the play moves towards the court after Peto appears in the world of the tavern to remind Prince Henry of another world, saying “The king your father is at Westminster” (2.4.350). At this point the main action of the play shifts its location from tavern to court, as the audience is let in on the night-time suffering of King Henry IV (3.1). The court strand becomes prominent as Prince Henry takes the crown from a pillow beside his sleeping, dying father’s head and tries it on (4.3.174). The final scene of the play brings court and London face to face as the new King Henry V enters the city to be formally presented to the citizens.

In the appearance of London in Gloucestershire during Shallow’s reminiscences, and in the appearance of the court in London as the new king enters, each imaginative place can be seen as a spirit, as an aspect of the play present in its totality.

The play’s quartet of imaginative places can be illuminated through a connection to the Heideggerian fourfold. In fact Shakespeare and
Heidegger, the philosophic play from the 1590s and the poetic philosopher’s concept from the mid-twentieth century, illuminate each other. As indicated already in this book, the notion of the fourfold gradually emerges in writings by Heidegger produced between the late 1930s and the 1949-50 lectures published as “The Thing” (see Malpas 2006, 225-28; Heidegger 1971, 165-86). The fourfold is the relationship between mortals and, above them, gods, with, on a parallel up-down axis earth below and sky above (see Malpas 2012, 17-19; Malpas 2006, 211-303). In Deep Locational Criticism the role of the fourfold is that of a dynamic and flexible tool used for relating people to their surroundings.

In Heidegger’s image of a bridge across a river in “Building Dwelling Thinking”, and in Malpas’s paraphrase (2012, 18-19), what is described is the gathering up of multiple elements into a unity:

the bridge appears as a bridge not through the exercise of its own qualities in determining an otherwise featureless terrain, but through a coming to appearance in which bridge, river, and the entirety of the countryside around it are gathered together as one and as many, and are thereby determined, in their being, as bridge, as river, as countryside.

The fourfold contains the notion of *equiprimordiality*, which means that the elements of a structure are all equally important and irreducible (Malpas 2012, 88-89; cf. Malpas 2006, 306). The gathering of the fourfold,
Heidegger says, always happens somewhere, and in the case of the example being discussed at present, the somewhere is the work of art seen as a thing.

For Heidegger a thing is not an object alone, but an object in the use for which it was shaped, the use which brought it into existence: “The jug’s thingness resides in it being qua vessel. We become aware of the vessel’s holding nature when we fill the jug” (Heidegger 1971, 169). Greek vases or Roman funeral statuary in a museum have, this would be to say, been ripped out of their world of use and hence no longer exist as things. At least until the 1950s, Heidegger considered the meaning of an artefact from the past to lie in its original use only. And perhaps he would have said that the text of a Shakespeare play, when read far from an Elizabethan-Jacobean playhouse, loses its “thing-ness”. But would he have been right? Could things moved or dislocated, instead of being understood as destroyed, be understood as taking on a new thingness?

The dynamism of the fourfold as a model emerges in that the place or *topos* in which being happens, the place that becomes central in Malpas’s reading of Heidegger, is neither simply determinative of, nor determined by, humans. “Instead, it is that within and on the basis of which human being is itself brought to articulate and meaningful appearance” (Malpas 2012, 152-53). What Malpas emphasizes is precisely the material, everyday or earthly nature of the structure. He describes the fourfold as built from “the appearance of the elements of the fourfold as such, the actual sky above us
and the actual earth at our feet”. The fourfold is highly concrete and non-abstract, this is to say.

Two alternative alignments of the four imaginative places of *Henry IV, Part Two* with the Heideggerian fourfold can be conceived. In the first of these, London comes to occupy the place of mortals, Gloucestershire the place of earth, the court the place of the gods, and the battlefield the place of the sky. Alternatively, it might be felt that places cannot stand in for beings, and that therefore “subjects” could be put into the position of mortals, “kings” in the position of gods, London *and* Gloucestershire (ordinary places) in the position of earth, and the battlefield *and* court (special places or perhaps heterotopias) in the position of sky. Here are the two possible alignments arranged graphically.

1.  
   
   | gods       | royal court | sky = battlefield |
   | mortals    | London      | earth = Gloucestershire |

or

2.  
   
   | gods       | kings       | sky = royal court and battlefield |
   | mortals    | subjects    | earth = London and Gloucestershire |

In version 2 “Gods” equals “kings” because while an individual king, *a* Henry, can and necessarily will die, kingship itself does not (on this view of
the universe, at least), because another Henry takes over.

The application of the fourfold to Henry IV, Part Two points the way towards a revised account of the origins of English realism which broadens realism not just from the novel to the drama but also from the earthly to the aerial, the mortal, the divine. In other words it enables realism to encompass the Heideggerian sort of being-in-the-world and being-in-place, whereas other understandings of realism – including Heidegger’s own – have tended to equate it with the belief that only matter which can be observed and recorded by the methods of the natural sciences actually exists. Seen through the fourfold, literary realism stops being naive or illusionistic, and can enrich the more nuanced accounts of realism developed in the twenty-first century (Beaumont 2007; Jameson 2013). And yet Heidegger seems to reject much of the mainstream of post-classical western artistic or cultural production on the grounds that, unlike the art of the ancient world, it is non-communal. As Julian Young puts it, for Heidegger

all Western art is “representational”. It is, in its “essence”, “realism” ..., “mimesis”, “representation (Darsterllung)” .... Hence, Heidegger concludes, it is essentially metaphysical, an oblivion of the Other of beings and hence of Being[.] (Young 2000, 141)

For Heidegger, that is to say, Western art tends to destroy what is not me in what I look at. But this Heideggerian reading leads to a rejection of Heidegger’s own view of realism.
Much of the present book draws its examples from literature set in London. Heidegger himself is closely connected to a very different sort of imaginative place, the rural Black Forest of south-western Germany. In his presentation of himself to others, this one site emerges again and again (see Gadamer 1994, 111-20). Its oddity in relation to Heidegger, in fact a very twentieth-century man, is indicated in an image reproduced by Adam Sharr (2006, 47), “Heidegger walking back to the hut, having filled a bucket with water at the well”, in which the philosopher, pot-bellied, in woollen v-neck jumper, white shirt and dark tie, smirks at the camera, against the background of a picturesque mist-filled vale. As Sharr indicates, there was a sizeable element of the bogus, and even the tongue-in-cheek, in Heidegger’s presentation of himself as a happily absorbed Black Forest artisan, some philosophical cooper or wheelwright. At Todtnauberg, where his mountain cottage is situated, he hosted international literary and academic celebrities, after all (Gadamer 1994, 119). But it is still true that, in Malpas’s words (2006, 314),

The thinking of place that is to be found in Heidegger’s work is … a thinking that … occurs in and through the only “place” it could for Heidegger: in the places and spaces with which he was himself familiar and in which his thinking was embedded—not only the village of Meßkirch, the city of Freiburg, and the locality of Todtnauberg in the Black Forest, but also the particular “topos” of the
lecture hall, the seminar room, and of the philosophical essay.

The thinking of this present book occurs, comparably to the position of Heidegger in Meßkirch, Freiburg, Todtnauberg and surroundings, in and through London – but also the particular “topos” of literary criticism.

Staying with London, let us now examine the argument that in a view of the imaginative places of the play in the Heideggerian fourfold, London in *Henry IV, Part Two* should be put in the position of mortals. The “we” of Shakespeare’s audience was in London. The readers or viewers of *Henry IV; Part Two* today may, of course, be in London or elsewhere. Wherever they are, however, London as imaginative place still has the quality of home, of “here”, in the play. Thinking deictically, what is on stage gestures at what is to be found in the streets of the Bankside. In this, the play represents a vital phase in the development of the English realist tradition, with Defoe and Dickens following in its wake.

At the same time it is important to remember the ways in which Shakespeare’s play is quite unlike later realist literary works. For instance, it was initially staged on a bare, apron stage with no attempt at creating the illusion of somewhere else. In its treatment of history, Sir John Oldcastle had become Sir John Falstaff, and Falstaff is far from being a representation of the historical Oldcastle with the name changed. Shakespeare clearly felt no need for his subplot to be factually accurate. And the London of the play is the London of 1600 rather than that of 1400. Shallow’s *alma mater*
Clement’s Inn, for example, was only established in the late fifteenth century.

The London of the play is actually about mortality, or contains mortality as one of its special characteristics. One can die anywhere, of course: in the play there are deaths in battle, and Henry IV dies at court in Westminster. But London is the imaginative place in the play in which the inherent mortality of humans is emphasized. Falstaff will die, and his every drinking session or sex act is an effort to seize the day because the day will pass. The red or purple face of Bardolph, “that arrant malmsey-nose knave” (2.1.38), “the fiery Trigon” (2.4.263) contains the story of his imminent death from drinking, and therefore contains his past, is his present, and indicates his future. In the play’s Londoner characters, including the page boy, Mistress Quickly and Doll Cutpurse, life is spanned: death waits for all. Thinking of the London of his youth, Shallow reflects, “Jesu, Jesu, the mad days that I have spent! And to see how many of my old acquaintance are dead”. His fellow justice of the peace, Silence, responds, “We shall all follow, cousin” (3.2.31-33). The play’s carpe diem aspect is peculiarly tainted with a sense of mortality, and this complex of meaning is specifically located in London.

This is a key point about the workings of what could be called realist-historical fiction, fiction set in a relatively knowable and evidence-laden past which on balance follows the conventions of realism. Chapter 4 of this book is concerned with the site of the Fortune Playhouse and its impact
across time, and Dickens’s *Barnaby Rudge* ([1841]) and other works dealing with London as a site of drink-fuelled, violent disorder could be brought into the same orbit as *Henry IV, Part Two*, so breaking with the usual paradigm of historicist literary studies.

To put London in *Henry IV, Part Two* into the position of the mortals in the Heideggerian fourfold is to view it as a kind of analogy to the Freudian ego, to view it as a beset, threatened *I*-position. The play’s London scenes, which are misunderstood if thought to be only or even chiefly about the character of Falstaff, are at the very heart of it. Central to Heideggerian topological thinking is the figure of homecoming (see Malpas 2006, 309). Associating London with the position in the fourfold of mortals makes London the centre of the play. This is a very different matter from seeing the lowlife scenes as Shakespeare’s off-the-cuff condescension to the groundlings, in a play that is really about the nature of royal political power and how it should be exercised (whether treated in the manner of Tillyard (1944) or Greenblatt (1985)).

Turning to the other components of the play’s fourfold, Gloucestershire is, in part, a site associated with greater honesty or integrity than London, but in part it is merely somewhere whose inhabitants are more credulous than Londoners. It has no real ethical or moral superiority over London, this is to say. Gloucestershire contains the stooge Shallow, brought down by his nostalgic aspirations to city gallant status, but there are also the plain-
speaking conscripts Ralph Mouldy, Simon Shadow, Thomas Wart, Francis Feeble and Peter Bullcalf (3.2.98-180). Both London and Gloucestershire are earthly sites. In the play’s fourfold, Earth can be understood as encompassing elements of both London and Gloucestershire: which is to say hedonism, work avoidance, ageing, the smartness of the servant boy in London, and the passive resistance of the recruits in Gloucestershire. Both are places to be found at a certain fixed location on maps, rather than concepts which can be located in more than one position on the surface of the earth, as can the court and the battlefield. Gloucestershire is rural and as such sits in a country-city opposition with London. At the same time it is the source of the king’s men – or at least the ones presented to the audience – on the battlefield. It is a synecdoche of rural England, a part that stands for the whole country, just as any slice of orange or individual grape contains the whole of what an orange or a grape or fruit in general is.

At this stage it is worth making reference forward to the idea of *manywheres* which emerges when we investigate a writer who apparently writes of nowhere: Samuel Beckett (see Chapter 8 below). Manywheres are literary locations which are simultaneously more than one thing. Whereas in the purer sort of realism, the normality or actuality of a location, its central and even its only true meaning, is understood to be that which can be found on a map, in some other sorts of writing, including that of Beckett and Shakespeare, this sense of a location co-exists with others, so that
Gloucestershire in *Henry IV, Part Two* is at once the Gloucestershire mapped by Christopher Saxton in 1576, and an imaginative place that is on earth, in England, but is not London.

Falstaff goes to Gloucestershire recruiting. He is the representative of the centre in so far as both the court and London are centres of the country. So centre goes to provinces, but the provinces also write back in the shape of the recruits (cf. Heidegger [1934]). The provinces, through the men of Gloucestershire, prove themselves to be, not a subordinate periphery, but a true whole, in the human comedy of the recruits Mouldy, Shadow, Wart, Feeble and Bullcalf, in the sense of the soil, and in the melancholic, reflective time shared by Shallow and Falstaff as they get drunk together.

What is happening in all this is that the minor subordinates the major in a way reminiscent of the postcolonial literary criticism of Frederic Jameson and Gayatri Spivak, who also describe processes in which it is colonial subjects who write back to the centre.

The court is in or close to London, next to London at Westminster; the men are taken to the battle. The court is the gods because the court can pass pitiless judgement on mortal London and its embodiment Falstaff. As a young man flirting with lowlife, Hal was one of the gods walking amongst mortals, among whom Ned Poins is as mortal as Falstaff.

The battle is sky because it is nowhere, just “up there”; it is where the gods live as mortals live on earth, in that whoever wins the battle in *Henry
*IV, Part One, Henry IV, Part Two and Henry V* rules, is the triumphant god, subordinates mortals and earth. Individual kings die but monarchy does not. The battle is where destiny lives.

Version 1 in the diagram, the “all-place” reading, is not so neat an analogy for the structure or world of the play as version 2 is. After all, the court (put into the position labelled “gods”) cannot really be said to live in the battlefield (putting that into the position labelled “sky”), even if the battlefield is where court factions clash; London (as “mortals”) does not dwell in Glouestershire (as “earth”), even though Falstaff, when he goes there, encounters profundities of living and dying that are hidden from him in London. In version 1, all four of the components of the fourfold are imaginative places. This means that version 1 is somewhat more elegant than version 2 and indeed is more of a departure from orthodox readings of *Henry IV, Part Two*, which privilege character and human roles such as monarchy. Each version has its advantages. And having the two versions of the fourfold reading alongside one another reveals more than having just one of them would. It indicates the provisional status of any attempt to line up this art work, this *act* of gathering, against the *concept* of gathering, the fourfold.

**Conclusion: Multiple Temporalities, Multiple Fourfolds**
The locational reading of *Henry IV, Part Two* presented here, in which the imaginative places of the play are provisionally aligned with the Heideggerian fourfold, does something different from orthodox readings of it as a history play. Such orthodox readings are liable to freeze the play in time, either in 1596, as an inaccurate or accurate reading by 1596 of 1413, seeing it naively as pure history, or through the lens of an over-sophisticated historicism. One of the things the fourfold reading does differently is that it understands the times to be as interactive and interdependent as the places. But the point is that, in human experience as mediated through literature, being *placed* is prior to being situated in time, and this crucially contradicts narratologists’ readings of literature, whose focus on the internal temporality of narrative can rarely grasp literature’s real-place relations and resonances. The bond between time and space keeps on reasserting itself (Bakhtin [1937-38]; Keunen 2011; cf. Malpas 2012, 56-7). Notably it has done so in the alignment which has emerged in this chapter between the London of *Henry IV, Part Two* and the mortality of humans.

A further interim conclusion is that place must be understood as interaction, interdependence, mutuality, multiple unity. First, we see how real place (London, Gloucestershire) and symbolic space (royal court, battlefield) interact, are interdependent. We see how “gods: court” and “mortals: London” threatened to break down into “gods: Prince Hal” and
“mortals: Falstaff”. Prince Hal is mortal and even monarchy can only exist in its place, the court; it is the placedness of each of the four that holds them together.

All this is to follow Version 1 of the fourfold given above, the all-place option, rather than Version 2, the people-and-places option. Exaggerating this preference for Version 1 would be wrong: Falstaff does not die in the play, even though his mortality is emphasized over that of others, whereas other mortals, notably King Henry IV but also the dead of the battlefield, do die during the play. To repeat, having both version 1 and version 2 of the fourfold reading of Henry IV, Part Two alongside each other is more illuminating than having either individually.

Finally, fourfold-based readings such as this help mediate the relationship between great artists and their surroundings or environment. The communality of Henry IV, Part Two consists both in its place in 1590s London and in its place in English (and Western and now what is called global) literary history as a foundational realist text. Shakespeare was indeed among the initiators of English literary realism, and here the artist and his surroundings also interacted and were interdependent. Henry IV, Part Two is the work of a great artist, not only a successful professional, and it is not merely an outcome or reflection of the 1590s, that time’s theatre, or Elizabethan politics. It is also a work in place, that massively emerges from the environments of London, of Shakespeare’s rural West Midlands, of
monarchy, of a world in which warfare in the time of the Wars of Religion, the Livonian War, the Revolt in the Netherlands, and English activities on land and at sea, in Ireland and America, could seem, in a way perhaps exemplified by the death of Philip Sidney, to be where the gods lived. But all this is to speak of a play as literature rather than as drama or theatre, and it is to drama and theatre that I turn in the next chapter.
Chapter 4. The Precise Spot Occupied by a Renaissance Playhouse

Theatre and Thing

This chapter is about crossing historical boundaries. The focus will be on the way that Deep Locational Criticism can problematize but also enrich our understanding of the borderlines between historical periods most often used by literary scholars. The approach can help students and researchers grasp or experience in a new way the London inhabited and written about by medieval writers, say, or a site that existed far more recently, such as the Jewish shtetls of the Russian Empire’s western parts and its successor states. In both of these examples, the place concerned has disappeared or been obliterated, and cannot be visited in any meaningful way today.

The example I shall be discussing in detail is the London site between 1600 and approximately 1660 of the Fortune Playhouse, just north of the walls of the City of London. Its coordinates of are 51°31’22”N 0°5’38”W (Wikipedia, “Fortune Playhouse”; cf. the map in Adams ([1917])) or, put another way (Bowsher 2012, 220), “at c NGR 532321 182091”. These references do not evoke the atmosphere of a location at any particular moment, but indicate a single position on the earth’s surface.
The source for the coordinates is the name, Playhouse Yard, given in around 1660 to a street lined with tenements, built where the theatre had formerly stood. Since the Second World War, the street has been called Fortune Street; The best evidence for how the building was oriented on its site is provided by a 1630s version of the so-called Ryther map. This map, not very accurate when it was first produced and by the 1630s about fifty years out of date (with some prominent buildings having been added or removed in the efforts to suggest that it had been updated), shows a large multi-sided building with a flag on the roof in position between today’s Golden Lane (then usually called Golding Lane) and Whitecross Street, towards the Golden Lane side a little way north of Beech Street (see Bowsher 2012, 98-103; for photographs of the area now, Images 4- 7 [typesetter: these images to be placed close to here please], Finch 2013b). The building’s dimensions are described in a famous contract between its developers and a contractor they employed to build it and, based on this, there have been various attempts to reconstruct its appearance, including a full-scale theatre building in Japan. The archaeologist Julian Bowsher (2012, 220) concludes that the Fortune straddled today’s Fortune Street, occupying both the site of the low-rise 1950s blocks of the Golden Lane Estate which are today immediately north of that street, and the small public park to the south (captured by Bowsher in a photograph he uses to guide today’s walkers).
Put simply, this is the place of the Fortune. But identification by co-ordinates provides little understanding of how the site itself interacted with the literary texts and performances associated with it. Nor does it clarify the meaning of this zone within the long-term history of the theatre in London, or explain how an understanding of this zone modifies that history. In search of depth, the Locational critic will turn to the most detailed topographical and historical accounts of the specific area under review. But there is no coverage of the Fortune’s site in either the *Victoria County History* of Middlesex or the *Survey of London*. In the latter, the neighbouring areas of Shoreditch and Clerkenwell have been described, one much more recently than the other (Bird 1922; Temple 2008a; Temple 2008b), but not the belt of land in between. All we can say is that, in its own time, the Fortune had the parish of St Giles-without-Cripplegate as its administrative, local-government identity.

This chapter examines how understandings or experiences of the site occupied in the early modern period by the Fortune playhouse should be related to existing knowledge of the plays performed there, the people who were involved in those performances, and the earlier and later history of the site. What in the Middle Ages was the zone beyond the walls of London became after World War II the site of the Golden Lane Estate, having gone through at least four major phases in between: the early Stuart era of the playhouse; the late Stuart era of suburban residential development; a long
period of residential decline; and the abandonment of the area by residents as it became increasingly the site of commercial premises only.

When the object of study is—in Heidegger’s terms—works of literary art, it is worth looking at a claim made in “The Origin of the Work of Art”: that if one reads great writers of the past, even in the best modern critical editions, one is reading them “torn out of their own essential space” (Heidegger 2002, 19-20). Even if there were an Elizabethan-Jacobean playhouse actually standing in the position it occupied in 1603 without ever having moved during the intervening centuries, “the world of the work that stands” would, on Heidegger’s account, have “disintegrated”. We might remember this when visiting a Gothic cathedral or Greek temple.

Heidegger’s assertion questions the idea implied in a work such as Bowsher’s Shakespeare’s London Theatreland or in the act of reconstruction of “Shakespeare’s Globe” on the South Bank of the River Thames: that the past can be preserved or revived. For Heidegger, when the culture goes, so does the site. When the god leaves the temple (because people stop believing in the ancient Greek pantheon of Gods), then the temple stops existing. This is quite hard to grasp, perhaps, unless we think of a former church building which can well be understood as no longer a church because it is now functioning as flats or a museum, say. Not far north of the site of the Fortune lies the deconsecrated church of St Luke’s, Old Street (1733), bombed during the Second World War, a burned-out
shell until the 1990s and now a concert hall. But Heidegger means that the meaning of places like Westminster Abbey and St Paul’s Cathedral in London, too, which might appear to have escaped the ravages of time, has similarly disintegrated.

I have chosen the Fortune partly because its site has more resonances for me personally than do the sites of the other Elizabethan-Jacobean playhouses, and partly because as a site it is less coloured by heritage arguments and performances than the much more famous Globe. A long time ago, the Fortune disappeared from sight into the areas north of the City of London that became first new housing development in the Restoration, then a dark and notorious neighbourhood, and later still a merely shabby and anonymously site of commerce. Very close by was Grub Street, later Milton Street, associated with hack writers to this day but in the early nineteenth century, according to Jerry Wright (2007, 235), the home of a desperately poor and drink-sodden colony of shoemakers. Despite the existence of a visual image of the theatre in the Ryther map, it is not remembered as graphically as the Globe on the Bankside, which almost by accident appears in the foreground of various famous views, some of them by Wenceslaus Hollar, for example. And while Bowsher’s archaeological guidebook identifies the whole playhouse world of the Elizabethan-Jacobean capital as “Shakespeare’s London theatreland”, Shakespeare himself was never associated with the Fortune.
Before getting into the nitty-gritty, I will spell out the stages through which the present chapter has passed. First I identified the coordinates of the 900 or so square metres of earth on which the playhouse stood. Then I turned back from this to the theoretical framework of Deep Locational Criticism via Heidegger’s claim (2002, 19-20) that works of art have their own “essential space”. Then I went through standard works on the Fortune Playhouse, trying to find out as much as possible about its situation, but just as crucially about the atmosphere or feel of the neighbourhood between 1600 and 1660. I paid particular attention to discussions of the second Playhouse building in its age of decline and demolition. Emphasizing the building and its site prevents us from over-valuing the moments in its history which are taken to be classic or essential. In this case these would be the first decades of the seventeenth century, when the Fortune hosted the premieres of plays by dramatists still known to later centuries.

Some strange moments caught my attention. For instance there were spells in the 1640s, after the theatres were closed by order of Parliament in 1642, when the players—perhaps hungry and desperate for money—reoccupied it and started earning their living there once again. In this reading focusing on the building, the date 1642 becomes a more porous boundary than it has tended to be in histories of the English theatre. Finally, I visited and took photographs (Finch 2013b). These show the site from the east and west, together with some other details now visible there.
Let us check through the details. The key facts about the establishment and construction of the Fortune are set out by Herbert Berry (2002, 156; my emphasis):

Soon after the Globe opened, Philip Henslowe and Edward Alleyn, neighbors at the Rose, set about building a public playhouse called the Fortune for Alleyn’s players. Alleyn, who was to invest about £100 more than Henslowe, acquired a lease on property *in Middlesex, some 100 yards beyond the northwest boundary of the City*, on December 22, 1599. The two of them then drew up a contract (which survives) on January 8, 1600, with a builder, Peter Street, who had pulled down the Theatre for the Burbages and probably built the Globe.

The site did indeed lie beyond the historic walls of London, but it nevertheless lay in the City ward of Cripplegate Without. This is a small but important correction. The new playhouse’s situation seems likely to have been chosen because land that Henslowe and Alleyn could afford was offered for sale there, and because the area, newly built up in 1603 (Clout 1991, 64), was accessible by foot from the City and the newest residential districts to the west.

This first Fortune building burned down in December 1621, but a replacement on the same site, “between Golden Lane and Whitecross Street, its entrance by way of Golden Lane” (Clout 1991, 64), opened in March 1623 and remained officially open until 1642. In the autumn of 1643, a
newsbook recorded “[t]he players’ misfortune at the Fortune in Golding Lane, their players’ clothes being seized upon in the time of a play by authority from the Parliament” (cited Adams [1917], 290). Plays were briefly staged at the Fortune in early 1648, but in March of the following year, just after the execution of Charles I, “the stage and seats were dismantled” by soldiers “so as to render the building unsuitable for dramatic purposes” (Adams [1917], 291).

By 1656, according to Berry (2002, 161; cf. Adams [1917], 292), the Fortune “was ruinous ... for lack of repairs”. Parts of the building had fallen down by the time of the Restoration, and in February 1661 the land was advertised as “to be built upon”, the theatre’s status as “totally demolished” recorded in March 1662 (Adams [1917], 293). So appears to end a story that neatly spans the age of Early Modern English drama that figures as a distinct temporal entity in university syllabi and academic publishers’ catalogues today. But appearances can be deceptive. Traces of the Fortune, as we shall see, remained in the neighbourhood for hundreds of years thereafter.

English Renaissance drama is well-documented and has been researched exhaustively for over a century. What can a Deep Locational approach bring to the study of it? For one thing it means shifting the focus from writer, text and performance to the physical and locational aspects which have formerly been of interest only as background or supporting details. In Heideggerian
terms these are part of the “thingly” side of the art works of the age. For Heidegger the art work is not about the creator or the audience but, in the words of Hubert L. Dreyfus (2005, 407),

performs at least one of three ontological functions. It manifests, articulates, or reconfigures the style of a culture from within the world of that culture. It follows that, for Heidegger, most of what hang in museums, what are admired as great works of architecture, and what are published by poets were never works of art, a few were once artworks but are no longer working, and none is working now.

For Heidegger, the importance of art lies in what he calls its “poetic essence” through which “art breaks open an open place, in whose openness everything is other than usual” (Dreyfus and Wrathall 2005, 12). Art gives a sense of meaning and togetherness to a certain group of people but also opens up new ways of viewing the world. As such, Heidegger’s view of art combines two notions which in artistic and literary theory have often been understood as opposed, that of tradition and that of revolutionary change. Heidegger’s stance here can be understood as an anti-aesthetic one, equally unconcerned with beauty, with the act of viewing (or some other sort of consumption), or with any notion of the artist’s individual genius.

In Heidegger’s terms, the artwork is something that a culture, a large group of people, *does* something with, yet that, equally, does something *to* them. Heidegger claims that the “thingly” qualities of art works have often
been forgotten: the hymns of Hölderlin had their place alongside cleaning
gear inside the knapsack of a World War One German soldier, while the
works of Beethoven sit alongside lumber in the publisher’s store room
(Heidegger [1935], 2-3). This is to think of the texts of poems and the texts
of music as things which need printing and circulation—and while their
physicality in our own era is increasingly often digital, it is nonetheless still
physical in that format. Heidegger reminds us of their materiality. To look at
the place of the Fortune is to think of the thingly aspect of performance.

This is indeed what much recent work on the early modern English
theatre has done, although not quite in the terms proposed here. Ever since
the 1980s interchanges between culture, politics and literature in early
modern England have been discussed by scholars such as Andrew Gurr
([1987]), Stephen Orgel, David Norbrook and David Starkey in a way that
focuses above all on personal networks and relationships. In Deep
Locational Criticism, the site of the Fortune, identified by its coordinates, is
placed alongside other sites in different times and places, not other aspects
of that particular age and place. In a literary geographic approach, however,
the supporting disciplines are archaeology, architecture, and human
geography, and a new kind of temporal dimension is introduced. The
historicist and contextualist reading of the Fortune inspired by scholars such
as Gurr, Norbrook and Orgel, and continued by others including Tiffany
Stern, is likely to be interested in its site at the particular moment when it
was hosting plays, not at the moment when Henslowe and Alleyn selected it, or when it was “ruinous”—not to mention the expanses of time before 1598 and after 1656.

In 1600, the Fortune was on London’s perimeter. A Deep Locational critic will consider multiple time periods and pay attention to temporal gaps and connections. Through such work on the place of the Fortune, connections emerge with the East End’s spatial shifts over time (see Chapter 7 below), and with the London periphery in Dickens’s *Barnaby Rudge*. All three cases could figure in a spatial literary history of the London periphery.

**Afterlives and Repeated Returns**

The Deep Locational discussion of the “thingly” physicality of this particular theatre and the mark it made on the London cityscape calls attention to its afterlife. We are more accustomed to looking at the afterlife of texts and writers than of the buildings in which books were written or plays performed, or of the streets in which people walked.

The place of the Fortune lived on after the disappearance of the actual theatre in that it left traces behind it. On John Rocque’s 1746 map of London its site is marked by the narrow street “Playhouse Yard”. The site already carried the name in 1677, according to a map of that date (Adams
(1917), 270-71), and the same name, written “Play House Yard” by a
mapmaker, still survived in 1868 (Weller [1868]). Today, Google Maps and
visits to the site take one to Fortune Street, London ECIY. This street name,
like its predecessor, records the former presence of the theatre. Playhouse
Yard ran, and Fortune Street runs, between Whitecross Street (marked as
“White Cross Street” in 1746) and Golden Lane, the location indicated by
Berry for the playhouse. Questions arise, however. Was the playhouse built
north or south of the street? Do the flats of the post-war Golden Lane Estate
today sit on its site? At the western, Golden Lane end of Fortune Street,
north of the street, we find a block of flats called Fortune House. Did the
City of London, landlords and planners of the Estate, or the architects they
hired, know that this marked the site of the playhouse?

One question would be about how this should be understood. In the terms
of archaeologists more concerned to gather and present the information than
to interpret it? Or in the more polemical terms of Lefebvre ([1974], 403), for
whom the “stratified and tangled” spatial networks of past cities reveal
oppressive histories and acts of resistance to power? The local memory of a
playhouse having stood thereabouts was preserved for centuries in the name
“Playhouse Yard”, for example on the Rocque map of 1746. This sort of
survival could be distinguished from the conscious topographic
antiquarianism of the new-old name “Fortune Street”, which goes hand-in-
hand with the twentieth-century municipal and even somewhat socialist
architecture, modernist in style but on a human scale, of the Golden Lane Estate. So what are we actually to do with the traces the Fortune left behind?

One route towards answering such questions would be to consult the archives of the City of London in the hope of discovering what, precisely, lay behind the decision to rename the street in this way. By the mid-twentieth century Fortune, personified as Dame Fortuna with her wheel in earlier times, had perhaps taken on more clearly positive associations. Are we to follow the school of thought associated with Peter Ackroyd (2000) and think that the traces left by the Fortune somehow later haunted this liminal zone on the City of London’s northern edge, its neighbours in 1746 including “Loyd’s Brewhouse” and in 1878 a mortuary and a saw mill (Ordnance Survey [1878])? In point of fact, the subsequently shabby and undistinguished commercial area on the City’s northern fringes and the former house of entertainment in or at least near the fields of the “Shakespeare” era turn out to be more similar than hitherto apparent.

Deep Locational Criticism involves repeated returns. In the present chapter, as in this book’s sections on Limehouse and the idea of the East End, I go back into London. More specifically, I return to its edges at different moments in the city’s history. Following earlier chapters’ attention to the lowlife scenes in *Henry IV, Part Two* and to African American urban experience as depicted on screen and in poetry, this chapter thus forms part of a pattern of returns to grimy urban modernity in its multiple Anglophone
forms. The book’s other repeated returns include returns to writers who seem to efface or muddy their placedness, including Beckett and Rossetti. And Deep Locational Criticism also involves oscillation between viewing an imaginative place in close-up and viewing it from a distance, part of the approach’s poetics of scale. In the next section, the focus tightens onto a single play, *The Roaring Girl* (1611) by Thomas Middleton and Thomas Dekker, which was not merely staged at the Fortune, but was also self-conscious about that fact.

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**The Roaring Girl on London’s Peripheries**

*A Guide for the Provincial Gallant?*

Apart from a period in the 1630s when the company usually based at the Red Bull, not far to the north-west in Clerkenwell, performed there, the Fortune was tenanted by the Admiral’s Men, afterwards the Palsgrave’s Men and eventually Prince Charles’s Men. One way of knowing what was put on there would therefore be to look at the repertoire of this company. As the company evolved, it may have continued to stage successful plays from its earlier history at the Rose on the Bankside, plays that dated back to before 1600 and the construction of the first Fortune. It seems that in the 1590s the Admiral’s Men’s repertoire included plays like Marlowe’s *Jew of*
Malta, Tamburlaine and Tamburlaine Part 2, Peele’s Battle of Alcazar and Lodge’s The Wounds of Civil War (Knutson 2002, 186). But it is not known whether the company went on staging these plays in the later, Jacobean and Caroline, years nor how the staging of them evolved. Like the Red Bull, the Fortune tended to be described by contemporaries as a large, noisy, outdoor venue with a downmarket crowd. After these preliminary thoughts on the literary content staged at the Fortune, the lens can move in on one play.

A play’s text contains within itself traces of the environment in which it was originally staged. The number of characters in any play, for instance, has some relationship to the size of the company for which it was originally written. The relationship between text and physical environment can be seen with unusual clarity in a play like The Roaring Girl. Many plays in the pre-newspaper era contained references to contemporary events. These were usually disguised or displaced since they could get playwrights into trouble, as in the case of The Isle of Dogs by Thomas Nashe and Ben Jonson in the 1590s, or A Game at Chess by Middleton himself in the 1620s. The Roaring Girl, however, is unique among the plays of this era in being all about “a living person of contemporary notoriety” (Mulholland 1987, 20). At the conclusion of one performance of the play Mary Frith, the original for Moll, may actually have appeared onstage at the Fortune to “dance a jig” (Griffiths [2004]). In the words of the play’s editor Paul Mulholland (1987, 21), The Roaring Girl
goes to considerable lengths to depict the stuff of City life. Topographical references, topical allusions, street scenes involving typical London figures, and a lively shop scene establish onstage the ambience, manners and by-ways familiar to its audience. At points the stage illusion becomes self-conscious.

Moreover, the play contains a number of references both direct and indirect to features of the Fortune playhouse itself.

Notable among these instances of meta-theatrical self-consciousness is Sir Alexander Wengrave’s speech early on in the play, beginning with the announcement that “The furniture that doth adorn this room / Cost many a fair grey groat ere it came here”. He could be understood as talking, within the framed fictional world of the play, about his own house, where the scene is set. But as he goes on, the audience is given a much clearer indication that Sir Alexander is breaking the boundary between stage and spectators by talking about them and the building in which they find themselves for the moment:

Stories of men and woman, mixed together

Fair ones with foul, like sunshine in wet weather –

Within one square a thousand heads are laid

(Middleton and Dekker [1611] I.ii.17-19)¹

Also, “the twopenny gallery at the Fortune” is a site where Moll claims once

¹ Parenthetical act, scene and line references hereafter in this chapter are to the same
to have spotted a pickpocket in action (V.i.283-4).

Mulholland (1987, 17) suggests that the setting of *The Roaring Girl* might be seen as little more than a cloak for what he calls its “central romantic action”, “a variation on the New-Comedy formula”. Coppélia Kahn, introducing the most recent edition of the play, focuses on its gender-bending thrills, embodied in the “irresistible” title character Moll Cutpurse (Kahn 725). Neither Mulholland nor Kahn says anything about the situation of the play’s performance on the edge of London outside the walls, however, and neither of them considers how this might be connected to the spatial indexicality contained in the play’s text and potential actualization in performance. Even a broadly spatialist reading of the play such as that of Kelly Stage (2009), while it mentions many of the zones and imaginative boundaries on London’s peripheries that will appear in the present discussion of *The Roaring Girl*, has nothing to say about the relationship between this and the site of the Fortune playhouse.

Yet alongside questions of ethics, including the satirical depiction of London as a corrupt centre of power and wealth which is emphasized by Mulholland, and questions of gender roles (put bluntly, whether the play is misogynistic, feminist, or both), the complex mirror relationship between the play’s setting and the site of its initial siting is central to its meaning. For one thing the setting is prominent in the actual words of the play’s text. This
is emphasized through the repeated use of toponyms and features of Jacobean London such as the two debtors’ prisons known as the Wood Street Counter and the Poultry Counter.

The setting is also uncannily close to the situation in which the first audience of *The Roaring Girl* would have found themselves when they walked out of the playhouse after having watched it and the other entertainments packaged together with it. In referring to the physical surroundings of its first staging, the play is not unique: many writers of the era, including Nashe and Jonson, presented their own city environment in comparable fashion. But *The Roaring Girl* does contain some remarkable moments that seem close to deictic indications of sites close to the Fortune, and relevant to discussions of spatial deixis elsewhere in this book.

An example is that of a proposed walk out to “Hogsden” (today’s Hoxton), a few hundred metres north east of the Fortune’s site, which will involve a stop at “Parlous Pond”, very close indeed to the Fortune, immediately across Old Street to the north (II.i.412; see the useful map in Mulholland’s edition: Dekker 1987, xiv). And when a citizen of London refers to “my barns and houses / Yonder at Hockley Hole” (III.i.95), one can imagine the actor in the theatre physically gesturing due west. That was the direction in which the hamlet of Hockley-in-the-Hole on the Fleet River lay, a kilometre west of the Fortune. The actor would probably have indicated the direction of the playhouse’s entrance on Golden Lane, though it is hard
to be more specific about the actual alignment of the building: the contract between Henslowe and Alleyn and their contractor (see Adams [1917], 274-77; reconstructions, Mulholland 1987, 44-5) specifies materials and dimensions only, merely stating that in most respects the Fortune would be similar to the same businessmen’s playhouse on the Bankside south of the Thames, the Globe. On the apron stage the actor could have been facing in any direction. It is impossible to be sure what the player at the Fortune physically did when he said this line. But still, perhaps more than in any of the play’s other lines, the presence of the Fortune is contained here, in what readers not yet thinking in a Deep Locational way might see as merely a throwaway piece of detail. Through the one phrase “Yonder at Hockley Hole”, we can go beyond the interest of a gender-bending Moll and recognise the presence of the site in the text.

Other such sites also appear. An ale-house called “Pimlico”, due north of Parlous pond, is named more than once as a potential destination, a trip there being promoted by one character almost in the manner of a paid-for advertisement as “a boon voyage to that nappy land of spice cakes” (V.i.57-58). In fact, the play contains an extraordinary range of reference to sites, particularly around London and, within London, places with lowlife associations such as prisons, so much so that The Roaring Girl almost amounts to a tourist guide to lowlife London in an era when a very high proportion of those staying in London were temporary sojourners. But this
is not the sort of guidebook that would proliferate in the nineteenth century, the sort linked with a name like Baedeker, that would concentrate on a list of approved sites and respectable promenading routes, plus advice about prices and how to avoid being cheated. Instead, it is a guide to the hangouts and habits of gallants, citizens, beggars pretending to be war veterans, those playing around with gender roles, and pompous nouveau-riche merchants, together with assorted hustlers and hangers-on. In its function as a guidebook the play seems to be aimed at young and not-so-young men, chiefly visiting London from provincial England and hoping for an adventure in the metropolis. From The Roaring Girl such consumers will, for one thing, learn about sites within walls of the City of London. Among these—and functioning as a direct warning about what will happen to them if they get carried away with their adventures—are the Wood Street Compter and the Poultry Compter, debtors’ prisons, whose functioning is detailed with relish by Sir Alexander (III.iii.85-95). But above all they will learn about sites on London’s periphery and within its orbit but not actually governed from the Guildhall, the City of London’s town hall: sites that are part of London but beyond the walls. Some of these have a fame which has transcended London: “Bedlam” (III.iii.83); “Barthol’mew Fair” (III.iii.160). But those most frequently mentioned call for more critical mediation—in the terms of Roger D. Sell (2001)—because twenty-first century students and theatre audiences are likely to be unfamiliar with them.
An important part of the world pointed out in *The Roaring Girl* to its first audience of aspirant gallants are the fields around London. These were a key place of resort, a site of conspiracies, assignations and dubious business activities from time immemorial until their final disappearance in the first half of the nineteenth century. In the fields were to be found Parlous Pond and the Pimlico tavern, and it is at Gray’s Inn Fields that Moll and Laxton arrange a meeting (II.i.295), just north-west of where London’s buildings stopped in 1610 (Clout 1991, 64)—“behind Gray’s Inn” is where Shakespeare’s erstwhile gallant Justice Shallow (*Henry IV, Part Two*, 3.2.29-30) claims to have fought in his youth “with one Samson Stockfish, a fruiterer”. Out on the fields waiting for Moll, Laxton then draws attention to the visibility of passers-by there, far greater than within the claustrophobic confines of pre-Fire wooden London, spotting “two Inns-of-Court men with one wench: but that’s not she; they walk toward Islington out of my way” (III.i.32-33).

A few extramural sites further from the City itself but within the range of people with money to hire carriages and boats also crop up in *The Roaring Girl*: Ware in Hertfordshire; Brentford and Staines in Middlesex. These are the three places proposed by the seducer Laxton to Moll, the title character, as destinations for what today might be called a dirty weekend. They too are
part of the bawdy, extra-mural world of the play, although seen from a
distance.

Related, but needing to be distinguished both from the fields and the
further-off pleasure spots, are the so-called suburbs (see Boulton 1987). In
*The Roaring Girl* the very word *suburb* seems designed to elicit sniggers.
The citizen Openwork complains about his wife’s scolding: “She rails upon
me for foreign wenching, that I, being a freeman, must needs keep a whore
i’th’suburbs and seek to impoverish the liberties” (II.i.302). Literally, the
suburbs at this stage were the semi-urbanised villages within a short walk of
the formally constituted City of London. In charting them in his *Survey of
London* ([1603], 69-91) John Stow indicated the ribbon development to be
found outside the ancient gates of the City, along roads leading away from
Aldgate, Bishopsgate, Moorgate, Cripplegate, Aldersgate and also to the
west towards enclosures of gentility like the Inns of Court.

Associated with the suburbs but not identical to them, and also on the
urban periphery, were the liberties. Whereas a suburb was at this time a
built-up area beyond the jurisdiction of the Guildhall, typically part of one
of London’s surrounding counties (Middlesex or, south of the river, Surrey),
the liberties were administrative entities covering specific portions of land,
chiefly the former possessions of religious houses dissolved at the
Reformation (see OED “suburb” *n.* 1.; “liberty” *n.* 1 6.e. (a), (b)). Francis
Sheppard (1957, Chapter 1) defines a liberty as “an enclave outside the
normal parochial administrative system”. These oddities were outside the
jurisdiction of both the City of London and the counties of Middlesex and
Surrey. Foreigners and religious radicals were among those who lived in
them (Brigden 1989, 136, 602).

Liberties were sites of “independence”, Sheppard writes—the Liberty of
St Katharine’s by the Tower was not “extinguished” until 1825. At the time
Middleton and Dekker’s play was being watched at the Fortune, “[m]any of
… [liberties’] ancient privileges [had] survived the Dissolution and still
conferred on them immunity from outside interference” (Sheppard 1998,
189). The Oxford English Dictionary reveals that, confusingly but tellingly,
the word liberty was used both for areas outside the walls of the City of
London that were governed by the City of London, and for areas that were
outside the “regular administrative structures” and therefore the cause of
problems in “the administration of justice”. The reason why the OED’s
lexicographers struggle with these administrative and geographical senses of
the word liberty, is that they attempt to isolate the meaning of the word from
any connection with particular and specific place. Unlike the Bankside, site
of the Globe and other playhouses, which was situated in the Liberty of the
Clink, outside the jurisdiction of London or Surrey officials, Golden Lane,
the address given for the Fortune (as we have seen, it lay to the east of that
street) was not in a liberty, but (while outside the walls) in a City parish, St
Giles-without-Cripplegate. The Hearth Tax records for the year of the Great
Fire ([1666]) include “Golding lane East: Play house yd”, surely the precise site of the playhouse, then recently built over with new houses.

How much of a difference between the Globe and the Fortune, and between the meanings of the plays staged at each, does such a distinction between liberty and City parish point to? Middleton was well aware of the reputation of liberties as places associated with disorder. Not far to the east of Whitecross Street lay the Liberty of Norton Folgate, with an obscure history. It survived as a separate local government unit until the twentieth century, and is discussed in a volume of the Survey of London edited by Sheppard (1957, 15-20):

A considerable amount of disorderliness and numerous trivial offences are recorded in the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century court rolls; indulgence in the inflammatory game of “closh” ... appears to have been one of the most popular pastimes, and the presentment in 1519 of the owner of a ruined building from which thieves could prey upon travellers along Bishopsgate Street ... suggests that the advantages for criminals of a “liberty” may have been appreciated. That this was so in 1604, when much of the liberty was occupied by the disused or adapted buildings of St. Mary Spital Priory, is asserted by Middleton who calls “Spital and Shoreditch the only Cole-harbour and sanctuary for wenches and soldiers”.

The sinister ruins and wide-open spaces of the fields north of the built-up
area are two main aspects of the London periphery occupied by *The Roaring Girl*.

A locational reading of *The Roaring Girl* could of course exaggerate the importance of the distinction between liberty and City parish. But perhaps the physical position of the Fortune outside the walls but within a City parish provides a clue to a quality of hidden and slightly threatened respectability that is at the very heart of the play. In this play written to be staged on that particular spot, Middleton and Dekker moralize somewhat about the activities of wealthy law students and others on the fields and in the suburbs. The anxious desire for respectability is to be seen in the characters of some of the Citizens whose shops appear on stage in Act Two, Scene One of the play, and even in Moll herself.

As is well-known, the suburbs were home to the most immediately accessible, and most raucous and openly unrespectable sites of entertainment in early modern London. Playhouses situated on the Bankside south of the river and in north-of-the-river zones such as Shoreditch and Clerkenwell were often used for other activities, for instance sporting events such as bear-baiting, the activity which made Edward Alleyn’s fortune and enabled him to subsidize the Fortune Playhouse for decades. In the text of *The Roaring Girl* certain toponyms carry with them charged associations of non-respectability. Moll presents herself to Ralph Trapdoor as “One of the Temple” or in other words, a gentleman-about-town; the Inner Temple and
the Middle Temple were themselves liberties and thus more or less self-
governing. Then she remarks “And yet, sometime I lie about Chick Lane”  
(III.i.161-62). Until 1869 Chick Lane ran west out of West Smithfield –  
Rocque’s map ([1746]) has it emerging from a huge area of “sheep pens” at  
the western end of the marketplace – into what was for centuries a  
notoriously dangerous and disreputable area, Saffron Hill, base of Fagin’s  
gang in Oliver Twist, for instance (cf. Mulholland’s note to III.i.162:  
Middleton and Dekker [1611], 142; Sanders 2010, 227-30). The words “lie  
about” themselves contain innuendo.

London suburbia in this era, then, contains both people of leisure with the  
money to spend on luxuries and entertainments, and groups of extremely  
non-respectable individuals. But the Temple and Chick Lane, a smart  
address on the one hand and on the other a site quite literally associated with  
filth—blood, excrement, animal carcasses—are less of an opposition than  
they might appear. Both lie in the extramural zone.

A comparison between The Roaring Girl and the writings of Dickens  
could be helpful at this point. The alignment in Bleak House ([1853])  
between the legal world of the Lord Chancellor and “Conversation” Kenge,  
and the hellish misery of Tom-all-alone’s is familiar to most students of the  
book (see the discussion in Chapter 2 above), but is rarely compared with  
anything found in early modern London drama. Both Bleak House and  
Dickens’s earlier Barnaby Rudge ([1841]), however, contain precisely the
same device as *The Roaring Girl*, that of seeming to oppose the Temple to urban lowlifes and their habitual environment and then calling this apparent opposition into question. In *Barnaby Rudge*, the two milieus are shown to be associated in the person of the fastidious but profoundly villainous Sir John Chester, who lurks behind the walls of the Temple directing the actions of ruffians who threaten the whole of society with destruction (Dickens [1841], Chapters 15, 23, 40).

Once again the connections across time are to be emphasized. The argument being made here is that certain locational patterns are long-lasting. In Middleton and Dekker’s play as in Dickens’s novels, written over two centuries later but with a near identical place setting, a hidden similarity between successful, leisured lawyers and the most desperate outcasts and criminals is revealed in association with the fringe zones to the north and west of the City of London. Conventional literary-historical discussions, so constrained by the boundaries between periods that specialists in early modern drama do not talk to Victorianists, fail to grasp this. “Psychogeographic” writings such as those of Peter Ackroyd and Iain Sinclair prove more helpful, positively encouraging the locational critic to listen to echoes and resonances across time. Equally helpful is a map indicating how the walled Inns of Court not only made the possible routes from City to West End in London extremely limited as late as the early nineteenth century, but were also at that time almost completely surrounded
then by London’s lowest and most overcrowded districts, St Giles and Clerkenwell (Clout 1991, 75).

*The Intermediate Fortune*

The study of earlier periods of literature requires not just historical but geographical precision. In a way that calls to mind J. Hillis Miller’s relative failure to situate Sam Weller in London, Mulholland imperfectly states the relationship between the City and the liberties, describing the latter as “subject to” the City’s control”. As has been seen from the OED, the liberties certainly could be seen in this way but also had another significance as pockets where offenders could hide because they were not in the ordinary government geography: no authority had power there. This is where Deep Locational Criticism can help enrich scholarship such as that of Mulholland, who in constructing his account of London in *The Roaring Girl* uses a single, very dated source, E.H. Sugden’s 1925 *Topographical Dictionary to the Work of Shakespeare and his Fellow Dramatists*, suggesting that, despite the place-rich content of the text of Middleton and Dekker’s play, place is not high on his agenda. And while the recent Oxford University Press *Complete Works of Thomas Middleton* and associated volumes contain some outstanding scholarship and writing, they could have been further enriched by drawing more on recent empirical research by, for instance, the Museum of London’s archaeologists, or on the *Survey of
*London*, with its sense of topography as a relationship between the built environment and human society.

Helpful at this point is attention to lexis of place. In the vocabulary of the play’s London “freeman” Openwork, the man accused by his wife of maintaining “a whore i’th’suburbs” and so serving to “impoverish the liberties”, *suburb* and *liberty* are distinguished, with *liberties* seeming to mean not the zones where fugitives could escape justice but zones governed by the City. Mulholland picks up merely that the liberties are closer to home for a citizen of London than the suburbs. The play’s Prologue, meanwhile, refers to “suburb roarers”: riotous, drunken and violent males who are to be understood as not real Londoners in comparison with freemen like Openwork, or indeed his creator Middleton. When Openwork’s wife accuses him of frequenting prostitutes, moreover, the word *suburb* seems circumstantial evidence against him, yet another argument for a more pointedly locational reading of the play (II.i.328, 339). A remark like “He struts up and down the suburbs ... and eats up whores, feeds upon a bawd’s garbage” (V.i.19-21) suggests to the audience that suburbs are thrillingly naughty places. It suggests as they watch the play that they are in close and exciting proximity to the suburbs, without actually having fallen into the cesspit, so to speak.

Disapproval of the suburbs is expressed in *The Roaring Girl*, then, even though on some definitions of the word that was precisely where the
Fortune was situated. Stow ([1603], 69-91) includes the Fortune’s site in the “Suburbe without Criplegate”, identifying it as what would later be called a slum: “Golding lane on both the sides is replenished with many tenements of poore people”. Being in a City parish rather than a liberty but sitting outside the walls, the Fortune was an intermediate point between the respectability of the City itself, the concentration of power at the fashionable Court and the wilder refuges represented by the abandoned, unpolicied refuges of liberties such as Norton Folgate. This sense of the in-between is reinforced by the fact that, according to a recent map (Seaver 2007, 62), the Fortune lay precisely on the boundary between the area under the jurisdiction of the Guildhall, administrative headquarters of the City of London, and the area beyond. In this the locality contrasts with the Bankside, Shoreditch and Clerkenwell playhouses, all of which stood clearly beyond the City in undeniable suburbs.

On foot, the Fortune was considerably closer than the other permanent public playhouses to the centres of civic power. As Scott McMillin (2007, 74) writes, “People living near St Paul’s Cathedral could walk to the Fortune in minutes and the Boar’s Head [east of the City in Whitechapel] in half an hour”, whereas trips across the river to the Bankside playhouses, including the Globe, typically involved a waterborne taxi-ride.

Today, orthodox literary productions—plays with identifiable authors and texts capable of being interpreted—tend to be seen as the centre, the most
important element, in the entertainment offered in playhouses and similar buildings on the edge of London in the early seventeenth century. But audiences at that time may well not have seen things this way. While it was proximal to the City and Church authorities, the Fortune was at the same time notorious for the bawdy quality of the show there. For example, there were the jigs, potentially lewd dances, performed after plays at the Fortune. One was perhaps put on by Mary Frith herself at the end of a production of *The Roaring Girl*. Alexander Leggatt (1992, 19) suggests that this post-play entertainment “may have been a greater draw than the play itself”, and certainly it scared the authorities because of the violence, rioting and theft it seems to have whipped up in audience-members, many of whom seemed to have arrived at precisely the point in the afternoon when words written by dramatists *stopped* being delivered by actors.

Recent work on the make-up of these audiences can be divided into two groups. While contextualist scholars such as Andrew Gurr (2004a; 2004b) look sceptically at the seeming oppositions between groups of people to be found in the texts of plays, Gillies (1994) and Mullaney (1998) emphasize the moral and the ideological connotations of the fringes of London, and develop notions of produced and contested spatiality. But both contextualist and spatializing studies tend to stay within the sphere of canonical texts. Deep Locational Criticism, by contrast, puts places at the centre of investigation, and reconstructs whole worlds, so that texts are merely a
starting point.

The guidebook aspect of *The Roaring Girl*, which links it to works such as Robert Greene’s “coney-catchi

ng” pamphlets, in their own times intended to help in the identification of thieves (see Newcomb 2004), also links it with later works. The name of Daniel Defoe’s 1720s *Moll Flanders* recalls the roaring girl of Middleton and Dekker, and Pierce Egan’s 1820s *Life in London* series, like the Jacobean play, offers an exposé of the slang used by London rogues, a lexis known in both the early seventeenth and the early nineteenth centuries as “cant”. Dekker, co-author of *The Roaring Girl*, was an acknowledged expert on this criminal argot.

As with many other pre-modern reports of dialect and slang, it is hard to know the extent to which cant was actually in use in early modern London—who used it and in what situations and how closely it resembled the stage representation of it in *The Roaring Girl*. But to have been credible before an audience many of whom must have had at least some personal experience of its use, it must surely have borne a fairly close resemblance to something that was actually in use. Words such as *booze* (used in *The Roaring Girl*) and *slum* (first recorded in Egan) have entered the language via these literary guidebooks to metropolitan lowlife. So in Act Five, Scene One of *The Roaring Girl* Moll demonstrates her knowledge of cant when she sings a duet in cant with the criminal Tearcat and then translates it loosely into standard English (for instance, she renders Tearcat’s “And
couch till a palliard docked my dell, / So my boozy nab might skew Rome-
booze well” she renders as “Let a slave have a pull / At my whore, so I be
full / Of that precious liquor” (V.i.224-5, 264-6). To use plays like The
Roaring Girl as straightforward evidence for how criminals and others
spoke in early modern London would be a mistake, but there can be no
doubt that they functioned as an interface or zone of translation between the
worlds of oral and written English (see Lotman [1984]).

**Time Travel**

In the way that wealthy dwellers in the Temple are juxtaposed with
dangerous criminality and squalor in both The Roaring Girl and Barnaby
Rudge, the Locational reading of the Fortune’s siting has already begun to
re-draw temporal boundaries and find continuities that have previously lain
hidden. Along with this, and the parallel to Defoe and Egan detectable in the
use of cant, further cross-period London connections can be made using the
other locational aspects of The Roaring Girl just outlined.

The local history of London attitudes to beggars is explored for the
eighteenth century by Tim Hitchcock (2004), who indicates that giving to
beggars was in that period understood as a very normal and even
pleasurable activity for the better-off, leisured classes, while the motif of
beggars’ disguises is a feature of London writing on begging at least as late as George Gissing’s *Workers in the Dawn*, published in 1880. In early to mid-period Dickens, the fields north of the built-up area of London appear as places that can be walked into from the area of London westwards from Holborn that would be built up between the mid-seventeenth and early nineteenth century, the area of Bloomsbury and Marylebone. But in *Dombey and Son* ([1848]), Dickens shows the last days of such districts, in the shanty-town of Staggs’s Gardens, which is demolished during the story told by the novel, and in the ramble north into the fields taken by Walter Gay. The fields in Dickens are situated further north and west than Gray’s Inn Fields. Whereas the fields associated with another of the Inns of Court, Lincoln’s Inn, survived in the name of a London square, by the end of the seventeenth century Gray’s Inn fields, where Shakespeare’s Shallow claims to have fought Samson Stockfish, had been enclosed and built over. The fields in Dickens’s *Barnaby Rudge* ([1841]), set sixty years before it was written, are north of the Foundling Hospital in Bloomsbury, their existence recorded in the name of the open space Coram’s Fields. The fields in *Dombey and Son* are even further north, beyond today’s Euston Road where the railway would arrive in the 1830s. The disappearance of the fields is graphically indicated in George Cruikshank’s 1829 cartoon “London Going out of Town or The March of Bricks and Mortar” (see e.g. Sanders 2010, 83).
As well as in the threatened fields, *The Roaring Girl* also anticipates later writings in its motif of London’s river as a site of transgressive or non-respectable leisure. Brentford, upriver to the west of London, the place where the Thames stops being tidal, is proposed by the play’s character Laxton as a place of sexual rendezvous. Outings on the water west of the capital still have associations of shady leisure content beyond the nineteenth century: in H.G. Wells, George Orwell and Patrick Hamilton, Maidenhead has some of the innuendo-shrouded glamour of Brentford in *The Roaring Girl*; in Jane Austen (*Emma*) and George Meredith (*The Ordeal of Richard Feverel*), Richmond stands for something similar.

Thus can one draw connections across centuries between depictions of both sites and of practices. Among the practices are activities like going upriver on a Sunday, or walking—and fighting, and love-making—on the fields just beyond where the houses stop. All such episodes may have origins in aspects of landscape that persist across centuries, which brings me back to the Great North Road as spine of England in Dickens’s *Bleak House*. That same road can have a connection to many tales, and to enduring London myths, such as that of Dick Whittington. To point out such connections is not to assert some trans-historical personality of place across the centuries. It is rather a matter of geographical pragmatics: of responses to place which at different historical moments may well be founded on enduring yet thoroughly non-mystical factors such as geology. As well as
being, in Lefebvre’s terms, examples of produced space, the river and the route of the Great North Road are physical facts. And to unpel layers of the past as they have left marks in particular places can help the temporal border-crossing of Locational criticisms, especially when the procedure is sceptical of any far-fetched mysticism. An example would be Papadimitriou’s splendidly ironic account (2013) of how the lines of sewers in North London typically follow natural water courses, which can thus be traced via storm drains in today’s streets.

Place identities as they resonate and mutate across the centuries remain under-studied by literary scholars. Historically-minded work on the early modern London theatre has investigated social networks and material, meaning-producing items such as actors’ prompt books. Dutton (2009) includes chapters on playhouses, but not one on, or even an index mention for, the Fortune (cf. Stern 2009). Gurr ([1987]) frequently mentions the Fortune in passing but does not focus on it as a site. Grantley (2008) focuses on the texts of plays and uses a representation model which would see a place as something inert, or in a conflicting way as something with only a textual existence. What is missing in all such work is a grasp of more enduring geographies as they impact literary culture. The interest scholars such as Gurr and Stern take in playhouses can actually relegate the buildings, the physical sites, to a background against which to foreground either dramatists as creators, or the surviving texts. Unlike Deep Locational
Criticism, this kind of contextualization does not put imaginative place at the centre.

A study of the theatre in early modern England that looks at the history of buildings and the activities of people is not in itself a novelty. Such work has been going on since before E.K. Chambers’s *The Elizabethan Stage* (1923; II.435-43 on the Fortune), assisted by key primary sources such as *Henslowe’s Diary* and the *Stationers’ Register*, and fuelled by the view of the English Renaissance public stage as having a peculiarly special place in English literary history. In recent years the study of extra-textual aspects of the pre-Civil War theatre has boomed. Yet Deep Locational Criticism can question and cross the dividing lines which in literary studies conventionally separate historical periods and genres of writing.

The study of the place of the Fortune shifts the emphasis away from reconstructing some pure or authentic heyday of the theatre. This was never the site of the peak of creative achievement in the early modern London theatre. The Fortune is more likely to be mentioned as an also-ran in the early decades of the seventeenth century, and after that as an oddity, merely because it was a large public playhouse that survived late. Nor does as much evidence about it survive as about some other London playhouses of the period. Studies of venues such as the Globe and the Blackfriars (e.g. Mulryne and Shewring 1997; Smith 1964) go into great detail in their efforts to reconstruct the physical environment of venues. But the primary
interest of a Deep Locational critic in the Fortune will not be in its precise layout—or rather the precise layout of two playhouses on the same site—in its heyday between 1600 and the late 1620s. Studies like those mentioned of the Globe and the Blackfriars are liable to isolate that time, the Renaissance or Shakespeare’s age or whatever it is considered to be, from what went before or after it, to abstract it, to turn a period into an artefact. Irwin Smith (1964, 283-86), it is true, traces as a brief postscript to his story the last days of the Blackfriars, and the efforts of the actors of the Blackfriars first to gain permission from Parliament in the late 1640s to begin staging plays once again, and then to get financial support, having lost their livelihood. But Smith is unusual in this.

My interest is in a spot on the surface of the earth more than in the building that occupied it. But the spot with its coordinates has a particular charge of meaning only because it was once occupied by the playhouse. Buildings like the two Fortune structures may seem to have disappeared, but in fact turn out to have left faint traces behind them. Other buildings survived, apparently, over many centuries (the Banqueting House of Inigo Jones in Whitehall; or the Tower of London, to take a more extreme example), and some buildings have been reconstructed as pieces of cultural heritage, as the Globe famously was (see images of the reconstructed Globe, under construction and complete: Mulryne and Shewring 1997, 81-96; between 160 and 161). Yet to recall Heidegger once more, the seemingly
obvious fact that somewhere like the Fortune has disappeared can perhaps help us understand how buildings that we think of—and which are presented to tourists and school-children—as having survived as traces of the past have themselves undergone radical mutations, so that what is visible today is in a sense no longer the same building that could be visited there hundreds of years ago.

One question, then, is about the charge of the site—the quantity and nature of the meaning that is transmitted like Chinese whispers from one time to another. Behind this question lurks that of how a Locational critic should view the more speculative, less scholarly types of psychogeography to be found in writers such as Ackroyd and Papadimitriou. Another way of viewing the site is with the layering eye of the archaeologist. To an extent this is what has been attempted in the present chapter. Imaginative places such as the fields around London and leisure spots up the river to the west have been tracked across time, in *The Roaring Girl* and later texts as well.

**Conclusion: Context and Space Revisited**

A comparable but non-identical project is the tracing of a theatrical company, a group of people who left coherent records behind them. One recent study of this kind is entitled *Locating the Queen’s Men, 1583-1603*. 
(Ostovich 2009). Here the site comes to seem less important than the people, “primarily a touring company” (Kathman 2009, 65), and thanks to their court connections the dominant theatrical company in 1580s England. The Queen’s Men were, like the Elizabethan court, frequently out of London, and when they did perform in the capital it was not in a permanent home but in one of “four inns in the City limits that served as part-time playhouses in the last quarter of the sixteenth century” (Kathman 2009, 65). But again this is not to focus on imaginative place.

A site, identified by coordinates, is a different sort of multiple unity from a single building, which can be rebuilt like the Globe, or excavated as was the Rose Theatre home of the Admiral’s Men, the company run by Henslowe and Alleyne before it moved to the Fortune in 1600 (Eccles 1990). Archaeological work at the Rose does, however, indicate the complex overlayings which occur over time on sites. The combined layouts of the Phase One (1587) and Phase Two (1592) buildings called the Rose and acted in by the same—yet shifting—group of people can be seen in relation to the street layout of 1989, when the archaeological survey was carried out (Eccles 1990, 85-88). Archaeology gives physical specifics of location in a way that textual study rarely can: “The site [of the Rose] today on Bankside is bounded to the south by Park Street, to the west by Rose Alley, to the east by Southwark Bridge Road, and to the north by office development” (Eccles 1990, 86). This is one of the many steps to be taken
in researching the imaginative world of a lost place.

Alongside the textual scholarship and the archaeology, the mass of work produced in recent decades on the early modern London playhouses and what was staged in them has included literary-theoretical, ideological and what I have called spatialist work. This last, influenced by Lefebvre and Certeau, includes the work of Gillies (1994), Mullaney (1988) together with more recent and circumspect work (e.g. Hopkins 2008; Yachnin 2012). Yet such work, in the line of what was once called new historicism, often seems quite far from the physicality of London sites over centuries. In terms of what it reads, such work tends to oscillate between canonical texts and artefactual contexts such as maps and government documents. It can be excessively given to abstract generalizations about the nature of power, spectacle, space and those who use it.

Work exploring contexts can cast light onto imaginative places. Tiffany Stern (2009b) offers an evocative and in fact thoroughly locational account of the late life of the Curtain, another playhouse:

The Curtain’s end is something of a mystery. It was not eventually “ruinated” when the Fortune was built, and it staggered on, hosting, to our knowledge, in succession, Queen Anne’s Men (between 1603 and 1609), The Prince’s Men (1611 and 1619-1623), some young men of the city (1615), and Elizabeth’s and Charles’s Men (1615-1617), until, in about 1625, it was relegated for the use of fencers. On 21 February
1627 it is described as swamped with excrement, and two men are charged “for casting six tunn of filth, taken of common previes, into the common shoare neer the curtaine Playyhouse”. Yet still the playhouse survived. In 1660 a list of “common whores, night-walkers, pickpockets, wanderers and shoplifters and whippers in London” includes “Mrs Mails by the Curtan playhouse”; as late as 1698 Samuel Newton collects rent on a “garden and houses called the Curtain playhouse in Hallowell Lane in Shoreditch”. Something called “playhouse”, perhaps the building itself turned into tenements, perhaps a memory of where it had been, continued to mark the Curtain’s space. (Stern 2009, 95)

Shoreditch is a little to the east of the Fortune’s site. There, the Curtain has left its mark, another “memory of where it had been”, to use Stern’s distinctly psychogeographic phrase, in the name of Curtain Road, London EC1 (where “Hallowell Lane” survives as Holywell Lane, too).

Stern is a specialist in the theatre of London in this period. The Deep Locational Critic could align work such as hers with an understanding of the nuances of a particular place in its internal complexity, in its relations with other places. London would be seen within Britain, and in relation to Paris, Dublin, Edinburgh and New York. Here models could be found in work produced by archaeologists, historians and geographers drawing broader comparisons between cities within the British Empire and the Anglophone
portions of the globe (Mayne 1993; Mayne and Murray 2001). This London would then be understood as having a potentially limitless quantity of nodes within itself, themselves all in flux yet displaying inertias as well. Deep Locational critics would need to keep their ears alert to the changing atmosphere of one or another sub-zone in London in the present, and to the way that this might reinterpret that or another zone in the past.

Read in a Deep Locational fashion, the London of 1610 comes into a new relation with London in other details and at other moments, and so potentially with other cities in other countries and the literary art works produced in them. The means of making the change here has been the attention paid in the present chapter to the coordinates marking the position of the Fortune, to the history and after-history—not to mention the prehistory, largely unconsidered in this chapter but actually vital—of the buildings that stood there between 1600 and 1655, and to the history of what went on in those buildings, including the texts of the plays performed there, but frequently not first performed there, and surviving in the repertoire there for decades after their first production. Among the connections which could be made through this process are some with the riverine east London of Arthur Morrison and Thomas Burke with the Bloomsbury of Christina Rossetti, both investigated elsewhere in this book.

As this book should already have indicated, the relationship between the early modern London theatre and locational histories elsewhere also
requires tracing. Among these histories are those of “Bronzeville” or—as conceived by whites—the Negro district of Chicago’s South Side in Gwendolyn Brooks, and the Long Island (related to Brooklyn by train) of Bernard Malamud, not to mention the telescoped view of England from the Dorset coast in E.M. Forster (see Chapters 2, 5, 6). Writings that would not previously have been put side by side become contexts for one another, and what come to the fore are the shadows cast over later times by a place’s literary associations. The Fortune escapes containment by the scholarship of the early modern English theatre. More practically, perhaps, the reading of texts alters when hidden echoes emerge, as with the landscape around Dublin in Beckett (O’Brien 1986) or with Christina Rossetti’s London, completely hidden in her poems, but perhaps revealed in her conversation.

This chapter has offered a preliminary Deep Locational study of the site occupied by the two Fortune Playhouse buildings for most of the seventeenth century. It has demonstrated that such a study could be carried out in greater depth and has pointed out some of the ways in which such a study is likely to differ from historical-contextual approaches to the same material. This has involved changes of emphasis such that moments judged to be especially important from an aesthetic-cultural standpoint are not overvalued at the expense of other moments. This levelling is carried out in the spirit of Perec’s inquiries into the Paris streets. Coming after the chapter on the Heideggerian fourfold of Henry IV, Part Two, which presented a
single-minded reading of a canonical literary work’s text, it has ranged around and been far more eclectic. If Chapter 3 was conceptual, Chapter 4 has been closer to empirical messiness. The conceptual and the empirically messy are equally important in Deep Locational Criticism, and so is the oscillation between speculative thought and topographical precision.
Chapter 5. Spatial Deixis and a Single Story

Levinson’s Neo-Whorfian Linguistics

The two previous chapters have applied different aspects of Deep Locational Criticism to early modern English literature: in Chapter 3, the philosophical aspect; in Chapter 4, the empirical aspect. Chapter 3 focused on a classic text, Chapter 4 on the physical setting in which some such texts were actually brought to life—a stage. The present chapter now turns to a much more recent and much briefer literary text, and asks how it could be read with the aid of accounts of spatiality produced within linguistics. As a genre, the short story has recently been of interest to workers in literary geography such as Sheila Hones (2010) and Marc Brosseau (2008, 381), who asks whether there might be something “ageographical” about this particular form. In the words of Brosseau (2008, 382), “the short story can only afford to mention a very limited number of places and spaces and those that do appear are often stereotyped, generic and easily recognizable to the reader”, the sheer “brevity” of the form making it useful as a test-bed for literary-geographical hypotheses. Still, if the short story form seldom presents, in Hones’s words (2010, 473) with a nod to the anthropology of Clifford Geertz, “thick descriptions” of places, it does contain readily
analysable examples of spatial indexicality of the sort investigated in certain branches of linguistics. For anyone interested in the nature of human spatial experience, the study of language is a key resource (see e.g. Landau and Lakusta 2006). Conversely, Stephen C. Levinson and other researchers have demonstrated that a comparison between the spatial reference systems of different natural languages casts light on the workings of language as a product of the human brain.

One aspect of humans’ relationship with space as recorded in spatial language, and one aspect only, is the topic of this chapter. Here, I will ask whether the hypothesis that all human indications of spatiality are managed through a limited number of frames of reference can help Locational scholars, are seeking to understand how literature refers to space and place. By “frames of reference” I mean models that in different ways suggest a relationship between what is being indicated linguistically and speakers, listeners, their surroundings and the universe.

Eventually, I will propose that a distinguishing pragmatic characteristic of literature is that it conceals its situation of utterance, that works of literature appear to be spoken from somewhere but are actually spoken from somewhere else, as the real living author mimics either omniscience or the voice of some other imagined person. Another literary technique is for an authors to conceal their own personal experience in what appears to be the point of view of someone else.
The technical side of my argument here builds on discussions of deixis produced since the 1970s. Stéphane Robert (2006, 168), using the earlier work of John Lyons (1977), calls deixis a demonstration of “the pivotal role of situation of utterance in language”. For anyone urging the importance of spatial context to the study of language and literature, deixis is a key phenomenon, and it bridges the gap between linguistic and non-linguistic study, so that pragmatics becomes not, as once seemed the case, a ragbag of areas which other linguistic specialisms were unable to classify, but a field linking psychological, philosophical, sociological and literary study through its approach to language in the world. The words “pragmatics” and “deixis” have traditionally had a broader range of application in continental European uses of the terms than in Anglo-American uses. Contributions to a collection in the former tradition edited by Daniele Monticelli (2005), most of them by workers based in France or Estonia, are as often philosophical or literary-critical as linguistic in orientation. Some emerging work on reference to spatiality in language use (e.g. Hickman and Robert 2006) is both thoroughly linguistic and broader, more cultural, material. So perhaps the gap between the two approaches is narrowing.

Levinson (2006, 97) argues that the words “deixis” and “indexicality” describe what is essentially the same phenomenon, yet he draws a distinction between the two that proves useful in the practice of Deep Locational Criticism, using indexicality as a label for “the broader
phenomena of contextual dependency” and *deixis* for “the narrower linguistically relevant aspects of indexicality”. In the same discussion he also makes two important claims, first that indexicality is a fundamental, even primary aspect of human communication (and existence), and secondly that linguistic manifestations of indexicality ought to be surveyed typologically, via the comparison of many different languages (see also Levinson 1983; Levinson 1992; Levinson and Wilkins 2006).

According to Levinson, all linguistic or gestural indications of spatiality operate through one or more of three particular frames of reference. These are the relative or egocentric (centred on the speaker), the intrinsic or allocentric (centred on something perceptible by the speaker), and the absolute (which, when used for reference to things on the earth’s surface, is grounded in compass points). “Any and every spatial representation, perceptual or conceptual”, he writes, “must involve a frame of reference” (Levinson 2003, cited by Robert 2006, 155). Levinson’s account of frames of spatial reference, like the Heideggerian fourfold or the binging to bear of multiple sorts of reference on a single set of real-world coordinates, is one of the templates for a Deep Locational critic.

Jérôme Dokic and Elisabeth Pacherie (2006, 259) have categorized Levinson’s work as a challenge to an assumption which they see as widespread: “that perception essentially involves a relative or egocentric frame of reference”. They call Levinson a “neo-Whorfian” because,
according to them, he believes that “the frame of reference that is dominant in a given language infiltrates spatial representations in non-linguistic modalities”. Rather than isolating language users from the particularities of the multiple contexts in which they use language, this is to say, Levinson reintroduces to the discussion a speaker’s surroundings, be they linguistic or environmental in some other – for instance geographical – sense.

In its emphasis on the relationships between language use and its surroundings, Levinson’s work can be compared with other moves towards the radically concrete and particular with which Deep Locational Criticism is aligned, for example Benjamin’s approach in *The Arcades Project*. Levinson’s approach also chimes with the emphasis on interaction between individual and surroundings which has been advocated here. One pertinent example of this is when Charles Taylor (1993) uses Heidegger and Kant to make the argument that as human beings we have pre-rational understandings that guide our responses to events and situations without our being aware of this fact. The spatial worlds inhabited by different human groups which are uncovered by Levinson’s typological linguistic research provide an excellent real-world example of what Taylor is talking about.

The attention Levinson pays to concrete particularities and contexts could be aligned not only with Benjamin and Taylor, but also with the spatial turn in the social sciences since the 1980s which has influenced some work in literary studies. This spatial turn has seen Anglophone geographers such as
David Harvey (see Castree and Gregory 2006) and Edward W. Soja (1996) draw on poststructuralist and anti-structuralist thinking from France, for example the work of Certeau, Foucault, Lefebvre, and to a limited extent Bourdieu. Applications in literary studies include the Anglophone work on modernism by Andrew Thacker (2003) and on Virginia Woolf by Anna Snaith and Michael Whitworth (2007), and the more recent “geocriticism” of Bertrand Westphal (2011) and Robert T. Tally (2013), devoted in large part to recommending the same group of thinkers.

**Context and the Thing**

The critique of hidden power relations undertaken by critical geographers such as Harvey and Soja reveals the structures and relationships of inequality that stand behind our spatialized experiences. But at the same time, but we are also all unique individuals. Going through a short story, “The Letter” (1973) by Bernard Malamud (1914-86), in search of its frames of spatial reference raises the question of whether the relative or egocentric frame is to be found in the perception of a character, or in a point of view which can be identified as authorial. Malamud was born in Brooklyn in 1914 to parents who had recently immigrated from a district then in the Russian Empire—today in Ukraine (see Lasher 1991, 47). Referring back to
the earlier discussion of Gwendolyn Brooks and Chicago (above, Chapter 2), a Deep Locational study of Malamud would be likely to question the importance of notions of cultural identity: he was American, culturally Jewish, male, heterosexual, yes, but not only that. “[M]y subject matter mixes the universal and the particularly Jewish”, Malamud himself claimed in a 1974 interview (Lasher 1991, 49). He was both more and less unique than any statement of cultural identity would make clear, an individual but also a biological human being.

An excellent biography concentrating on Malamud’s life as a writer was produced in 2007 by Philip Davis. One objective of Deep Locational Criticism, alongside its varied efforts to put actual places at the centre of analysis, is to help break down the boundary between biographical and literary-critical accounts of writers and their works. Malamud’s novels and short stories are highly worked, artful pieces of prose. They describe, among other things, relations between men of different generations, ageing, dreams and realities of escape to elsewhere, baroque and grimy details of outerboroughs New York Jewish life and multi-ethnic Manhattan life. And they touch, again and again, on madness and the fear of its onset.

Malamud’s short stories vary considerably in length and “The Letter” is one of his shortest, a mere seven pages (Malamud 1982, 99-106). It describes two father-son relationships in the setting of a psychiatric hospital. One is that between the protagonist, Newman, and his father. Newman visits
his father every Sunday at the hospital where the father is a patient, travelling away from it afterwards by train. When he leaves the hospital, readers must infer, Newman returns to the world that most of us would judge as normal, within which he is classed as sane.

Every Sunday Newman is button-holed by Teddy, an inmate, who repeatedly asks him to post a letter, “a thick squarish finger-soiled blue envelope with unsealed flap” containing “four sheets of cream paper with nothing written on them” (Malamud 1982, 100-1). Newman, sane, always refuses. One Sunday another patient, Ralph, joins Teddy in urging Newman to post the letter. Ralph is Teddy’s father; they are veterans of different world wars. Eventually Ralph challenges the barrier which divides him and his son from the world outside the gates of the hospital, which is also the barrier separating Newman, not institutionalized, from his own father as well as from the two ex-servicemen. Ralph says Newman is as mad as the other three, eventually asking him, in the closing line of the story, “Why don’t you come back in here and hang around with the rest of us?” (Malamud 1982, 106).

The whole story is built around a barrier both physically located and social, something medically or legally determined: the barrier between the psychiatric hospital and the community or rest of the world (which is the definer or creator of the barrier). This is crucially a spatial barrier, and its spatiality is repeatedly emphasised in Malamud’s story, from “the gate” of
the opening to the “come back in here” of Ralph’s words at the very end.
When Ralph suggests to Newman that he “come back in here”, his words indicate that the barrier between the supposedly normal world of outside and the supposedly abnormal world of inside has a porous or permeable quality. Newman is at present defined by society as sane. He lives in a society which practices the incarceration of people defined as insane or unable to function, and which is perhaps more likely to do so to members of certain social and ethnic groups: women, criminals, immigrants, ill-educated people. For him, this potential permeability is a dangerous prospect.

Alongside linguistic analysis, the permeability of the barrier between these two parts of the world, the spheres of those defined as normal and those not, could be read via the Heideggerian notion of path. The title chosen by Heidegger for a collection of his most important essays of the period 1935-46, after his spell in the public eye as the first National Socialist Rector of the University of Freiburg, was Holzwege. A literal translation of this into English is “wood-ways”, wood in the sense of a small forest, but the collection is actually published in English under the title Off the Beaten Track (Heidegger 2002). Taken together, these titles give a sense of the Heideggerian notion of the path. On the one hand, such paths are actual ways through actual woods, for instance those Heidegger himself knew in south-western Germany. Readers elsewhere will easily be able to imagine equivalents known to them, be these in forests, wetlands or over
hills and other uncultivated areas. On the other hand, the path is a way of proceeding intellectually, which tolerates diversions and has no obsession with a fixed goal or need to erase the roughness and the details encountered in getting to a philosophical destination. The title of the collection and renderings of it into other languages indicate that each stage on a walk has its value and that one learns through experiencing it. The notion of *Holzwege* clearly chimes with the approach taken by recent English psychogeographers such as Papadimitriou (see Hermann [1994]; Schatzki 2007, 11-32). To follow a path is to have purpose, wherever that path leads, and for this reason it matters more to be on a path—as we all are, being alive and mortal—than to reach a destination, which in some ways can only mean death.

Reading “The Letter” this way, we might focus not on the cultural construction of the opposition between sane and insane, normal and abnormal (as Foucauldian or other postmodern readings are likely to suggest), but on the routes and connections linking the worlds of the supposedly sane and the supposedly insane. We might also focus on the question of the purpose of the mental hospital, lunatic asylum or county “farm”, called by such different names in different eras: this could be some sort of ceremonial encounter between the person outside (doctor, relative) and the person inside (patient). Such a reading might be backed up in a more wide-ranging Deep Locational study of the same material through
comparisons with non-fictional and fictional accounts of parallel experiences in the USA, for example by Ken Kesey and Oliver Sacks.

**Frames of Reference in “The Letter”**

Malamud’s “The Letter” is divided into two parts, the first essentially focused on Newman’s relations with Teddy, the second on his relations with Ralph. Preceding each half is a single-sentence paragraph in the present tense (the rest of the story being in the past): “At the gate stands Teddy holding his letter”; “Ralph holds the finger-soiled blue envelope” (Malamud 1982, 99, 103). The point of the story, put crudely, is “who’s the real loony?” Perhaps Newman’s sanity is cast into doubt by Ralph’s words; perhaps the suggestion is that the world outside the walls of the institution is just as mad (or sane) as the world within; or perhaps it is that Newman is himself somehow unmanned, exposed by Teddy and Ralph to the truth of himself as someone whose masculinity is cowed, threatened. Like Teddy, he has failed to escape the orbit of a father judged insane by society. He is an adult man – middle-aged, we might hypothesize – yet one still cast in the role of a boy.

To understand the functioning of spatial deixis in “The Letter”, we need to distinguish between relative (or egocentric), intrinsic (or allocentric) and
absolute perspectives on spatial relations inside the text. The first two frames of reference, being arbitrarily centred on fixed or mobile points in the world (me or something else), go together.

Some researchers with literary interests treat deixis as a phenomenon that necessarily organises the world in relation to a communicative pairing made up of a speaker and an auditor. In an account of how literary scholars could make use of linguistic pragmatics, Roger D. Sell (1998, 531), for instance, claims that in what he calls “Time Deixis and Place Deixis” the temporal and spatial situation of a “sender” (a term encompassing both a speaker and a literary author) are presented in relation to “the times and places of any person, event or thing referred to, in some act of communication, and all these times and places in relation to those of the receiver(s) of the message”. Such a view takes in Levinson’s egocentric (self-centred) frame of reference and it arguably also describes his allocentric (visible object-centred) one, although relating the position of something to—say—a barn is obviously not the same as relating it to the position of an auditor. But Sell describes no equivalent to Levinson’s absolute frame of reference.

Daniele Monticelli, comparably (2005, 203), calls the relative, speaker-centred interpretation of deixis the “classical” one, so confirming Dokic and Pacherie’s claim (2006, 259) that most students conflate deixis with speaker-centred reference. Earlier accounts of deixis, notably the coining of the term (and that of the origo or deictic centre) by Karl Bühler in the
1930s, undoubtedly do build the concept on pairings such as *this* and *that*, *here* and *there* in which the proximity or distance of things to a speaker and auditor are what is described. But Levinson’s research, based on empirical data from dozens of different actual languages, goes considerably further. It does so by revealing the actual geography of variation within human spatial reference, which is very far from being everywhere the same.

If the egocentric and allocentric frames of reference in “The Letter” are to be considered, the question arises, as I say, of whether the *origo* is the non-fictional author Malamud or instead a fictional character. If the latter, then the *origo* seems likely to be the protagonist Newman. Some matters of location in the story seem naturally inseparable from the point of view of a character, for example the following passage in the first, Teddy-centred part: “[t]he mailbox hung on a short cement pole just outside the iron gate on the other side of the road, a few feet from the oak tree. Teddy would throw a right jab in its direction as though at the mailbox through the gate” (Malamud 1982, 101). Here the word “outside” defines the postbox as located on the other side of the legally-enforced barrier separating the characters from the world beyond. This is so even if Newman is only temporarily inside the hospital enclosure, and in theory at least also there by his own free will. The words “just outside” relate the mailbox to Newman’s viewpoint. Once again the barrier separating the supposedly normal world of the non-institutionalized Newman from the other characters comes to
seem shaky or porous or uncertain. Newman, after all, goes to the hospital every Sunday, out of duty more than desire, it would seem. He is almost as tied to the place as its inmates are.

To take another, more spatialist locational perspective, and one involving the political history of human spatial organization, Newman and his interlocutors are actually in one of the “other spaces” or heterotopias discussed by Foucault, alongside market-places, circus tents, brothels and graveyards. These are all places “absolutely different from all the sites they reflect and speak about” yet nevertheless “real places—places that do exist and that are formed in the very founding of society” (Foucault [1967]). In the words of Ellen Rees (2013, 126), in the Foucauldian heterotopia “we gain a momentary critical distance from the everyday”. Rees’s own example is the cultural functioning of the mountain cabin in modern Norwegian society. Experienced by the reader via Newman’s journey there and back, the twentieth-century western mental hospital, represented by Malamud here in its metropolitan US form, also provides this distance.

Similarly, the phrase “a few feet from the oak tree”, as a locational marker for the mailbox at which Teddy gesticulates at with his fists, implies that one particular oak tree (and no other) is within the characters’ ocular view at this moment. To complicate matters, this moment is in fact many moments. This passage, after all, represents what Teddy “would say” on many different “Sundays”. The tree, readers would guess, is not very far
away—let us say not much more than 100 metres or so—from the characters since it can be assumed to be clearly visible to all of them. Teddy apparently shadowboxes, flinging out punches which point out to Newman the location of the postbox and the repeated drama with the letter. Allocentrically speaking, the mailbox is spatially related to the oak viewed from both Newman and Teddy’s point of view inside the gates. The perspective of Newman—not a first-person narrator—is not clearly distinguished from that of Teddy in these exchanges, again clouding the distinction between the institutionalized men and the supposedly sane man who meets them when he visits his father.

The story’s opening line (“At the gate stands Teddy holding his letter”) could also be read in either egocentric or allocentric terms. This is to say that the words could be related either to the viewpoint of Newman, or to the gate itself. Teddy’s position at the gate must surely—a reader beginning the story infers—be visible to some proximal but at this stage unidentified other fictional character. Readers will be sure of this on account of the line’s grammatical form. If it were worded differently, say as “Teddy stood at the gate holding his letter”, readers could imagine themselves in the company of an omniscient narrator viewing a solitary Teddy. Reading the jaunty, familiar “stands Teddy”, they are instead likely to infer a viewer.

Instead of reading this line egocentrically or allocentrically, however, it might be more natural to view it within the terms of a relationship between
non-fictional author and equally non-fictional (whether actual or envisaged) audience. Here we are moving from location understood geographically towards a psychological, relative, existential conception of it. On this reading, the audience is identified as made up of people who know the English language, while other details in the story suggest that its members also have some knowledge of the USA as a real place or collection of places that existed in the twentieth century. The reader is envisaged as being, classically, American; perhaps—taking into account the contextual, extra-textual information that “The Letter” was first published in Esquire magazine—as being male. Not certainly Jewish, perhaps, but most likely white, from the city or suburbs rather than the countryside, and educated to at least high school graduate level and probably college-educated. From the text itself, readers can infer that they will be given more information: what gate is this? Readers expect eventual revelation, this is to say. But the key technique of the opening is a concealment of intra-textual reference—what, in other words, the story is going to say next.

Where, though, could scholars using Levinson find an absolute frame in Malamud’s story? The notion of an absolute frame of reference very helpfully explains aspects of extra-textual reference about which literary pragmatacists of different colours, including both Sell and Monticelli, have so far not said very much. Adding the absolute frame of reference considerably expands a reading of “The Letter” which has so far focused on
the egocentric and allocentric matters of how Newman, free to leave for New York City at the end of the afternoon, and Teddy, compelled to stay inside the boundaries of the hospital, relate to things just outside the periphery such as the oak tree and the mailbox, and to things further off like the Long Island Rail Road station where Newman will later catch his train back to the city. The absolute frame explains aspects of what literary scholars of a more traditional bent were apt to call background or setting: the real-world resonances of a text.

Here, we are back on more clearly Deep Locational ground. Throughout the present book the active and semantically central status of setting in literature, the fact that it is not the mere “background to action” (Hones 2011, 686), has not only been asserted, as also by recent spatialist readers such as Moretti, Westphal and Tally, but has been demonstrated using concrete examples. In the first few paragraphs of the story, as Newman converses with his father, it would be hard for a reader coming to the text entirely cold to get a sense of where in the real world we are. Of course someone picking up a volume by Malamud might well know that he was a twentieth-century American writer from New York. But then again, they might not.

It is true that in the early paragraphs, the word “Sunday” is used five times, indicating that the setting of the story is in part of the Christian West where Sunday is a day when shops and businesses are shut and so on which
to visit relatives. Of course the language is English. In the name “Newman”, which appears twice in these early paragraphs, I think Malamud deliberately leaves the question of whether the protagonist is Jewish unanswered. While it would be a natural reading of the story to see it as one of Malamud’s many stagings of relations between American Jews and Gentiles, with Teddy and Ralph, tough-talking war veterans, in the latter category, there is nothing about Newman to identify him as either Jewish or not Jewish. His institutionalized father, while deranged, speaks standard American English, not using the Yiddish-inflected word order and vocabulary that Malamud frequently uses to portray elderly immigrant characters: “Your mother didn’t talk to me like that. She didn’t like to leave any dead chickens in the bathtub. When is she coming to see me here?” (Malamud 1982, 100). Newman’s name, indeed, could be read literally as that of the man who is new, and so perhaps of the son within a parents-and-son trinity neither specifically Christian nor Jewish but doubtless derived from monotheism. The mystery matters. Acts of concealment, in fact, are vitally important to the story.

But it is only with the words “Newman got up to go to the station where he took the Long Island Rail Road train to New York City” (Malamud 1976, 82) that readers get situated precisely on the non-fictional map of the world. Malamud’s use of toponym is sparing, sitting as it does somewhere between the detail of realist fiction—to be assessed in the chapter that follows this
one, concerned with E.M. Forster’s *Howards End*—and the purging of names practiced by Samuel Beckett, subject of Chapter 8 below. It would be possible to identify absolute temporal reference of a similar sort in the statement about the mailbox: “Once it had been painted red and was now painted blue”. Both halves of this statement drive me to encyclopaedias, histories, maps and other reference materials. Did the US Mail at some point in the twentieth century change the colour of its mailboxes? This would locate the setting of the story in time after that event but perhaps only by one to three decades.

**Extra-Textual Reference: Long Island**

At this point in my reading it is time to begin tracing the story’s extra-textual indexicality. This is the second aspect of Deep Locational Criticism in the triad given in the present book’s first chapter of this book, the other two being arrangements found within texts and personal experiences of place. Extra-textual indexicality is not what the linguist concerned with deixis classically analyses. By deixis, after all, is most often understood as linguistic reference of a para-gestural sort pointing at something outside the utterance in its context: “look at that!”, for instance.

Considering extra-textual indexicality in “The Letter” means thinking
about various real places. The Long Island Rail Road (LIRR), unlike many of its US counterparts, still exists and still thrives. But in this sort of Locational reading, concerned with the second term in the triad proposed earlier, what matters most is extra-textual reference to the mental hospitals of Long Island, New York.

There were once three huge psychiatric institutions in Suffolk County, New York. Among them only one is still open, the Pilgrim Psychiatric Center. This was the largest mental hospital in the world at the time of opening, according to the Office of Mental Health of New York State (OMH 2011). The hospitals were in Brentwood and Central Islip, in western Suffolk County. In the USA and other Western countries, the period between the end of the nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century was the heyday of the institutionalization of people defined as having mental illnesses. More specifically, “The Letter” has its setting in the era of Ken Kesey’s *One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest* (1962) and Milton Rokeach’s *Three Christs of Ypsilanti* (1964), both of which marked a shift in public opinion such that hospitals of this sort came to be seen as places of oppression and incarceration.

Knowing about the history of these institutions provides contexts for “The Letter”. They were initially known as “farms”, the idea being that the inmates did useful agricultural labour for the communities they belonged to. This work was outlawed in the 1970s. The Kings Park Psychiatric Center
was earlier called the Kings County Asylum, the word *asylum* having once connoted sanctuary. Think once more of the Liberty of Norton Folgate in London, where a ruined priory and its outbuildings acted as refuges for criminals. The word asylum later came to carry a terrible stigma. Today, these former asylums on Long Island are almost all closed (see Leita and Leita 2013).

The more one reads of these institutions, the more one is struck by their enormous size and the extent to which they formed something like a parallel city to New York. Maps and aerial photos of the institutions and their buildings at their mid-twentieth-century zenith look like images of whole towns. As a sort of mirror image of the main or “normal” city, during New York’s era (c. 1920-65) as the biggest city on earth they turn us back once again to the Foucauldian heterotopia, part of actual human life, in fact everyday, yet at the same time utterly different from normality, however that is conceived.

Malamud alludes to this immensity when describing Newman’s journey home from the hospital: “Newman left on the four o’clock train. The ride home was not so bad as the ride there, though Sundays were murderous” (Malamud 1982, 103). Inhabitants of big cities have all heard comparisons between commuting and murder. Newman’s anti-commute (away from the city, in leisure time) makes it seem as though half the city were decamping and going to visit its other (insane) half.
The historical institutions quite directly mirrored the boroughs of New York City, since their origin was as county hospitals dating back to before the municipal reforms of the 1890s, which established the city’s present boundaries by consolidating what had previously been different counties within the state of New York. Brooklyn, site of Malamud’s birth and upbringing, thus had its “own” asylum, bearing its former name (King’s County); Queens and the Bronx had their own particular institutions too. In a parallel way, the Metropolitan Boroughs which formed London between 1889 and 1965 had cities of the dead laid out on the fringes of districts which by about 1870 were built up, sometimes in arrangements reflecting the map relationships of the Boroughs themselves. Today, in Finchley, outer North London,, the St Marylebone Cemetery lies to the west of the St Pancras and Islington Cemetery, mirroring the geographical layout of those boroughs in inner North London south of Finchley (and their parish predecessors).

Deep Locational Criticism takes sensings beyond what New Criticism would have regarded as the boundaries of the text. In “The Letter” Malamud does not give the impression of the institutions’ enormous size conveyed by other types of source concerned with them (Leita and Leita 2013; OMH 2011). There, they seem ghost towns comparable with other twentieth-century relics like the town of Pripyat, close to the former nuclear power station at Chernobyl in Ukraine. In Malamud, by contrast, there is no
reference whatsoever to the scale of the buildings Newman is visiting.

Moreover, by not letting readers know Newman’s exact social position to readers, by not indicating whether he is a janitor, clerk or novelist, Malamud seems to be deliberately dislodging “The Letter” from a position in which it could easily be read biographically. As Davis outlines (2007, 5-7, 84-5), Malamud’s mother and brother, both diagnosed with schizophrenia, were both committed to Long Island institutions. Newman’s ride on the Long Island Rail Road was thus one which Malamud himself took several times in adulthood. Malamud’s father Max, in the reverse of the sane-son-insane-father pairing in “The Letter”, would travel from the shop he ran in urban Brooklyn every Sunday to see his son, Bernard’s brother, “struggling out to the hospital on Long Island, leaving the store at 8, arriving at 11, leaving for home at 2 …. He needed to apply for a pass, each time, to take his son outside for a walk” (Davis 2007, 85). The parallels with the story are unmistakable. Important in both is the journey out from the city to the institution just beyond the metropolitan area, but nevertheless belonging to, constituted by, the metropolis. Newman himself, repeatedly shifting between the supposedly sane world and the supposedly mad one, and in the process coming to doubt his own sanity, might seem not to be on any worthwhile or fulfilling Heideggerian path. Yet his is such a path of one sort, just as for the rest of us.
These Locational thoughts about Long Island alter Malamud from a writer interpreted via a notion of American-Jewish identity to a writer capable of being understood in a considerably richer way when grasped as particularly located in place and time, yet also ever-shifting in those respects. The same kind of shift, from an African-American and gender-based identity to a located Chicago existence, was earlier suggested in reading Gwendolyn Brooks (see Chapter 2, above). After such a reading, Malamud is to be both distinguished from others with whom he is often grouped on the basis of identity – Saul Bellow, Philip Roth – and connected to others who are not usually considered together with him: Joseph Heller, Mario Puzo, Richard Wright, James Baldwin, even Brooks herself. And this is only to think about the writer in a single-author focus.

Beyond this, and as regards Deep Locational Criticism in general, what emerges from a reading of “The Letter” is a sense of the permeability of all borders. Things and their seeming others or opposites are connected and frequently melt into one another. This is another refiguring which occurs by means of the Heideggerian notion of path. Here, the differences emerge between Deep Locational Criticism and a predecessor like postcolonial studies emerge which, though grasping cultural oppositions as constructed
and power-driven, oddly reinforced the opposition (cf. Michaels 2006). The parallel cities of “The Letter”—sane and insane or living and dead—matter as an example of the imaginative place that exists both in bricks and mortar and in people’s heads. Going further, “The Letter” and other Long Island writings could all be subjected to a fuller Deep Locational analysis based on the poetics of limit and scale. This could think both about the nature of their particular urban periphery and about the relative magnitudes of New York City, American Jewish fiction, and even the English language, working with the contexts of greater New York’s municipal histories and changing attitudes towards mental health.

Returning to the linguistic account of spatial reference with which this chapter started, it is possible to arrive at a conclusion. Linguistic researchers such as Dokic and Pacherie have debated whether the use of frames of reference in spatial indexicality is in fact as universal as Levinson has alleged. But Levinson’s concept of an absolute frame of reference proves an elegant way of uniting literary deixis at the character and author levels. This chapter has not turned out to be a piece of stylistic or otherwise closely linguistic analysis of a literary text, in the tradition of work by Paul Werth (1999). Instead, the Levinsonian account of indexicality has been used as a starting point for a Deep Locational reading of Malamud’s story, taking in both the internal world of its narrative and the reference to real place which this begins with, presupposes and comments upon. As Levinson’s
typological linguistics is far more situated in the concrete and particular world than are more structural or utterance-confined subfields of linguistics, so Deep Locational Criticism is far more contextualist-philosophical in nature than is most analysis in the poetics-and-linguistics tradition represented by Werth.

The key locational fact in “The Letter” is that of the porous barrier between the mental hospital, that site that could be thought of as a heterotopia but also as a prison, and the outside world. There are connections between the outside and the inside, both the more prosaic such as the transport network (in Malamud, specifically the Long Island Rail Road), and, more ominously, the possibility for a “normal” person to be incorporated within it. All of this points once again towards a Heideggerian reading that emphasizes multiply unified connections rather than divisions, yet which, more than this, and in Benjaminian fashion, refuses to prioritize theoretical structures over concrete actualities.
Chapter 6. Technology and Toponym in a Canonized Novel

Electronic Maps and Cosmopolitanism

Recent work developing geographical information systems (GIS) in literary studies holds the promise of a long-overdue rapprochement between quantitative and qualitative approaches to place. It contrasts in several important respects with the place-centred “geocriticism” proposed by Bertrand Westphal (2011) and Robert T. Tally Jr (2013).

The cartography whose usefulness to literary studies will be assessed in the present chapter is more own-to-earth in talking about the real world than the highly metaphorical approach offered by Tally (2013, 44-78). For Tally, cartography provides an analogy for the activity of writers. “Like the mapmaker”, Tally (2013, 45) writes, “the writer must survey territory, determining which features of a given landscape to include, to emphasize, or to diminish; for example, some shadings may need to be darker than others, some lines bolder”. This is hardly any more Locational than would be a comparison between a writer and a composer of music, or a writer and a civil engineer: it is a mere metaphor. In discussing the case study which is at the heart of the present chapter, I will make the characteristically Deep
Locational moves of, first, revisiting an imaginative place that has been studied both in the library and on foot at an earlier date, in this case a view of southern England presented in E.M. Forster’s *Howards End* (see my earlier discussion: Finch 2011, 148, 267), and of, secondly, applying to it a particular empirical technique. If Chapter 5 applied the first two elements of the Deep Locational triad (arrangements found within texts and reference to the outside world) to Malamud’s story “The Letter”, the present chapter adds to these a consideration of the third component, personal experiences of place.

Movements towards a GIS methodology for literary studies have developed from discussion of what a GIS for historians would consist in (see Gregory and Ell 2007; Great Britain Historical GIS). Since these beginnings, David Cooper and Ian N. Gregory (2011) have presented what aims to be a specifically literary GIS. At the heart of Cooper and Gregory’s work here is the effort to reconcile the mappable localities of the real world with “complex social spaces” including “gendered domestic environments, which provide the setting for much narrative activity but which are not easily charted with the use of geographical coordinates” (Cooper and Gregory 2011, 92). Other work arising, like theirs, from the Spatial Humanities project at the University of Lancaster, stands further from experimentation with mapping technologies and closer to a traditional literary criticism modified by the encounter with notions of spatiality.
An example of this modified traditionalism is an article by Christopher Donaldson (2013b) which basically deals with print culture, but also recognizes and elevates the spatial. Following Moretti ([1997], 70; cf. Finch 2011, 28), Donaldson argues that the shift from the metropolitan to the non-metropolitan which seems to have been a large-scale feature of literary taste in the nineteenth century is core to the meaning of literary works then produced. The claim is that in works such as Harriet Martineau’s Deerbrook and Wordsworth’s “Michael” the setting is not mere background but the “unacknowledged legislator” (with a nod to Shelley) of the work as a whole. This is close to the position taken within Deep Locational Criticism.

But there are important differences. Donaldson thinks of “local distinctiveness” as a Barthesian effect of the real, or in other words as a sort of trick writers carry out on their readers, making readers think that they are experiencing real places when in fact they are not. “Michael” is concerned with the situation specific to the rural North of England in Wordsworth’s lifetime, where old-established very small landowners, people who farmed the land they owned with their own hands, had a peculiarly deep relationship to locality (cf. Relph 1976). As such, Donaldson claims, the poem’s setting is integral to its meaning, not distinct from it. But Donaldson traces only a part of what is in fact a larger-scale process. Wordsworth’s early writings (or, to take another example, George Crabbe’s The Borough) were seen by established contemporary critics such as Francis Jeffrey as
containing material too “low” or coarse to be classed as literary. As the nineteenth century went on, the same sort of writing became understood as admirable or necessary because it was in touch with real life and real people.

Donaldson does not use GIS, indexicality, place-philosophy or multiple empirical disciplines, and in this respect is much closer to the mainstream of British literary studies than is the practitioner of Deep Locational Criticism. What he does do is argue for the centrality of the spatial, and by combining this article with another of his (Donaldson 2013a), we can discern a stage in a literary-critical shift. Gradually, the literary work and its writer are coming to be seen in the context of the landscape, with the latter becoming far more important to the overall picture than formerly tended to be the case. In Donaldson’s concluding words, what is detected here is “a tendency among Wordsworth’s readership to use his works as a framework for experiencing the Lakeland landscape”.

But even so, here we can still see the continuation of the curious practice I have noted elsewhere (Finch 2011, 11-17), by which certain writers are identified as place writers, whereas others are not. Wordsworth, like Thomas Hardy, is one of those who are readily identified with place, within a viewpoint which seems to take place as equal to rural rootedness. This practice finds a corrective in the examination of what can appear to be placeless writing (see Chapter 8 below).
The same practice of distinguishing place writing from the work of writers who seem unconcerned with place somewhat affects the undeniably valuable work of Cooper and Gregory. In the historical moment under consideration in the present chapter, the Edwardian “Little England” tradition anatomised by Patrick Wright (2008, xix) involved an insistence that being static somewhere was ethically better than moving around. As Wright outlines, in the early twentieth century Hilaire Belloc and G.K. Chesterton contrasted Rudyard Kipling, born in India and well-travelled in different cultures, with an imagined English peasant who had never travelled anywhere much, yet whose attachment to somewhere was in consequence of that lack of travel more profound. In Wright’s paraphrase, the Little Englanders Belloc and Chesterton felt that

Kipling did not belong to England …, or indeed “to any place; and the proof of it is this, that he thinks of England as a place. The moment we are rooted in a place, the place vanishes. We live like a tree with the whole strength of the universe.” (Wright 2008, xix)

The words Wright quotes here are Chesterton’s. They anticipate one side of Heidegger on place (but not the only one). And traces of a Chesterton-like anti-cosmopolitanism do also lurk in *Howards End*.

Putting these thoughts on the generalities of place writing and cosmopolitanism aside, what scholars such as Cooper and Gregory do is to make technologies accessible that might otherwise be baffling. One
Geographic Information System is the electronic or online map. Any literary scholar who has ever tried to use the map room at the British Library or somewhere similar will have realised just how inaccessible the paper technologies stored there are for non-specialists. It requires the mastery of a particular vocabulary even to ask the staff for what is required. The maps they fetch up are physically unwieldy and require the use of specific tools and even furniture. Their scalability is hard to manage. Comparisons between, for example, the many different nineteenth century maps made in varying decades at varying scales are very problematic. Literary scholars may find themselves wearily turning back down the steps from the map room, and returning with a sigh of relief to the pile of books waiting on their desks in the Humanities Reading Room. Our specialism is texts, and we would do well to stick to them: this, at least, is what such experience seems to confirm.

But maybe not. The electronic map, whether in CD or online form, makes historical cartography more accessible for the literary scholar. As an example of what is available, let us take the so-called “Great Maps” of Georgian and early Victorian London. The “Great Maps” from this era are those based on an original survey, and therefore distinguishable from lesser ones based on one of these but then amended. The amount of sheer labour involved in the construction of one of these “Great Maps”, the most up-to-date technology of mapping imaginable in their own day, is mind-boggling.
The Great Maps appeared in the century before the First Series of Ordnance Survey (governmental, military) maps of London started appearing in 1863. In the 2010s, these pre-Ordnance Survey maps are more accessible than they have ever previously been. John Rocque’s 1746 London, Westminster and Southwark is fully available online. Richard Horwood’s map with the same title, published 1792-9 and purportedly “shewing every house”, Christopher and John Greenwood’s London (1830), and Edward Stanford’s Library Map of London and Its Suburbs (from around 1850) can all also be viewed electronically (Motco 2013; cf. Mapco 2014).

In terms of cultural meaning, differences between the scales of these maps hint at the decreasing comprehensibility of London in the first decades of the nineteenth century: Roque and Horwood produced maps on the scale 26 inches to the mile, the Greenwoods on eight inches to the mile and Stanford on six. The earlier maps, in other words, penetrated the darker recesses and narrower streets of inner London with far greater accuracy than did the later ones.

How swiftly and readily such maps can be used in the assessment of a literary text can be confirmed by glancing at an entry from Peter Watts’s blog (2010-13, 16 February 2010) The Great Wen. The entry concerns Hare Marsh, a street in inner east London, as it was represented cartographically between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, and as it is refigured in Alexander Baron’s 1969 historical novel (set in 1911) King Dido. Today,
Hare Marsh is a short cul de sac south of Cheshire Street in Shoreditch. Baron’s novel is mostly set in a street next to Brick Lane, a street which Baron calls Rabbit Marsh. Watts works through the representation of the neighbourhood in the Rocque ([1746]), Horwood and Greenwood maps, comparing it with later cartographic representations: the poverty map of Charles Booth from the 1890s; Bartholomew’s Pocket Atlas and Guide to London of 1922, and the Stepney Official Guide of 1952. Giving links to large online images of all the maps, he shows that what today is the western portion of Cheshire Street was in the 1922 map called Hare Street, so that the Rabbit Marsh of Baron’s novel could be equated with it.

Here, the notion of a poetics of scale can be reintroduced. The poetics of scale is a means of bridging the gap between the maps with fictional characters’ routes traced, as in Moretti’s in his Atlas of the European Novel 1800-1900 ([1997]), and the interior, the phenomenologically experienced place, which much fiction works to describe. Marking the routes of characters created by, say, Dickens on a map apparently supported by the toponyms in a Dickens novel seems hard to equate with the philosophical question raised in the “possible worlds” theory considered for instance by Bertrand Westphal ([2007]) of whether attaching the same toponym to a place or node inside a work of fiction is actually to indicate the place in the outside world that can be visited. In fact, among other things, it is.

But back to technology. Today, a scholar of modern literature can use old
maps together with web mapping applications and sites such as Google Maps and OpenStreetMap (OSM). When I started working on Forster and English place in 2005, these systems were in their infancy, and I knew nothing about them—Google Maps first appeared in February 2005. Instead, I used Streetmap.co.uk. This is effectively like using a pile of maps of different scales overlaid on one another. They range from a map of the same sort as those found inside the front cover of a road atlas down through road atlas maps themselves, then down through various smaller-scale maps taken from the Ordnance Survey. The largest-scale map is simply a blown-up version of the second-largest-scale map.

Google Maps and applications like it have become near-universal tools of twenty-first century life. This is in large part because of their shortcut qualities: it is possible to click through to Google Maps from any Wikipedia article which refers to a particular somewhere; from Google Maps you can click through to Google StreetView; you can use them, anywhere, to get directions from any given point A (for users, most often the point where they are) to any given point B.

**Placing Forster’s Abinger Hammer: Online Maps and Legwork**

The shortcuts and scalability offered by the online mapping technologies
now most widely used are valuable. But the caveat to my remarks about the Map Room at the British Library is that if we examine streetmap.co.uk in current (2013) form we can see that Streetmap still has certain advantages over Google Maps and similar applications. For one thing, Streetmap offers precision in terms of gridlines and scale. The Google Maps image of Abinger Hammer, Forster’s home between 1925 and 1946, to take one example, seems subject to the commercial pressures of interest groups in a way that the – perhaps authoritarian, certainly top-down in operation – utterly reliable Ordnance Survey is not. In the Abinger Hammer area, for instance, Google Maps indicates some businesses but not others. In April 2014 these included the “Kingfisher Farm Shop” and “Abinger Stained Glass” but not the post office and general store at the centre of the village. Some months later these might be there or might have gone; they are unstable, transient markers. The Ordnance Survey, in its governmental and military terms, has rules that apply across the whole country: P.O. for *post office*; P.H. for *pub*; trade names are only rarely given.

It seems likely that the businesses in Abinger Hammer which appear on Google Maps are using it as a media forum in which advertising space can be placed so as to meet certain consumers. This is a salient fact about the new online mapping. Another is that a year later, in 2015, Google Maps conceives and transmits Abinger Hammer differently from a year earlier, because the Google Corporation has decided to make the old version of
Google Maps (afterwards labelled “Google Maps Classic”) unavailable. Whether or not “New” Google Maps is an improvement is debatable; what is not is that Google Maps as a route for its users to locational conceptions of the world is problematic on account of an instability which is controlled by commercial decision-makers who are not accountable to users. The territory of online mapping remains contested as Google competes across PC and, increasingly, mobile platforms with competitors backed by Apple and Microsoft, while open-source alternatives to these highly proprietary tools continue to be developed (e.g. Open Street Map).

Taken overall, the online publishing of old maps and the march of mapping software like Google Maps has led to a democratization of cartography. Researchers now have near-instant access to dozens of different maps, from the past and the present, of varying scales (Mapco 2014). This must be one of the impulses behind geocriticism and the entry of cartographic readings into the literary critical mainstream. Still, the proliferation of online cartographic resources should be handled with care. There is a danger that the maps which exist online will become canonized while others are forgotten. Perhaps more problematic still, certain ways of seeing may come to seem unbiased or normal. Here Denis Cosgrove’s account (1984) of landscape as a particular and partial means of perceiving portions of the world should be remembered and applied to cartography.

To move from a close-up map of a single neighbourhood, through
different levels of Ordnance Survey maps with their categories recording things, to the road map and the route map, is to be reminded that there are different ways of seeing. On the whole, it is fruitless to rant against globalization and the elimination of local difference. Edward Casey (2001, 406-8; cf. Heidegger [1949], 254) has examined the widespread assumption that globalization makes the human experience of place shallower (in his terms “thinned out”) because seemingly multiple but actually similar experiences are more easily available than in the past. Casey describes what he presents as a paradox: as a result of globalization places “can never become utterly thinned out; they may become increasingly uniform and unable to engage our concernful absorption, yet without ceasing to exist altogether as places for us”. For Casey, there are even advantages in this situation. Glancing at Yi-Fu Tuan’s Cosmos and Hearth, he points out that the loss of depth may be accompanied by a far greater level of knowledge and tolerance of the world at large than ever existed in the past. This is relevant to the comparison between the global-imperialist-cosmopolitan strand (represented by Kipling) and the rural little England one (of Belloc and Chesterton), as teased out by Wright in his introduction to a single small locality—the pre-World-War-II Jewish East End of London, seen in Emanuel Litvinoff’s Journey Through a Small Planet, as a fragment of or representative of an entire world.

All this is to say that one GIS cannot substitute for many. In Deep
Locational Criticism, which involves repeated returns to certain places and their literatures, information systems will continue to rely on the legs, the eyes and the camera lens of a researcher, not to mention books and maps which are only available in print. In the terms of Deep Locational Criticism, the points made by Casey and Tuan at the end of the twentieth century both have to do with scale. Casey’s first point is that in the age of globalized electronic communications people are likely to be having experiences that are thinner or shallower than at any previous time in history; but what emerges from Casey’s reading of Tuan is that people have become more broad-minded in consequence of the same changes. Their points have to do with scale, in that depth of vision and breadth of vision cannot coexist. In fact, in Deep Locational Criticism the ideal move would be repeatedly to alternate between the two, to zoom in and out, in order to attain a multiply unitary picture of a particular place.

In my research connecting Forster and local English place, maps of Abinger Hammer and its surroundings initially helped me plan on-the-ground walking. Forster was commonly described a writer with a feeling for particular places, but few people writing on his work from an academic point of view actually bothered to visit Stevenage, Abinger Hammer or Tonbridge, places with such important meanings for him. I set out to do this, first of all by recording the walks I took, taking photographs and gathering textual materials from local history-writing, Pevsner guides and elsewhere,
via local museums and reference libraries. On 8 July 2006, for instance, I travelled to the Surrey Hills and walked around Abinger Hammer, peering over the gate of West Hackhurst, which had been Forster’s home there. I went back twice more in the thirteen months that followed, writing down what I saw, interviewing people and taking photographs (Finch 2011, 190-93), procedures I repeated during three visits to Stevenage, Hertfordshire (Finch 2011, 190-93, 358-61).

Perceptions of place are individual, while places also, to some extent, endure. If two people independently visit Istanbul, their two Istanbulss will never be identical. Neither of them will be absolutely right about the city, whatever dimensions of identity or depth of knowledge may be involved on either side.

For a literary example of the individuality and shifts of place response, let us consider the return to Salinas, California described by John Steinbeck in *Travels with Charley: In Search of America* (1962). Salinas is the town outside San Francisco where Steinbeck grew up. In *Travels with Charley* he recounts – or perhaps presents a fictionalized version of – a return there after decades away, following a coast-to-coast journey in a motor home with a poodle for company. Steinbeck finds the town where he grew up now massively larger and more crowded than when he was young, filled with strangers, and indistinguishable from much of the rest of the America he has just travelled through, above all in its choked submission to the automobile.
“You can’t go home again”, Steinbeck says, quoting Thomas Wolfe. He rants about the experience to some old-timers in a bar, men who seem endangered survivals from Steinbeck’s own era in the town. He knows them and they know him. Steinbeck presents himself orating: “I went to the Field of Love back of Joe Duckworth’s house by the Ball Park. It’s a used car lot. My nerves are jangled by traffic lights. Even the police are strangers, foreigners” (Steinbeck 1962, 201).

Eventually, the ranting of Steinbeck’s narrator figure turns the elderly bar-owner against him: “I guess you don’t like us no more. I guess maybe you’re too good for us” (Steinbeck 1962, 202). Steinbeck treats the town of his youth as the real place. Changes that have happened since then are understood by him as acts of vandalism damaging its pure essence. He thinks that the men in the bar should share this perception. After all, they are ageing locals and this is how he at this moment identifies himself. The barman, however, sees him as not a true insider at all, but instead as an outsider who has abandoned Salinas and whose views of the town therefore do not deserve the respect he might give those of someone understood as a local. The men in the bar have, simply by remaining there while the town changed, moved with the times together with the town. Steinbeck, who has gone far from the town and conquered the world as a writer, becomes, on his return to what he thought was home, someone stuck in the past, an anachronism, though there is of course a sense in which if Steinbeck
presents himself as an anachronism, since just the fact that he can write about the experience demonstrates that there is a part of him that is not an anachronism—that can criticize himself from a non-anachronistic viewpoint.

Our experience of place thus involves an ever-shuttling, ever sensitive relationship between belonging and outsiderdom, past and present, microcosm and macrocosm, in which a place is like other places, is part of a pattern, but is also unique. In our placed existence it is possible for someone to think that they know somewhere, to think they belong, and then find out with a start that the location they thought they knew no longer exists or was really somewhere else all along.

Mapping Chapter 19 of Howards End with Toponyms

I now offer an account of a single chapter of Howards End (Forster [1910]), Chapter 19, by mapping a list of its toponyms onto a map generated from the open-source mapping technology available online at Sharemap.org (Finch 2012b; see Figure XXX). Chapter 19’s closing paragraphs have sometimes been extracted from the novel and used to stand for Forster’s views as a whole, or even for those of Edwardian England. The extract begins with Margaret Schlegel’s sharp words to her sister Helen, then shifts
to the voice of a third-person narrator.

“If Wilcoxes hadn’t worked and died in England for thousands of years, you and I couldn’t sit here without having our throats cut. There would be no trains, no ships to carry us literary people about in, no fields even. Just savagery. No, perhaps not even that. Without their spirit life might never have moved out of protoplasm. More and more do I refuse to draw my income and sneer at those who guarantee it ...”

There was a long silence, during which the tide returned into Poole harbour .... The water crept over the mud-flats towards the gorse and the blackened heather. Branksea Island lost its immense foreshores, and became a sombre episode of trees. Frome was forced inward towards Dorchester, Stour against Wimborne, Avon towards Salisbury, and over the immense displacement the sun presided, leading it to triumph ere he sank to rest. England was alive, throbbing through all her estuaries, crying for joy through the mouths of all her gulls, and the north wind, with contrary motion, blew stronger against her rising seas. What did it mean? For what end are her fair complexities, her changes of soil, her sinuous coast? Does she belong to those who have moulded her and made her feared by other lands, or to those who have added nothing to her power, but have somehow seen her, seen the whole island at once, lying as a jewel in a silver sea, sailing as a ship of souls, with all the brave world’s fleet accompanying her towards eternity?
This is an account of England as a place that has emerged from and is somehow still founded on “savagery”, and it is also a meditation on what a place (and a nation as a particular sort of place) is, how it is constructed by generations of people. It is a passage in which the visionary, the person capable of seeing “the whole island at once”, the poet, stands alongside the empire-builder. The question is which of them is truly England’s owner.

As well as with the opposition between imperialist versus immobile native teased out by Wright in discussing Kipling and Belloc, Forster’s account here should be compared with the view of England implied by the famous line from Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*: “This also ... has been one of the dark places of the earth” (Conrad [1902], 48). In the passage from *Howards End*, too, Forster reflects on the ethical dilemmas involved when people inherit money and then live on that money, the classic dilemma of 1890s and Edwardian Liberalism. Readers can think of Shaw and Galsworthy. Faced with passages like this, Forster critics such as Daniel Born (1992) and David Bradshaw (2007, 151-72) have indeed teased out associations of savagery and money as, in Fredric Jameson’s term, a kind of political unconscious at work in this novel.

As an alternative to such readings, the Deep Locational critic seeking a literary GIS will attend to eight toponyms: “Branksea Island” (an archaic name for Brownsea Island), “Frome”, “Dorchester”, “Stour”, “Wimborne”, “Avon”, “Salisbury”, “England”. What does it mean to deploy the names of
places as Forster does here? Is it merely an incantation, a series of sounds that seem to say “England! England!”? This is what critics focusing on the imperial-age nationalism implicit in these words would perhaps argue. The lyricism, the “immense foreshores”, the “sombre episode of trees”, the sun leading something (what does “it” refer to?) “to triumph”, the throbbing, the touch of Shakespeare (“as a jewel in a silver sea”): all of these incline us to take the passage as a literary equivalent of Elgar’s lushly romantic Edwardian music.

But the toponyms in the passage could instead be understood as an extratextual indication of real place which can be comprehended only by readers who know the south of England. As such, the passage exemplifies what Roland Barthes in *S/Z* called the cultural code. This contains “references to ... a body of knowledge”, in this case southern English regional place (Barthes [1970], 20). The passage can also be read as a piece of social deixis, since readers are supposed to know these places if they claim to be genteel English people, and the toponyms function as an allusion to the literature of the past as well, an allusion to a national literature and the possibility of England having or having had what Forster in Chapter 33 of *Howards End* calls “a great mythology”. If this is so, then a key name would be that of Michael Drayton, the Jacobean poet whose epic *Poly-Olbion* mythologized the land of Great Britain on the basis of toponyms and particularly the names of personified rivers.
A more technologically sophisticated analysis of the sort associated with the term “Literary GIS” indicates a way of building on these thoughts. Cooper and Gregory (2011) do something valuable when in plotting the views of the Lake District in Gray and Coleridge they take account of the heights and the distances from settlements by means of which these writers’ view of the area is constructed. Thomas Gray, they write, generally ignores those intermediate vertical sites that are situated in between the terrain across which he travels and the high peaks towards which he gazes: places between 300 and 600 metres account for less than 5 per cent of the places named in his account. (Cooper and Gregory 2011, 97)

Here we get beyond some synoptic notion of the “idea of the Lake District”, into the relationship between the specifics of topographic variation, on the one hand, and textual content, on the other.

For a meaningful GIS of Chapter 19 of Howards End, which itself has meaning only within the framework of the novel as a whole, we would need to read its closing paragraph. Here Forster’s narrator voice, more clearly ironized and distanced from any idea of Forster himself than is that of Steinbeck in Travels with Charley, becomes ecstatic, in what is a dialogue with the opening paragraph of the same chapter. As a prelude, it is necessary to remember that when Forster says “England”, he means something bigger than the country of England on the island of Great Britain, or rather he
means both that and the empire or Great Power and nation-state ruled by England. As such, it is very precisely an imperialist usage of the word (think of Kipling), and one which would not be used today. In the 1920s, Forster himself would become a noted anti-imperialist—perhaps the leading anti-imperialist writing close to the centre of power in metropolitan England—thanks to the critique of Empire offered in *A Passage to India*. But in *Howards End* he proposes something more like an *Entente Cordiale* between imperialists and anti-imperialists.

Let us now go to that opening paragraph. A lengthy quotation is needed.

If one wanted to show a foreigner England, perhaps the wisest course would be to take him to the final section of the Purbeck Hills, and stand him on their summit, a few miles to the east of Corfe. Then system after system of our island would roll together under his feet. Beneath him is the valley of the Frome, and all the wild lands that come tossing down from Dorchester, black and gold, to mirror their gorse in the expanses of Poole. The valley of the Stour is beyond, unaccountable stream, dirty at Blandford, pure at Wimborne—the Stour, sliding out of fat fields, to marry the Avon beneath the tower of Christchurch. The valley of the Avon—invisible, but far to the north the trained eye may see Clearbury Ring that guards it, and the imagination may leap beyond that on to Salisbury Plain itself, and beyond the Plain to all the glorious downs of Central England. Nor is
Suburbia absent. Bournemouth’s ignoble coast cowers to the right, heralding the pine-trees that mean, for all their beauty, red houses, and the Stock Exchange, and extend to the gates of London itself. So tremendous is the City’s trail! But the cliffs of Freshwater it shall never touch, and the island will guard the Island’s purity till the end of time. Seen from the west the Wight is beautiful beyond all laws of beauty. It is as if a fragment of England floated forward to greet the foreigner—chalk of our chalk, turf of our turf, epitome of what will follow. And behind the fragment lies Southampton, hostess to the nations, and Portsmouth, a latent fire, and all around it, with double and treble collision of tides, swirls the sea. How many villages appear in this view! How many castles! How many churches, vanished or triumphant! How many ships, railways, and roads! What incredible variety of men working beneath that lucent sky to what final end! The reason fails, like a wave on the Swanage beach; the imagination swells, spreads, and deepens, until it becomes geographic and encircles England.

So Frieda Mosebach, now Frau Architect Liesecke, and mother to her husband’s baby, was brought up to these heights to be impressed, and, after a prolonged gaze, she said that the hills were more swelling here than in Pomerania, which was true, but did not seem to Mrs. Munt apposite. Poole Harbour was dry, which led her to
praise the absence of muddy foreshore at Friedrich Wilhelms Bad, Rügen, where beech-trees hang over the tideless Baltic, and cows may contemplate the brine. Rather unhealthy Mrs. Munt thought this would be, water being safer when it moved about.

“And your English lakes—Vindermere, Grasmere—are they, then, unhealthy?”

“No, Frau Liesecke; but that is because they are fresh water, and different. Salt water ought to have tides, and go up and down a great deal, or else it smells. Look, for instance, at an aquarium.” (Forster 1973, 164-65)

Here mystical lyricism in the first paragraph is juxtaposed with domestic comedy in the second. Forster’s habit of juxtaposing things in this way was something that F.R. Leavis ([1938]) found objectionable: he thought Forster should have been satisfied with social comedy and not attempted anything weightier.

The passage from the end of the chapter contains both a visual, quasi-cartographic and in fact impossible view of England seen from a standpoint on the south coast, and an ideological view of England as beautiful and noble. In effect England is foreshortened, in a viewpoint that is not that of the cartographer, so much as of the viewer capable of looking from a great height, as when an aeroplane one is travelling in breaks through the clouds twenty minutes before landing, with the difference that this is a fixed
viewpoint. Forster, needless to say, had never been in an aeroplane when he wrote this passage. Looking beyond Salisbury Plain, in the passage, Forster describes ‘all the glorious downs of Central England’, by which he means an area in which several ranges of hills, the Mendips, the Cotswolds and the Marlborough Downs meet. Such an area would only be considered ‘Central England’ from the viewpoint of the south coast (perhaps it is something like the frontier between the South of England and the English Midlands), and yet Forster does quite frequently in his writing identify this particular area with a sort of core or heart of England’s geographic identity and even mystical personality (see Finch 2011, 141-50).

The construction, in the passage quoted, of the physical land of England as nation-state is, crucially, presented to a foreigner who is also a member of the family. This is “Frieda Mosebach, now Frau Architect Liesecke”. Frieda is not just any foreigner, either, but a German. Into the picture come the relations between the English and German royal families. George V of England, who came to the throne in 1910, the year of publication of *Howards End*, was the first cousin of the German emperor Wilhelm II, and the same family relationship exists between the Schlegel sisters and Frieda in *Howards End*. And another factor here is the increasingly ominous arms race and colonial rivalry between England and Germany during the Edwardian decade.

The Locational approach, proceeding in the present chapter by reading
toponyms, helps to establish connections between the minute specifics of
place and text and the larger political movements of the years in which
*Howards End* was conceived, written and published. Forster’s epigraph for
*Howards End* is “Only connect”, and the connection he has in mind is also
one of scale in the manner proposed in Deep Locational Criticism. The fact
that Forster is ironically treating precisely the matter of high politics and
foreign policy is indicated when Frieda and Mrs Munt snap at each other
about the excellence of their respective localities, Pomerania and the Dorset
coast, and then stop, the narrator quipping that thus “another international
incident was closed”. The Schlegels are fairly cosmopolitan and open-
minded while also being members of the English upper-middle-class, but
Mrs Munt, their aunt who lives on the Dorset coast, stands for a dull,
exasperating but still somewhat charming English middle-class outlook:
anti-intellectual, quite fiercely nationalistic and locally particularist, this last
characteristic being emphasized by her repetition of a rhyme pronouncing
the superiority of her own coastal home town, Swanage, over its two local
rivals, Bournemouth and Poole (Forster 1973, 19.165).

These two paragraphs present a relatively absurdly idealized southern
England. This is the one indicated to Frieda by Mrs Munt, and Forster
means to say that this is a myopic view. Forster does not mean that England
really *is* this view. After all, it fails to take in not merely Scotland and
Wales, but also the industrial Midlands and North on which much of the
wealth of the likes of Schlegels and Wilcoxes was founded, and it also, even at the zenith of British imperial power, completely obscures from view Ireland and the many British colonies and dominions elsewhere in the world. The problem with a text like this for readers today is that of determining whether Forster is actually celebrating England in the gushy tones of the first of these paragraphs, or whether he is actually satirizing the excesses of patriotism. This is not a problem Margaret considers at the end of the chapter when she feels she cannot reject the Wilcox side of England, the ruthless money-making and governing side. A strength of Howards End is that in it Forster dialogizes the opposition between the local and the large-scale. But he remains resolutely anti-cosmopolitan. What readers have always seen in the novel is a quasi-religious attachment to a small-scale site like an individual house in the landscape of a certain English county.

Because so many resonances can be heard in the paragraphs I am discussing, it is tempting to see attempts at a literary GIS as necessarily reductionist or unjustifiably selective. Cooper and Gregory’s work begins with the Lake District itself, from “an awareness of the braided nature of the region’s socio-spatial and cultural histories”. As such, it seems more radically place-first than the text-led sort of Deep Locational Criticism exemplified by this present chapter’s reading of Forster, for which a more rough-hewn version of Barthes’s codes might seem a fuller model. While Barthesian analysis lacks the technological sophistication of a project such
as Cooper and Gregory’s on the Lake District, to trace the toponyms of
Chapter 19 onto a map does help answer the question of how Forster’s
approach to England in the chapter should be understood.

Chapter 19 is just under 3,000 words long, only a sixth of it—the opening
paragraph of 350 words and the closing paragraph of less than half of that—in
the narrator’s voice. But it is the narrator’s words in this chapter which
have interested critics rather than their interaction with the chapter’s passage
of dialogue. As I have argued elsewhere (Finch 2011, 399), in readings of
Forster the idea or symbolic dimension of English place, has always been
exaggerated at the expense of the undercutting, minor-key mockery and
quiet laughter. The closing paragraphs are what have attracted critics’
attention to Chapter 19. Leavis ([1938]) quoted the passage to indicate what
he found contemptible in Forster. Barbara Rosecrance (1987, 125-26)
defends Forster from this attack, insisting that the passages in the narrator’s
voice, which she calls “[e]legaic and passionate, sentimental and
unabashed”, “transcend the focus on personality even as they represent a
desperate attempt to retain the civilization for which it was a primary
value”. For John Sayre Martin (1976, 119) the passage presents fewer
difficulties. “Forster's panoramic description of England in Chapter 19”, he
says, gives “the sense of a richly varied, dynamic country whose ultimate
destiny no one can foresee”. None of these readers gets especially close to
grasping the depth of response to place and place constructions in the
passage, although Rosecrance in her answer to Leavis gets closest.

The chapter contains many toponyms, and the next task is to map these, using ShareMap. The toponyms, together with a few phrases that imply toponyms but do not actually contain them, are: “England” [in the voice of the narrator, and also with the other cases unless indicated otherwise]; “the Purbeck hills”; “Corfe”; “Frome”; “Dorchester”; “The valley of the Stour”; “Blandford”; “Wimborne”; “the Stour”; “the Avon”; “Christchurch”; “The valley of the Avon”; “Clearbury Ring”; “Salisbury Plain”; “the Plain”; “the glorious downs of central England”; “Bournemouth”; “the Stock Exchange”; “London”; “the City”; “the cliffs of Freshwater”; “the Island”; “the Wight”; “England”; “Southampton”; “Portsmouth”; “Swanage”; “England”; “Pomerania”; “Poole harbour”; “Friedrich Wilhelms Bad, Rügen”; “the tideless Baltic”; “Vindemere” [Frau Architect Liesecke (FAL)]; “Grasmere” [FAL]; “the mud of your Pool” [FAL]; “Poole harbour” [Mrs Munt (MM)]; “Bournemouth” [MM]; “Bournemouth” [MM]; “Poole” [MM]; “Swanage” [MM]; “Bournemouth” [MM]; “Poole” [MM]; “Swanage” [MM]; “Wickham Place” [FAL]; “Ducie Street” [Helen Schlegel (HS)]; “Corfe” [MM]; “the downs on which we are standing” [MM]; “Swanage” [MM]; “the Isle of Purbeck”; “Swanage”; “Ducie Street” [HS]; “Howards End” [HS]; “a country seat in Shropshire” [HS]; “Hilton” [HS]; “near Epsom” [HS]; “Evie will have a house when she marries, and probably a pied-a-terre in the country” [HS]; “a hut in Africa” [HS];
“Howards End” [HS]; “Swanage”; “Waterloo” [Margaret Schlegel]; “her eyes shifting over the view, is if this county or that could reveal the secret of her own heart”; “England”; “Poole harbour”; “Branksea Island”; “Frome”; “Dorchester”; “Stour”; “Wimborne”; “Avon”; “Salisbury”; “England”; “the whole island”.

The view at the end of Chapter 95 is from somewhere near Swanage on the Isle of Purbeck, on the south coast of England. This, in Forsterian imaginative geography, is the frontier between a wilder England and the long arm, reaching down to the sea at resorts, watering holes, retirement spots and commuter towns, of London: “Bournemouth’s ignoble coast cowers to the right, heralding the pine trees that mean, for all their beauty, red houses, and the Stock Exchange, and extend to the gates of London itself. So tremendous is the City’s trail!” (Forster 1973, 19.164).

Using Sharemap I took a selection of the toponyms from the chapter and plotted them onto a map of England (Finch 2012b; see Map 1, a black-and-white hand-drawn version of the map based on Pinkerton [1818] [typesetter: please reproduce Map 1 near here]). The black curved line on the online version is “Bournemouth’s ignoble coast”; the routes of the three rivers mentioned (the Frome, Stour and Dorset Avon) are marked out in blue; red tags cover the settlements mentioned (Dorchester, Blandford Forum, Wimborne Minster, Corfe Castle, Poole, Christchurch, Salisbury, London). An important absence from this map are the place names in Germany that
appear in the chapter ("Friedrich Wilhelms Bad, Rügen", "Pomerania").

Mapped onto the map of England, the toponyms mark out a rectangle extending from Dorchester in the South West, with its Thomas Hardy associations, via Salisbury Plain, online shaded lemon yellow (shaded pale grey on Map 1), to, at the end of “the glorious downs of central England” (in this case the system shaded online in pink running from the Wiltshire Downs through the Chilterns), Stevenage in Hertfordshire. In a reminder of the overall imaginative geography of the novel, there lies Forster’s childhood home Rook’s Nest which is carefully reproduced in the novel as Howards End. Chapter 19 offers a contrast between a perspective fanning out up river valleys to the north west of Corfe Castle, and the isolated figure of London off to the north east (with Bournemouth its representative, or advance guard, on the coast). Salisbury Plain and the “glorious downs of central England” potentially link the two, and so link industrialised and urbanized south-east England with an ancient, pre-human past represented by geology and the routes of rivers.

A brief technical note is in order. Sharemap helped me create the maps which appear both in this chapter and Chapter 7 below, but the final versions of the maps which are reproduced in this book were then redrawn by me using transparencies on the basis of printed and enlarged versions of maps freely available online via Wikimedia Commons, before being turned into printable files (see Map 1; Map 2). Their creation thus involved a fairly
complex mixture of digital skills and materials with analogue craft skills and tools.

The impression of the country as a whole arises from the mention of individual places, to recall Belloc and Chesterton once more. But, reading Forster, we should remember that major parts of the country are completely absent from the view here: the parts which are not connected to either the metropolis or the rural southern counties. They are, we might add, also absent from Forster’s personal experience, not part of his environment. The view from the south coast in Chapter 19 of *Howards End* is emphatically of a rural England still class-stratified in a very old-established way, however much Forster may ironize the voice in which this version of England is imagined.

**The Potential of Literary GIS**

The GIS reading of Chapter 19 serves as a reminder of how subtle the interplay is in *Howards End* between ironic comedy of manners and grand patterns of symbol and ideas. Mapping toponyms using ShareMap can also indicate ideologically or otherwise motivated absences. Cooper and Gregory point out “the vast swathes of blank space” on their own “comparative GIS” of the written-up travels through the Lake District of the poets Gray and...
Coleridge, observing how this “raises questions about the possible imaginative and cultural marginalization of particular tracts of land within the Cumbrian topography” (Cooper and Gregory 2011, 98). The absences in Forster’s English topography are perhaps even more glaring: the North, the non-English parts of the British Isles. Yet Forster here is also engaged, much more clearly and indeed self-consciously than Gray or Coleridge in their travel journals, in symbolic cultural work, in imagining a nation. This is an equiprimordial England (Malpas 2006, 306), in that the whole is made up of the vitally important parts, but the whole is itself partial – a view from a specific somewhere, to recall the Gadamerian notion of horizon. All writing of place turns out merely to scratch the surface of somewhere and from this to posit views of totality that are partial, which Heidegger would call worlds.

*Howards End* has often been treated as a Condition-of-England novel that is only partially successful, because undermined by its clumsy treatment of social class. Critics have returned to it again and again when assessing the mind-set of Edwardian England yet have almost as frequently attacked Forster’s presentation of the character Leonard Bast, the clerk, for reflecting his own latent class prejudice ignorance of social levels different from his own (Kermode 2009).

But what GIS and an analysis of the toponymy in Chapter 19 reveals, finally, is a perhaps surprisingly concrete, even gazetteer-like dimension,
involving an open and localist habit of listing. On this reading, Forster seems less like Virginia Woolf and more like Arnold Bennett than he has been conventionally judged. His England emerges as a region, a portion of England. Seeing things this way, the Deep Locational reading advances beyond the influential approach of Jed Esty (2004), in which late-imperialist English writers such as Woolf and Forster are viewed as Little-Englanders alongside Chesterton and Belloc (Wright 2008). Using Deep Locational Criticism, readers of Forster and Woolf could move towards a view of them as localists alert to particular topographies. And the particular topography of Chapter 19 of Howards End is concerned with how London and outer southern England relate to each other. Woolf’s southern English and London topographies in Jacob’s Room, Mrs Dalloway and Between the Acts are closely comparable, equating England as they do with London and counties to its south and south-west. So despite – or perhaps because of – their privileged upbringings Forster and Woolf would both emerge as somewhat myopic about other ways of viewing their native country: from the north, for instance, or through lower-class eyes.

GIS techniques provide literary scholars with new possibilities that in some ways resemble those offered by Franco Moretti’s distant reading project. Moretti, indeed, is taken by Cooper and Gregory (2011, 92), as the main figure in the recent development of a literary geography. Perhaps comparative study is needed, as when Cooper and Gregory extract meaning
by comparing and contrasting Gray and Coleridge. In examining just a single writer such as Forster it is not so easy to get a convincing new interpretation merely by reading some points on a map. As Cooper and Gregory (2011, 92) recognize, the danger of glib over-generalization, and of neglecting the complexities of “phenomenological experience”, as Cooper and Gregory (2011, 92) recognise, is ever present. Cooper and Gregory circumvent this by overlaying many technologies onto one another, including the intriguing “Digital Elevation Model (DEM) that allows the heights of each location mentioned to be calculated” (2011, 96).

But the effort Cooper and Gregory make to contain human emotions within their cartographies by means of what they call “mood maps” seems to stretch too far. The mind does not map experience as one maps space from the air or by using surveyors’ instruments, and so the actual on-the-ground shape of the Lake District cannot fully correlate with human experience. In fact literary GIS cannot contain human place experience as recorded, constructed, imagined, invented, played-with in literature. What its insights offer are merely portions of the complete picture. In a locational criticism not only Moretti and some well-funded technical people are needed but also Barthes, Heidegger, history books, and much more.

The application of GIS technologies as part of what is now called the digital humanities seems far away from the mid-twentieth century humanist thinking which, as exemplified by figures such as Leavis and the
Wittgensteinian philosopher Peter Winch ([1958]), claimed to be a distinct mode dependent for its success on the perceptual and combinatory skills of the interpreter. On the argument of Winch, the humanities were distinct from the experimental sciences precisely because one investigator’s findings would not be those of another, which did not mean that the humanities were somehow unscientific. In part, to be sure, GIS technologies have come to the fore in an environment in which humanists are afraid of being swept away by the applied sciences or Google. A locational criticism with aspirations to depth needs to investigate and evaluate GIS techniques much more fully than has been possible in this short section. A whole book would be required.
Chapter 7. An Imaginative Place: The East End of London

Repeated Returns to the East End

This chapter works towards a Deep Locational literary history of a single imaginative place. As such, it can be put alongside Chapter 4, on the Fortune Playhouse. The difference is that whereas the concern there was with a single spot on the earth’s surface, what is in focus here is a single imaginative region or conception of place.

The East End of London is a potent conceptual site but also a nebulous one. Important work on conceptions of it has been done by Emma Francis and Nadia Valman (2011) and Paul Newland (2008), following classic earlier works of historical scholarship focusing on social class and economics (Stedman Jones 1971) and on gender and sexual identities (Walkowitz 1972; Koven 2004). Thoughts of the East End contain what has earlier been described as a synoptic rather than a topographic understanding of imaginative place, in that as an idea it represents a gathering into one symbol of a mass of often contradictory locational features. But synoptic conceptions of imaginative place, or urban imaginaries, to use the term of Andreas Huyssen (2008), do exist. They are “part of any city’s reality, rather than being only figments of the imagination” (Huyssen 2008, 3).
Some of the East End’s key associations will now be examined. Among these are crime, as well as a more general sense that rules of behaviour applicable elsewhere in London do not apply there. Another association is with waves of immigration from within and outside Britain that have passed across the area ever since the Tudor period.

A section at the end of the chapter represents a “second stab” at the idea of the East End. This second stab is one of the repeated returns to partially-known places that are central to the practice of Deep Locational Criticism. This final section is built around two somewhat different models: that of a founding distinction within the East End between waterside zones and the rest; and that of the history of the association between Jews and the East End, especially for a hundred years or so after 1850, as a basis on which has been founded the idea of the East End as a peculiarly immigrant-receptive site.

Most of the chapter should be understood as a first attempt to talk about the idea of the East End in a way that combines attention to on-the-ground co-ordinates and mental conceptualizations: mappable locations and place as experienced, in other words. The aim is to move beyond both spatialist, politicized accounts of the East End and transhistorical, somewhat mystical accounts. The former can be exemplified by the work of Paul Newland (2008), concerned to see the East End as entirely or almost entirely a cultural construction which reflects underlying political ideologies standing
behind this act of constructing, the latter by Peter Ackroyd’s (2000) psychogeographic account of the East End.

The chapter is based around the claim that the East End, since it was first imaginatively constructed in approximately the way it is understood now, has physically moved eastwards and expanded. The modern East End as imaginative place emerged quite rapidly and specifically in the 1870s and the 1880s. This was the era of novels by Margaret Harkness and Walter Besant, the era in which the philanthropic work of Thomas Barnardo and the Salvation Army under William Booth became famous throughout the British Empire, and it was also the era of Jack the Ripper. Deep Locational Criticism is about repeated returns. This book has already discussed J. Hillis Miller’s claim to be writing a topographic criticism, and threw into question his positioning of Dickens’s Sam Weller, who moves between coaching inns in the City of London, as within “East London”. The present chapter returns to the East End of London, to London poverty in the past, and to life experienced in the overcrowded surroundings of a huge city more generally.

Here I consider the larger and yet more nebulous matter of the idea of the “East End” itself. Repeated returns are one sort of movement along a Heideggerian path (Pöggeler 1987; Pöggeler 1997). Heideggerian accounts of place are often thought of as anti-technology. Efforts to apprehend place that are based on technology, meanwhile, such as the Geographical Information Systems that were at the centre of Chapter 6, can lack much
sense of the actual texture of human place experience. A feature of this chapter is the effort to bring the phenomenological and the technological understandings of literary place construction face to face, to make them look at one another. So the chapter discusses, alongside several close readings, another literary GIS, a map trying to show the topographic shifts of the “East End” of London when it is understood as an imaginative place (Finch 2012c).

Plotting the Shifting East End

From Arthur Morrison to the Kray Twins, the East End of London is peculiarly myth-bound. This seems above all to have been the case in the period of the British Empire’s long slow decline, over about a hundred years after 1880. There exist myths of crime and violence but also, in port districts such as Limehouse, accounts of an inter-mixing of peoples that was then extremely rare elsewhere in Britain then except in a few parallel zones in other ports: Bristol, Cardiff, Liverpool. During the twentieth century the East End also became associated with myths of community, and specifically working-class community.

Myths of the East End suggest that this is a peculiarly unchanging part of London. Writers such as Peter Ackroyd and Iain Sinclair certainly lead their
readers to think so. Ackroyd (2000, 271) approvingly cites Sinclair’s argument for a place connection between the funeral of the East End gangster Ronnie Kray at the end of the twentieth century and the followers of the highwayman Dick Turpin centuries earlier, aligning them as “memories of grand criminality”. In *London: A Biography*, Ackroyd (2000, 675) claims that the East End of London has “always existed as a separate and distinct identity”. But contrary to the idea of some consistent meaning in the East End existing over many centuries, the “East End” has, in fact, moved steadily eastward since the early nineteenth century, and only came into being as a capitalized place name in the second half of that century.

In Dickens’s *Oliver Twist* (1837) Bill Sikes lives at Bethnal Green, then an outer suburb, but the headquarters of Fagin’s gang lies on Saffron Hill, north-west of the City of London (Map 2: 5, 1). Next to the Fleet River, an open sewer, Saffron Hill was for two centuries after the 1666 Great Fire of London a noxious corner of ill-repute on the immediate north-western fringes of the City of London (Clout 1991, 64-5; Finch 2013a). For most of the nineteenth century, what today would be called the East End was not identifiably the worst portion of London or notably “other” in relation to the western parts of the city. It was oriented around the making of money rather than the spending of money, for sure, but the most decayed and notorious portions of London were found in the continuous zone which Gareth Stedman Jones (1971) called the inner ring around central London, through
the slum districts which run from Bethnal Green westwards. In the first
three quarters of the nineteenth century the dangerous slums appear around
the northern and eastern fringes of the City of London, as well as on the
southern bank of the Thames. This is a continuation of the existence noted
in Chapter 4 above of City liberties such as Norton Folgate as places of
refuge (St Katherine’s, to the east of the City was one, but so was Ely Place
to the west). Jerry White (2007), comparably, speaks of the removal of
pockets of “old London”, decayed groups of streets that had survived from
the seventeenth century and earlier, as the main objective of those who
sought to improve the city in the period 1800-70.

Low-life fictions written as late as the period 1880-1914 continue to focus
on London slums outside the East End. The worst slum in George Gissing’s
1880 debut novel Workers in the Dawn is Whitecross Street (Map 2: 2),
north of the City and immediately adjacent to the site of the Fortune
playhouse (see Image 7). The plot of Gissing’s second novel The Unclassed
is built around the collecting of slum rents slightly west of there on St John
Street in Clerkenwell, the setting, too, of The Nether World (1889). During
his early writing years, Gissing himself, after a few months in a court off
Tottenham Court Road, lived on the fringes of the lowest districts, not in
them. The slum homes of the most struggling writers in his New Grub Street
(1891) are located in pockets close to the centre, in Islington, due north of
the City, and Marylebone, due north of the West End.
This anticipates accounts, perhaps dated even when first produced, of West End slums in books published in the period 1901-14: for instance Joseph Conrad’s *The Secret Agent*, H.G. Wells’s *Ann Veronica* and Gissing’s own *The Private Papers of Henry Ryecroft*. These are all books by middle-aged writers remembering their youth in the 1870s and 1880s. There still were West End slums in 1910, but they were fast disappearing and in any case were becoming increasingly unrepresentative of London poverty as a whole.

Areas such as Clerkenwell are derided as “oriental regions” by a Gissing character, the cynical West End painter Gilbert Gresham (*Workers in the Dawn*, Part Two, Chapter X), but they do not seem like the core East End as it is understood today. The boundaries of that core East End are not very different from those of today’s London Borough of Tower Hamlets, with the southernmost portion of Hackney thrown in, east and south east of Clerkenwell. On a map of the imaginative East End created using ShareMap (Finch 2012c; see Map 2, a black-and-white version of this map based on Bacon [1920]) I indicate it as a yellow region, and hypothesize that as an imaginative place it came into being around 1870.

As for that legendary figure Jack the Ripper, he operated in the zone of lodging-houses immediately to the east of the City (Map 2: 3). These have been well described by Richard Dennis (2008b), who indicates how they
operated as businesses with specific people operating them. Dennis, like other researchers with a straightforward and empirical approach (e.g. White 2007, 322-49), considers the extremes of London poverty and crime in the late nineteenth century in a way that is far from the Gothic or melodramatic style of a Dickens, Conan Doyle or Robert Louis Stevenson. Dennis indicates how the desire on the part of lodging-house keepers and their employees to behave decently towards the desperate, alcohol-ravaged people who frequented such places could clash with the commercial imperative. The Whitechapel Murders were real and horrific events. But vulnerable people had been brutally killed in London with startling regularity for century after century. The murders were not merely a discursive construction but “Jack the Ripper” largely was, and this had enormous consequences for the image of the East End in the twentieth century.

A key literary text in the creation of both the discursive idea of the East End known later and some of its key institutions is Walter Besant’s *All Sorts and Conditions of Men* (1883). This novel treats the zone east of Aldgate Pump, the traditional eastern boundary of the City of London, beyond which lay the East End (the point missed by Miller in his reading of *Pickwick*), as if it were a bizarre yet depressing kingdom in itself, full of bored, well-fed yet godless worker bees. Subsequent key East End writings by Arthur Morrison ([1896]) and Thomas Burke (1916) shift the scene steadily further
east, in Burke’s case to the riverside port area of Limehouse (Map 2: 4, 6). The mid-twentieth century might be considered the apogee of the mythical East End, and within this the classic location was Bethnal Green, scene of heroism and tragedy during the bombings of World War Two, and home a century after Bill Sikes to the Kray Twins, symbols of home-loving East End villainy (Map 2: 5).

A few points from the second half of the twentieth century should be appended. One would be the transplanting of people from the East End to places further from central London in what until the early twentieth century was rural Essex. This was already noticeable by 1935, the date of Simon Blumenfeld’s East End novel Jew Boy ([1935]). From the 1920s there was large-scale resettlement of working-class East Londoners in huge new ‘cottage’ estates along the Thames estuary (Map 2: 11). The communal effects of the large-scale move from inner-London districts such as Bethnal Green outwards to newly-developed parts of the London-Essex fringe such as Woodford (Map 2: 9) are assessed in a famous sociological study by Michael Young and Peter Willmott ([1957]; see McKibbin 2011, 87). The effect was to establish a new East End several miles east of the old one and far larger in topographic extent, since people were no longer living at such close quarters.

In 1965, following the Local Government Act of 1963, the administrative boundaries of London were redefined. Greater London was established,
covering a much larger area than was governed between 1889 and 1965 by the London County Council (LCC), and containing boroughs merged with one another that were two or three times larger than their predecessors. As becomes clear viewed graphically (Map 2), Greater London as constituted in 1965 took in a vast area of what had formerly been defined as Essex. One major reason why it did so was the large-scale rehousing of former East End residents on the Essex lowlands east of the Lea Valley which had taken place since the First World War, in sites such as the very large estates of Becontree, built by the LCC before the Second War, and Hainault, built by the same body in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as smaller groupings of tower blocks not only in the inner city but also in formerly rural areas that also contained genteel suburbia, for example the Orchard Estate in Woodford (Map 2: 9, 10, 11). One way of understanding East London in the twenty-first century would be as the area covered by six boroughs: Tower Hamlets, Hackney, Waltham Forest, Newham, Redbridge and Havering. This area today has a combined population of 1.6 million people.

Or one could look at the title sequence of EastEnders, a BBC television soap opera which started in 1985, and now available via YouTube. Here, the East End seems to have moved further east, to centre on Leamouth, the point at which the River Lea enters the Thames, immediately east of the Isle of Dogs, and more broadly on the whole zone which in the 1980s came to be known as Docklands (Map 2: 7). In the 2010s this more easterly East End
has acquired a new focus in the park built for the 2012 Olympic Games on former railway land at Stratford, east of the River Lea (Map 2: 8). Since the 1980s, property in London has become spectacularly more expensive than formerly, and areas in the inner East End such as Bethnal Green and Spitalfields have undergone gentrifying transformations. I would contend that although it is possible to see an East End diaspora in many areas of southern and eastern England, what could be called the “classic” East End of the period 1870-1980 no longer exists.

**Stages on One Road: Gissing, Shaw, Morrison**

In 1880, Gissing described *Workers in the Dawn* as a story of “earnest young people striving for improvement in, as it were, the dawn of a new phase of our civilization” (G.R. Gissing to Algernon Gissing, 2 January 1880, cited Coustillas 2011, 159). It is a novel which struggles to reconcile the positivist values of Gissing’s mentor Fredric Harrison with Gissing’s own highly ambivalent reaction to the people he saw around him as a struggling writer renting rooms in central London, people he was often inclined to see as utterly degraded. To take just one example, there is Polly Hemp, a cunning procuress and abandoned drunkard, who connives in the road to ruin undertaken by Carrie, wife of the novel’s protagonist Arthur
Golding. She is described as “something far more akin to beast than man. Of iron constitution, she still, at the age of forty, showed no signs of yielding health, though she drank desperately, and had several times been almost killed in the fierce brawls which were her delight” (Gissing [1880], 484).

Workers in the Dawn was written when Gissing was in his early twenties and writing from the slums. He was living in paltry rented rooms surrounded by people whose manners horrified him, and left him unable to cloak his portrait of slum-dwellers in irony as when writing The Nether World a decade later. Nevertheless, Workers in the Dawn is notable for its portrayal of a wide range of slum-dwellers with varying character traits, from a crudely villainous professional beggar to a saintly printer. The novel tells of London extremes of a sort that writers in subsequent decades would feel strongly obliged to situate in the East End. That they came to do so was part of a literary trend led by Besant.

Another story of East End writing between the 1870s and the 1920s is that of a journey away from earnestness. Mid-Victorian writing on the poorest districts of London tended to adopt an elevated, high-minded tone. Gissing in 1880 spoke warmly of his characters as “earnest young people”. One stage on this journey was Oscar Wilde’s mockery of contemporary values in The Importance of Being Earnest (1895). The butt of Wilde’s wit in this play, the po-faced seriousness with which members of the upper classes were increasingly expected to behave, is itself an indication of how
these values were growing stale by the 1890s. Writing set in the East End and published between 1890 and 1920 would move far from earnestness into sensation and horror.

So far one of the few coherent narratives of the history of London slum writing is that produced in the mid-1960s by the urban historian H.J. Dyos ([1966], 139). The same narrative is still basically accepted in the mid-2000s by the historian of “slumming” Seth Koven (2004, 9). Up to and including Gissing, Dyos alleges, Victorian writers sentimentalized the urban poor, about whom they knew very little. Then, he claims, there was a sudden move towards the “complete authenticity” of Arthur Morrison’s *A Child of the Jago* and *Tales of Mean Streets*. And it is perfectly true that mid-Victorian novelists such as Dickens, while they took the plight of the poor seriously, were quite happy to present fictional characters, including both slum-dwellers and members of the higher classes who came into contact with them, as either wholly good or wholly bad.

But Dyos’s assumption of the authenticity of Morrison looks mistaken now, as pointed out by Diana Maltz (2011) and others. Dyos, in a typically 1960s way, sees a binary gulf between the sentimental Victorianism of Gissing and the unflinching acceptance of urban reality in writers only a few years younger than him such as Morrison (Gissing was born in 1857, Morrison in 1863). But the writings on the East End of both Gissing and Morrison move eastwards from the area covered by their predecessors:
Gissing from St Giles and Saffron Hill to Clerkenwell and Whitecross Street; Morrison from there to Shoreditch and Wapping. Gissing and Morrison represent successive stages in a journey from the earnest (Dickens and Charles Kingsley’s writings of the 1840s and 1850s could be prime examples), to its complete opposite in Burke’s *Limehouse Nights*.

In the last years of Victoria’s reign, writing on the poorest parts of London most often adopted a serious, concerned tone even when a writer professed to hate and despise the poor. A case in point is Gissing’s *The Private Papers of Henry Ryecroft*. This book is partly fiction, partly autobiography and partly a series of meditative essays. It was written in the late 1890s towards the end of Gissing’s life, when his moderate success as a writer had physically removed him from the world of the poorest in London. But a different tone starts to emerge in the early plays of Bernard Shaw, notably *Widowers’ Houses*, also written in the 1890s. In this play, concerned with a young man’s dilemma on discovering that not only his fiancée’s money but also his own money derives from slum landlordism, the poor are not actually represented on stage. Indeed, for all Shaw’s vaunted Fabianism, in *Widowers’ Houses* the very notion of a social problem seems to be mocked.

Mockery of the prevailing earnest discourse about social problems is embodied in *Widowers’ Houses* by the physical on-stage presence throughout the play’s final act of a “blue book”, a government report. The
gratingly cockney former rent-collector Lickcheese refers on his reappearance, very smartly-dressed, at the beginning of the third act to “the great public question of the Ousing of the Working Classes” (Shaw 1946, 82). Here, Lickcheese is alluding to the Parliamentary Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes. This had produced its report in 1885, leading in turn to an Act of Parliament which enabled local authorities to inspect rented properties and punish landlords who allowed the buildings they owned to become insanitary.

The “blue book” in Shaw thus exists at the intersection between high society, fashionable opinion and dinner-table talk with low-life—the domestic lives of the poor which earlier Victorians had tended to ignore. Produced with a flourish by Lickcheese, the blue book is literally struck a blow by Sartorius, slum landlord and Lickcheese’s former employer. Then, abandoned when Sartorius and Lickcheese leave the room in the hope of coming to a private financial agreement, the book is discovered by Blanche, Sartorius’s daughter. She reads it and discovers what is now the publicly established truth about her father. He is “[t]he worst slum landlord in London” (Shaw 2000, 85), and slum rents are the source of the money through which she has been raised as a lady. Blanche attempts to destroy the volume by tearing it in half. This failing, she casts it into the fire, but it falls short of the flames. Sartorius returns, spots the “blue book” and rescues it. Ultimately the actions of central government, in a way utterly counter to the
socialist doctrines Shaw espoused as a public speaker, seem limp and even feeble in comparison with personal, mutually beneficial deals done within the moneyed classes. For an audience in the theatre, the experience of a play such as *Widowers’ Houses* is that of a comedy of manners set among wealthy people, the lives of the poor remaining off-stage.

In contrast with this, Shaw’s *Mrs Warren’s Profession*, written in 1894, slightly later than *Widowers’ Houses*, does represent slum-dwellers, or at least an ex-slum-dweller, on the stage, in the shape of the title character. Mrs Warren is a woman raised in a London rookery who is given the chance to tell her story as one of pathos (Shaw 2000, 247-52). She explains how she became a prostitute following a childhood of poverty and neglect, ultimately becoming a successful brothel-keeper. But this story is undercut by the fact that she continues to profit from this immoral business (however justifiable her initial entry into this “profession” is made to seem).

Mrs Warren’s slum origins are identified as being “down by the Mint” (Shaw 2000, 247), across the road from the Tower of London going eastwards, and so combine an identity in the ancient pockets of criminal refuge known as the liberties with a newer, specifically East End locational identity. This places her origins in the innermost and westernmost part of what would emerge in the 1880s and 1890s—thanks to Besant and Morrison and other writers—as the well-defined East End. In *Widowers’ Houses*, Sartorious’s property is reported by Lickcheese to be “down there
by the Tower” (Shaw 2000, 83). The reference to the Tower in the one play suggests that the impoverished area chosen by Shaw for Mrs Warren’s childhood in the other play is that of the nearby Royal Mint and the former Liberty of St Katherine’s, rather than the area of Southwark known as the Old Mint and used by White (2007, 8-10) as a metonymic representative of early-nineteenth-century “Old London”, with its patches of decrepitude encircling the central districts.

Morrison’s *A Child of the Jago* ([1896]), set in Shoreditch, at the north-east corner of the City, represents a step eastwards from the Whitecross Street of Gissing’s *Workers in the Dawn*, and northwards from the Mint area where Shaw’s Mrs Warren grew up. It also represents a step towards a view of the poor as alien, bestial and other. One explanation of this might be that slum writing needed to be increasingly sensational in order to sell. Dyos ([1966]) suggests that by the 1890s the English middle-classes had grown used to hearing about the plight of the poor around them, so that conditions which would have been shocking in the 1840s were now merely boring. About the same time that Morrison’s representation of Shoreditch in *A Child of the Jago* caused a sensation, Henry Nevinson wrote a more nuanced account of life in the same borough, *Neighbours of Ours*, in which he lightly fictionalised a period he had spent living in this westernmost part of the East End (as it was conceived in the 1890s). Nevinson complained afterwards that whereas his own book was praised by the critics and Morrison’s abused,
Morrison was the one who sold better and became famous. Readers, this is to say, were becoming desensitized, or were losing faith in the reality of slum horrors, a phenomenon with parallels in the expectations and tastes of cinema audiences after the 1950s.

But there are other possible explanations for the differences between Morrison and his predecessors. One is biographical. Unlike Dickens, Besant or Gissing, Morrison was himself an east Londoner, from an upper-working-class background in Poplar. So perhaps he related to that sector of London as his own, with an insider’s empathy and feel for it, and perhaps, too, he was shy about revealing his roots there.

Sometimes, as in a short story called “Behind the Shade” in Tales of Mean Streets, he wrote the bleakest social realism (Morrison [1894], 97-106). “Behind the Shade” tells of two women from a declined sea captain’s family in the riverside parts of the East End who consider themselves the most socially elevated people in their neighbourhood and starve to death because of the stigma against asking for help. Morrison describes their changing appearance in haunting terms, and in conclusion relates the deaths to the surroundings in an East End which was by now a recognized topic of concerned discussion: “After the inquest the street had an evening’s fame: for the papers printed coarse drawings of the house, and in leaderettes demanded the abolition of something, or the reform of something else” (Morrison [1894], 106).
In his preface to *Tales of Mean Streets*, Morrison describes the east end in the same terms as Besant: as the unknown but frequently stereotyped world “out beyond Leadenhall Street and beyond Aldgate Pump”. Taking a middle-class spectator’s point of view here, he looks from the City, seeing a region opening out eastwards. He is concerned to emphasize, for the benefit of middle-class readers who think of it as a land of filth inhabited by bruised people living in beggarly poverty, that this region to the east is actually a huge world in itself, with many “grades of decency” (Morrison [1894], 17) separating the respectable working-class streets there from actual slums, places where the inhabitants are frequently close to starvation. In the context of the present book, the view of Sam Weller moving through “East London streets” given by Hillis Miller (1995, 132) and queried early on here has been more thoroughly contextualised by repeated returns to the frontier between central London and what has lain beyond it in different centuries.

For all the subtlety of his view, Morrison certainly sensationalized in his most famous account of the East End, *A Child of the Jago*. The word “Jago” in the title of this book is the name of a rookery, a close packed area of a few streets and the alleys and courts between them, of old houses in an advanced state of decay, condemned and about to be demolished. In the mean time, the Jago is off limits to the police and the public apart from a single brave clergyman. The Jago is closely modelled on a group of streets immediately to the south-east of St Leonard’s Church, Shoreditch, known
collectively as the “Old Nichol”. This area was torn down in the 1890s and replaced with one of the first major developments of social housing constructed by the LCC, the Boundary Street Estate. Morrison describes the Jago satirically as a total inversion of Victorian respectability, a place where status is conferred by drinking, thieving and acts of extreme violence.

As Dyos points out, Morrison is startlingly different from most predecessors in that he views slum-dwellers through their own eyes. An example is when Josh Perrott, burglar and father of the eponymous child of the Jago Dickie, goes burgling in wealthy Highbury: “He tramped one quiet road after another on the look out for a dead ’un—a house furnished, but untenanted. But there was never a dead ’un, it seemed, in all the northern district” (Morrison [1896], Chapter 23). Josh’s expedition is referred to in his own argot as a “click”, just as Jago dwellers like Kiddo Cook and Pigeony Poll carry their slum names within this book as their real names.

Dialect is present in A Child of the Jago, then, where it is held to be a social phenomenon that calls for scholarly treatment. So “furnished, but untenanted”, in the passage written from Josh’s point of view, resembles a dictionary definition of what Josh thinks of as a “dead ’un”. This treatment, and other such glosses, recall other projects contemporary with Morrison’s own, for example the English Dialect Dictionary. This was the work of Joseph Wright (1855-1930), and was published in six volumes by Oxford University Press between 1898 and 1905, the first volume appearing only
two years after *A Child of the Jago*. Wright, like Morrison, had risen from the lower orders but even more spectacularly: an illiterate Yorkshire mill-worker at fifteen, Wright had a Heidelberg PhD by thirty. Morrison’s blatant sensationalism, then, sits alongside acts of scholarly distancing from a region and groups of people who could be identified in socially stigmatizing ways as his own, acts which resemble the far more systematic and distanced work of Wright.

Sarah Wise (2008) describes the real-life Old Nichol in Shoreditch, the original for the Jago, as chiefly home to people who struggled to survive through extremely badly paid home-working. Here Wise, contradicting Dyos’s 1960s claim that Morrison’s account of the East End, because it does not sentimentalize, is trustworthy. Morrison presents home-working in his Jago as a cover, and the place as in fact a thieves’ den. Although occupations like matchbox-making undoubtedly could be a cover for other activities, a lie told to interfering authorities, Morrison certainly gives his account more punch by exaggerating the criminality of the district.

Wise (2008, 226) indicates both the depth of Morrison’s engagement with the Old Nichol, the neighbourhood he fictionalised as the Jago just before it was demolished, and the partiality of his view of it. Morrison’s eighteen-month stint as a regular visitor to the Jago, drinker in its pubs and interviewer of the locals, not only resembles Wright’s work on the English Dialect Dictionary, but also anticipates the work of twentieth-century US
sociologists like William Foote Whyte ([1943]) on Boston and Gerald D. Suttles (1968) on Chicago, plus New York urbanist writing by Jane Jacobs (1961) and Marshall Berman ([1982]). But as an imaginative writer, Morrison’s stance is far from documentary. Whether or not Wise is right to present him as merely a “mouthpiece” for the charismatic Anglican clergyman Arthur Osborne Jay, who claimed to be acting in the locals’ own interests when he enlisted the congregation members at his High Church ceremonies, it seems incontestable that Morrison constructed the doomed Nichol as more glamorously horrible than it actually was.

For instance, there is the fighting. Gissing mentions the “fierce brawls” in which Polly Hemp engages. Morrison gives readers something far more vivid:

Blinded with blood, Sally released her hold on Mrs Perrott, and rolled on her back, struggling fiercely; but to no end, for Norah Walsh, kneeling on her breast, stabbed and stabbed again, till pieces of the bottle broke away. (Morrison [1896], 67)

The fact that women fought one another in the streets became an almost pornographic cliché about the slums only in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. There is no mention of it in Dickens, or in non-fictional accounts from the 1840s and 1850s such as that of Thomas Beames on St Giles. Such brawls do appear in early Gissing (there is one in *Workers in the Dawn*, in Huntley Street, Bloomsbury), but in depicting them Morrison goes
further in the direction of violence and quasi-pornographic titillation. This is how the move away from sentimentality can be understood as a move towards sensationalism, towards using the slums to stimulate the palates of jaded readers.

One reason why the settings of London slum writing shift eastward is a very material one: the destruction of old slums. Morrison ([1896], 129) describes the demolition of the Jago as “letting light and air at last into the subterranean basements where men and women had swarmed, and bred, and died, like wolves in their lairs”. He describes demolition men, in their own parlance “wreckers”, “no jack-a-dandies”, who refuse to enter certain rooms during the destruction process. This conveys a sense of the horror which the slums had for members of the working classes whose lives, materially speaking, were only a rung or two above those of slum-dwellers. Between 1840 and 1910 the dominant thinking of the powerful was that slums should be removed by physical destruction, above all by the cutting through of roads and railways, but also increasingly by the construction of what were supposed to be model dwellings.

In the “miasmic” theory which dominated views of public health in the earlier part of this period, the notion of air played an important part. Air was precisely what made hilltop suburbs in London so desirable, and what drove wealthy Victorians to elevated dormitories in Surrey. In this respect Morrison does not differ from Beames fifty years before him, who had
described the rookery of St Giles being ripped open, exposed to public view, during the construction through it of New Oxford Street (Flint 1987, 135-46). Downwind from the rest of London, the East End became identified by comfortably-off people who lived elsewhere as the capital of bad air, and the label stuck. Another reason for the shift is the more discursive one proposed by Dyos: readers demanded new thrills.

Morrison should not be evaluated solely on the basis of how truthful an account of the real-life Old Nichol his Jago is. Locationally speaking, A Child of the Jago might give the appearance of a piece of lexicographic, sociological and ethnographic research carried out by a participant observer in a way that distinguishes it from writings by Dickens, Besant and even Gissing. Before writing the book, after all, Morrison systematically studied the residents of the Nichol for over a year, spending much time there, but also conducting interviews with slum-dwellers from the Old Nichol at his house just outside London (Maltz 2011). Morrison often faces criticism from those who say that he falsified what was actually there. But the Jago in the novel also functions in a much more purely literary way as a symbolic other to the orderliness of Imperial Britain, deliberately placing this other right next to to the commercial heart of the Empire, the City and Port of London. As such, A Child of the Jago is importantly something other than a piece of referential, realist fiction. It is also a piece of fantasy or dystopian literature, and its realist elements create a tension or quality of
undecidability within it that would not be there if, like H.G. Wells’s “The
Time Machine”, it had been set at a spatial or temporal distance from
Victorian England. In the terms of Malpas (2006, 306), and referring back to
the theoretical framework of the present book, what helps this to be
recognized is the principle of equiprimordiality (within which the parts of a
structure cannot be reduced to the identity or meaning of the whole to which
they belong). This is the principle through which the multiple identities of
Morrison’s book can be grasped: as realist reportage; as satirical romance.

**Going too Far? Thomas Burke and the Ethics of Slum Fiction**

In the second decade of the twentieth century there was a fashion for writers
and artists from outsider or proletarian backgrounds, and for the odd and
fresh views of the world they could provide. D.H. Lawrence, James Joyce
and the painter Mark Gertler could be understood in this way. In this context
we also find Thomas Burke and his book *Limehouse Nights*, published in
1916.

Burke was, like Morrison, an East Londoner. But whereas Morrison
concealed his roots in the East End working classes, Burke, or those
promoting his career, made play of his, and even exaggerated them. He may
have grown up, like Morrison, in Poplar, close to the Docks just north of the
Isle of Dogs, but he went to a school for the sons of distressed gentlefolk, and before he became successful as an author worked in publishers’ offices (Witchard 2007; Witchard 2013). Burke’s name is not a famous one, unlike those of contemporaries of his with points in common—Joyce, Lawrence—but he was a successful writer in his day. Recently he has been rediscovered, notably in a series of pieces by Anne Witchard (2004; 2007; 2013), as a prolific professional writer who returned again and again to his origins as an ordinary Londoner, and to his Dickens-like knowledge of the most unknown London streets and neighbourhoods.

*Limehouse Nights*, Burke’s debut, is a shocking and disturbing read. It steps further than Morrison down the path towards connoisseur-like appreciations of violent and sexually abusive acts. It also heads further east than Dickens, Gissing or Morrison, so indicating the eastward movement of the East End itself. The book is a collection of short stories—tales in the mode of Conrad, Kipling and Saki—set in Limehouse, west of Poplar and east of Wapping in the heart of London’s port area in the period between the beginning of the nineteenth century and the 1960s.

Readings of *Limehouse Nights* by Witchard and others have focused on the exotic. Burke returns again and again to sexual (and emotional) relationships between Chinese men and local cockney girls, the latter often very young indeed. It is not surprising, then, that critics like Witchard and Paul Newland should contextualize Burke by using notions like the “yellow
peril” and put him alongside authors such as Sax Rohmer, creator of the villainous Fu Manchu. Newland (2008, 105-24) views *Limehouse Nights* through the lens of Edward W. Said’s concept of orientalism. The reason is that Burke emphasizes the Chinese population of Limehouse just as Morrison, in portraying the Jago, stresses the criminal fraternity. The metal posts known as “the posties” act as a frontier dividing Morrison’s Jago from the normal world beyond in streets like Bishopsgate and Shoreditch High Street, the world of policemen and shopkeepers, such that the Jago-dwellers become carnivalesque inversions of respectable, stratified London society. Burke’s emphasis, by contrast, is on intermingling. Among the locational readings offered in the present book, thoughts such as these work towards a typology of boundaries, and at this point we should recall the dangerous porosity of the boundary separating Malamud’s Newman from those incarcerated in the mental hospital of “The Letter”.

But alongside its deployment of tropes of exotic threat, there is a strain of Joycean naturalism in *Limehouse Nights*. This is at odds with its blatantly racist, gaudily colourful and pornographic side. Grant Richards, who had published Joyce’s early work, was brave enough to bring out *Limehouse Nights* when a dozen other publishers had rejected it, fearing scandal or legal action (Witchard 2013). The naturalism of *Limehouse Nights* is a grotesquely exaggerated version of the Zola of *Thérèse Raquin*, itself clearly descended from the Gothic tales of Poe. Burke, like Zola there, deploys
precise toponyms, and gives accounts of dreadful, shocking, repulsively abusive human relations. The naturalism is accompanied by an ambivalent interest in the harsh visual beauty of the docks, as covered in impressionistic descriptions that are close to the territory of early poems by T.S. Eliot like “Preludes” and “Rhapsody on a Windy Night” and even to the German expressionist painting of Otto Dix.

Despite Witchard’s efforts, Burke remains a little-known writer, so that a taste of his prose may be necessary if I am to cast light on the locational aspects of *Limehouse Nights*:

Marigold lived under the tremendous glooms of the East and West India Docks; and what she didn’t know about the more universal aspects of human life, though she was yet short of twenty, was hardly to be known. You know, perhaps, the East India Dock, which lies a little north of its big brother, the West India Dock: a place of savagely masculine character, evoking the brassy mood. By daytime a cold, nauseous light hangs about it; at night a devilish darkness settles upon it.

You know, perhaps, the fried-fish shops that punctuate every corner in the surrounding maze of streets, the “general” shops with their assorted rags, their broken iron, and their glum-faced basins of kitchen waste; and the lurid-seeming creatures that glide from nowhere into nothing—Arab, Lascar, Pacific Islander, Chinky, Hindoo, and so on, each carrying his own perfume. You know, too, the streets of plunging hoof and horn that
cross and re-cross the waterways, the gaunt chimneys that stick their derisive tongues to the skies. You know the cobbly courts, the bestrewn alleys, through which at night gas-jets asthmatically splutter; and the mephitic glooms and silences of the dock-side. You know these things, and I need not attempt to illuminate them for you. (Burke [1916], 41-42)

This is from the story “The Father of Yoto”, which ends with the note of a Beatrix Potter story: “Tai Ling and Marigold are still in West India Dock Road, and very prosperous and happy they are, though, as I say, they have no right to be” (Burke [1916], 56). An uncharacteristic story, because most of the others in the collection, bearing trashy, thrilling titles like “The Chink and the Child”, “Beryl, the Croucher and the Rest of England”, “The Gorilla and the Girl”, or monosyllabic ones—“The Paw”, “The Cue”, “The Bird”, “Old Joe”—end in terrible violence.

The shocks Burke delivers are not those conveyed by unflinching accounts of poor housing and dirt, even when larded with topless street brawls, as by Morrison in the Jago. Burke never mentions fleas and is uninterested in the interior of a room beyond its bareness, or on occasion its decoration with Chinese lanterns and joss-sticks. It is like Van Gogh’s chair after Courbet or Daumier. No, the shocks Burke delivers are those of sexual and physical abuse. The worst brutes in Burke are not the Chinese immigrants but the English working-class: huge, forever drunk dockers and prize-fighters, or malnourished, forever smoking chancers like Perce Sleep
in “Old Joe”.

These shocks could be condemned. “The Paw” concerns a father who, for days on end, tortures his eleven year old daughter so as to make her kill the Chinese man with whom the girl's mother has run off.

What happened during the next four days in that loathly room can hardly be told. Day and night there were screamings and entreaties. Not one night’s rest did she know. Sleep for an hour he would give her, and then she would be awakened by a voice singing a familiar song of “Stick-a-knife”, and lean hands that worked horrors upon her rosy limbs. (Burke [1916], 87)

Or there is “Old Joe”, in which a paralysed corpse-like ex-docker, who sits “imprisoned” in “a great Windsor chair”, cries out for help, in agonies, as his idiot daughter is tricked upstairs by his stepson the degraded Perce, who has pimped her out to a Chinese man as a way of repaying a gambling debt.

Thinking of genre, a story like this is not far from being a horror story, which perhaps means that Burke should not be read as a naturalist. *Limehouse Nights* is extravagantly terrible in a way that Morrison’s *Tales of Mean Streets* and even the more sensational *A Child of the Jago*, with their documentary claims, are not. Morrison’s *The Hole in the Wall* ([1902]), unlike the other two books of his discussed here, draws attention to its status as a work of fiction by presenting itself as a tale, a yarn. The year 1916 was just before *Women in Love, Ulysses* and *The Well of Loneliness* were all
banned or provoked trials. In this light, it is perhaps surprising that *Limehouse Nights* was published at all. Despite being best known for getting cold feet about Joyce, Grant Richards courted controversy. A year after *Limehouse Nights*, he sailed close to the wind with Alec Waugh’s *The Loom of Youth*, a tale of public-school homosexuality which proved another *succes de scandale*. When I first picked up *Limehouse Nights*, I identified it as trashy popular fiction, but in fact the publishing context places Burke in the *avant-garde*, as far as such a thing existed in England then.

Potentially the most shocking aspect of *Limehouse Nights* is the sense that the author is inviting his readers to join him in connoisseurship of the acts described in it. In Dickens’s *Bleak House* ([1853]), the death of Jo the crossing sweeper becomes a source of righteous anger and thus makes middle-class readers feel good about themselves because they feel that Jo is human and his suffering unacceptable. But whereas the tonality of Victorian slum fiction, including that of Dickens, Besant, Gissing and Morrison is uniformly serious, Burke gives his readers scenes of the most appalling abuse and cruelty with, as it were, a broad grin on his face. The tone is that of the music hall—which he describes superbly in several of his stories—with its harsh belly laughs, or perhaps it recalls the violent mishaps of silent film comedy. Burke suggests that life is just filthy, and that the Bayswater or St John’s Wood drawing room with its bright fire and warm cakes to nibble on is shutting out the real world of irrational passions, substance
abuse and mindless violence, while at the same time he also suggests that
the comfortably-off reader will enjoy the titbits he offers.

The problem with reading slum fiction is that a reader might dread the
horrors to come, particularly if they are presented in a tragic mode as most
often (but not always) in Gissing, and so be secretly anticipating them.
There is a thrill-seeking aspect. One might compare the mentality of those
involved in the Victorian settlement-house movement, the establishment of
buildings in the East End such as Toynbee Hall and Oxford House for the
edification and benefit of local people. According to Seth Koven (2004,
273), the genteel “young men” from much wealthier backgrounds who
worked in them as a charitable act “could try on new masculine styles and
explore dissident sexual desires while basking in the limelight for their
altruistic sacrifices” while they were there. This is clearly highly
problematic in an ethical sense. The charity worker might genuinely want to
help but could end up being an exploiter.

*Limehouse Nights* describes a highly atypical portion of the East End, the
multi-ethnic zone around the Docks, as more exotic, more different from the
rest of the surrounding city and country, than it probably was. In so doing it
helps cement the notion of the East End as raucous and criminal. It contains
the very opposite of the notions of community and support networks which
would become the other main component of the myth of the East End that
would be fully established by the mid-twentieth century.
The East End after Burke

The East End held on to a fairly clear identity until the Second World War. The destruction of buildings and displacement of people which then happened changed it forever (Salisbury 2012). Even before the war, during the 1930s, massive numbers of East Enders had moved – or been moved – to peripheral estates like Becontree in Dagenham. After the 1950s, the East End came increasingly to be identified in a type of personality (sharp-tongued, indomitable, self-reliant, xenophobic perhaps) and a dialect. The latter could be diluted, as in the widely publicized concept of Estuary English, the very name of which indicates an eastward move from London, out into the regions flanking the Thames estuary in Essex and Kent. Concepts such as “Essex man” and “Essex girl” also contain dilutions and displacements, sneers at the descendents of slum-dwellers.

In the 1980s a new era in the history of the East End began with the establishment of the London Docklands Development Corporation. Canary Wharf was constructed as a zone of skyscrapers and most of the warehouses along the Thames have since been replaced by or converted into housing developments for wealthier purchasers. The Shoreditch which Morrison reconstituted as the Jago has become a centre for creative businesses:
fashion, software development. And yet the London Borough of Tower Hamlets, the local authority which includes Whitechapel, Limehouse and the Isle of Dogs, still contains a higher proportion of people living in poverty than anywhere else in the south of England.

This chapter has told the story of how the “East End” was summoned up in the 1880s, and how it then expanded eastwards. Among the Deep Locational techniques showcased here have been the use of researcher-created maps via open-source software and the juxtaposition of these with texts read in a literary-historical manner that nevertheless puts their geographical placement at the centre of their meaning. The East End was fashioned—above all, perhaps, by Besant, the Jack-the-Ripper coverage and Morrison—from discursive materials that were already in existence. A major source was writings on London rookeries and zones where criminals had operated relatively freely since the sixteenth century if not earlier—liberties such as Norton Folgate, mentioned above in Chapter 4, can be remembered. These were areas towards which various sorts of people gravitated.

In part, the creation of the “East End” mirrored changes in the non-discursive world, in mimetic fashion. A contention in Deep Locational Criticism is that literature has, among other functions or ways of operating, a mimetic one. The changes that the idea of the “East End” drew on were in large part those charted in classic works on Victorian poverty and social
change (Dyos [1966]; Stedman Jones 1971), the construction of roads and railways being the main means by which the very poor were driven out of other parts of inner London, notably those on the northern and north-western fringes of the area built up at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, but also south of the river. Dyos’s account of a shift between a Victorian sentimentalism evident in Dickens and Gissing and a fearless authenticity exemplified by Morrison is an oversimplification. But it remains one of the only attempts to assemble a narrative of London slum fiction over the many decades during which London was in several ways the world’s leading city.

**Second Stab**

Deep Locational Criticism calls for repeated returns and does not exclude personal modes of writing. This chapter was first drafted in the early autumn of 2012, at the outset of a longer-term project: to write a literary history of the idea of the London slum in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Over the three years that have followed, I have returned to the East End in several ways, physical and textual, and gathered some different perspectives on it.

Among these returns, four walks through parts of the East End cast new light on it. On three of these I was alone, it was daytime, and the main purpose was to take photographs (all three were in sunny weather). First, on
Remembrance Sunday in November 2012, I walked between Rotherhithe and Limehouse stations on the London Underground via Tower Bridge, taking in waterside areas that between the early nineteenth century and the 1970s had all been docks. The second return, the same month but on a weekend day, took me westwards from Mile End to Liverpool Street station via Stepney Green. The third, a year later in November 2013, was through the former Jewish East End: from Aldgate East station up Brick Lane, now a centre for the Bangladeshi community who have lived in London E1 in numbers since the 1960s (see Dench 2006), east along Cheshire Street into an area of surviving weavers, then doubling back westwards through gentrified Spitalfields and Shoreditch to the area of former slums to the north of the City around Whitecross Street (Image 7). This walk was undertaken in preparation for a talk on the London Jewish writer Alexander Baron. The fourth return, also in November 2013 but after dark and in the rain, was a guided walk through the Boundary Street estate in Shoreditch led by the scholar of East End writing Nadia Valman.

Several literary texts which I read for the first time in 2013 also modified my view of the East End. Morrison’s *The Hole in the Wall* ([1902]), explored recently by Maltz (2011, Sections III and IV), establishes a dichotomy within the East End between, on the one hand, a riverside strip characterized by sailors, men of many nationalities, passing through, spending money, drinking, becoming involved in crime as brawlers and—
when drunk—prey to thieves, and, on the other hand, a working-class interior. This casts light on the specificity of the zone within the East End covered by Burke in *Limehouse Nights*.

I also spent some time in the autumn of 2013 working through London Jewish fiction. This has as one of its key locations a geographically very small portion of Whitechapel known, thanks to Israel Zangwill (1892), as the Ghetto (cf. White 2007, 152-59), but also contains a precisely-sensed awareness of parts of Europe rarely covered at all by British fiction, notably in the former Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. In the words of Jerry White (2007, 155), in the twenty years after 1880 there was a “massive colonization” of the inner East End by Jewish immigrants in the twenty years after 1880, with older-established inhabitants forced out because unwilling to pay what the newcomers would pay to live there. Zangwill (1892, 19) places the Ghetto as physically extremely close to, but in its identity absolutely distinct from what could be called the Jack the Ripper world: “its extremities were within earshot of the blasphemies from some of the vilest quarters and filthiest rookeries of the capital of the civilized world”.

Forty years later, in his novel *Jew Boy*, Simon Blumenfeld would identify the East End with Jewishness, just as for Gwendolyn Brooks “Bronzeville” is an ethnic or racial marker perhaps even more than a geographically locational one. Blumenfeld ([1935], 48) describes a demonstration in which
Jews by the thousand gathered on Stepney Green and marched westwards to Hyde Park, protesting against the measures being taken against Jews in Nazi Germany. Marching west through Clerkenwell, his protagonist imagines the perspective of onlookers: “It seemed as though the East End had emptied itself”. Within London Jewish writing of the mid- to late twentieth century the “East End” as a term is used generationally, often to refer to the specific streets and tenements where ancestors lived (e.g. Baron [1963]; Litvinoff [1972]).

In February 2014, I began a six-month spell as a visiting researcher in the School of Geography at Queen Mary, University of London. This made me a daily commuter into Tower Hamlets, enabling me to observe the streets and people there as never before, as well as to interact frequently with researchers into the area discussed here as the East End.

These walks and readings, as well as exemplifying the repeated returns of Deep Locational study, also reveal the need for further returns. These would pay attention to various movements and continuities. The Jewish trajectory from Whitechapel, as outlined particularly well by Baron in The Lowlife ([1963]; cf. Sicher 1985) is northwards from Aldgate towards Hackney and Stoke Newington, but then when possible transferring to north-west London (and further afield in the process of assimilation), to districts like Golders Green, Hendon, Mill Hill and Edgware. What I have so far not explored is the other great East End diaspora of the period since the 1930s, that of
former, “cockney” East Enders to the outer boroughs of east London, and to Essex beyond. Some of the descendants of nineteenth-century cockneys, themselves often the children of immigrants from Ireland or rural England, today remain in areas such as Bethnal Green and Stepney. No doubt there are literary records or mediations of their experience and that of this cockney diaspora, but I do not yet even know what the titles are or which writers have told this story. This is not to mention the literary history of two other groups who between them arguably occupy a key place in the former old inner East End in the 2010s: incoming gentrifiers, typically educated and ambitious people from a very wide range of social and national backgrounds, and the Muslim community of Whitechapel and Bethnal Green, many of its members immigrants from Bangladesh and their descendants.

To explore an imaginative place zone such as the East End adequately, what is needed is a ceaseless oscillation between the empirical precision on place of geographers and historians such as Dennis and White, and the alertness to constructions, to ideas, of Miller and Moretti. Yet further examination of the philosophical grounding of such work is also needed, something that tends to be lacking from the writers just mentioned, both the more down to earth and the more imaginatively-minded. Following the experiments with linguistic pragmatics, spatial technologies and historical geography in this chapter and its two predecessors, such examination is
revived in this book’s final chapter.
Chapter 8. Anti-Place and Multiple Place in Beckett

Samuel Beckett’s writing often seems curiously placeless. Existing scholarship connecting his work to specific places has largely focused on the Ireland he knew in childhood and youth. In this chapter, Malpas’s philosophical topology is tested as a means of getting to grips with the elusive role of place in Beckett. *Murphy* (1938), for a start, is loaded with toponyms, especially in its presentation of London. These enable the novel to function as a piece of slum naturalism but also paradoxically drive an alienating sense of placelessness. Additionally, *Murphy* contains enclosed spaces deliberately isolated from surroundings, which seem to have no environment or even position. Beckett’s post-war fiction, for example *Molloy*, largely dispenses with either realist or surrealist use of toponyms, but unlike *Murphy* evokes the actual landscapes to which Beckett had emotional and remembered links. As for his post-war drama, including *Endgame*, it accentuates the bareness that seems to connote placelessness. Yet *Endgame* is multiply located and its “manywheres” can be traced: regions to be found in atlases; the idea of nowhere; the space inside the head; possible worlds and imaginary worlds. The developing field of literary geography needs to take account of the complex multiple relationships between place and placelessness apparent in writing produced throughout Beckett’s career. Malpas’s philosophy of place begins to establish a
typology of notions such as ground, unity and limit which could be used in such an analysis.

**Placed and Unplaced Writing?**

Since the cultural turn of the 1990s, literary geography has become an established subfield of social and cultural geography. Its focus, to quote Marc Brosseau, is on “teasing out the multiple intersections between people and places, identity and territory, and spatial practices and cultural discourses” (2009, 212). In the same period, literary scholars have shown a complementary interest in developing new geographical approaches (e.g. Cooper and Gregory 2011; Moretti 1997; Moretti 2005; Moretti 2013; Thacker 2003; Westphal 2007). Within this body of work, discussion has begun of writing that seems, in Brosseau’s words, “ageographical” (2008, 381). This present chapter builds on such work, examining a writer who could seem an extreme example of literary placelessness. Peter Boxall, indeed, speaks of “the traditional critical insistence on the universality of Beckett’s placelessness” (2010, 160), and Paul Saunders (2011) has read Beckett’s *Trilogy* as a concerted effort at negating literary treatments of place, especially realist ones, with their assumption that an enveloping human environment can be described accurately. Several of Beckett’s later works do seem close to having no setting in place or time. James Knowlson, Beckett’s biographer, discusses them as follows:
*Imagination morte imaginez* (Imagination Dead Imagine) (1965) is set in a white rotunda in which two figures exist like embryos waiting for birth or extinction. In *Le dépeupleur* (The Lost Ones) (1971) a larger cylinder is inhabited by 200 people who live out a strictly regulated Dantesque existence. *Bing (Ping in English)* (1966) features a single figure in a small white cube. These works come very close to being formalist constructs, creating alternative worlds. Yet the texts are powerful as well as enigmatic and, in spite of all appearances, they do draw from and reflect on the “real” world. What remains of consciousness in a world where all is reduced? (Knowlson 2004, 723)

Knowlson’s account here points towards a key crux in locational thinking, the question of whether the place-world of human experience should be understood as single or multiple. Do we all live in individual spheres, or are we all attempting to describe and understand a world which when we write and read is fundamentally shared?

In recent scholarship, as Boxall points out, the “universal, placeless surface” or “blank face” of Beckett’s writing is confronted with a submerged connection to place, to homelands (2010, 160). So far, this acknowledgement of Beckett’s relationship to place has largely concentrated on Ireland, despite the fact that Beckett spent most of his writing career outside Ireland. It takes its cue from O’Brien’s *The Beckett*
Country (1986), a large-format book in which sparse biographical text surrounds black-and-white photographic images of urban, suburban and rural scenes in Dublin and its environs, and the same line of enquiry is developed in more recent scholarship (e.g. Kennedy 2010; Morin 2009). Russell Smith, for instance, outlines “some of the strategies by which Beckett reworked autobiographical material in his writing” (2013, 2), autobiography for Smith being closely associated with Beckett’s memories in adulthood of his early childhood in the suburbs of Dublin. The present chapter aims to move discussion of the located qualities of Beckett’s writing beyond Ireland. It does so within a poetics of place inspired by human geographers and philosophers who, since the 1990s, have reshaped the concept, removing its associations with fixity and various sorts of conservatism. Notable among these theorists are Doreen Massey, who grasps place as something not tied to “coherent and homogenous” identities but “outward-looking” in an era of the “fragmentation and disruption” brought about by “time-space compression” (1994, 146-7), and Tim Cresswell (2006), who has examined the place identities associated with varied examples of human mobility. Equally helpful are the philosophers Malpas and Casey. Casey suggests that in attempts to develop a place philosophy interactions between the human body and a newly polymorphous understanding of place need to be investigated (Casey 1997, 330-40). The place philosophy of Cresswell and more especially Malpas
suggests ways of getting to grips with the specific dichotomies between inner and outer worlds, and between place and its negation, that are apparent in Beckett’s work. In the light of these conceptions of place, Beckett’s writing can be reassessed: not as the work of a displaced, alienated urban modernist but as more generally human, in the way his texts connect with those of far less obviously modernist contemporaries.

Malpas, as discussed earlier in this book, develops the concentration on place found in the later essays and lectures of Heidegger. In his formulation:

Place refers us, first, to that underlying structure of placedness that is essential to our being as human. This underlying, one might say, ontological, structure, although properly topological, is everywhere instantiated differently, and yet everywhere is the same. (Malpas 2012, 63)

We are always placed, Malpas argues, and moreover “the placed character of our own being … is worked out through the specific places in which we live and move” (2012, 63). Questioning the assumption that “place” means especially the more rooted, rural attachments to certain sites frequently associated with the pre-modern past, he asserts that “there is no privileged place in which placedness—or being—is made pre-eminently apparent” (Malpas 2012, 64. This point proves important when Malpas defends of Heideggerian place thinking against the charge that it entails conservative or even fascistic politics, and when he appreciatively compares Heidegger,
associated with rural settledness, with Walter Benjamin, known for his writings on the ever-changing particularities of the modern city (2012, 137-57; 226-35). In his earlier writing on the philosophy of place, Malpas (1999) draws on the Romantic poetry of Wordsworth and on Proust’s modernist fictions of memory, in order to make the case that literature is vital for the understanding of human placedness, since it records the depth and richness of human place experience better than any other sort of writing.

More recently, however, Malpas has speculated that “some places are perhaps better attuned to enabling” the appreciation of human placedness than others (Malpas 2012, 64). So although Malpas’s notion of topology has much potential for application in literary studies, it does – residually, and perhaps even against the philosopher’s will – treat one sort of placed human identity as the default or proper sort. Here he has in mind the deep or intimate or longstanding, rather than the shallow, casual or fleeting, encounters with multiple somewheres which we all have every day in the contemporary world. The study of apparently placeless writings like Beckett’s calls attention to problems with Malpas’s philosophy of place, as well as demonstrating its usefulness for literary geographers.

C.J. Ackerley and S.E. Gontarski argue that Beckett’s career should be understood as a shift “from stories of motion (quests, wilderness journeys, joyous outgoing and sad return, coming and going, home and asylum, ‘on’ as a goad) to narratives of stillness or imperceptible movement, of closed
space” (2004, 385). This is to read Beckett’s career spatially. In such a reading, space as a conceptual quality of the material universe in the manner charted by Descartes could seem to be in conflict with place as part of the texture of everyday experience in the way that it is understood by Malpas and Casey. The encyclopaedia (or gazetteer) format of Ackerley and Gontarski’s Companion to Beckett perhaps encourages its authors to take more account of Beckettian location as a central aspect of his writing than most Beckett scholars do. And alongside philosophical conceptualization of spatial motion there is also the question of the locale, or setting, of “the Beckett country” as a “psychological landscape, not unlike ‘Greeneland’, replete with bicycles, dogs, dustbins, and destitutes in hats, greatcoats, and ill-fitting boots”, but also “grounded in SB’s boyhood Dublin, its mountains, forests, swamps and coast” (Ackerley and Gontarski 2004, 41).

Earlier Beckett criticism typically underplayed the real place aspects of his work. For instance, the fact that the 15th arrondissement of Paris, where the writer lived, “pervades” Beckett’s post-war writings was largely passed over by Beckett’s earlier readers (however, see Fletcher 1965, 184). And, with only a handful of exceptions (Lassman and Byron 2010; Saunders 2011), there continues to be little consideration of the complex interaction between real and invented place in Beckett work, even in publications such as the Journal of Beckett Studies. But as Ackerley and Gontarski observe, “[t]he Unnamable’s world is the Rue Bracion, opposite the former
shambles, with its statue to the ‘hipphagist’, Ducroix”, and although “the particulars of Paris decline in the later work, those that appear are the more salient” (2004, 426-7). The inability of critics to grasp connections such as these was fuelled by the fact that the decades in which Beckett became famous, the 1950s and 1960s, were those during which, as Ackerley and Gontarski put it in their entry for “Biography”, “the text was expected to speak for itself” (2004, 59). But the gazetteer approach, too, has its risks, since it can make textual sites seem more identical with real-world ones than they actually are. Since the 1990s, following biographies by Knowlson (1996) and Anthony Cronin (1996), there have been more locational readings of Beckett, including several recent assessments of the place of France in his work (e.g Travis 2008; Ullmann 2013). But such readings need to move beyond the chronological “exposition” of Beckett’s movements in Ireland, London and France offered by Charles Travis (2008)—as if this were a straightforward explanation of the changes in approach to place found in Beckett’s writings between the late 1920s and the early 1950s.

**London Toponyms in *Murphy*: A Board-Game World**

Following the Heideggerian paths indicated by Malpas leads to the discovery of qualities in Beckett we would be unlikely to find otherwise. For instance, via Beckett’s experimental but very identifiably placed and
referential debut novel *Murphy* (1938), the placed quality, the being-in-place of Beckett’s seemingly unplaced or anti-place later work, can be revealed with all due clarity, whereas hitherto the toponymic aspects of *Murphy* have been under-studied.

*Murphy* tells the story of a young, bohemian Irishman wandering through Depression-era London, and of his encounters with others, encounters which often take the form of pursuits or contests. Then Murphy leaves London for an asylum, as a worker not a patient, and eventually is killed accidentally in a gas explosion, his death misinterpreted by others as suicide. He is understood by his colleagues as “the male nurse that went mad with his colours nailed to the mast” (148-9). This brief plot summary does not capture the quality of the book, which has a frenzied precision and game-like quality anticipatory of writings by Borges and Fowles that would appear later in the century and be described as postmodernist. It is a novel which, compared with Beckett’s later work, may appear “undemanding” (Rabinovitz 1986, 67), but which is structured by hidden patterns of repetition, duality and multiplicity. It has been overshadowed by Beckett’s post-war writings, which are, locationally speaking, radically different from it. For *Murphy* is richly toponymic and filled with detailed allusions to specific places that can be found in maps, almanacs or bus timetables. But through a reading of *Murphy* it is possible to recover or re-identify the placed quality, the being-in-place, even of Beckett’s later writing. As well
as its wealth of toponyms, *Murphy* also contains the seeds of an approach to location that could be classed as anti-place or unplaced.

The toponyms of *Murphy* are above all those of streets and districts within London. These begin, in the first sentence of the novel, with the “mew in West Brompton” (3) where Murphy initially lodges, and end in Hyde Park, “between the Round Pond and the Broad Walk” (166). Such toponyms are laid out by Beckett during the moves across the map of the city indicated in this novel by walks, bus and tube journeys and taxi rides (e.g. 75, 91, 93). One such passage describes a rush-hour journey on a “nice number eleven bus” from terminus to terminus and back “through the evening rush”, which is undertaken as a leisure activity and is thus a subversion of the functional purpose of urban bus routes to take people to and from work (59) (see Ackerley 2010, 107). In the terms of geographers such as Cresswell (2006), these moves exemplify the mobile variations of human life in a twentieth-century urban environment characterized by space-time compression.

In *Murphy*, Beckett deals out the addresses and atmospheres of different zones in an offhand way, beginning with the “West Brompton” of the novel’s first sentence, and continuing with a group of street and bridge names in Chapter 2: “Edith Grove”, “Cremorne Road”, “Lot’s Road”, “Stadium Street”, “Regent Street”, “about halfway between the Battersea and Albert Bridges” (3; 11; 12). None of these sites has its situation on the
map of London spelled out for the reader: London itself is not actually named until Chapter 3 (19). Beckett also draws on many quirky or dispiriting minor details of the insalubrious area of inner north London around Brewery Road, “between Pentonville Prison and the Metropolitan Cattle Market”, on “the heights of Islington” (41), including “the pimple of Market Road Gardens opposite the Tripe Factory” where “Murphy loved to sit ensconced between the perfume of disinfectants from Milton house immediately to the south and the stench of stalled cattle from the corral immediately to the west” (47) (see Ackerley 2010, 82-3; 90-2). These details represent more than the “backdrop” that Travis argues they constitute (2008, 84). The effect is surrealist rather than realist, making details stand out in their oddity as themselves, and incidentally also revealing the sex and death drives of human psychology.

On the whole, Beckett’s novel is sharply accurate about details and relative positionings. This contrasts with the treatment of London to be found in Guignol’s Band (1944) by Louis-Ferdinand Céline, an associate of Beckett’s on the 1930s Parisian literary scene. In Céline’s text, London place names are toyed with and mixed up by a fiercely slapdash narrator: “another stretch of hovels … Hollyborn Street … Falmouth Cottage … Hollander Place … Bread Avenue!”, “Forward!… Tottenham … the Strand … and the East streets”, where “Hollyborn” recalls Holborn and “Tottenham” is probably Tottenham Court Road, not Tottenham at all
(Céline 2012, 24; 72; ellipses reproduced from original text). Beckett and Céline both question stable and reliably toponymic views of the city. But where Céline works by modifying and conflating toponyms, Beckett instead juxtaposes the named streets and districts of London with internal spaces, notably those of rented rooms, which can come to resemble the inside of a mind or skull, or the whole universe.

Scholars have used Beckett’s engagement with the rationalist philosophy of Descartes and others to understand this locational juxtaposition of big world and small world in the London of Murphy as part of a general dualism, in which the interior space or little world of the mind becomes opposed to the big world of motion (Ackerley and Gontarski 2004, 321-2). The little world appears in Murphy, Ackerley and Gontarski argue, in settings like the mental hospital (and within it two particular rooms, the garret and the padded cell) and the chess board. The London rooming house or bedsit house in Murphy is something of a bridge or borderline between big world and little world, while the mental hospital is itself understood by at least one scholar (Rabinovitz 1986) as lying on the frontier between the two.

In terms of referentiality or indexicality (Levinson 2004), there are two levels of identifiable place in Murphy, one outside and one within London (cf. Rabinowitz 1986, 77; 81). Central to the outside-London level is the train and boat route “from Euston to Holyhead, … from Holyhead to Dun
Laoghaire” (74). On the same route, beyond Dublin there is Cork, whence Murphy has come to London (4), and beyond London Paris. This spatial-deictic level can thus be identified as a line running Cork—Dublin—London—Paris. Paris appears as part of Murphy’s recalled experience, and therefore as a combination of the little world of mind and the big world of motion. Consequently, following the narratologist M.-L. Ryan (2014), Murphy’s Paris could be understood as inside his London, since one is narrated from within the other (Hones 2011, 687, 695). Trudging up the scruffy Caledonian Road in London towards his lodgings, he remembers being in Paris and “the toil from St Lazare up Rue d’Amsterdam” there (47) (see Ackerley 2010, 90). This non-London level of the internal landscape of Murphy is essentially linear, following the span Cork—Dublin—London—Paris, although there are moments when it flashes up elsewhere, as when Murphy remembers “a garret in Hanover” he once occupied when he moves into a similar room at the mental hospital, the Magdalen Mental Mercy Seat (or MMM) (98).

In Murphy, the locational level containing sites within London is considerably richer and more multiple than the Cork—Dublin—London—Paris line that largely stands for the world outside London here (see Ackerley 2010, 26-7). The level within London resembles the board of a game, on which the characters move around like counters. As such, it finds an echo or repetition in the night-time chess game Murphy plays with an
inmate in the mental hospital, all of its moves appearing in the text of Murphy, so that it could be reproduced (145-6). And the first encounter between Murphy and his prostitute girlfriend Celia provides a clear example of how in this novel Beckett draws upon his knowledge of London’s topography. The setting is the Lots Road area, in the 1930s one of London’s zones of lodging houses filled with temporary sojourners but also decayed and declined people who stayed for decades (Beckett himself lodged in the Lots Road area in 1934-5; see Images 1 and 2 and the discussion of Lynne Reid Banks’s The L-Shaped Room, above in Chapter 2):

It was on the street, the previous midsummer’s night, the sun being then in the Crab, that she met Murphy. She had turned out of Edith Grove into Cremorne Road, intending to refresh herself with a smell of the Reach and then return by Lot’s Road, when chancing to glance to her right she saw, motionless in the mouth of Stadium Street, considering alternately the sky and a sheet of paper, a man. Murphy. (10-11)

Lots Road lies on the Chelsea side of the border between the Chelsea and Fulham districts – formerly civil parishes, later metropolitan boroughs – on the Thames to the south-west of central London. For much of the twentieth century Chelsea was gentrifying, fashionable and artistic, while Fulham was merely shabby and overcrowded. Like the other street where Murphy lodges, Brewery Road in Islington, Lots Road was surrounded by noxious
and smoke-generating industries, notably brewing, gravel extraction and a power station, built near Chelsea Creek (“the Reach”) to supply electricity to the London Underground (Croot 2004, 12, 91, 156; Image 2). The streets, in the marginal zone surrounded by waters known as Sandy End (Croot 2004, 63-4), can be found in the London A-Z atlas.

The game-like aspect of Murphy coexists with the slum naturalism also present in the novel’s representations of Lots Road, West Brompton, and Brewery Road, Islington. In Murphy, as in Joyce’s Ulysses (1922) and Finnegans Wake (1939), the topographical and toponymic precision does something other than bolster verisimilitude. Beckett’s youthful reading of Joyce, in the 1929 essay “Dante … Bruno. Vico … Joyce”, insisted that, in Joyce, words are themselves as well as, and perhaps over and above, being referential counters acting asmeremarkers for something else: “[h]is writing is not about something; it is that something itself” (Beckett 1983, 27). In Murphy, toponyms are something more than mere components of scene-setting background, which is how the earlier efforts in literary geography described by Hones (2011) tended to interpret place reference in fiction. They are far more: they are a crucial aspect of the texture of his writing about place, a manifestation of his drive towards what his character Mr Willoughby Kelly calls the “beastly circumstantial” (Beckett 1983, 11).

The Madhouse of Murphy: Anti-Place Re-Placed
As a concept, place denotes something positive. To consider human existence as fundamentally placed is to relate human beings to one another and to a knowable external world, regardless of whether place is conceived in terms of the multiple unity of Malpas (2012), the ever-shifting contests of Massey (1994), or the more static, rooted existence associated with the word by Relph (1976).

And yet some locational or spatial zones can function as anti-places. A room is an anti-place if it becomes a stand-in for the whole world, a reduction of the world to the seeming boundaries of four walls. Everyone’s world of existence has certain unconsidered limits, which can define the meaning of that existence or act more negatively (Malpas 2012, 73-95). At the opening of Murphy the protagonist wants his own world to be like this: confined to a room, the bigger world shut out, or at least curtained out. As far as possible, Murphy creates in his West Brompton room an environment that is completely dark and in which he experiences no sensations, thereby attempting to remove himself from bodily engagement with his surroundings:

The corner in which he sat was curtained off from the sun, the poor old sun in the Virgin again for the billionth time. Seven scarves held him in position. Two fastened his shins to his rockers, one his thighs to the seat, two his breast and belly to the back, one his wrists to the strut behind. Only the most local movements were possible. Sweat
poured off him, tightening the thongs. The breath was not perceptible. (2)

Murphy’s binding of himself anticipates later Beckettian literary practice with its establishment of limited worlds. It also connects with Beckett’s own claim to carry around with him a memory of life in the womb (Cronin 1996, 2). Like the unborn foetus, Murphy is fated to be expelled from his bounded space, but in ways that are linked not so much to the human universality of gestation and birth as to the mundane particularity of municipal housing policy. The house where Murphy lodges has been “condemned”, which is to say declared a slum, unfit for human habitation, by local government authorities, and is scheduled for demolition.

When it comes to anti-place, the padded cells or “quiet rooms” (101) of the hospital represent an extreme example of a situation in which an inhabitant, patient or prisoner is isolated “like a monad” (which is the room and its inhabitant) from the context and surroundings of the outside world (109). But there are other sites in *Murphy* which have their placed qualities stripped away from them. An example is a room in the Brewery Road lodging house where Murphy and Celia stay. This room is inhabited by an elderly man referred to by Murphy as “the old boy”. They hear him ceaselessly pacing the room, which he never leaves, as he has done for who knows how long beforehand. Ultimately, he kills himself in the room, slitting his throat with a razor (81-3). Celia then moves into the room and is
heard there pacing as “the old boy” formerly did, in a further instance of the repetitions noted by Rabinovitz (1986, 74).

Imprisonment entails restrictions on mobility, usually imposed from outside, but potentially also by the self. It is also a confinement to one point on the earth’s surface that at once becomes a whole locational world and, experientially, loses its position in terms of the earth’s co-ordinates for the one incarcerated there. The imprisoned person is more bounded by four walls than is the person who could be understood as economically or psychologically trapped (cf. Brosseau 2008). Alongside the self-imposed imprisonment of the “old boy” goes Murphy’s voluntary confinement of himself, binding himself to a chair in his room in the condemned building at West Brompton (3). But even anti-place moves can be placed. Murphy, who ties himself up in the West Brompton room then moves to another rented room in another malodorous district, could be read in social terms as a denizen of a particular locational zone, that of the London house let out in rooms in the post-Victorian decades. Celia and “the old boy” inhabit this socio-economic zone, too.

In fact, the images of the figure self-bound in a chair, of the old man alone in his room heading for suicide, of the mental hospital – and within that the padded cell – brought together by Murphy himself as a clash between “the big world and the little world, decided by the patients in favour of the latter, revived by the psychiatrists on behalf of the former, in
his own case unresolved” (107), could be understood in terms of a *scaled* notion of place rather than via an *opposition* between place (outside, big) and anti-place (inside, small). In such a reading, the big world – the outside world believed in by those who run not only hospitals but also shops – and the little world of mind, room, chair and bed are actually connected. Murphy’s tragedy, if such it can be called, is his inability to recognise the connection: his urge to pretend to be alone and immobile is his undoing, leading as it does to his absurd death.

**Regions of “Nameless Things”**

Beckett claimed that his decision to write in French instead of his native English allowed him at last “to write the things I feel” (Knowlson 1996, 319; cf. Travis 2008, 78). He took the decision immediately after the Second World War. Following this decision came the run of fictional and dramatic writings which turned him from an outsider on the fringes of the Paris avant-garde into one of the central figures in the literature of the twentieth century. Beckett’s pre-war writings abound in place names, but their post-war successors become, over time, almost entirely stripped of toponyms. An early poem such as “Enueg I”, for instance, has a setting clearly identifiable as Dublin. The identification is made possible by toponyms: “the Portobello Private Nursing Home”, “Parnell Bridge”, “the hill down from the Fox and Geese into Chapelizod”, “Kilmainham”, “The Liffey” (Beckett 2006, IV.11-
Similarly, when “a little wearish old man” is identified as Democritus, this seems a sort of simile: he resembled Democritus but in fact was an ordinary old Irishman.

By contrast, when Beckett’s post-war writings talk about places, they most often do so in a way that seems to dispense not only with toponyms but with naming _per se_. In _Molloy_ (1955), for instance, the wandering protagonist recounts his movements from his “mother’s room” (3) to a view of “a road remarkably bare … without hedges or ditches or any kind of edge, in the country” (4). “The town” said to be “not far” from here (5) is perhaps the same one mentioned a little later, near one of whose entrances and exits, “narrow and darkened by enormous vaults”, he is afterwards apprehended by the police for some unspecified misdemeanour (16). _Molloy_ contains personal names, and some of these do have real-world place attachments. So with _Murphy_, the single word that is both the title of the book and the name of its protagonist is identifiably Irish, and Jacques Moran, the “agent” later set on Molloy’s trail has a confusingly similar and equally Irish surname. All three names, “Moran”, “Molloy” and “Murphy” are more obviously Irish than “Beckett”. Yet these names are always threatened by collapse into, in the words of Molloy himself, “no things but nameless things, no names but thingless names” (26).

Few if any toponyms straightforwardly referencing placenames to be found in the atlas appear in _Molloy_, leaving the possibility open for scholars
to argue that the home life of the explicitly Catholic Moran, Molloy’s pursuer in Part II, functions in the novel as “a hidden shell of [Protestant] Anglo-Ireland” (Jeffers 2009, 82). Molloy’s life is eventually revealed as having been spent in a “region” called “Ballyba”, comprising the “market-town, or village” and its surroundings, a “commune, or a canton” (128). In Molloy’s own account, during Part I, the settlement and its surroundings are a city of uncertain but seemingly large extent; for Moran, they are something much smaller. Beckett’s Molloy thus encodes a pervasive sense of spatial uncertainty.

In Molloy, the landscape on the fringes of Dublin visible to Beckett in childhood, his most intimately-known landscape, gets a deep and more sensitive treatment than that accorded to London in Murphy. Here, place is handled via the deferral or erasure of toponyms rather than through their advancement and display. Ballyba, which Molloy knows and equally does not know, is understood by him as a “region” (60). This is a term human geographers have been familiar with since the inception of their discipline, and which still remains important to them today, if sometimes as a concept to revolt against (Crang 1998, 15-31; Entrikin 2008). For Molloy, a deep uncertainty attaches to this term:

I fail to see, never having left my region, what right I have to speak of its characteristics. No, I never escaped, and even the limits of my region were unknown to me. But I felt they were far away. But this
feeling was based on nothing serious, it was a simple feeling. For if
my region had ended no further than my feet could carry me, surely
I would have felt it changing slowly. For regions do not suddenly
end, as far as I know, but gradually merge into one another. (60)
The region is at once capable of being marked out on a map (although one
region tends to “gradually merge” into another, rather than being rigidly
demarcated), and something that a person carries around with them, an
aspect of the lived body. Molloy appears at once the opposite of a masterly
geographer, an utterly unreliable guide – he is unable even to remember the
name of his native town, in whose environs he says he has spent his entire
life (26-7) – and a universal human figure, resembling everyone who drags
their body only as far as their feet can carry them, until they die.

Turning the Telescope on the Without: The “Manywheres” of Endgame
Turning to drama, Beckett’s post-Second-World-War plays have reached a
large audience precisely by taking as their strongly visualized stage world
the polar opposite of the crowded realist or naturalist stage setting of his
predecessors, including two who, like Beckett, emerged from Dublin’s
Protestant community: Oscar Wilde and George Bernard Shaw. The stage
sets Beckett insisted upon for plays such as Waiting for Godot and Endgame
are strikingly bare. They lack locational markers of the sort present in most
late nineteenth-century writing, including the plays of Wilde and Shaw.
Shaw’s plays, in particular, are highly toponymic in a referential sense. Particular districts, streets and even buildings are indicated by name and given characteristics such that their audiences are asked to identify what is marked by a certain toponyms within the fiction with what is marked by the same toponyms in the non-textual world. In *The Philanderer* (1893), Shaw’s first stage direction locates the action at “a flat on Ashley Gardens in the Victoria district of London” (1922, 73). The details of its appearance on stage claim to convey how a wealthy, artistically-minded bachelor’s London flat in the 1890s would have looked, including “theatrical engravings and photographs” on the wall and the “small round table” with “a yellow-backed French novel lying open on it”. The visual contrast between Shaw and Beckett for the theatre audience could hardly be greater. *Waiting for Godot* begins with the stage direction “A country road. A tree. Evening” (Beckett 1986, 11). *Endgame* starts with something still blander: the opening stage direction of the play is “Bare interior. / Grey light”. (Beckett 1986, 92).

Consequently, Beckett’s writing poses a challenge to literary geographers, who, on the whole, turn towards the sort of writing which is explicitly placed, and which draws its core feelings about human existence from the encounter with place. In existing literary topographies, key reference points are thus the poetry of Wordsworth or the fiction of Thomas Hardy and William Faulkner (Malpas 1999; Miller 1995). And as Sheila Hones (2011) points out, earlier efforts at literary geography perhaps paid
excessive attention to writing that is highly referential in the sense of containing long, scene-setting descriptive passages which seem to correlate with places in the real world.

Yet all writing, literary and not, indicates the world and positions its readers – and, implicitly, its producers – in relation to different portions of it: all writing has a deictic aspect (Green 1995; Levinson 2004). Beckett’s writing shares this relationship to geography with highly toponymic – or metonymic – fiction, or the poetry of place. Where the topographies of “realist” or “naturalist” fiction have commonly been taken at face-value as pieces of naïve indexicality, those found in modernist novels like Beckett’s *Murphy* or *Molloy* have conversely been taken as dimensions of artistic experimentation and not what they also are: indexical gestures and pieces of documentary historical evidence about particular places at particular times. When “the great English schools” are alluded to in *Molloy* (21), something multiple is put into place, since the action of the novel is not clearly located on the map of the globe that also includes England. Instead, one world seems to appear in another, with the lurking possibility that Beckett’s characters are experiencing the world that we experience, just in a radically imperfect or simply different way. Beckett’s post-war writing, then, denies easy associations with specific place referents, but is by no means altogether without these associations. It emphasizes particular complexities and
multiplicities in human place experience of which that literary geography needs to take account.

As discussed above, the highly placed and topographic Murphy contains important anti-place elements. These can be detected both in Murphy’s treatment of himself, and in the imminent obliteration of his personal places in West Brompton: “the corner in which he sat” and the room’s aspect will alike vanish into the rubble when the building is demolished (2). Conversely, the apparently anti-place, stripped-back world of Endgame could be re-read within a realist paradigm as actually happening somewhere, but with the spatial setting reckoned as unknown to the characters, or as a devastated zone where once knowable places had been. The characters of both Endgame and Molloy may, indeed, be deranged: they may not properly understand the relationship between themselves and what places may exist out of the audience’s sight, offstage. But equally, Endgame contains the possibility of being understood in a science-fictional way as a world in itself, an alternative world (Doležel 2010; Pavel 1986; Westphal 2011).

What needs to be developed is an understanding of place in Beckett as complex and, in Malpas’s terms, multiply unitary. In Beckett’s representations of place, a drive towards nowhere coexists with the presence in his writing of what, I would argue, could be called manywheres. As a way of conceptualizing location in Beckett, the notion of manywheres involves identifying overlaps between the places of the head (those of dreams and
experience) and the places of geographers, town-planners, sanitary officials, almanac-writers, compasses, and atlas-makers. The latter outer-world grouping is that found in books such as Whitaker’s *Almanac* – the 1935 edition of which was used by Beckett during the composition of *Murphy* (Ackerley and Gontarski 2004, 19) – or the A-Z street atlas of London. In such books, as in this outside-world aspect of Beckettian manywheres, the actual names of streets and their topographic relationship to one another are at the very centre of the meaning of the book rather than being (as in narratological or ideological readings of “realist” fiction they can seem to be) some extraneous or excessive piece of detail, added on only to convince readers that they are in a world they know already.

*Endgame* can seem an unequivocal, extreme presentation of Beckett’s drive towards nowhere. What spectators in the theatre will see at its outset is a nearly-bare room with its windows giving onto greyness, nothingness (“Bare interior. / Grey light”). Later in the play, the key moment in locational terms is another stage direction: Clov “gets up on ladder, turns the telescope on the without” (Beckett 1986, 106). This “without” means not an absence or lack, but an outside, aspatial context or environment. Its presence in *Endgame* clashes with the inward drive that Ackerley and Gontarski detect in Beckett’s own career trajectory, suggesting as it does that his writing became stripped, after World War Two, of spatial
situatedness. And then there is the following exchange between Hamm and Clov:

Hamm: The waves, how are the waves?

Clov: The waves? [He turns the telescope on the waves.] Lead.

(107)

The sun is “Zero” but outside it is not “night”, only “Grey” or, wonderfully and oxymoronically, “Light black. From pole to pole”, according to Clov (Beckett 1986, 107). Within the stage direction about the telescope, midway through Clov’s words here, evidence can be found (in the word “the”) that there actually are, in the world of the play, waves outside, just as the real Victoria Street is nearby in the opening scene of Shaw’s The Philanderer. But all an audience can know is that Clov turns the telescope, because that is all that an audience-member will actually see. Interestingly, the history of Beckett’s text reveals that things were not always so blank and detached from any sense of locatedness. According to Ackerley and Gontarski, “early drafts locate the action during and immediately after World War I, specifically in Picardy” (2004, 174). In this sense, Endgame was very directly stripped of toponymic references in the course of Beckett’s shaping and revising of the play.

But far from being set nowhere, Endgame can be understood as placed in several places or spatial contexts simultaneously. Indeed, the play contains more than one somewhere. David Pattie (2000, 77) calls Endgame
“infinitely allusive”, but in fact these sites can be specified and enumerated. The multiplicity of location in *Endgame*, its manywheres, might be sketched out as follows:

1. Picardy after World War One.

2. Western Europe after World War Two.

3. An idea of nowhere. A world that has no postal addresses; a world that cannot be mapped.

4. The world inside a head, the universe of the rationalist or Occasionalist philosophy absorbed by Beckett while studying in Paris as a young man (Ackerley 2010, 29).

5. A possible world in the sense presented in hypothetical fiction or science fiction. (Viewed this way, events like those represented in *Endgame* could conceivably happen after a nuclear holocaust.)

6. An imaginary world, the creation of a writer. (This quality is shared by *Endgame* with every explicitly fictional depiction of place, but not those found in travel-writing or memoir.)

7. The world of the stage, in which an audience looks through the fourth wall of a proscenium-arch theatre, at a group of people they know to be actors repeating what they have memorised, some words invented and written down by Samuel Beckett.

8. As Pattie (2000, 77) points out, the title of *Endgame*, if nothing else in the play, alludes to the space of the chess board.
(remembering that *Murphy* both contains a chess game whose moves are included in the text of the novel, and treats the map of London as if it were a game board around which characters, like pieces, move or are moved).

The richness consists in the fact that *Endgame* has all of these resonances made to harmonize or clash within it (some, indeed, such as Picardy, repressed so far as to become latent in the text), whereas more realist fictions of the same era, from Iris Murdoch to Alexander Baron, largely enact a single reference to a particular historical somewhere, and so direct attention away from the purely imaginary or possible-world qualities of their texts.

**Conclusion: Toponyms, Regions and Categories of Writer**

Understanding Beckett’s peculiar multiplicity of place helps put him back into the world he inhabited, sometimes by drawing comparisons between him and writers to whom he is not usually compared. The big world and little world in *Murphy* can be related to one another on a scale of magnitude rather than being put into a conceptual opposition, as by Beckett scholars such as Ackerley and Gontarski. This reassessment, in turn, enables the locational complexity of “realist” fictions to be grasped. A literary geographer has to work harder to tease the locational dimension out of Beckett’s texts than those of writers who present actual places more directly.
and seemingly transparently, be they poets of place such as Wordsworth, or writers of fiction which abounds in seemingly reliable toponyms, such as Murdoch or Baron. Beckett’s more surrealist or consciously denuded landscapes are remote from toponym-founded realism but they are nevertheless very richly locational, a fact opened up by the notion of manywheres. Nonetheless, Beckett is frequently treated in isolation from such writers or contrasted with them, when in fact their texts all share the quality of being located, of being “in place” (Malpas 2012, 63). Deictic indexicality of place is a feature of all writing.

The landscapes of the mind, of waking and dreaming, need to be related to the landscapes that can be explored in the world. Beckett explores West Brompton or Brewery Road and places them on the London map, but he also does so as part of an effort to explore his characters’ psychology, as a reading of Molloy makes apparent. And the notion of recombining and abstracting in order to create a distinct fictional world, a “Molloy country”, for instance (Ackerley and Gontarski 2004, 41), is something with which Beckett experiments more clearly and consciously than do, say, Hardy or Arthur Morrison. Finally, his handling of location in both Murphy and Endgame is the outcome of a critique of the locational worlds found in Dickens, Balzac, Hardy and Shaw. Yet all of these writers, Beckett included, lived and wrote in the same modern London and Paris.
Literary geographers such as Hones (2011, 694-7) are right to query the assumption that apparently realist fictions like Fitzgerald’s *The Great Gatsby* or the works of Shaw, Murdoch and Baron mentioned in this chapter need to be understood as straightforwardly set in one somewhere. But equally, the multiple unities of seemingly unplaced fictions such as *Endgame* and *Molloy* do also index several referential levels and exist in relation to actual topographies. As Malpas says, we are all always in place, and we are all also always in particular places (2012, 63). Places as they are conceptualized by people and the boundaries between them can be traced, and in doing so literary geographers have a toolkit available in Malpas’s philosophical topology, for example in his reflections on “Ground, Unity, and Limit” (2012, 73-95). The reading of Beckett offered in this chapter demonstrates his placed qualities, while also making the case for developing further dialogues between literary studies, place philosophy and human geography. Accounts of the relationship between representations of place in Beckett’s work and the actual sites that can be visited around Dublin, Paris and London only hint at the potential for a literary place-based study of Beckett’s career as a whole, which could make a significant contribution to the broader project of literary geography.
Afterword

Works of literature are located, situated in space. They emerge from places which materially exist, but which are also the creations of people, sites whose definitions, boundaries and perceived characteristics are forever shifting. They are written somewhere, by someone from somewhere, at some time, for audiences envisaged as being somewhere. They are published and consumed in specific, varying places. Works of literature are only one among many sources available to the researcher interested in imaginative places themselves. Such a researcher will consult photographs, websites, histories, artistic works in other genres, memoirs and whatever other materials are available, and will walk the ground concerned, notebook and camera in hand, trying to apprehend whatever traces of the past can be detected there now.

Deep Locational Criticism takes as its starting points these two insights: the situatedness of literary works; and their status as only one component in the establishment and transmission of imaginative places, as starting points. This book is intended as a toolkit for researchers and teachers who want to use Deep Locational Criticism. What could result from this are rich, productive, celebratory, utterly trans-disciplinary accounts of human
relations with location, each one an “affirmation” (Anderson and Harrison 2010, 1) as much as a critique. Such accounts would zoom ceaselessly between the details of texts and individual places at particular times and the very large-scale: political programmes and conceptions of history. As well as theorizing, “get out into a muddy field and look around you”, as the landscape archaeologist Matthew Johnson (2007, 82) puts it. Deep Locational Criticism offers literary scholars the possibility of grouping well-known and little-known texts in new ways and of reappraising central questions in literary studies: canonization and periodization. In practising it, literary researchers could open up dialogues with other disciplines along the lines proposed by Malpas, Thrift and others.

In the classroom, students practising Deep Locational Criticism could explore human activity in places and times both relatively more proximal and more distant from them. They could do something entirely new early in their university careers, something which would enable them to develop the kind of skills that twenty-first century young people increasingly and outstandingly have: notably, an ability to use the Internet to do fast and dirty investigation. The developments of such research and presentation skills would be combined in Deep Locational university study with a growing understanding of traditional literary and historical ways of working.

Deep Locational Criticism involves a move away from a literary scholarship focused on authors and words and towards a literary geography
more concerned with imaginative places themselves. This has consequences for the boundaries between academic disciplines. Here, human geography, place philosophy, archaeology, visual studies and urban history all meet literature.

A-Z Glossary of Terms

Introductory Note

This list is partly an explanation of the book’s contents, and partly an indication of potential research areas. The latter could include imaginative fields like the forest, the graveyard, the sea, the coast and many other sites, as well as boundary relationships such as “indoors versus out of doors”. Future Deep Locational critics could, for instance, work to establish a typology of literary-spatial boundaries, including the porous, the impermeable and others.

The glossary is not meant to define the words it contains in any exhaustive or final way. Instead, it lays out some of their associations: it aims at opening up rather than closing down discussion. Where particular sources on the list of references are relevant to the term under consideration, these are indicated after the glossary entry. The references are examples of scholarship or creative writing from different historical periods which are relevant to the headword they come under, but are not presented as the only or even the main sources in which the matter of the headword can be pursued. They only happen to be pieces of writing which help clarify or enrich understanding of the term in question.
There are numerous words used for particular imaginative place conceptions which do not figure on the list: province, back country, pale, hinterland, to name but a few. Many of these have to do with notions of neighbouring, or surrounding, or spatial subordination, or proximity and difference, notions that can well be understood using the poetics of scale proposed here. The list is intended to introduce and to define the main theoretical terms and imaginative place conceptions actually used in the present book: a term’s absence does not necessarily mean that it is unimportant.

As Tim Cresswell states in his introductory book on the topic (2004), place is something that we are aware of in everyday life, that has a common-sense meaning, but which is also in use as a term. Malpas (1999, 19-45, here 19) argued in his earlier work that the very everydayness of place as a notion made it hard to deal with intellectually, made it opaque. The word place and its relatives should, despite their everyday currency, be used with caution, and their coverage reflected upon. But the objective of the present book is not to stop research or classroom investigations at the stage of debates over epistemology or the definition of words. The rigour of philosophical discussions of terms, among them Malpas’s work with Heidegger, underpins the list that follows, but so does the practical, level-headed and open-minded approach typically taken by workers in the fields of human geography and urban history, and so does the richness of
association to be found in literary accounts of particular places, memories of them and journeys through them.

anti-modern: rejecting the concept of modernity, refusing to believe that we are on the “after” side of a before/after barrier. An anti-modern view of place is typically founded on a traditional or rural base; readings of Heideggerian place based on notions such as belonging and dwelling, and certain branches of ecocriticism are anti-modernist. Liable to be accused of nostalgia.


archaeology: research activity which excavates the material culture of the past, layer by layer, revealing the build-up of meaning on one point. Insufficiently used so far to rethink the relationship between literature, space and time. A literary-archaeological approach (see Chapter 4 above) works to reveal the barriers or junctions in the record left on one physical spot. Compare the notion of a ruin, in which the material culture of the past becomes suffused with nostalgia and the picturesque in quite a contrary way.

archipelago: a group of islands. To see, for instance, the islands of Great Britain and Ireland and the others grouped with them in north-western Europe as an archipelago rather than as “the British Isles” (or “the United Kingdom” plus “the Republic of Ireland”) is to alter their locational being and thus to reinterpret the writing produced in and about them.
Brannigan 2014; Kerrigan 2008; Prescott 2009.

architecture: as a mode of thought not a profession, the study of the environment as built and, crucially, as designed by humans; buildings understood as, in the terms of Lefebvre, conceived. Topographic historical works often have a strong focus on buildings; literary topographies concerned with imaginative places like the room, or with particular types of building within social practice, such as the informally subdivided London terraced house, will pay attention to architectural writing. Related to locational thinking, Heidggerian architectural thought as well as humanistic and politically critical accounts of architecture, can all be important for Deep Locational Criticism.

art: on the Heideggerian view, the “poetic essence” of art is as whatever can bring a group of individual people together in an understanding of one thing
that also changes all things (or in other words the *world*). The view of *literature* taken in Deep Locational Criticism admits nominalism (art is what people call art) but also views literature as a species of gathering or Heideggerian art work; Heidegger’s view of art, on one reading, moved gradually away from an *anti-modernist* stance in which the art with communal meaning of the past has given way to isolated *representations*, towards one which valued the defamiliarizing power of abstraction in twentieth-century art forms. In the Post-World-War-II period, Kenneth Clark viewed art as a natural evolution of the human relationship to *environment*; Pierre Bourdieu as entirely a cultural construction intended to enforce distinctions of status.


**atmosphere**: the feel, or unique character, of somewhere. The atmosphere of a location is made up of a combination of qualities detectable with the *senses* and associations; individual and subjective but also capable of being discussed and described; something some *places* can seem to have more of than others; something someone might sense or might not; see also *landscape*. Casey (2001, 418) uses atmosphere for the “special diffuseness or ‘glow’ of an individual landscape”. The atmosphere of a place is conveyed peculiarly well in still photographs, but perhaps even better by
senses other than the visual, notably smell; some works of literature attempt
to capture atmospheres of place while others do not; both types are equally
capable of being examined via Deep Locational Criticism.
Adams 2013; Browne 1976; Casey 2001; Mayne 2013.

**background**: an inert or secondary sort of context; within the embodied
engaged view of the universe proposed by Charles Taylor, whatever we
emerge from, what stands behind us or is taken for granted when we look at
something. In literary studies to c.1980, for example in a series of books by
Basil Willey widely used in university teaching, the knowledge needed
before work on a certain writer or period can begin. A principle of Deep
Locational Criticism is to bring the background forward, finding meaning
there; looking through the text of the book, The term background is also
frequently used biographically, in concepts like that of a person’s
background, and also in the analysis of the visual image, in which
foreground and background can be distinguished and the background is
behind whatever is in view; some important metaphoric aspects of the
concept emerge in these usages.
Page 1980; Taylor [1993]; Thrift 2008; Willey [1934]

**barrier**: something in the way; a marker of or physical *thing* that enforces a
*border* or *boundary*. A hedge is one such, typically accompanied by a *sense*
of organic growth, a thickness. *Mountains* or *rivers* can form natural barriers, fences, walls, *roads* and railways man-made ones.

Miller 1995.

**biography**: a written narrative of a human life; the foundation of literary interpretation on this, often held to be at odds with interpretation based on *text* or *context*. A goal of Deep Locational Criticism is to reunite textual, contextual and biographical varieties of reading. Also, a genre of writing founded on projections of, or as tracked by Saunders games with, the notion of a life.


**border**: a sort of *boundary, periphery* or *limit*, notably one demarcating where one political unit stops and another starts; as such, often a *barrier*. For Lotman ([1984], 210), its function “comes down to a limitation of penetration, filtering and the transformative processing of the external to the internal”. Figuratively, includes the border between fiction and its others, including non-fiction and myth, which as Pavel (1986, 75-85) points out is not the same sort of border in every time and *place*.

Lotman [1984]; Pavel 1986.
boundary: a dividing line between two places; in Heideggerian terms, a limit which creates a here and a there, and as such (see Clark 2011, 60) gathers multiplicity into unity while also creating division in what might otherwise have been undifferentiated. Less often used with a geopolitical meaning sense for a national frontier than is border. Clark 2011; Heidegger 1971, 145-61.

bridge: in the fourfold of Heidegger, a bridge is one example of some particularity that “gathers”, or actually brings into being a particular place; figuratively, anything that joins two things. Heidegger 1971, 145-61.

cartography: the practice of constructing a map. By Tally (2013, 47-78) used metaphorically for the action of a writer. Here, cartography is taken more literally, for example as exemplified by the maps produced in various methods such as cartographic history, distant reading and literary geographic information systems (GIS), and in the maps produced by creative writers (Thomas Hardy and George Orwell, for instance) themselves as explanations of their fictional worlds to themselves and others. Barber 2012; Cable 2013; Clout 1991; Cooper and Gregory 2011; Finch
centre: a topological middle, or a location in which power, services and population are focused. Compare periphery, to which it is opposed, and related terms: in terms of a city, the centre is not the outskirts, or the suburbs, or the environs, and a metropolis or major city can be considered more central than its outliers. In this book the notion of a centre is frequently relativized, as in the application of linguistic pragmatics making use of deixis, and of work in the social sciences which critiques the disproportionate levels of attention commonly given to seats of political and economic power. Techniques for use in such relativizing acts are provided by the postcolonial studies of Fredric Jameson and the everyday life writing of Georges Perec. Also, any focus, with no necessary indication that what is focused on is more important than anything else.

Cable 2013; Jameson [1990]; Levinson 1983; Perec [1974].

chora: Greek word sometimes translated as space as in extension or a receptacle (see container) in contradistinction to topos, understood as place or location. Malpas (1999, 25) says that the “temptation” to align the pairing chora/topos with the modern western opposition between space and place “ought to be resisted”, because of the complexity of place on his
understanding of it. Within Deep Locational Criticism, location is similarly complex.

**chronotope**: Bakhtin’s time-space: the characteristic time-and-space arrangement of a certain sort of literature; setting understood in time rather than as fixed and unchanging. Within chronotopic approaches, time and space are understood as unitary. The chronotope of the TV sitcom (a small number of fixed interior settings; characters tending to age more slowly than their actors) could be contrasted with that of the heroic epic like *Beowulf* or the *Aeneid* or the book of Exodus, involving the move to somewhere from somewhere else and the lifespan of one or two heroic individuals who achieve something and then die; Bakhtin’s own example is what he calls “adventure time”, in which the time of adventures seems unrelated to the outside time of the world.

city: often moralized, either positively or negatively, as dynamic and liberating place of modernity or place of hellish inauthenticity. Can be a term for a legally-constituted body (a corporation), and also for the area governed by such a body, or for a built-up, connected expanse, visible from above; still largely overlooked by the sort of literary studies centred on the
notion of *environment*; the *place* of human mixing, of multitudes, of alienation, of bohemia, of accretions of money, of revolutions, of markets, of shops, of slums, of *art* galleries and museums.


cityscape: the *urban* equivalent of a *landscape*; a *city* as visually depicted, whether literally or figuratively; the city as surveyed with the eye; perhaps detectable in literary crowd *scenes*. The city often lacks prospects: being in a *room*, or part of a crowd, or in a narrow *street*, or lodging in a basement involves being without a view, although spires, squares and boulevards are visually salient parts of cities. There is also the age-old trope of viewing the skyline of the city (or the smoke it emits) from outside it. Investigating cityscape would involve considering the options available to painters and photographers of city scenes. Another sort of cityscape is that which emerges in the detection of the age-old shape of the landscape underneath later built-up areas, which happens diversely in *archaeology* and *psychogeography*. A cityscape can often be described precisely in terms of a city’s *architecture*. 

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clearing: in Heidegger’s philosophy, a space cut by humans in the forest, thus creating a place with limits separating the human area (see city; rural) and the wilderness. More generally, the idea of the clearing is allied by him both with being as such and with thinking as the revelation of truth (unconcealment); the clearing is thematized as an imaginative place in the literature of the American frontier from Mary Rowlandson to Laura Ingalls Wilder.

Malpas 2012, 73-95; Wilder 1932.

colony: an outpost of one political or ethnic grouping within an environment either previously unoccupied or already occupied by others; a sort of periphery. Particularly important in certain critical approaches concerned with the workings of power.


compass points: a way of establishing and describing position or location based on the universality (to humans) of being located on the earth. Measurement based on these cardinal directions (north, south, east and west) leads to global positionings, which in a locational study work as a way of introducing a usefully arbitrary element into a literary archaeology such
as that in Chapter 4 of this book of the precise spot occupied by an Early-
Modern English playhouse: to take one point on the earth’s surface and dig
downwards is in a way to tell the whole story. Compare *point*.
Berry 2002; Bowsher 2011; Gohlka and Gottfried 2010.

**concrete:** that which can be touched, that which is the content of *everyday*
*life*. Not having a rigid methodology, Deep Locational Criticism focuses on
concrete examples of actual *places* and *experiences* of them, as part of its
*topographic* rather than *synoptic* approach, and resists abstraction. Equally
to be resisted is the notion of “the” concrete as opposed to “the” abstract,
itself an abstraction.
Benjamin [1982] (very many of the other entries in the bibliography to this
book exemplify concretion of one sort or another).

**container:** assemblage of the *boundaries* within which some *thing*, for
instance a drink of water, comes to exist as apart from others. One way of
viewing *topos*, or *place*, is merely as what is contained inside something,
and *space* as an element which does the containing. This, however, is
consequent upon the prior observation of *concrete* actuality in the shape of
such containers in use by humans.
Aristotle 1961 (Book IV).
**context:** the cultural and other **surroundings** within which a person or text exists, usually as overlapping with other contexts; whatever is in the **background** in a view of something. In academic **literary studies** before 1930 and since 1980 often the default approach to a piece of writing (as opposed to the textual, focusing on the words on the page); annotated editions of literary texts are by their nature contextualist.


**cosmopolitanism:** classically, the condition in which one is or feels oneself to be a citizen of the **world** rather than a member of one **nation.** When used pejoratively, a cosmopolitan is an unpatriotic person, often an immigrant; sometimes the word has Anti-Semitic implications; today frequently understood in terms of processes of cosmopolitanization which are far beyond the control of the **individual.** One of two main rival ways of understanding human existence in **location,** the other being notions of **rootedness** and belonging.

**country**: a *nation*-state; the *land*, the often naturally delineated portion of the *earth* where a certain group of people live; a *region* or *district*; agricultural and other non-*urban* areas, the countryside. In literary-*place* terms, sometimes the particular *rural* area associated with a writer, used either with or without a definite article as in “Hardy Country” or “the Forster Country”. The title of Eoin O’Brien’s book *The Beckett Country* makes use of the inherent doubleness of meaning—a *landscape* and also a nation-state—of the word in that its subtitle is *Samuel Beckett’s Ireland*. Cf. *city*.


**critical**: stance involving an assumption that a study of *place, literature*, etc., ought to work to produce a critique, and so expose socio-political tensions and contradictions, in particular the falsehoods of the knowledge structures that support those who hold *power* (in the shape of capital, consumerism, imperialism and colonialism, elites, *centres* ruling peripheries). *Literary criticism* which uses the term *space* in discussing *locational* matters is usually asserting that it is, in this use of the word, critical. The title of Belsey’s *Critical Practice* contains a double meaning: critical as the adjective identifying both the practice of literary criticism and
identifying Marxist critique.


deixis: reference, usually linguistic or bodily, to something outside the utterance in which the referring is done; indexicality, or pointing and gesturing with words; more broadly, a pragmatic means of understanding how partners in communication situate one another in relation to whatever is being discussed, a means of situating oneself in one’s environment or surroundings. Different kinds of deixis are typically distinguished: spatial; temporal; personal; social; discursive. See also frame of reference.


depth: here, specifically the principle of repeated returns to certain points at different times and from different disciplinary and other directions, including the differing viewpoints provided by the interpreter or investigator being at different stages on a Heideggerian life path. Key to the principle of depth is that there can be no final view, no explanation, of a work of literature. Compare questionability.

Finch 2011; Papadimitriou 2013; Perec [1974].

displacement: removal from (former) place, the fact of being pushed aside
or out of place, of being dislodged. For Freud (1973, 208-9), displacement is when “a latent element is replaced not by a component part of itself but by something more remote—that is, by an allusion”, or in other words is metaphor (the allusion) as opposed to metonymy (the component part); for Malpas, reading late Heidegger, place is inherently questionable, and therefore matters of displacement and placelessness are key to an understanding of topological complexity, and not characteristics of a fallen, cosmopolitan, globalized and consumerist age, to be bemoaned; displacement is also a widely-used concept in postcolonial studies and work on modernism. Compare non-place.

Freud 1973; Malpas 2012, 137-57.

distant reading: proposed by Moretti as the opposite of close reading and as a new direction for literary studies; a practice of criticism which involves looking from afar at a large mass of literary material (all the novels published in eighteenth-century England, for example) and which uses techniques of analysis, for instance involving statistics and cartography, not traditionally among those used by literary scholars. Deep Locational Criticism produces examples of distant reading but will be likely to use the poetics of scale to oscillate between these and close readings.

Moretti 2013.
**district**: a component of a larger *urban, suburban* or *rural* area usually as defined in at least a semi-official way using *boundaries* that can be viewed on *maps*. Compare *region, local*; not always easy to distinguish from the smaller *neighbourhood*. The district is of particular interest as part of a poetics of *scale*. Scholarly *topography* often focuses on districts, and so does *realism* in fiction; writing concerned with certain districts as localities can often be identified by the use of *toponyms* in book and chapter titles. Dyos [1966]; Morrison [1894]; Litvinoff [1972]; Newland 2008; Papadimitriou 2012; Papadimitriou 2013; Self 1991; Sheppard 1957; Sicher 1985; Stedman Jones 1971; Stow [1603]; Temple 2008a; Temple 2008b; Zangwill 1892.

**door**: somewhere that, with the right authorization or equipment, one can move through, where one *place* gives on to another; the entrance to somewhere, a division or *boundary* that can be locked or unlocked, open or closed. The door is on Miller’s list (1995, 7) of emblematic *imaginative places*. Related concepts are contained in the words *doorway, gate* and *gateway*. Miller 1995.

**dwelling**: a mode of human existence in which the relationship to *surroundings*, the *environment*, has deep roots. A term derived from
Heidegger’s “Building Dwelling Thinking” and widely used in the humanistic geography of the 1970s and 1980s, sometimes understood as a reaction to modernity which is characterized by nostalgia. See placelessness, problem of place, rootedness.


earth: our planet; soil that can be dug, where plants can grow. For Heidegger the earth, a component of the fourfold, conceals, holds back, is what things return to; Clark (2011, 59) argues that Heidegger’s “stress on the inherent resistance and ‘opacity’ of the earth, its complete otherness to human constructions and uses of it” is a vitally anti-totalitarian aspect of Heidegger’s thinking. Earth is closely associated with materiality: recall the clay that we are made from according to the Bible. In an allied way, dirt is connected imaginatively to reality and money. And our planet has the same name, not as rocks or trees or water, but the brown stuff we can plough; in science fiction, Earth is one planet in relation to others. Compare world, geocriticism.

Clark 2011; Westphal 2011; Heidegger 1971; Malpas 2012.

ecology: the arrangement and relationship of life forms characteristic of a particular environment, and the study of such arrangements. Ecology has sometimes been associated with fascism as an extreme version of the
argument that place equals belonging in one spot or within one zone, somewhere in which outsiders or foreigners have no rights or do not belong. Bate 1991; Clark 2011; Thrift 1999.

**engagement**: a researcher’s involvement, whether personal (biographical) or intellectual, with components of whatever is being studied, as opposed to detachment from them. See Charles Taylor (1993, 333), glossing Heidegger: “Grasping things neutrally requires modifying our stance to them that primitively has to be one of involvement”. Deep Locational Criticism does not adopt a critical stance which is centrally political, but recognizes the observer’s necessary yet not necessarily damaging involvement in the observed; cf. background, experience, pre-understanding. Embodied by some Chicago-school sociologists, practitioners of psychogeography and workers on Heidegger’s thought. Hatherley 2010; Lefebvre [1968]; Malpas 1999; Papadimitriou 2013; Sinclair 1997; Suttles 1968.

**environment**: just surroundings, or (from an ecological and in literary-critical terms ecocritical perspective) what is in the physical universe that is not man-made. A thing or individual or imaginative place is more likely to be defined by its environment but distinguished from its surroundings. The ecocritical view concentrates on the fact that humans are or risk destroying
the environment with industry, roads and agriculture. Some geographic readings ask about sustainability; an environmental approach can be ecological, caring for everything in the biosphere.

Bate 1991; Buell 2001; Malpas 2012, 114-35; Clark 2011.

**equiprimordiality**: see *multiple unity*.

Malpas 2012.

**everyday life**: the focus of an approach to human culture and practices emphasizing repetition, home and habit, and focusing on details of concrete existence; often involving cross-overs between academic and imaginative modes of writing and thinking. Also *quotidian*. Deep Locational Criticism frequently attends to quotidian aspects of human *place experience*.


**experience**: how the lives and surroundings of individuals seem to them, in a linear narrative beginning with earliest memories. *Place*, importantly, is something we already know when we begin talking about it, because we exist within it, and this makes it difficult to talk about. But since experience is founded on our being in place, place requires investigation. *Humanistic geography* is founded on this assumption that place is space experienced and merits investigation. Compare *pre-understanding*. 
extension: space as something measurable but empty of content, as theorized by Euclid and Descartes, who abstract it from everyday life. See container, location, position

Descartes [1641]; Casey 1997.

flâneur: an individual, typically male, leisured and independent, strolling through the nineteenth-century city and observing it visually. This figure, made famous by Baudelaire and Flaubert, stands apart, watches, can waste time and consume with the eye, for instance in the arcades of Paris which fascinated Benjamin. The early theorist of modern urban mentalities Georg Simmel suggested that “becoming blasé” in the manner of the flâneur—the “dedicated stroller” and commentator of nineteenth-century urban journalism and fiction—emerged as a “coping strategy” in the then-unprecedented urban society of ceaseless and potentially frightening novelty (Crang 1998, 50). In cultural studies, a key representative of modernity. Controversy over the flâneur has revolved around gender, since women could be thought of as excluded by cultural norms or duties from adopting this role, and male theorists have tended to ignore the experience of women in discussions of flâneurs. But the activity relied on leisure and was therefore above all only available to those with enough money not to have to
go to work every day. The concept directs attention to the importance of the
gaze in the construction and consumption of place, but perhaps elevates a
certain historical moment to a higher level of importance than it deserves.

forest: an ancient place of trees or other landscapes, supposedly unmodified
by humans, associated all over Europe with the primal, with darkness, with
beasts. A true forest is arguably therefore not a place at all, with places only
being formed as the forest is felled; in Britain at least, early forests were
zones reserved for hunting, the leisure activity of the powerful, from which
agriculture was barred. For Heidegger, the forest is important in the
construction of thoughts based on its topology, such as the path which only
leads to a forester’s hut.

fourfold: in the topological thinking developed by Heidegger during the
1940s, the relationship between mortals and gods (the latter understood to
be in a higher sphere), with on a parallel up-down axis earth below and sky
above, so that mortals and earth are both below, sky and gods above. The
fourfold is a figure for conveying multiple unity as a principle for existence.
Intended to explain human existence which is related in it to constants, but
taken by workers in humanistic geography to indicate a desirable state of
affairs not present for people experiencing conditions of *placelessness*. Not a vertical hierarchy, but to be imagined as a square, with mortals and earth to be imagined as its corners at the lower level (they are one one plane), sky and gods on another (they too share a plane).

Heidegger 1971, 145-61; Malpas 2006, 211-303; Malpas 2012; Miller 1995, 55 (a rejection of this concept); Young 2002, 92-121; Young 2006.

**frame of reference:** in linguistic pragmatics, typological linguistics and branches of *literary studies* influenced by them, a model used to relate matter outside language which is being described linguistically to speakers, auditors and the (proximal or distal) *environment*. Various such models exist, among them the egocentric (speaker-*centred*), allocentric (object-*centred*) and absolute (using global or universal *reference* points). See *deixis*.

Dokic and Pacherie 2006; Levinson 2004; Levinson and Wilkins 2006.

**gender:** in human *individuals*, the difference between male and female as socially or culturally constituted; the fact of being one, the other or neither. All humans, however *positioned* in terms of gender, exist in *place*. The *locational experience* of members of one gender will have both similarities and differences. There is considerable scope for future research into the relationship between gender and location.
Gilber and Gubar 2000; Massey 1994; Middleton and Dekker [1611]; Wolff 1985; Woolf [1932]

**geocriticism:** a branch of *spatialism* more concerned with *possible worlds* or in other words with possibilities in narrative, than with politics. Its principles including putting *place* at the centre of analysis, often examining multiple texts concerned with the same one, and in this sense, geocriticism and Deep Locational Criticism are alike.

Pavel 1986; Tally 2013; Westphal [2007].

**geographical information systems [GIS]:** the use of computer *technology* to gather data related to distribution in real *space*, which can then be displayed and interpreted in academic work in the humanities. In *literary studies*, the development of GIS could result in *maps* based on the frequency of or use of particular words in given texts, for example.

Cooper and Gregory 2011; Finch 2012b; Finch 2012c; Great Britain Historical GIS; Gregory and Ell 2007.

**geography:** the academic study of *space* and *place* on the surface of the *earth*, or in more general use, the *locational* or spatial as opposed to the temporal or some other pole. Academic human geographers have much freedom to use different sorts of material, as compared to workers in *literary*
studies; they tend to avoid romanticizing or dramatizing oppositions; their analyses sometimes fail to give the sense of place found in the work of sociologists, imaginative writers, photographers or historians (urban, local, cartographic, for instance), this being for them only one of the dimensions of place, and less important than more measurable aspects. Malpas accuses geographers of being over-simplistic about place. Noteworthy for literary geographers are the critical geography of Harvey and Soja, the locality study of Massey and the non-representational theory of Thrift, as well as the humanistic notion of place as space plus human experience, in Relph and Tuan.


globalization: the effects on human culture and the environment of industrialization, urbanization and the movement of capital, characteristic of world history after the Second World War and the Cold War and intensified by the impact of present-day communication technology. Arguably leads to a removal of place differences but also to other
phenomena, post-cosmopolitanism and neo-provincialism. According to Casey (2001), globalization involves a thinning of place, in which people’s place experience becomes shallower; “their bonds are loosened”. But the other side of this thinning, the cosmos as opposed to the hearth in the terms of Tuan, is that people gain more experiences of more different places and may be less likely to confuse the details of one particular place with human experience more generally.


ground: the basis of other things; what we stand on. In Malpas’s Heideggerian topology, used together with limit; in Casey’s study of landscape, something more straightforward or everyday, simply what is below our feet while the sky is above us, and in this respect closer to the earth of the Heideggerian fourfold.

Casey 2001; Malpas 2012, 73-95.

heterotopia: somewhere defined by society as different from the ordinary spatial zones where the general rules obtain; a site in which people gain “a momentary critical distance from the everyday” (Rees 2013, 126). A heterotopia is somewhere with its own rules which can be opposed to those of the world around it, as in the brothel or graveyard; to be contrasted with the repetition aspects of everyday life, yet actually a part of everyday life.
Heterotopias are spatial equivalents of the time-based Bakhtinian carnival, a limited suspension of the ordinary rules where carnival represents a temporary one.

Foucault [1967]; Rees 2013.

**history**: a temporal narrative *scaled* according to human lives (not based on geological time, or the age of the *universe*, or conversely on the universe of a few minutes or less); in the discipline of historiography chiefly based on what has survived into the present in written evidence. **Location** needs to be understood in relation to the temporal axis, since every location is forever in change and becoming different locations. Much excellent work by historians and historical geographers in sub-fields including *local*, *urban* and architectural history has locational applications. History is be distinguished from *archaeology*, which travels through the layers of the past by going downwards on one *position* on the surface of the *earth*.

[some examples, all covering London:] Barber 2012; Brigden 1989; Clout 1991; Dennis 2008a; Dennis 2008b; Dyos [1966]; Koven 2004; Sheppard 1998; Stedman Jones 1971; Wise 2008.

**home**: where some individual or group dwells or comes from, the *place* of belonging. Not identical to *house*, which is a fundamentally architectural concept; in *gender* terms home is often understood as the feminine interior
sphere. Heidegger presents the return home, emblematically that of a traveller such as Odysseus, as the central goal of thought and being; Malpas (2006, 309) denies that home, for Heidegger, is to be equated with either Heidegger’s Black Forest or “some premodern agrarian existence”, “in spite of his preference for imagery drawn from his own German life and experience”. Instead, “[t]he ‘homecoming’ of which Heidegger speaks is a return to the nearness of being. That nearness is not a matter of coming into the vicinity of some single, unique place, but rather of coming to recognize the placed character of being as such”. Home is aligned with the concept of living somewhere as dwelling, and contains a crux, depending on whether it is understood as fundamentally an origin, or fundamentally a place occupied.
Heidegger [1951]; Malpas 2006.

horizon: when it is visible, the evidence before an individual’s eyes of the spherical nature of the earth, since when that person moves, it does too, and when a tower or mountain is climbed, it recedes. Casey (2001, 417) writes: “Every landscape has a horizon, yet space never does …. The horizon is an arc wherein a given landscape comes to an end”. For Heidegger’s pupil Gadamer humans are, experientially speaking, always situated somewhere, yet our “horizon of understanding” is forever shifting.
Casey 2001; Gadamer [1960].
**house**: a building in which human individuals sleep and eat. The characteristic site of human **dwelling**: a container of sorts; a repository of memories; a private **space**; sometimes in literary treatments, the setting of a work of fiction (as a unit that can be known, whose boundaries are known), sometimes acting as a microcosm.

Banks [1960]; Bourdieu [1970]; Dickens [1853].

**humanistic**: in **geography** and other fields, holding, in a way often understandable as **anti-modern**, that the natural sciences cannot explain everything (the view that they *can* being in such an approach labelled **positivism**). What is proposed in the present book is a reconciliation between humanistic and **critical** or **power**-based thinking, using the resources of **technology** including **geographic information systems (GIS)**. Humanistic approaches emphasize the personal and as such result from and exemplify **engagement**; among them, **psychogeography** is extremely personal.

Collingwood 1946; Heidegger [1950]; Papadimitriou 2012; Relph 1976; Tuan 1977; Winch [1958].

**imaginative place**: a **place** as conceived and as encountered in **experience** at varying levels of **depth**; what comes to mind when someone thinks of
somewhere. The main target of investigation in Deep Locational Criticism. Evidence of imaginative place is to be found in literary, visual and other texts. Imaginative place is a new concept, but many existing locational literary and social studies in effect reveal imaginative places, so that it is a discovery rather than an invention. Compare manywheres.

[among examples of writings other than fictions that are particularly revealing of specific imaginative places and which can be understood, in part, as theorizations of imaginative place:] Ackroyd 2000; Anderson 1983; Augé [1992]; Becker 2009; Benjamin [1982]; Berman [1982]; Bhabha 1990; Bourdieu [1970]; Bourdieu [1983]; Brown 2001; Bull and Back 2003; Cable 2013; Cheng and Robbins 1998; Clark 2011; Cohen 2010; Cooper and Gregory 2011; Cosgrove 1984; Crang 1998; Cresswell 2001; Dennis 2008b; Doležel 2010; Donaldson 2013b; Dyos [1966]; Ellem 1976; Entrikin 2008; Esty 2004; Finch 2011; Finch 2013a; Fischer-Lichte 1999; Francis and Valman 2011; Gatrell 1999; Gervais 1993; Gillies 1984; Gurr 2004b; Hatherley 2010; Heidegger [1951]; Heidegger [1934]; Heidegger [1950]; Heinloo 2011; Helgerson 1992; Hickmann and Robert 2006; Hobhouse [1994]; Hobsbawm 1990; Hoskins [1959]; Ingold 2000; Jameson [1990]; Labov 1966; Lefebvre [1974]; Lefebvre [1968]; Lefebvre [1953]; Leita and Leita 2013; Levinson 1992; Levinson and Wilkins 2006; Ley 1974; Malpas 1999; Malpas 2006; Malpas 2012; Mark et al. 2011; Massey 1994; Matz 1921; Mayne 1993; Mayne and Mussay 2001; Meløe 1988; Miller 1995;

**individual:** a human being as separated from others and known to himself or herself. Deep Locational Criticism shows a concern with **particularity**, the **concrete** and the **personal**. In it, the single individual’s perception matters; approaches that emphasize **space** rather than **place** often ignore or downplay the individual; **biography** puts a single individual at the **centre** of analysis organizing places and other individuals around the one at the centre; The use of a mechanism of **scale** makes movement between the level of the individual and that of the many possible; fiction frequently places an eponymous individual at the centre of a text; even scholars who emphasize processes at a level far removed from the individual (Lefebvre, for instance) tend themselves to be interpreted as challenging and influential individuals. Beckett [1938]; Bellow [1951]; Bloom 2000; Coustillas 2011; Davis 2007; Dickens [1841]; Finch 2011; Kent 1990; Knowlson 1996; McGann 2000; ODNB; Shields 1999.
interaction and interdependence: the view taken in Deep Locational Criticism that things, including locations and individuals, come into being dialogically and rely for existence on their partners, opposites or neighbours rather than being either independent of or controlled by their environment. As Malpas (2012, 201) points out, the surveyor and the ordinary person who both put together a workable understanding of a place must view it from different positions and interact with it; this approach is more open-minded and polycentric than that of spatialism and its critical relatives. Compare Casey’s notion of “ingoing and outgoing body” (2001, 413-16). In Heidegger’s account of the French geographer Vidal (see Malpas 2012, 149), cultural and physical geography interact, shape one another, in the shaping of somewhere.

Casey 2001; Malpas 2012.

intra-textual arrangements: how locations are related to one another in a literary text, analysed as if it were (what it is not) an autonomous system or structure. In a novel such as Orwell’s Burmese Days, the layout of the English Club and other buildings within the Maidan as indicated by the author in a sketch map, with the River Irawaddy as one boundary of that and the jungle beyond. One component of the methodological triad used in this book. Sometimes cartography is used by authors or researchers to
display or interpret the intra-textual arrangement of a given text or group of
texts. Cf. *loco-reference; physical experience*.

Gatrell 1999; Orwell 2009, ii.

**iridescence**: in Malpas’s reading (2012, 38-40) of Heidegger, the shifting
ever-unique surface to which, as much as any to underlying meanings, the
student of *place* to be faithful. See also *questionability, sense*.

Malpas 2012.

**junction**: where two *things* meet one another; a crossing point or
intersection of *roads* or railway lines; as such a place in or outside a *city*
which is a focus for events. Could potentially be investigated further in
future *locational* criticism.


**land**: a portion of the *earth*’s surface capable of being divided up and
owned by *individuals* or countries; the part of the earth’s surface that is not
covered by *sea*, that humans can walk on; also, a *country*. In the latter
meaning, often used in English with fairy-tale or archaic connotations.

**landscape**: a type of painting representing areas of *land* visible to the eye;
also, the *topography* or particular characteristics of a certain *region* or
**district.** A term frequently used in discussion of overlaps between imaginative conceptions, literary *art* and pictorial *representation*; Casey (2001, 416), referring to *humanistic geography*, presents landscape as inevitably of *place*, because known through *experience*, rather than of *space*; Denis Cosgrove and a group of cultural geographers inspired by him, drawing on Raymond Williams, write of a landscape as a way of seeing embodying a certain political position. As a concept, landscape emphasizes the visual and the *rural*; for Cresswell (2004, 10) “In most definitions of landscape the viewer is outside it” whereas in place we are inside it. For Malpas (2012, Chapter 5), the dichotomy of subject and object, viewer and viewed, is associated with Descartes as part of the long process beginning in the classical era by which place became mere *position*; the emergence of the landscape view in seventeenth-century Europe was simultaneous. Cf. the somewhat paradoxical *cityscape*.

Antrop 2013; Brace and Johns-Putra 2010; Brown 2001; Casey 2001; Clark [1949]; Cosgrove 1984; Cresswell 2004; Daniels 1993; Daniels and Cosgrove 1998; Hardy [1878]; Jackson 1980; Johnson 2007; Malpas 2012; Mark *et al*. 2011; Palang and Paal 2008; Relph 1981; Relph 1987; Tuan 1977; Williams 1973.

**limit:** where some *location* stops or gives way to another, a *periphery*. In the topological philosophy of Malpas and deriving from readings of
Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and Kant’s *Prologomena*, has two quite different meanings: either an origin, which is also something’s determining nature (what makes it *it* and not something else), or a terminus, merely the point in *space* at which some line ends or the *boundary* with a qualitatively different zone is reached. Cf. *ground*.

Malpas 2012, 73-95.

*(literary) criticism*: the engaged, evaluative study (not necessarily carried out in an academic setting) of *literature* as opposed to textual and biographical scholarship or gossip. Also, as in German biblical higher criticism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, criticism can denote the analysis and comparison of sources and texts in search of the ideal text of a religious or literary work. Criticism in either of these definitions is distinct from a *critical* stance understood as the development of an ideological critique concerned with the workings of power, the objective of radical scholars such as David Harvey and Nicholas Mirzoeff. Engaged literary criticism however can lead to a critical approach involving the unmasking of power, as well as to an engaged relationship with texts. For the latter reason, (literary) criticism has been chosen as a label for the activity being presented in this book. Some *contextual* work is also valuable as criticism.

[examples of useful and *location*-sensititve literary criticism:] Ackerley [2004]; Auerbach [1946]; Bakhtin [1937-38]; Bradley [1904]; Esty 2004;
literary studies: the academic field in which literature is analysed. Studies of literature and place have veered between critical, explicitly political, approaches (including those concerned with the environment), scholarly documentation, studies of a particular site or region, and accounts which aim to include the personal experience of the observer.


literature: a written art work, any piece of writing judged as such (canonized); also, whatever texts are the focus of attention in certain university departments. Cf. the nominalistic definition proposed by Sell (2011) for whom literature is merely what people, over long periods of time,
take to be literature. The definition of literature used in Deep Locational Criticism has the advantage of inclusiveness: it can cope with canonical literature, obscurities and popular literary genres alike. Alternatively, literature can be defined as whatever writing represents the vagaries of human experience (the notion of representation itself being highly problematic), or as some sort of combination of entertainment and edification. Literature is also any piece of writing qua writing, as opposed to writing as functional: something that is read for itself rather than for some other purpose.

Auerbach [1946]; Bradbury 1996; Brown 2003; Clark 2011; Malpas 1999; Saunders 2010; Sell 2000; Sell 2011; Sicher 1985; Taylor [1993].

lived body: the world as experienced through the senses. To be distinguished from the body as understood in metaphysics as the mortal, physical container of human existence, or in biology as the complete structure of a single organism. The human experience of spatiality, notably our perception of size and scale, and so our perception of place, must derive from our bodies; according to Casey (2001, 413), work on the geography of the individual gendered human body, frequently as developed from French feminism, stands against scientistic or reductionist views of place as straightforwardly and correctly knowable; in recent work including the non-representational theory of Thrift, the body is another term for “us”, or
“people”, alongside Heidegger’s “mortals” or the “subjects” of deconstructive and postcolonial literary criticism, one founded on a biological or anti-metaphysical metaphor.


loc-: words with a Latin etymology referring to situation, position, place. Cf. topo-. Considering the etymology of such words leads to a question: do the knowable and friendly, emotional, sense- and spirit-related views of place enter through Latin writing (thinking of the genius loci)?

local: relating to an area with approximately known limits that is being considered, or that one is more broadly conscious of. Compared with a district, a locality, the associated noun, is more often rural; in the study of history, attention to the history of a particular sub-nation locality, for instance a village or county; in geography locality is asserted by Massey as a means of introducing a bottom-up, politically radical way of understanding place rather than one based on rootedness; as an noun, a local is also a denizen, someone from around here or around there, with evaluative connotations usually attached; Malpas (2012, 150) suggests that their pull to the local makes place-led approaches inherently non-racist, but notions of the local can also be placed in opposition to cosmopolitanism. Corke 1993; Donaldson 2013b; Hoskins [1959]; Massey 1994.
locale: a *place* understood as somewhere both unique and structured. As generally used, one’s *surroundings*; as a synonym for *imaginative place*, the concept of locale is at the *centre* of Deep Locational Criticism; locale is knowable, if not completely, and therefore not likely to be very large in relation to the human *lived body*, either *rural* or *urban*; the *atmosphere* of somewhere that can be conveyed in a novel or a series of photographs could be described as locale, and so, in relation to fiction, locale is associated with *setting*.

Finch 2011; Massey 1994.

location: the general dimension or *world* in which any given *site* is *positioned*; in this book, a neutral, encompassing word for *place*, or position, for the answer to the question *where*?; also, in general use outside Deep Locational Criticism, a site itself or a set of coordinates, or an *imaginative place*, or the fact of someone or something being situated in such a position. Has broader coverage than *extension*; Malpas (e.g. 2012, 201) sometimes uses *location* for Cartesian abstract extension as opposed to Heideggerian *topos* or place and Agnew (1987), too, uses it for measurable *position* as opposed to experienced place. As the study of location, Deep Locational Criticism is related to but has emphases and characteristic practices different from those of *literary geography*, the term favoured by
Cooper and Gregory (2011), following Moretti (1997), or *geocriticism* (Westphal 2011), or spatial criticism or theory (applying critical social thinking to literary studies), or even literary *topography, topology*, place criticism (the terms used by Malpas, and of great interest here). The word *location* is already sometimes used in the titles of works of *geography* and *literary studies* concerned with place, and seems there to be selected for a neutral quality that it has.


**loco-reference**: indications in a text and its *surroundings* of an extra-textual *world*, of actual *places* capable of being investigated by means other than literary *criticism*. The loco-reference of a novel, for example George Orwell’s *Burmese Days*, includes the fact that the text says something about Burma under British rule, and that there is a *River Irawaddy* in reality and that Burma has a tropical climate. One component of the methodological *triad* used in Deep Locational Criticism. Cf. *intra-textual arrangements*; *physical experience*.

Orwell [1934].

**manywheres**: a consequence of the fact that *location*al dimensions different
from one another in both magnitude and order can be distinguished in a literary work, so illuminating both that work and the environment in which it came into being as well as the surroundings in which it has since been read. Works of literature classifiable as realism may have fewer manywheres than works written in other genres. See imaginative place; scale.

**map**: a plan of some location usually as seen from directly above, whether diagrammatic or accurate at a certain scale. The map has been used for centuries as a technology of power that is also one way of conceiving a city or country, from Elizabeth I, Queen of England, graphically represented standing on one in the Ditchley Portrait to the emergence of a map-like mode of thinking in the nineteenth century thanks to the increased availability of maps; now used more frequently than formerly in literary studies, for example by Franco Moretti. See cartography.

Anderson 1983; Barber 2012; Bradbury 1996; Cable 2013; Clout 1991; Cooper and Gregory 2011; Finch 2012b; Finch 2012c; Google Maps; Helgerson 1992; Ingold 2000; Moretti [1997]; Moretti 2005; Motco; Open Street Map; Ordnance Survey [1878]; Rocque [1746]; ShareMap; Streetmap.

**metropolis**: the chief city from a certain locational point of view; an
imaginative place in which many city characteristics—for instance cultural, financial and population concentrations—abound; the central, ruling hub of a country that also has colonies. In the latter meaning, to take the British example, equal to the whole of England, or southern England in relation to the British Empire. Also, a centre for some other sort of rule, for instance ecclesiastical.

Berman [1982]; Benjamin 1982; Dennis 2008a; Jameson [1990].

mimesis: In Aristotle and later aesthetic theories influenced by him, for example the neo-classicism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and arguably also the realism and naturalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, showing or imitation (Abrams 1953); literature and art understood as aiming at objectivity, the representation of whatever exists outside them. As such, a mimetic reading would seem to be the opposite of one in which a book contains an autonomous (subjective) world created by a writer; alternatively (Malpas 2012, 122-24), objectivity and subjectivity are interconnected “within the complex structure of spatiality” and not to be opposed; in mimetic readings the artistic creation is classically somehow secondary to what it represents. See original, realism.

Auerbach [1946]; Beaumont 2007; Malpas 2012; Morris 2003; Pavel 1986.

mobility: the quality of being in motion; potentiality for motion. Notions of
place in humanistic geography and related fields of study have sometimes been founded on stasis or rootedness, the assumption that to be in place is ideally to know one’s home environment and feel a sense of belonging there. Much recent work in human geography, for instance that of Cresswell, is concerned instead with mobility: taxi-drivers, travelling salesmen and nomads have a sense of place as good as that of farmers or rural clergy. Mobility in the definition of concepts is part of the Heideggerian view of the path of thought and detectable in numerous accounts of concepts as formed discursively. Identities and locational experiences, notably imaginative places, are forever in change, and the concept of mobility recognizes this.


modernity: in this book, the phase in which we now live, whenever that is considered to have started; the phase which begins with one or more of a group of phenomena including widespread and visible industrialization, urbanization, colonialization and the entry of a particular region into global or imperial economic relations. Much social-science thought involves an assertion of the primary importance of modern times, starting in most parts of the world somewhere between 1850 and 1950, in their character as ever-changing or globalized or driven by technology or all of these; thought of
the modern is often associated with the city and with a figure like the flâneur who moves through the modern city, playing with it. Modernity is associated by Simmel with over-stimulation, an intensification of the importance of money, and with the tendency to become blasé. Within the social sciences Bruno Latour and Nigel Thrift reject the concept of modernity outright, arguing that we perceive the world from within it and so exaggerate the specialness of our own era; cultural approaches emphasizing space often argue for the specialness of modernity, however.


motion: movement, whether fast or slow, jerky or smooth, on foot or by some other means conceived in technology. Future criticism concerned with location should typologize motion.


mountains: a feature of landscape associated with the sublime and the Gothic; emblematically or symbolically a high place, somewhere above, rarified, not on the plain (or plane) of everyday human struggle, and as such a sort of heterotopia. As Miller (1995, 7) points out, a major human imaginative place notion.
multiple unity: a conceptualization in which in which the totality of a location’s being and the uniqueness of its components have equal value. A principle of Deep Locational Criticism derived from Malpas’s reading (e.g. 2012, 88-89) of Heidegger and embodied by the fourfold. Also equiprimordiality). Cf. iridescence.

Malpas 2012.

nation: a group of people who share a genetic or racial heritage, a language, a culture or a land (homeland), or all of these; the animated abstraction which comes into being when this group acts together. In geopolitical terms, the most important place unit since about 1780 (in the terms of some, the era of modernity), although now being challenged by other forces in an era dominated by technology; see boundary. For Anderson and Hobsbawm, nations are imagined; for postmodern thinkers they are a linguistic-political construct; for others, nations are the most important reality on the world map and in the head, deriving from a sense of rootedness, and the membership of a group. The nation is associated with independence movements but also political extremism and even fascism, associations which critical thinkers sometimes seek to avoid by using instead different notions of group allegiance.
neighbourhood: an area of a town or city within which a resident might expect to recognize other residents and categorize them, as well as to spot outsiders. Frequently the object of attention in Chicago-school sociology of the mid-twentieth century, but also in sociolinguistics. See district; cf. local.

non-place: in the terminology of Marc Augé, specifically a man-made site with a quality of artificiality excluding the outside world, whose uniqueness or placement in a particular locale is not readily apparent to its users. Examples include airport departure lounges, casinos, motorways, hotels. Consequent upon the development of technology. Presented by Augé as characteristic of the period following industrial modernity. Relph’s humanistic geography of placelessness is in some ways a more generalized and more pessimistic view of allied historical phenomena, seeing the situation in the present as meaningless and unfulfilling compared to that of pre-modern pasts. To be distinguished from the un-surveyed, unknown and
so unplaced or pre-placed *wilderness* and *forest* of earlier periods. Compare *displacement*.


**non-representational theory**: an approach to the social sciences which instead of studying representations (including the artistic, or forms such as political systems), traces human social practices as activities of the *lived body*. Rejects biographical accounts of human *experience*. A helpful alternative to earlier, more socially or biologically deterministic accounts of what lies behind *individual* subjectivity.

Anderson and Harrison 2010; Thrift 2008.

**nostalgia**: a warm feeling about aspects of the past that have been lost, a desire to go *home*. Often thought of (especially in politically *critical* accounts) negatively as a kind of sentimental false-consciousness, a desire for the impossible that has regressive outcomes. By Heideggerians such as Malpas, nostalgia is defended, on the grounds that all investigation is a sort of return to roots. It can be detected in approaches to *place* which seem to long for a lost *rootedness* in place of the *mobility* of an era dominated by *technology*. Compare *problem of place*.

Malpas 2012, 161-77; Relph 1976; Relph 1981; Hoskins [1959]; Stow [1603].
**original**: drawing on notions of *mimesis*, the view that *places* in works of *literature* are modelled on, or represent or mirror places in the *world*. Characteristic of what Pavel (1986, 43) calls “an external approach to fiction”. Before 1950, dominant in *literary studies* accounts of *place*, reintroduced in a qualified way here and in, for instance, work on Beckett. The suggestion would be that real world place is prior to literary place.

Ackerley and Gontarski [2004]; Bradbury 1996; Cooper and Gregory 2011; Harper 1904; Matz 1921; Pavel 1986.

**particularity**: conceptualization stating that the unique attributes of every *place* matter as much as and confirm its occupancy of a *universe*, that universe getting its character from its composition out of numberless particular places. In Heideggerian approaches understood as a necessary circularity; Deep Locational Criticism takes its cue from studies which begin with the particular, but uses *scale* poetics to oscillate between this and the large-scale, rather than being only empirical or inductive. Literary-biographical scholarship and psychogeographic writing both exemplify fairly extreme particularity in their approaches to *literature* and *location*, and yet there is much of value in both. Typological linguistics as practiced by Steven C. Levinson is another example of a highly particularizing mode of research. Cf. *concrete; iridescence; multiple unity*. 
[Every analysis of a specific imaginative place confirms the importance of particularity to an understanding of human existence.]


path: a way through or across somewhere, for instance a forest or mountain, that makes it traversable; also, anyone’s thought or other work conceived as made up of stages on a journey through life. Important in Heideggerian thinking, in which it is opposed to abstraction and systematization; the metaphor “life as a journey” has been examined by Paul Werth; literary studies approaches alive to biography should maintain awareness of this concept.


periphery: an edge, a border, where one place stops and another starts, a limit. Often somewhere far from the centre or opposed to it in terms of power, somewhere exploited: a colony, a province, a county palatine; a slum or other undesirable urban district, or the hinterland of a city that is neither urban nor rural. Peripheries can be understood as the basis of the power exerted by or at the centre. Attention to peripheries is valuable in that it leads to an understanding of particularity and a topographic rather than
synoptic view of location.


photography: the practice or art of using a camera to capture and reproduce images of the world via the recording of light. Can capture atmospheres of place; accused by Heidegger of objectifying, or in other words of presenting an image that is untrustworthy because of its pretense to completeness or finality. See visual image.

Adams 2013; Browne 1976; Davies 2009; Finch 2006-12; Mayne 2013; Young 2000.

physical experience: the inclusion in investigations of location of personal appraisals of place achieved for example by visits to the site being studied. One component of the methodological triad used here. In a novel such as George Orwell’s Burmese Days, the evidence of place which could be gathered from both Orwell’s non-fictional writings (for example letters) about his time in Burma and those of contemporaries, taken together with the evidence of maps, photographs and, potentially, journeys to sites in Burma. See intra-textual arrangements; loco-reference.

Orwell [1934].

place: where we are and have been and could be; what we occupy, what we
see, what we can *map*. For Malpas (1999, 25), “place is inextricably bound up with notions of both dimensionality or *extension* and *locale* or environing situation”; here, the overarching term is *location* and *place* is reserved for the *individual* places which people can know through *experience* as part of *everyday life*.


**place and space**: the two dimensions of *location*. Their definitions and the distinction between them are controversial. Both words answer the question *where? Critical* thinkers typically see *space* as contested, a *place* as stable and hence perhaps conservative: roughly this is what practitioners of *spatialism* think, although Cresswell points out how close Lefebvre’s social space is to place. Casey argues that place, a living human relationship to *surroundings*, has historically been subordinated to space, a three-dimensional physical unit thought of as empty of content but measurable. A related shift or opposition can be seen in geographers, among whom to assert spatial science is to identify yourself as a physicalist, whereas to assert place is to identify yourself as *humanistic*; Malpas (2012, 152)
discusses how Heidegger, late in his career, reconceived space in place terms as a clearing in the woods where building and dwelling can begin. Casey 1997; Castree 2003; Cresswell 2004; Heidegger 1971a; Lefebvre [1974]; Malpas 2012; Robbins and Cheah 1998; Soja 1999; Thrift 1993; Tuan 1977.

placelessness: being nowhere, having no sense of place, not belonging where you are but only occupying it in a temporary or unemotional way. For humanistic thinkers, this consequence of technology is to be regretted; see non-place; often associated with globalization; also, a sense that a work of literature is without a place setting or that a writer has worked to eliminate locational aspects from his or her writing. Descartes [1641]; Relph 1976; Seaman and Sowers 2008.

plane: a flat, two-dimensional portion of space with no depth. Somewhere that is not place in so far as place is space experienced by humans; where Cartesian spatiality happens, a mathematical imagined no-place. Descartes [1641].

plain: an extensive, flat, area of land. Opposed to a mountain; somewhere people struggle; somewhere one can view from an elevated position and see rivers, cities and fields spread out there. As in Matthew Arnold’s poem
“Dover Beach”, The characteristic site of human settlement.
Arnold 1979, 253-6; Mann [1924].

**point**: on a map, a single *position*; on Malpas’s account, a *location* (as opposed to an *imaginative place* or *locale*), identified by coordinates and without inherent meaning. Sometimes characterized by *mobility*, as when a person or something else seen from above in *motion* is understood as a point. Compare a point of view or perspective, which is a figurative notion of where someone looks from.
Malpas 2012, 201.

**polycentricism**: a view of the human *world* as containing multiple *centres* of potentially equal importance for human existence irrespective of their relative magnitude or degree of *power*. Opposed to models of monocentricism, or *metropolis* and *periphery*: a topological way of understanding *place* that does not involve reduction to a vertical or monolithic structure of power.
Malpas 2012, 201.

**porosity**: of a *barrier* or *boundary*, the quality of being penetrable, of admitting substances *through* and perhaps therefore also of allowing transgression. A concept useful for relating one *place* to another but also for
helping understand any limit or periphery dividing different places; Compare Beckett on region in Molloy: where does one begin and another start?

position: a point without meaning, location as understood in a way abstracted from experience. An important anti-modernist argument is that since the Renaissance, place has been ousted by this. More broadly, a stance, or point whether literal or figurative, from which anything in particular is viewed. See compass point, extension, location, space.
Casey 1997; Malpas 2012, 102-11.

possible worlds: in literary studies, the notion that a writer of fiction does not via representation indicate a single universe known to writers and readers alike but instead tests what if? hypotheses. The concept is derived by Pavel (1986, 43-50) from modal semantics, with the term itself originated by Leibniz. Among literary theories of location, possible worlds approaches are likely to pay attention to science fiction and counterfactual writing, and try not to be bounded by mimesis, verisimilitude, or the autonomous worlds of post-Romantic aesthetics. The rich accounts of text given by possible world theorists are let down, by their failure to engage with the actual existence of non-textual location. Cf. geocriticism, mimesis;
realism.

Pavel 1986; Doložel 2010; Westphal [2007].

**power**: capability of acting, of altering **place**, and of controlling events and other **individuals**, groups or **countries**. This what stands behind the **critical** notions of place proposed by Foucault, Lefebvre and practitioners of **spatialism**; the capability of acting, of altering place; thematized in Shakespeare’s tragedies and **history** plays. Power matters to understandings of human existence, but should be balanced by notions such as that of **polycentricism**.


**practical concept**: philosophical view that concepts come from agreement, are understood already, and from the ability to act by mastering skill sets that results from existence within the **world** of a certain **technology**. Thus, for the reindeer-herders and boat-builders of northern Norway, **imaginative places** such as the **sea** and the **land** are actually different for one group from what they are for the other. Influenced by the later Wittgenstein. See **experience, pre-understanding**.

**pre-understanding:** Heideggerian concept outlined by Taylor (1993, 326-7) in which “one has an implicit understanding” of what *lies to hand* (not a body-based metaphor in this view but “a really existent agent in the *world*”), thanks to embodiment. This is an answer to the excesses of earlier philosophical debates over how we address basic existential tasks. Pre-understanding is known by the conscious subject in a way that e.g. digestion is not. See *body; experience; practical concept*.

Taylor [1993].

**problem of place:** the view that the concept of *place* is tainted by the supposed alliance between views of human locatedness which value *rootedness* and tradition, or extremist right-wing politics. Associated with *ecology*. In the extreme form expressed by Cheah and Robbins, place is attacked as a conservative, illusory concept, and even as a key component of fascism; see *dwelling, nostalgia*.

Cheah and Robbins 1998; Clark 2011; Malpas 2012, 137-57; Miller 1995; Wolin1993b.

**psychogeography:** the practice of using anti-rational literary and artistic techniques as a means of engaging with the *city*. In its post-1980s English form, psychogeography uses the human *experience of place* for a whimsical and associative sort of artistic effect, creating links across time, so that the
ragbag of phenomena visible on a seemingly unremarkable walk come to seem somehow (there is a mystical strand in it) connected and meaningful. Originated in 1950s French situationist thought, a descendent of surrealism and thus of modernism, in which the precise details of the real are used for defamiliarizing effect. The psychogeographer is typically a solitary, leisured individual, and as such a direct descendent of the flâneur. Tempting to dismiss as a media fad fetishizing the hobby experience of self-indulgent white males. Psychogeography nevertheless has great potential as a means of exploring the questionability of location when allied with academic disciplines (geography, history, literary studies, philosophy and sociology) practised rigorously. See sense; spirit.


questionability: of placed human existence, the fact of not being a complete or final understanding of anywhere visited or inhabited. To think of human beings as fundamentally in place is not “to presuppose a homogeneity of culture and identity” or “to exclude others”, but via the Heideggerian fourfold and the concept of multiple unity to think in terms of “complexity and indeterminacy” animated by interaction and interdependence. This is Malpas’s answer to the problem of place and foundational for this book. The consequence will be that a traditionally “deep” field such as philosophy
and a traditionally “surface” practice such as *geography* will need to learn from one another. See *iridescence*.

Malpas 2012, 151-54.

**realism**: in *art*, depicting the *real*; also, the belief that this can be done. The hypothesis of Watt ([1957]) links realism with *modernity*, and describes it as operating through the accumulation of detail and, via *verisimilitude*, the use of temporal and spatial markers matching those developed in the same *site* and era (seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe) for discussion of the *world* we inhabit outside of books; the seeming normality or natural status of realism is challenged by modernist artists, while in the era of postmodern thought it was condemned by some as an illusion operating deceptively in the service of a dominant ideology; reappraised since the 1990s as a variety of effects and techniques whose fabricated status is now well-known, or as one of a range of possible approaches at a writer’s disposal. Cf. *possible worlds*.


**reference**: indexicality, or textual means of indicating the outside *universe*, for example by means of *toponym* and delineations of proximity and distance. A term used in linguistic pragmatics and narratology. See *deixis*;
mimesis; realism.


region: a portion of mappable land either smaller than or larger than a country, typically larger than a district or neighbourhood; also and chiefly in plural, an area viewed as alien, unknown or hostile. Often identifiable by cultural, economic or landscape characteristics. By the Berkeley school of regional geographers under Carl O. Sauer, a region was understood as having its own personality (but to invoke scale poetics, this was within the specifics of a large-country context); on the porosity of its borders, see Beckett’s Molloy; examples of the regional novel (as an alternative to a focus on the nation or the world beyond that level) abounded in the period between the early nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; the locational writers Lefebvre and Heidegger were closely associated with their native regions of France and Germany respectively, which entered into their writing.

Cooper and Gregory 2011; Crang 1998; Entrikin 2008; Hardy [1878]; Lefebvre 2003; Malpas 2012, 149; Sharr 2006.

repeated returns: the practice, characteristic in Deep Locational Criticism, of going back to a given location at varying intervals of time, approaching it
via different routes, whether in terms of its actual geography or via different texts or media. In this way, a path towards the location or imaginative place is beaten out, but no complete or final view of the place is offered or desired. Malpas (1999, 194) traces the notion to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations within which, its author says, the “same or almost the same points were always being approached afresh from different directions, and new sketches made”. Models for the practice exist in the writing of local history and autobiographical writing.

Corke 1993; Malpas 1999; Perec 1999, 212-21; Saunders 2010; Steinbeck 1962; Wittgenstein [1958].

representation: standing for; presenting; showing again; also, as in postcolonial theory, an image or construction of some other, however accurate or inaccurate. Whether art, including literature, is capable of this is a major crux; the argument here is that among other functions, it does this, and that any example of this is also the construction of something new, which itself then enters the world; for Malpas (2012, 85), life is action “in relation to an encompassing environment or locale”; to be alive is to have a conception (which is a representation) of one’s life. The social theory of Thrift pursues alternatives to representation, in performance and bodily practice. See mimesis; realism.

Anderson and Harrison 2010; Malpas 2012; Newland 2008; Said 1978;
Thrift 2008.

river: fresh water in motion from a spring to the sea, a key resource for drinking and washing for humans and animals and therefore a focus of settlement. Its downward flow has made it a key source of place symbol ever since Heraclitus; appears on Miller’s list of key examples of imaginative place; for Heidegger, a bridge can gather the two sides of a river into a multiple unity, making from them a single yet complex place, as exemplified by cities built around rivers; can also be a symbolic boundary as when Caesar crossed the Rubicon in initiating the Civil War that brought the Roman Republic to an end, or in the function of the Mississippi as gateway to the American West (as well as the artery connecting US South and North); in the literature of southern England from Spenser to T.S. Eliot via Austen and Meredith (indicating its key characteristic of variety), an imaginative place associated with louche leisure.

Finch 2011, 278-80; Heidegger 1971a; Miller 1995; Twain [1884].

road: a path broad and regular enough to be traversed by vehicles, classically connecting two points, notably two cities. Bakhtin discusses the chronotope of the road; appears on Miller’s list of key examples of imaginative place; widely thematized in literature and art from the picaresque novel to the road movie. See route.
room: a unit of indoor space, arguably the smallest experiential one, divided from others by walls and doors. Can (as in Beckett and Perec) resemble a little world, or (as in Forster) stand for constraint, or social norms; the universe as conceived in the literary terms of the comedy of manners as opposed to the Romantic poem; in terms of scale the room is quite near the bottom, the site in which we most frequently are whilst reading and writing. Beckett [1938]; Forster [1908]; Perec [1974].

rootedness: (on the metaphor of a plant with roots in the earth) being fixed in place. Alternatively seen as positive (by those who argue that human existence is best when slow to change and conducted in a rural setting; one side of Heidegger and much humanistic geography takes this stance) or negative (by those who seek a critical approach to the politics of space, often focusing on events in the city). Compare dwelling. Heidegger [1934]; Miller 1995, 55; Wright 2008.

route: a connection, the way from somewhere to somewhere else. The pursuit of connections rather than the division into binary oppositions is central to this book, indicating the importance of this notion to it; an important complex exists under this overarching headword, containing path;
lane; road; street; highway and other such notions; traverses local limits.

Google Maps; Malpas 2012, 73-95.

ruin: a decayed or damaged structure originally built by humans. Evidence of the human past; sometimes considered picturesque, sometimes a memento mori; conceptually allied with rootedness, driven by nostalgia; the past in the present, in contrast with the views of the past taken in the disciplines of history (the past reconstructed as itself) and archaeology (the past as layers in a single place).
Jackson 1980; Orlando [2004].

rural: (of regions or districts) not urban; devoted to agriculture. Writing which focuses on the rural most often covers change in it, or its decline and disappearance; as imaginative place often thought of as unchanging in contrast with the city; opposed to the city although the border between the two (an important imaginative pairing) is more characterised by porosity and shifting limits than sometimes thought; mid-point between the city and the wilderness; in Heideggerian thinking a man-made clearing in the forest.
Hardy [1878]; Lefebvre [1953]; Williams 1973.

scale: the degree of magnitude at which some location or thing is seen,
whether close-up, from far off, or at infinite possible gradations in between. Returning to \textit{place} for Malpas (2006, 310) involves “allowing things to be what they are, in their closeness as well as their distance”. A poetics of scale could be introduced into \textit{literary studies} a poetics of scale. A view of a place at any scale is as truthful as any other; in this light, stereotyping can be understood as worthwhile because it is the only way we have to make an early approach to something; scale \textit{relates} pairings—\textit{space} and \textit{place}, big and small, \textit{centre} and \textit{periphery}—rather than dichotomizing them (still too frequently done in discussions of the relations between concepts like \textit{globalization, local} and \textit{nation}); the action of Deep Locational Criticism can be understood as that of \textit{zooming} in and out, on the analogy with the view from an aeroplane or the use of online \textit{mapping} applications. See \textit{technology, world}.

Clark 2011, 130-40; Google Maps; Malpas 2006; Open Street Map; Smith 2000.

\textbf{scene}: a \textit{site} known through \textit{experience} or remembered, conceived of as somewhere viewed; alternatively, in a work of fiction, where the scene is set, the setting; also, a division of a play (or a work in prose) with a different \textit{place} setting from those before and after it. A term used by E.M. Forster in a 1961 interview when asked about the place aspect of his fiction. Cf. \textit{locale}; \textit{site}; \textit{landscape}. 
sea: as an imaginative place, the expanses of salt water that cover most of the surface of the earth. Somewhere primeval, primordial; a world in itself; somewhere that must be navigated using available technology in pursuit of human mastery of the earth; somewhere that cannot be mastered; a watery graveyard; the opposite of the land; an other world, with the capsule of the ship forming the model for the spaceship of science fiction as part of the voyage narrative; the home territory of the figure of the sailor; in the world between 1600 and 1950, the key site of connection between continents.

Cohen 2010; Conrad 1957; Dickens [1848]; Melville [1888]; Morrison [1902].

sense: an atmosphere, a feel of what some location is like; the shifting, unique surface quality of somewhere. Notions of the genius loci or spirit of place are more intense versions of this; related to the notion that each place is unique—the notion of singularity—but also to the idea that a place is something that exists in the mind of an individual; perhaps underrated or not grasped by workers in geography. Empirical study is founded on the trustworthiness of sensory perception. Thinking of acts of sensing thus brings us close to work emphasizing the body and senses other than the visual. See iridescence; questionability.
setting: where, in terms of time and location, a work of literature (or opera, film, etc.) is positioned. A historical novel is by definition set earlier than the time in which its first readers live; one of the main building blocks of literary analysis. Understood in creative writing courses as an essential component of fiction. Almost all works of narrative have some setting; indeed, narrative seems impossible without it and works like Beckett’s which seem without setting can be revealed to have one concealed in them. Compare the chronotope first proposed by Bakhtin, a particular type of conjunction of time and space characteristic of a particular linguistic or artistic genre.


shore: an edge; where the sea stops and the land starts (or vice versa); a border but not a boundary; like the sides of a river, a place where human culture naturally gathers. For poets such as Arnold and D.G. Rossetti ("The Sea-Limits"), being next to the sea brings people into contact with expanses of time, connects them to the distant past.


site: in Deep Locational Criticism, the unmarked term for any given
sociology: academic study in which the human group, as opposed to the individual, is an actor. Ranges from the participant-observer empirical end (e.g. of the Chicago school) to the more conceptual, critical and postmodern (in Bourdieu and Lefebvre, and more recently British non-representational theory). At the heart is usually the testing of models, so that the particular combination of phenomena to be found at one site has meaning only in relation to a conceived whole (a radical difference from work in history, which privileges the particular over the general). Sociological approaches to place have much in common with those produced in sociolinguistics, anthropology and human geography.


space: Has been understood in two key and quite opposed ways: (a) as a
three-dimensional emptiness; alternatively (as in the ‘spatial turn’ taken in
cultural studies and the social sciences in recent decades) (b) location
conceived as mobile, constructed and contested. View (a), frequently
associated with Descartes, sees space as location before or without human
involvement, afterwards available for measurement (Malpas 2012, 108).
Accepting view (a), Casey (2001, 404) argues that the history of Western
philosophy is that of the wrong-headed denigration of place (understood by
him as space filtered through human experience) and the elevation of
space’s “most encompassing reality”. In his history of space, Lefebvre
([1974], 45) labels view (a) “absolute space”. Key shifts towards view (b)
include Lefebvre’s polemical advocacy of “social space” over time, which
was earlier judged far more important in Marxist thinking, and Certeau
([1980], 117), for whom space is characterized by “intersections”,
“velocities” and “time variables” rather than stasis. In the light of work such
as that of Lefebvre, Certeau and Foucault, Malpas asserts the spatial in
Heidegger over the temporal whereas Lefebvre ([1974], 121) had earlier
accepted the then orthodox claim that for Heidegger “time counts for more
than space”. The description Lefebvre [1974], 45) offers of improvisatory
spaces makes them resemble highly humanized places, the arrangement of
components gathered in Heidegger’s fourfold, and this contributes to the
argument advanced here that opposing space and place is not at present
helpful. See also place and space, spatialism.
spatialism: the advocacy of a politically-focused critical approach to location. In it, space is understood as a human or socio-cultural construction, something produced (in Lefebvre’s terms) or manipulated; see geocriticism.

Harvey 2003; Newland 2008; Snaith and Whitworth 2007; Soja 1999; Tally 2013; Thacker 2003; Westphal [2007].

spirit: non-material personality held in some approaches to cling to a place. The mystical concept of the genius loci, the presiding god or spirit, exemplifies the idea of spirits of place. A spirit can have a ghostlike quality. Ackroyd’s view of London and in general psychogeography are postmodern urban branches of thinking about places which are founded on enduring or hidden aspects of them. Such a perspective traces its lineage from Greek and Roman literature through the Renaissance and Romanticism with, in Britain, a surge in the late Victorian and Edwardian period; the idea that certain writers are writers of place who are specially attuned to it belongs here; see sense.
stasis: being still, not moving. In so far as place is about one somewhere it is associated with stasis, and placelessness (or space) with mobility or motion; in human geography, Massey’s approach to place and Cresswell’s related account expand place beyond rootedness and stasis to include movement.

Cresswell 2004; Cresswell 2006; Heidegger [1934]; Massey 1994, 115-76.

street: a route in the city, typically flanked by buildings, but also a site to exist in, an outdoor living-room. Especially in the most crowded cities, aspects of urban public life are concentrated here, such as pubs, corner shops and al fresco entertainments. The street is often associated with walkability and terraced housing or tenements; key lexical collocations associated with it include “street life” and “street walking”, indicating how the street contains multiplicity and a certain democracy or egalitarianism, a classically urban variety, vice (in the figures of the streetwalker and outdoor urban drug-dealer), and danger (which can be that of emptiness, when the bustle vanishes). A place of popular rebellion and disorder.

Jacobs 1961; Morrison [1894]; Open Street Map; Simon 2012; Streetmap.co.uk; Suttles 1968; Whyte [1943]; Wise 2008.
suburb: since the nineteenth century, a residential area of a city that is beyond a shortish walking distance from the city centre; in earlier uses areas of building that adjoin a city but are beyond its formal boundary. A branch of the urban rather than an intermediary between that and the rural; the related adjective suburban shifts from an innuendo-laden usage in early modern England, making reference to the brothels and taverns for which such zones were then known (see Middleton and Dekker [1611]), to indicate from the nineteenth century onwards a small-minded attempt to retreat from the diversity and perceived dangers of the urban, both uses being pejorative.

As a physical environment suburbs are highly variable, their shape and extent dependent on the mode of transport used to connect with the city and to form internal interconnections (suburbs built with cars in mind tending to be more of a spread-out grid; streetcar and railway suburbs developing in linear fashion with foci around stations).

Dennis 2008a; Finch 2011, 70-121; Middleton and Dekker [1611]; Silverstone 1997; Stow [1603]; Thompson 1974; Thompson 1982; Thompson 1988.

surroundings: the environment in which an individual or group exists, whether or not perceptible within the sphere of the lived body; also, merely what is around somewhere, its neighbourhood, what is near to it whether
alike or not. Frequently as something from which an individual or place is distinguished, as in E.M. Forster’s *Where Angels Fear to Tread*, Chapter 6: “she gradually got to feel that we must rescue the poor baby from its terrible surroundings”.

Forster [1905].

**synoptic**: characteristic of approaches to *imaginative place* in which places are understood as symbolic or imaginary unities, as opposed to *multiple unities*. Instead, *location* is here understood as characterized instead by its *topography* or variety, yet as the principle of multiple unity makes clear, synoptic views of location are realities, since people have formed them. Potentially, *place* could not be understood at all synoptically, this is to say, but in reality it is sometimes but by no means always understood this way. Understandings of this sort include views of the *world* as fundamentally divided into *nations* or according to *barriers* such as “East” versus “West”, as well as understandings of particular cities or epochs which reduce them to a few, supposedly representative or central, of their multiple actual characteristics. As Certeau and Mirzoeff have pointed out, a view from above which attempts to see somewhere as a whole is a view which exerts power over that somewhere, which makes an effort to control it. Postcolonial or ideological accounts of views of location (here labelled *critical*) are often in fact critiques of synoptic thinking, but can fall into the
trap of assuming that all conceptions of location are synoptic or work by summary and exclusion.


**technology**: systems developed by human beings to facilitate, speed up or regularize activities or to make connections between *individuals*, which do not require the user of a given system (e.g. a car, a telephone) to understand how it functions. By Heidegger, critiqued as the dominant component of *modernity*. In establishing a poetics of *scale* with the help of computerised applications, technology is a helper for Deep Locational Criticism; the Heideggerian account tends to be anti-technological, or at least opposed to its dominance as a mode of thinking; its impact in the past, for example in the advent of railways or the car, can be traced; every source on the list of references for this book employs technology of one sort or another.


**thing**: whatever is not alive and can be apprehended as one, apart from others. Central to approaches which claim a non-*positivist* sort of
materiality; for Heidegger, a thing can be a “mere thing”, but the thingness of something, for instance a jug, can best be seen in use, as when a jug is filled with wine which is poured out for a guest; things are the *concrete* and distinguishable items which can be seen in a *landscape*, according to Casey (2001, 418).


topo-: prefix of words with meanings related to *location*. They have a Greek etymology, with *topos* usually translated as place in its most neutral definition as situation or position. See *loc-*. Compar *chora*.

topography: a way of talking about a *place* which involves moving through the place as you talk, which follows the spatial layout of that place met in human sensory *experience* at ground level rather than from above or in plan view; also, a foregrounding of *location* in *literary studies* or philosophy; thirdly, a *cartography* of the *earth* indicating the relief of the *land*. A topographic approach to *imaginative places* breaks them down into their actual shapes and particularities, rather than uniting them into a single *synoptic* vision such as the *nation* as imagined community of Anderson (1983) or the “*urban* imaginary” of Huyssen (2008).

Anderson 1983; Finch 2011; Huyssen 2008; Malpas 1999; Miller 1995;
topology: mathematical account of position; also, the portion of
Heidegger’s thinking that is not transcendental. In the latter sense, topology
is made into a complete, place-led interpretation of Heidegger by Malpas.
Malpas 2006; Malpas 2012.

toponym: place name, usually in English one that is capitalized as a proper
noun. Miller (1995, Introduction) thinks that the names that we give to
places are an integral part of what he calls their topography, or in other
words that we cannot think the place without thinking the name. In writing,
toponymy can be the anchor for verisimilitude since it makes the textual or
imaginary (made-up), as opposed to imaginative (conceived) place appear to
“be” the place that can physically be a place that can be visited (as such, it
can be understood as a part of the cultural code of texts, in the terms of
Barthes), the “same” place where a reader’s car broke down once or where
her uncle used to live, simply because a novelist says that the setting is
Birmingham or someone went to serve in Ireland.
Barthes [1970]; Cooper and Gregory 2011; Finch 2012b; Gatrell 1999; Matz
[1921]; Miller 1995; Papadimitriou 2012.

topos: Greek word often translated as place. Used as the basis for other
words relating to location; for Malpas (2012, 13), Heidegger’s thinking is topological in that it is of place, concerned with place, has place as an object, but also “emerges out of” and “returns to” topos, and as such is a thinking that rejects “any form of reductionism”. Cf. chora; loc-; topo-.

**triad**: theoretical or methodological figure composed of three units. Potentially less absolute and more capable of opening up, instead of closing down, analysis than the figure composed of two, the dyad or binary. In the study of space, Lefebvre’s triad including perceived, conceived and lived space is well-known, and has in part inspired the methodological triad used in this book, which involves awareness of intra-textual arrangements, loco-reference and physical experience in anatomizing an imaginative place. Compare the fourfold of Heidegger.
Lefebvre [1974].

**universe**: the assumed everywhere that underpins all thinking of location. The Heideggerian fourfold is an interpretation of the universe; Beckett’s writings often explore the relationship between being bounded as an individual and the totality of space. Cf. world.
Beckett [1938]; Heidegger 1971, 145-61; Perec [1974]
**urban**: built-up, not **rural** as in either agricultural or **wilderness** land. Compare **city**: there are less implications of a centre in the word **urban** than in the word **city**.  
Dyos [1966]; Huysen 2008; Jenks 2008; Leita and Leita 2013; Mayne and Murray 2001; Newland 2008; Relph 1987; Soja 1996

**verisimilitude**: an effect brought about in a piece of writing by the accumulation of details, to imply that the contents of this text match those of the **world** in which readers live. A device characteristic of **realism**. According to Miller (1995, 6), the most obvious answer to the question “What is the function of **landscape** or **cityscape** description in novels and poems?”; describing and naming landscape and cityscape anchors the literary work to specifics that readers recognize and are therefore able to process; compare the use of alternate or **possible worlds**.  
Doležel 2010; Miller 1995; Watt [1957]; Westphal [2007].

**visual image**: human-made **representation** of how some **location** looks to the human eye, whether from **ground**-level or from above. The use of drawings, **photography** and other visual representations (see **cartography**, **map**), themselves critiqued, is key here. Geographers and—even more fundamentally—archaeologists, topographers and architectural writers frequently incorporate visual images alongside text, something literary
scholars have also attempted, though the use of images is a more recent arrival in literary studies than in the other disciplines mentioned here. Browne 1976; Davies 2009; Dennis 2008; Emery and Wooldridge 2011; Gohlka and Gottfried 2010; Mayne 2013; Mirzoeff 2011; Papadimitriou 2013; Sharr 2006; Temple 2008a; Temple 2008b.

wilderness: the planet Earth or world imagined in a pristine, pre-human state. An imaginative place which is revealed via human acts of clearing. By making space for civilization which is ruled by humans, we become aware of the other of such space. See rural, city, porosity, limit, environment, forest.


world: where we all live, the globe, planet Earth. Also, any given totality; for Heidegger, something coherent formed subjectively by humans (where earth is something alien to humans, and something detotalizing). A famous notion of Giordano Bruno’s is that there is an infinite number of possible worlds; science fiction writers deal in other worlds, but also other possible alternate reality views of our own world;

zooming: the act of relating different levels of *place* magnitude rather than dichotomizing them, by moving between smaller- and larger-*scale* views of a certain *location*. Writers on location from both human *geography* and branches of *literary studies* orientated around the *environment* tend instead to dichotomise the different levels of magnitude, to construct oppositions between them. Zooming, a characteristic practice of Deep Locational Criticism, instead makes the levels of locational magnitude infinitely multiple. See *scale*.

Clark 2011, 130-40; Google Maps; Open Street Map; Tuan 2001.
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